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KEI Blog : The Peninsula

South Korea's Continuing Turmoil: A Timeline

February 4, 2025
Contributors (last name alphabetical): Je Heon (James) Kim, Joo Young Kim This timeline is the third part of a series that covers major events in the aftermath of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s…

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US Public Opinion on Hallyu and Implications for Korean Soft Power

Je Heon (James) Kim
February 4, 2025
An analysis of US public opinion suggests that the recent rise of Hallyu should be taken seriously due to its impact on attitudes about Korea.

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What Happened: Q4 2024

Nils Wollesen Osterberg
January 31, 2025
During a time of political change in both the United States and South Korea, new investments, partnerships, and diplomatic dialogues continued to strengthen the economic and technological partnership between the two nations.

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Articles
Mitigating the New Politics of Zero-Sum

January 30

Major political developments at the end of 2024 have ushered in new unpredictability in the US-South Korea relationship for 2025. First came the re-election of Donald Trump in the United States, followed by dramatic events in South Korea that are still evolving after President Yoon Suk Yeol’s short-lived declaration of martial law. Deep political division is a powerful undercurrent contributing to both these developments, the aftermath of which will play out in unique and uncertain ways in each country over the course of 2025. Politics is a perpetual contact sport. There are winners and losers, after all. The depth of political polarization in both countries, however, has brought out a tendency in political leaders and their challengers to increasingly frame and pursue political choices in starkly binary, zero-sum terms. Sustained high levels of polarization, in turn, render increasingly impossible the political tolerance that is necessary for the kinds of compromises that modern-day liberalism and pluralism rely upon—those that pay more heed to acknowledging and striking some balance among interests, rules, and rights. What feels more unfamiliar and concerning about today’s new “politics as usual” emanates when each “side” in a deeply divided political system pursues starkly iconoclastic goals not just to achieve their political priorities in traditional ways but also to delegitimize or tear down what a sizable portion of the population on the “other side” still values and finds important. When this happens, politics moves beyond a series of compromises that evolve over time amid a competitive marketplace of ideas and interests into something else altogether: a zero-sum contest where “winning” becomes not just achieving new political priorities but also an act of overturning the other side’s past accomplishments and denying acknowledgment of their policy priorities. One external manifestation of the rise of zero-sum beliefs in US politics is a fundamental shift away from traditional US support for the postwar liberal economic order—and nowhere more so than in international trade. This is the system that Washington meticulously forged, invested in, and championed following the end of World War II. At the center of this approach was the belief that the United States’ longer-term interests are best served through a series of international commitments that enable all its members to reap the benefit of mutually beneficial growth that can come from adhering to rules-based trade. Maintaining the system often proved messy and difficult amid conflict, cheating, and other challenges. Trade, moreover, can be more zero- than positive-sum at times, an angle that China well understands and often pursues. Inertia also has crept into the system, preventing new compromises among nations that had proven necessary to keep the trading system relevant and responsive to evolving needs and changes. Rather than invest further in trying to take on these challenges collectively, as it has in the past, the United States instead has effectively abandoned much of its historic leadership role in this area and proceeded to progressively untether itself from many of the obligations it long insisted upon but now no longer finds prudent. Even as the United States remains the world’s second-largest exporter, Washington’s nearly 75-year commitment to promoting open, rules-based trade has come to be viewed in the political mainstream of both political parties in increasingly zero-sum terms. Simply put, it has resulted in the view that trade is a greater source of harm than opportunity for the United States. With