KEI Spotlight

This article was published in National Interest on August 27, 2024

The United Nations Command (UNC), a U.S.-led multinational command that enforces the Korean Armistice Agreement and coordinates international contributions to maintain peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, recently welcomed increased contributions from existing Sending States—countries that provided combat forces during the Korean War—and the accession of new members.

On June 11, New Zealand announced it would deploy forty-one additional personnel to the UNC and its Military Armistice Commission, and Germany joined the UNC on August 2 as its eighteenth member state. Such developments are part of a longer-term effort to bolster the standing and functions of the UNC in an increasingly complex strategic environment on and around the peninsula. Often characterized—with some justification—as a U.S.-driven effort, UNC modernization reflects a mix of additional variables, including the member states’ deepening bilateral relationships with Seoul and increased fidelity to the goal of peace and security in Korea and the Indo-Pacific. The Yoon administration’s effort is to enhance the UNC and ROK agency within it, as well as the growing linkages between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security.

Still, challenges remain. For one, in the 2000s and 2010s, ROK progressives and conservatives—if for different reasons—heavily critiqued the UNC for infringing on Korean sovereignty. Such sentiments persist and could become resurgent. Additionally, the UNC’s enhancements provide symbolic and signaling value. Yet, there is a limit to the member states’ contributions and a lack of concrete legal and operational agreements between those states and Seoul. Finally, multilateralizing Korean security is beset by misaligned expectations and risks, accelerating dueling narratives about escalation on and beyond the peninsula.

New Leadership and Strategic Landscape Shifts Discourse on the UNC

A shift in Korean leadership and the strategic landscape has altered the ROK’s discourse on and enhanced US efforts to bolster the UNC. More than any previous ROK administration, the Yoon administration has pushed to modernize the UNC and sought to shape the process. In the context of North Korea’s steadily advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and new nuclear policy law, Seoul has sought various ways to enhance deterrence in Korea. Beyond the Yoon administration’s primary objective of strengthening Washington’s extended deterrence commitment, a more robust commitment from the UNC is another part of the equation.

Seoul’s hosting of the ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting in November 2023—one day after the annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting—was the starkest evidence of this effort. It was the first such gathering hosted by the ROK and combined defense representatives from UNC member states, yet only Seoul and Washington sent their highest-level defense officials. In the joint statement following the meeting, the participants noted their determination to “continue increasing mutual exchange and cooperation between the ROK-U.S. Alliance and UNC Member States to inform our combined training and exercises” and “that they will be united upon any renewal of hostilities or armed attack on the Korean Peninsula challenging the principles of the United Nations and the security of the Republic of Korea.” Although a notable statement, it was a toned-down reiteration of the Greater Sanctions Statement released following the 1953 armistice, which more forcefully stated that the Sending States would be “prompt to resist” any such renewal of hostilities and threatened to expand the conflict beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Additionally, by highlighting the direct connections between South Korea’s security and the seven UNC Rear bases in Japan, President Yoon embedded improved Seoul-Tokyo relations and strengthened U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation within a multilateral framing. The administration also embraced expanding the UNC, signaled its intent to increase South Korea’s own staffing of the command, and aims to hold a second ROK-UNC ministerial meeting this fall in Seoul (separate from the SCM in Washington). Seoul’s newfound embrace of the UNC as integral to deterrence on the peninsula was also made evident in U.S. and ROK officials jointly announcing UNC member states’ participation in the alliance’s combined military exercises last summer—a statement previously made by U.S. officials alone.

Furthermore, ROK and U.S. efforts to enhance the UNC have developed alongside an evolving conception of Indo-Pacific security and its growing linkage with the Euro-Atlantic. The latter linkage is structurally driven by U.S.-China competition yet was significantly accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As Washington conceptualized and increasingly signaled a networked or lattice-worked region, minilateral groupings took on new value and purpose. The UNC, while historically centered on Korea, was increasingly tied to Northeast Asian and Indo-Pacific security.

To be sure, both Wellington and Berlin’s recent contributions to the UNC are specifically focused on Korea. New Zealand’s personnel will take on roles in the UNC honor guard and UNC Security battalion operating on the DMZ. Germany will deploy a Bundeswehr’s modern A319 OH observation plane starting in September. Further, though not specifically a UNC operation, New Zealand just deployed a ship to monitor North Korea’s maritime sanctions evasion activities for the first time, joining ships for fellow UNC member states Germany and Canada. Yet they framed their contributions in broader terms.

In June, New Zealand’s Defense Minister Judith Collins noted “our need to step up to better support peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and the Indo-Pacific more widely,” a sentiment reinforced by Foreign Minister Winston Peters. Also, at the ceremony marking Germany’s accession to the UNC, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius emphasized the close linkage between European and Indo-Pacific security. Such messaging aligned with President Yoon and German chancellor Olaf Scholz’s meeting at the seventy-fifth NATO Summit in Washington, during which they expressed concerns about North Korean provocations, deepening Russia-North Korea ties, and vowed to expand security cooperation between NATO and South Korea.

