The Peninsula

American Public Opinion and the US Election’s Implications for South Korea

This piece is part of a series based upon the fifth annual survey commissioned by KEI and conducted by YouGov. On Thursday, October 10, KEI will host an event and release a report summarizing the results from the annual KEI/YouGov poll at our Washington, D.C. office.

The fifth annual KEI/YouGov poll on American attitudes toward Korea coincides with the run-up to the 2024 US presidential election and an accompanying rise in interest in public polls that address election-related topics. With Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the race and Kamala Harris’s acceptance of the Democratic Party’s nomination in August, there is growing interest in who may be ahead in the presidential race and why.

KEI selected the post-Labor Day window for its annual poll with YouGov. The poll was conducted from September 3 to 13, 2024, following the Democratic National Convention, to provide a snapshot of this year’s presidential race and the implications it might hold for US-South Korea relations. This article outlines the initial set of results.

Who’s Ahead?

Similar to other national polling, the KEI/YouGov poll shows Harris (44 percent) in a virtual tie with Trump (42 percent). Approximately 93 percent of self-identifying Republicans and 39 percent of Independents endorsed Trump, while 88 percent of self-identifying Democrats and 37 percent of Independents supported Harris. Most of the respondents appear to have made up their minds. Only 5 percent of those surveyed have yet to decide whether to endorse one of the two leading candidates, and 7.5 percent of the sample population are either not eligible to vote or will not vote altogether.

The demographic breakdown shows that Harris is favored among respondents under 44 years of age, who identify as women and/or people of color, and who have higher education levels. Self-identifying ideological moderates also narrowly tended to favor Harris. Trump, on the other hand, was clearly favored by White voters and individuals over the age of 45.

Foreign Policy Challenges

There was relatively little difference in what both candidates’ supporters saw as central foreign policy challenges for the United States. China and Russia were leading concerns for voters aligned with either candidate, followed by Iran, North Korea, Israel, and Ukraine. Trump’s support base clearly indicated greater concern toward China than individuals aligned with Harris.

While Ukraine is an area of the world that is more concerning for Americans than countries such as Afghanistan or Venezuela, other geopolitical issues—particularly those linked to the Middle East—may also be gaining more attention. Studies by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Pew Research Center confirm that concerns about Ukraine began to wane as early as August  2022. The KEI/YouGov survey shows that there may be some partisan differences regarding Ukraine, with Trump supporters expressing less concern about this issue than Harris supporters. The KEI/YouGov survey also suggests that the respondents link Russia to the Ukraine issue. For instance, past KEI/YouGov annual data shows that the number of people who saw Russia as a foreign policy challenge increased from 47 percent in 2021 to 59 percent in 2022—the year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Partners or Adversaries?

As for perceptions regarding potential partners or adversaries, the 2024 KEI/YouGov survey did not show major partisan differences in views toward most countries. However, there were some notable differences in how Trump supporters saw European countries or countries such as Mexico and Ukraine. When asked to “select the countries that [the respondents] feel are critical partners of the United States,” only 46 percent of Trump supporters chose the European Union compared to 67 percent of Harris supporters. Similarly, 17 percent of Trump supporters saw Ukraine as a “critical partner” compared to 38 percent of Harris supporters. Finally, 31 percent of Trump supporters named Mexico as an important partner compared to 42 percent of Harris supporters. This is consistent with reports and research that show Republicans—and Trump-aligned Republicans in particular—tend to associate Mexico with immigration and drug cartel-related issues.

To the extent that these opinions mirror the foreign policy priorities of the Harris and Trump campaigns, differences between the two sides on issues such as ending the Ukraine conflict, border security, and transatlantic security cooperation are meaningful as we look to November.