this dramatic shift in view, the bipartisan political consensus that long upheld the US commitment to the system has faded into the background. As the United States continues pushing away, it has offered no consistent vision for what kind of system it might prefer instead. The fundamental principles of non-discrimination, transparency, and due process that the United States long insisted on being reflected in international trade rules routinely reflected its own practices and principles. Once US political polarization became so deep and results in chronic discord and gridlock over what the rules should be within its own borders, it no longer became able to consistently advocate abroad for these old rules, much less agree on and advocate for new ones. These deep domestic disagreements are a principal reason the United States failed to follow through on the Barack Obama administration’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, championed as a “high standard” model for trade. It is also why, nearly a decade later, history appears ready to repeat itself should the Trump administration follow through, as widely expected, to terminate further support for the Joe Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Meanwhile, firms that attempted to adjust to the United States’ discriminatory new rules for subsidies and other incentives enacted under the Biden administration-supported Inflation Reduction Act, whether by moving large production lines across national borders or re-configuring products and supply chains, may suddenly find these incentives terminated or further curtailed. If these predictions hold, these efforts and programs—just as some launched by the first Trump administration were then spurned by the Biden administration—will have fallen victim to the new reality of zero-sum-driven politics across differing US administrations. US political polarization and the ensuing decisions will assuredly further impact its trading partners in these or similar ways into 2025 and beyond, including security allies like South Korea. Political choices made in Seoul’s own turbulent political marketplace, from trade to industrial and other economic policies, amid its shifting politics and priorities will also be closely watched and assessed for their impacts on the United States. Those of us in government in early 2017, who witnessed in stark terms the challenges that rapid and dramatic shifts in political power and expectations in both nations wrought on traditional approaches and assumptions, cannot help but see parallels as 2025 begins. Political change is once again sharp and dramatic, giving rise to new uncertainties and risks, such as the potential for miscues, amid certain new expectations and priorities. It is safe to say that in 2025, as it was in 2017, simple reliance on the depth and breadth of the common interests shared between the United States and South Korea will prove insufficient in the face of new expectations that prioritize changing the status quo. This time around, a more proactive approach that takes these new domestic political realities into account is necessary. To transcend zero-sum worldviews, a more productive start would include a readiness on both sides to clearly express and acknowledge the other’s priorities and concerns up-front, a readiness to be more flexible about the ways each could adequately accommodate the other’s core concerns, and a consistent readiness to prioritize the potential for compromise wherever possible and necessary. As the United States and South Korea redefine and vigorously safeguard their essential interests, effective problem-solving will require going beyond conventional thinking and boundaries to include other possibilities across all facets of the US-South Korea relationship. The difficult project for 2025 is to imagine what could be added to, instead of taken away from, this important relationship to respond to legitimate concerns in ways that also help begin to tamp down on the zero-sum-driven assumptions and impulses that have emerged as the familiar face of today’s political polarization in each nation.   Michael Beeman served as a senior trade official at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for over 16 years, most recently as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea and APEC from 2017-20 during which he led the renegotiation of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. From 2023-24, he was a Visiting Scholar and Lecturer at Stanford University. He received his DPhil in Politics from the University of Oxford in 1998 and is the author of Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Stanford, 2024). The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

