The Peninsula

How Lee Jae Myung Hopes to Rebuild Leverage on the Korean Peninsula

North Korea’s celebrations marking the eightieth anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) were a fireworks-filled spectacle with high-profile Chinese, Russian, and other foreign officials in attendance. The centerpiece of this year’s military parade was the newly unveiled Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile, described as the nation’s “most powerful nuclear strategic weapon system” and rumored to have the capacity to carry multi-warhead systems. Taken together with displays of his latest conventional weapon acquisitions, from new tanks to artillery systems and drones, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un hopes to reinforce the notion that his state is a nuclear power with plenty of firepower to defend those nuclear weapons. This posture poses a significant challenge to South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and his efforts to reestablish inter-Korean dialogue and promote lasting peace.

Weeks earlier, President Lee used his first speech at the United Nations General Assembly to describe his Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization (END) initiative. This “pragmatic” approach to engaging North Korea involves freezing nuclear weapons development over complete disarmament in the short run, with denuclearization as the final goal. North Korean Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Kim Son Gyong quickly rejected this idea, telling the General Assembly that North Korea would “never give up nuclear which is our state law, national policy and sovereign power.” The October 10 display of Kim’s arms and powerful friends further reinforces the regime’s claims that it will never disarm.

The Donald Trump administration, for its part, has yet to fully outline its North Korea policy but is increasing pressure on South Korea to heighten self-reliance and pay a larger share of its defense costs as U.S. military resources are increasingly marshaled toward deterring China. At the heart of this debate is wartime Operational Control (OPCON), a decades-long and politically charged issue between the two allies. President Lee, like most South Korean presidents, has stated his desire to transfer wartime OPCON away from the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command (CFC). Putting aside debates around sovereignty, OPCON transfer may embolden North Korea to test the credibility of U.S. deterrence commitments and exploit potential gaps between the allies. Yet, the envisioned Future Combined Forces Command (F-CFC)—with a South Korean commander and U.S. deputy—offers a model for maintaining unity of command while aligning with U.S. demands for greater burden-sharing among its allies.

For Seoul, OPCON transfer also carries major strategic implications for deterrence and diplomacy. A stronger focus on defense by denial—reducing the perceived gains Kim could expect from aggression—could enhance stability and reassure Pyongyang that dialogue remains possible. If managed well, Lee’s stewardship of OPCON and the broader alliance framework could help balance deterrence and diplomacy, giving his END initiative a firmer foundation.

Progressive Approaches to Inter-Korean Relations

President Lee has appointed inter-Korean policy veterans across his administration. National Intelligence Service Director Lee Jong-seok and Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young, for example, were key players of the Sunshine Policy era in the early to mid-2000s and suggest continuity between President Lee and liberal predecessors Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. Presidents Kim and Roh emphasized economic exchange with the North and integrating the Korean Peninsula as a means of lowering tensions and beginning the process of reunification. Operating in an environment where North Korea possessed a demonstrated nuclear weapons capability—beginning with its first nuclear weapons test in 2006—former President Moon Jae saw economic engagement without the precondition of denuclearization as a means of trust building. The high-level communication and summit diplomacy that resulted would, Moon believed, cement South Korea as an influential leader in the region that was best equipped to negotiate a denuclearization arrangement with Kim Jong Un.

Inter-Korean relations warmed as a result, but ultimately these efforts failed to secure a long-lasting reduction in tensions on the peninsula or slow the pace of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. Reasons for this include shifts in the calculations of U.S. and North Korean leadership and low economic returns on investment into North Korea. For example, although the Bill Clinton administration supported Kim Dae-jung’s dovish approach to inter-Korean relations, then President George W. Bush’s labeling of North Korea as part of an “axis of evil” posing threats to global peace and stability pressured South Korean leaders to be less proactive in their economic engagement with the North.

During the Moon administration (2017–2022), Pyongyang frequently bypassed Seoul—despite its outreach efforts—in favor of negotiating with Washington directly, as Kim believed the United States to be the more critical actor in shaping peninsular security. Kim’s approach seemed to bear results when the United States unilaterally canceled its 2018 joint military exercises with South Korea without consulting the Moon administration, further cementing Kim’s view of the South as a junior partner.

The key takeaway from inter-Korean relations this century is that successful diplomacy with North Korea hinges on U.S. support and coordination and South Korea’s ability to demonstrate its independent military capacity and leading role in influencing regional security to North Korea.

 Aligning Geopolitical Interests

In multiple declarations since the mid-2000s, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have affirmed their steadfastness in pursuing complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as the ultimate goal of any negotiations with North Korea. However, Lee’s UN speech emphasized the need “to seek realistic and rational solutions based on a cool-headed perception that denuclearization cannot be achieved in the short-term,” suggesting that future negotiations with North Korea should focus on freezing any further development of advanced nuclear weapons technology and arms control over immediate steps toward denuclearization. In Washington, Trump has signaled his willingness to talk with Kim “without preconditions,” leaving the door open for Seoul to potentially play a facilitating role in bringing both parties back to the negotiating table.

The South Korean government should communicate closely with the United States to arrange any future dialogue with Kim and agree on shared goals and bargaining methods. Closer coordination between the allies will make it clear that Pyongyang cannot negotiate around Seoul and will avoid surprises that leave Seoul in a weaker bargaining position, like the 2018 military exercise suspensions. Avoiding a misalignment in North Korea policy, the likes of the divide between the Bush administration and the Kim and Roh administrations, will ensure that the END plan has space to operate in a more forgiving international environment.