The US-South Korea Alliance Dimension

Regarding the alliance, more than two-thirds of supporters of both candidates agreed that 1) the US-South Korea alliance is in the interest of US national security, 2) US-South Korea trade is beneficial to the United States, and 3) US troops on the Korean Peninsula should be maintained or increased. In short, supporters for both campaigns value the US-South Korea relationship despite other global demands. The Chicago Council’s 2024 survey also showed bipartisan majorities agreeing that the US relationship with South Korea strengthens US security and that they value having US bases on the Korean Peninsula. One key difference with our data is that Harris supporters were more likely than Trump supporters to view the US-South Korea trade relationship as beneficial (Harris: 75.6 percent; Trump: 67.8 percent) and appreciate the impact of the alliance on US national interests (Harris: 77.1 percent; Trump: 67.5 percent). The fact that there was strong support for increasing or maintaining the US troop presence in South Korea (Harris: 67.6 percent; Trump: 68.3 percent) will be a source of policy continuity regardless of the election result. This is good news for the alliance.

One interesting finding is that Trump supporters in the 2024 KEI/YouGov survey appeared to favor a more focused view of alliance cooperation than Harris supporters. On average, 42.8 percent of Trump supporters thought the United States and South Korea should cooperate on technology, developing international trade rules, and supply chains, and 48.7 percent pointed to North Korea and security in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific. However, only 26.7 percent supported alliance cooperation on global health and human rights and 17.3 percent on climate change.

Unlike Americans aligned with Trump, those aligned with Harris tended to be more supportive of bilateral cooperation between the United States and South Korea on a wider range of issues. For instance, on matters that both groups thought were equally important, such as security in East Asia (57.8 percent) and North Korea (53.7 percent), Harris supporters tended to favor bilateral cooperation by 6 to 8 percentage points more than those supporting Trump. Like Trump supporters, Harris supporters also prioritized technology (52.3 percent), the development of international trade rules (52.8 percent), and supply chains (54.1 percent). But unlike Trump supporters, they were more supportive of cooperation on global human rights (55.6 percent), global health (54 percent), and climate change (56.1 percent).

A similar ordering and contrast of policy priorities is apparent regarding US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation. Trump supporters are more likely to favor cooperation on technology (65 percent), supply chains (71 percent), the development of international trade rules (54 percent), North Korea (45 percent), and security in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific (69 percent). Meanwhile, global health (22 percent), human rights (15 percent), and climate change (11 percent) are at the bottom of this list. Harris supporters favor cooperation in all of these areas at a higher level.

However, there was little difference in the relative policy positions between Harris and Trump supporters on North Korea. Individuals aligned with both Trump (70.6 percent) and Harris (67.5 percent) had an unfavorable view of North Korea. Both sides also agreed (89.8 percent) that North Korea giving up “its military nuclear capabilities” is important. This consensus suggests that any negotiated compromise involving North Korea under either a Harris or Trump administration may be perceived as a political failure if North Korea does not concede on the nuclear issue.

Another difference between Harris and Trump supporters relates to the topics of North Korean human rights and humanitarian assistance. For Trump supporters, allocating humanitarian aid to North Korea was less acceptable (40 percent) than advocating for improved human rights in North Korea (81 percent). Although there was a similar difference in allocating humanitarian aid for North Korea (61 percent) versus advocating for human rights improvement in North Korea (90 percent) among individuals aligned with Harris, their support for humanitarian assistance was significantly higher than that of Trump supporters.

Conclusion

Every election cycle generates uncertainty about continuity and change in US foreign policy and how a new administration might manage relationships with counterparts on the international stage. Despite an increase in global volatility during 2024, North Korea remains one of the top concerns of respondents in both camps. Moreover, there is bipartisan recognition of and support for the US-South Korea relationship. Concerns related to North Korea and China remain at the forefront of American public opinion. The 2024 KEI/YouGov survey, nonetheless, highlights the contours of a noticeable difference in opinion regarding the overall scope of the US-South Korea military alliance and how far it should extend into and prioritize economic and other areas. Such differing priorities may provide a basis for understanding possible implications for this relationship depending on the outcome of the election.

 

Methodology

Matched and Weighted Sample Size: 1,184 aged 18 and older

Margin of Error: +/- 3.22 percent at the 95 percent confidence level

Interview Method: Web Only (English)

Dates: September 3-13, 2024

Organization: YouGov

 

Dr. Je Heon (James) Kim is the Interim Director at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). Andy Hong and Jennifer Ahn are Program Officers at KEI. Scott A. Snyder is President and Chief Executive Officer at KEI. The views expressed here are the authors’ alone.

Photo from Shutterstock.

KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.