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KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

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Implications of the US Treasury’s Designation of Currency Manipulation for South Korea

January 24

The last thing South Korean monetary officials need to hear about is the US Department of the Treasury’s recent addition of South Korea to its currency monitoring lists. The timing could hardly be worse, as it was made in November prior to the drastic drop in the value of the won, partly driven by various factors such as South Korea’s domestic political uncertainty. On January 16, the Bank of Korea decided to hold the interest rate steady at 3 percent, likely due to concerns over the effectiveness of previous rate cuts and the need to stabilize the won, which had hit a 15-year low against the US dollar. The recently announced America First Trade Policy explicitly addresses the issue of reducing the United States’ current account deficit and directs the Secretary of Commerce to investigate the causes of this deficit in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Trade Representative. Section 2(e) also reaffirms the Treasury’s authority to review and assess foreign exchange policies and take action if deemed “currency manipulation.” Although it does not explicitly list specific countries, these policies will affect countries with significant trade imbalances with the United States or those accused of intentionally devaluing their currencies to gain a trade advantage, such as China, the European Union, Mexico, Canada, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, and South Korea. In light of these circumstances, the South Korean government and the country’s businesses will need to be agile in dealing with these external challenges that could emerge. While the gravest challenge facing many countries under Trump 2.0 is his administration’s potential tariff policy, there is also a risk involving volatile exchange rates. Trump’s policies—including increased tariffs, tax cuts, and a focus on America-First policies—are expected to strengthen an already strong US dollar by lowering its current account deficit and bringing in more foreign investment. While a stronger dollar will benefit some South Korean exporters, the broader implications for the South Korean economy are concerning. Interest rates, for example, will likely have to remain high to ward off inflation caused by the weak won, especially in imported energy and food prices. In addition, Korea’s typically highly leveraged companies that have taken on a lot of US-dollar-denominated debt will find it harder to repay. On the other hand, policies that induce more US investment in now cheap Korean assets could stimulate needed investment and growth inside South Korea. South Korea’s recent return to the US Treasury’s currency monitoring list, announced on November 14, 2024, presents a layer of complexity for policymakers. The timing of South Korea’s designation—at the end of the Joe Biden administration’s term—marks a reversal of progress in addressing US concerns about its currency practices, even as the won has generally weakened over the past several years. The recent designation stemmed from the fact that South Korea satisfied two of the three criteria for currency manipulation: a trade surplus with the United States of at least 15 billion USD and a global account surplus above 3 percent of GDP. The third criterion—one-way net foreign exchange purchases—was not found in Korea, although it reported net foreign exchange sales of 9 billion USD, which is approximately 0.5 percent of GDP, over the four quarters ending in June 2024. The Treasury expressed concerns over Korea’s foreign exchange sales, cautioning that such interventions should only occur in exceptional circumstances of market instability. Legal Bases for Treasury’s Currency Manipulator Designation The US Treasury has the legal authority to designate a country as a currency manipulator under two key statutes: Section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988 Act) and Section 701 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (2015 Act). While both acts outline similar criteria, they differ in their legal implications. In other words, the Treasury can determine that a country satisfies the criteria under one act without necessarily meeting the standards of the other. The 1988 Act grants the president the authority to engage in negotiations with major trading partners to achieve fair and balanced trade and financial relationships. Under Section 3004, the Treasury is directed to assess whether a country manipulates its exchange rate to prevent balance-of-payments adjustments or gain an unfair competitive advantage in international trade. If a country meets these criteria, the Treasury must initiate negotiations—either through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or bilaterally—to ensure that the country adjusts its exchange rate policies to eliminate unfair advantages. The 2015 Act builds upon these provisions by requiring the Treasury to monitor the macroeconomic and currency policies of major trading partners. The act outlines three specific criteria for identifying unfair currency practices: (1) a significant bilateral trade surplus with the United States exceeding 15 billion USD over 12 months, (2) a material current account surplus exceeding 3 percent of GDP during the same timeframe, and (3) persistent and one-sided foreign