An Independent South Korean Defense Posture

Perhaps the boldest policy maneuver Lee is undertaking is his renewed focus on talks with the United States over the return of wartime operational control (OPCON) of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces to South Korea. If successful, the increased independence of South Korea’s national security policy and decision-making regarding the use of military force may give Lee a boost in stature and more leverage in entering dialogue with North Korea.

North Korea sees the United States retaining OPCON as evidence that the United States is the ultimate decision-maker and thus the one to talk to about security and military matters, not South Korea. If the South Korean military were fully under the operational control of the South Korean government, however, there would be more reason for North Korea to engage with the South to address security concerns. This would increase inter-Korean communication via hotlines and other mechanisms that can increase fidelity and ultimately lessen the risk of conflict.

South Korean military modernization and independence in wielding kinetic tools might change North Korea’s strategic calculus enough that it is forced to regularize communication with the South. Where missile tests and the destruction of inter-Korean roads and railways were once a ploy to ratchet up threat perceptions and attract the United States’ attention, Kim would have to reckon with the fact that his provocations would be met first and foremost with a South Korean response, not a U.S. one. Accordingly, he could not circumvent the South Korean government to speak directly with the United States and would have to attain South Korean buy-in to any agreement that would offer him security assurances or economic concessions.

South Korea has already taken steps to enhance its own deterrence of North Korean aggression through the acquisition of advanced conventional military capabilities like precision missiles. Such measures aim to make Kim face high costs and deny him benefits if he pursues military action, pushing him toward diplomatic off-ramps. Wartime OPCON transfer to South Korea does raise questions over U.S. extended deterrence, but it also provides South Korea with more autonomy to enter talks with the North, which could lead to traction on nuclear weapons negotiations.

In Washington, the Trump administration seems amenable to finalizing a wartime OPCON transfer as part of its push for U.S. allies to take a larger share of the costs and responsibilities for their own defense. U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby has advocated for South Korea to “take primary, essentially overwhelming responsibility for its own self-defense against North Korea” to concentrate U.S. resources on its defense posture toward China. For his part, Lee has pledged to build a “self-reliant defense,” with plans to increase defense spending by 8.2 percent next year and bolster the domestic defense industry and acquisition of advanced weapons systems. These commitments, paired with an argument that South Korean wartime OPCON frees up U.S. strategic resources for other operations, can reassure the United States that South Korea is closing the gap in alliance burden-sharing while giving South Korea a stronger hand in forging an independent national security and engagement strategy toward North Korea.

South Korea’s Domestic Debate on OPCON Transfer

The wartime OPCON transfer issue is the subject of intense domestic debate that Lee will have to skillfully navigate to ensure a successful transfer, particularly if the agreed-upon timeline extends beyond his presidential term. One criticism of transferring wartime OPCON to South Korea is that it presents an opportunity for North Korea to drive a wedge in the U.S.-South Korea alliance, increasing its provocations to test the credibility of U.S. deterrence commitments and creating divergent threat perceptions that will put the allied forces at odds in terms of prioritization and planning. But diverging perceptions and priorities within the U.S.-South Korea alliance can be mitigated by the continuation of a highly integrated and communicative F-CFC) like the one envisioned in the current OPCON transfer agreement. A unified command structure with a four-star South Korean commander and a four-star general U.S. deputy commander would preserve the unity of command and bilateral consultative mechanisms that have served to smooth over alliance issues for decades. South Korean OPCON and leadership within the F-CFC would entail more South Korean defense spending and burden sharing for peninsular defense, aligning with the Trump administration push for allies to share more of the costs for their defense rather than creating a point of tension.

Another key concern is whether the OPCON transfer is relevant to North Korea’s strategic thinking on inter-Korean relations, as any perceived assurances would be weighed against the perceived hostility of increased joint military exercises and deepening South Korea-Japan security ties that the North has consistently criticized. Under the current framework, the South Korean government has relied on the threat of United States intervention and nuclear retaliation to deter North Korea by punishment. South Korean OPCON changes the decision-making space for both North and South Korea: the North will have to seriously consider the likelihood of South Korean retaliation to its provocations, and the South will have to focus on building the defensive capabilities necessary to deter North Korean aggression by denial rather than through the threat of U.S. punishment.

Reducing the perceived gains that Kim could expect to receive from an aggressive course of action rather than promising high costs to him after the fact is more likely to delay North Korean hostilities and prevent a spiraling security dilemma. Strong deterrence by denial and less rhetoric of severe retaliation will be strong assurances to North Korea that dialogue is possible. Even joint military exercises and trilateral U.S.-South Korea-Japan cooperation can be reframed as measures to show North Korea the futility of attempting to attack South Korea instead of offensive postures to threaten a preemptive attack on the North if Lee manages his new national security policies well.

Conclusion

With shared goals and close coordination with the United States and a stronger and more independent military posture, the Lee administration can elevate its diplomatic stature vis-à-vis North Korea more than that of prior administrations that could not achieve a long-term accord for reduced inter-Korean tensions. Playing a facilitating role in a future Trump-Kim summit and packaging a wartime OPCON transfer with further commitments to increase defense spending will ensure that U.S.-South Korea policy toward North Korea proceeds in lockstep and that the allies can operate flexibly while enjoying high levels of mutual trust. North Korea’s response to any invitations to dialogue remains outside of South Korea’s control, but in managing other geopolitical and national security factors, South Korea can change the strategic environment to add value to direct inter-Korean talks. With the right capabilities and incentives, it is still possible to bring Kim to the negotiating table.

 

George Sebastian Garcia is Program Officer at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). All views presented here are the author’s alone.

 Feature image from the South Korean presidential office.

KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.