exchange market intervention via net purchases of foreign currency exceeding 2 percent of GDP over the same timeframe. If a country satisfies all three criteria, the Treasury is authorized to initiate negotiations. Should the country fail to adopt appropriate policies within one year, the president may impose remedial actions, such as: prohibiting the Overseas Private Investment Corporation from approving new projects in the country; prohibiting federal procurement of goods or services from the country; directing the US Trade Representative to take the currency manipulation into account when negotiating bilateral or regional trade agreements; or requesting increased IMF oversight of the country’s macroeconomic and exchange rate policies. Implications of South Korea’s Inclusion in the Monitoring List The US Treasury has monitored South Korea’s exchange rate policy primarily through its semiannual reports to Congress since 1988. Shortly after the 1988 Act, South Korea was labeled a currency manipulator due to a significant increase in current account surpluses. This designation lasted until the Treasury and ROK Ministry of Economy and Finance established “Financial Policy Talks,” and Korea adopted the market average rate system in March 1990, removing it from the list the following month. Despite this, the Treasury criticized Korea’s pervasive capital controls for limiting currency fluctuations in the market, while South Korea maintained that these measures were necessary to stabilize the economy and manage volatile exchange rates. In 2015, the Treasury expanded its oversight by introducing the “monitoring lists” of currency manipulation, adding South Korea alongside China, Japan, and Germany. Korea remained on the list until November 2023, when it no longer met the criteria. Specifically, South Korea only met one of the three criteria for two consecutive reports in November 2023 and June 2024: having a trade surplus with the United States over 15 billion USD. However, in its November 2024 report, the US Treasury reinstated South Korea on the monitoring list because it met two of the three criteria outlined in the 2015 Act. China, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, and Germany were also added to the list. The report highlighted that South Korea’s current account surplus expanded significantly over the four quarters ending in June 2024, reaching 3.7 percent of GDP—a sharp increase from 0.2 percent of GDP for the same period in the previous year. This was primarily due to an increase in Korea’s goods surplus, driven by strong external demand for its technology-related products. South Korea’s trade surplus with the United States grew to 50 billion USD, up from 38 billion USD the previous year. China’s designation as a currency manipulator in August 2019 provides valuable lessons for understanding the potential implications of such a designation. The US Treasury labeled China a manipulator after the yuan weakened below 7 RMB per 1 USD following the Trump administration’s imposition of additional tariffs on Chinese imports. Shortly after the Phase One trade agreement was signed in January 2020, the Treasury removed China from the list, acknowledging its efforts to stabilize the yuan and address currency-related concerns. The incident underscores the use of currency designations as a negotiating tool in broader trade disputes. In addition to China, Vietnam was also designated a currency manipulator in December 2020. Following the Treasury’s designation, the US Department of Commerce took unprecedented action by initiating a countervailing duty (CVD) investigation in June 2020. This marked the first CVD case where currency undervaluation was treated as a form of subsidy. Although the United States and Vietnam reached an agreement in July 2021 to address the Treasury’s concerns and avoid further escalation, it did not affect the Commerce Department’s final decision to impose company-specific CVD on certain Vietnamese exporters, which ranged from 6.23 percent to 7.89 percent. South Korea has maintained that any interventions in exchange markets are intended to reduce market volatility rather than gain trade advantages. Although the risk of being designated a currency manipulator remains low for South Korea, the symbolic ramifications are still significant. The Trump administration will prioritize addressing trade imbalances and perceived unfair trade practices, potentially revisiting currency manipulation as a central issue in the relations with trade partners. To mitigate these risks, South Korea must strike a balance between supporting economic growth through strategic monetary policies, adjusting interest rates by considering multiple factors such as inflation and economic growth rates, and avoiding actions that could be perceived as currency manipulation, which could invite greater scrutiny by the Treasury and potential retaliatory actions. Navigating this complex landscape will require careful coordination of policies to ensure both economic stability and harmonious US-South Korea relations.   Hyerim Kim is Lecturer at Seoul National University's Graduate School of International Studies and former Deputy Director at ROK Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. The views expressed here are the author’s alone. Photo from Shutterstock. KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
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Protectionism With Opportunities for US-South Korea Trade Under Trump 2.0

January 22

The economic relationship between the United States and South Korea is stronger than ever, but President Donald Trump’s promises of higher US tariffs pose risks to the relationship. In 2023, trade between the two countries in goods and services was valued at 256 billion USD, and South Korea became one of the largest sources of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States. However, the relationship is vulnerable to protectionist shifts in US policies. The South Korean response to these risks will ultimately shape the future bilateral economic relationship. As protectionist US trade policies will likely distort current trade patterns, a well-positioned South Korea could stand to benefit. Impact of KORUS FTA and a New Era of US Protectionism In 2012, the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) brought significant trade liberalization between the United States and South Korea. Market access improved, and tariffs were eliminated for 95 percent of traded goods. That year, the United States exported 64 billion USD of goods and services to South Korea, which remained steady through 2016. Meanwhile, US imports from Korea grew from 70 billion USD to 80 billion USD, establishing a clear US trade deficit. Importantly, US imports of Korean automobiles increased by 35 percent between 2012 and 2016. Figure 1: Bilateral Goods Exports between the United States and South Korea (in USD millions) Source: ITC Trade Map. A new period of US protectionism began in 2016. Trump led a significant departure from the longstanding Washington Consensus and the US pursuit of free global trade in favor of protectionism and promises to bring manufacturing home. Trump introduced new tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum, solar panels and washing machines, and a range of Chinese products. The United States also withdrew from free trade negotiations such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and undermined the WTO appellate body for dispute settlements. In 2017, the KORUS FTA became the Trump administration’s first target for renegotiations. Motivated by the growing deficit in goods trade, the renegotiation of the FTA focused on the Korean automotive industry. In 2016, automotive imports were valued at 88 percent of the US bilateral goods trade deficit with Korea. While automobile rules of origin continued to require at least 35 percent of value-added be produced in the United States or South Korea to benefit from the tariff exemption, the renegotiated KORUS FTA extended the existing 25 percent tariffs on pickup trucks entering the US market until 2041. Additionally, Korea reduced non-tariff barriers, especially those enacted on the US automotive industry, while the United States introduced tariff-exempt quotas on steel imports from Korea. The objective to protect domestic production was continued by the Joe Biden administration. His administration did not reverse Trump’s protectionist trade policies but, rather, introduced industrial policies—often perceived as discriminatory—such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act with significant incentives favoring US domestic production. President Biden also increased tariffs against China in 2024. Nevertheless, South Korea’s trade surplus with the United States has continued to grow, largely driven by Korean automotive exports (See Chart 1). While US exports to Korea have also grown, the increase is almost entirely driven by energy exports. In 2024, South Korea was the sixth largest trading partner of the United States. As such, while trade between the two nations is more valuable than ever, Trump’s persistent focus on the trade deficit in goods should raise questions about the future of the KORUS FTA and bilateral automotive trade.   Figure 2: South Korean Car Exports to the United States; US Car Exports to South Korea (in USD millions) Source: ITC Trade Map Potential Scenarios for US-Korea Trade Based on Trump’s public announcements about his administration’s likely tariff policies, there are several implications for South Korea. The net impact on Korean exports will be driven by the amount of trade diversion created by the new tariffs, which would shift the sourcing of imports from lower to more expensive suppliers. One possible scenario consists of universal US tariffs against all imports. Experts have stated at least some tariffs should be expected and that non-discriminatory tariffs would be the simplest for the United States to implement. All else equal, and without free trade agreements such as the KORUS FTA, higher prices of final and intermediary imported goods facing US consumers and producers, respectively, will lower demand for imports and increase demand for goods produced in the United States. Considering the size of the US economy, South Korean exports could suffer from lower demand and falling global prices in this scenario. Another scenario involves universal tariffs accompanied by higher tariffs against China. While universal tariffs would make all imported goods more expensive in the United States, the disproportionately higher tariffs against China would make exports from other countries relatively more competitive. Current Chinese exports to the United States would have to be filled from other countries. Disproportionately large tariffs against China may divert trade in favor of other exporting nations, including South Korea, and this could offset the negative effects of universal US import tariffs. President Trump has also suggested higher tariffs, up to 25 percent, levied on US imports from Canada and Mexico, despite the current FTA between the three nations. Such tariffs would be an extension of the scenario with asymmetric tariffs, bringing even more trade diversion. Whichever tariff policy the United States pursues, the future of the KORUS FTA will impact either scenario. If non-discriminatory tariffs are levied on US imports from all countries, and South Korean exports are exempt under the KORUS FTA, South Korean goods become more competitive. Nations that enjoy FTAs with the United States could benefit, even if China faces the same tariffs as all other countries. In the case of higher tariffs against China, a continuation of the KORUS FTA would position South Korea to benefit even more from trade diversion. Conclusion There are several factors that will determine the future of the US-South Korean economic relationship as Trump assumes office. Tariffs should be expected, although at which levels remains unclear. However, not all tariffs are necessarily bad for South Korea. Targeted tariffs against China present an opportunity for South Korea. As a manufacturing powerhouse, South Korea is well positioned to benefit as the United States limits trade with China and the resulting trade diversion as prices of Chinese goods in the United States become relatively more expensive. Tariffs may also protect Korean manufacturing investments in the United States and reduce Chinese competition in the automotive industry. Rules of origin would become increasingly important to ensure that Korean exports avoid higher tariffs against China. The more entwined South Korean supply chains are with China, the greater the risk that higher tariffs will be applied to South Korean exports if rules of origin become more restrictive. As showcased through the Biden administration’s CHIPS Act, which contains guardrails against Chinese components of advanced semiconductor imports to the United States, reducing or even eliminating Chinese contents in some value chains may become particularly important for Korean export industries with strategic or national security implications in the United States. South Korean exports and investments in the United States face both risks and opportunities. While a repeat of the 2017 KORUS FTA renegotiations should not necessarily be expected, the growing trade imbalance driven by South Korean car exports highlights the need to carefully navigate the risk of potential renegotiations. Preserving the KORUS FTA and well-positioned industrial supply chains could allow South Korea to take advantage of higher tariffs against China should they become a reality.   Nils Wollesen Osterberg is Economic Policy Associate at the Korea Economic Institute of America. The views expressed here are the author’s alone. Photo from Shutterstock. KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
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February 6, 2025

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