Persistent Challenges, Limitations, and Risks

Yet despite shifts in discourse and significant developments around UNC modernization, persistent challenges remain. There has long been opposition across the political spectrum within South Korea to the UNC, based on the belief it infringes on critical areas of Korean sovereignty—particularly regarding inter-Korean engagement and self-defense measures against external threats. A growing multilateral grouping affecting core Korean sensibilities and decisions could, depending on the political context in the future, elicit strong pushback.

A future progressive leader in Seoul, while facing severe obstacles to re-engaging Pyongyang given Kim Jong Un’s seemingly fundamental shift on inter-Korean reconciliation and reunification, would bristle against any real or perceived UNC-driven restraint on their efforts. Further, likely inclined to seek greater autonomy from the United States—including through the OPCON transition—longstanding critiques of the UNC could reemerge under future progressive leadership. However, such tensions are not exclusive to the progressive camp in Seoul. It is conceivable that the current Yoon administration or a future conservative administration might turn away from the newfound embrace of the UNC based on various unmet or misaligned expectations.

One reported rationale for UNC modernization is to help shore up Korean deterrence in the event of Trump’s return to the White House. However, this misses the obvious point that the UNC remains a U.S.-led command. If there is less American fidelity to the alliance or CFC under Trump, that also would extend to the UNC. Furthermore, under such circumstances, many UNC member states themselves would face similar concerns about a waning U.S. security commitment, causing them to reorient their focus toward shoring up their own defenses rather than commitments elsewhere. These are not entirely binary choices, but on balance, their attention would likely shift away from Korea.

Additionally, President Yoon has spoken about an enhanced UNC in a manner that mischaracterizes its role and responsibilities. For example, during his Liberation Day speech in 2023, after calling the seven UNC Rear bases in Japan “the greatest deterrent which keeps the North from invading the South,” he noted, “A renewed North Korean invasion will trigger an automatic and immediate intervention and retaliation by the UNC, and the UNC-rear in Japan is sufficiently equipped with necessary land, sea and air capabilities.”

The UNC’s multilateral framework offers a valuable signaling deterrent and evidence of international diplomatic solidarity—one that Yoon himself has helped strengthen. Nevertheless, the UNC is not a warfighting command (that changed in 1978). The UNC would intervene under such circumstances to mitigate escalation and restore armistice conditions but, most assuredly, not to retaliate. American bases in Japan (seven of which are mutually designated by the United States and Japan as UNC bases for use by UN Sending States) very likely would be involved in a renewed Korean conflict, but under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, especially if those bases were themselves under armed attack. Yet, that would be a U.S.-Japan alliance decision and operation, not a UNC one.

Moreover, invoking the UNC as a retaliatory force gets well ahead of how UNC member states view their commitment. For most members, they simply do not have the resources to commit. Most European UNC member states are currently struggling to provide capacity and capabilities for Europe’s own defense in the context of the Ukraine War. To think they will muster large amounts of resources for Korea—particularly in short order—is unrealistic. And, even if they possessed such resources to deploy and the political will to do so, there remains a lack of formal standing commitments of forces from UNC members for a crisis or conflict or visiting forces agreements for potentially larger force deployments.

Additionally, as concerned as U.S. commanders are about the ROK’s retaliatory rhetoric and potential actions, UNC member states have reservations, too. They do not see enhanced UNC involvement as grounds to threaten retaliation nor want to commit themselves to such a situation militarily. One of the best analysts of the UNC notes that the earlier UNC revitalization effort was unable to address key concerns, namely that the United States rather than the UN maintained unilateral control over the UNC and that the U.S. treaty commitment to the ROK “relegated the UNC to a role of being a multinational force provider to the bilateral combatant command.” Such concerns likely persist. A security crisis in Korea will bring these reservations to the fore and manifest, even if through quiet diplomatic channels, in UNC member states calling for ROK restraint rather than encouraging retaliation.

Finally, overstating or mischaracterizing the UNC’s role may accelerate dueling escalatory narratives on the peninsula and in the region. For example, consistent with its longstanding position on the UNC, the North Korean Foreign Ministry responded to Germany’s UNC accession by saying it was an “act of wrecking peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and aggravating the situation” and the “ever-escalating military confrontation on the Korean peninsula demands the DPRK take more thorough measures for bolstering up its self-defensive capabilities to defend the sovereignty, security and interests of the state.” Chinese voices have echoed such sentiments.

Xinhua News framed Germany’s accession as a U.S.-driven effort to pressure other countries to join the UNC—a command the dissolution of which Beijing has pushed for since the early 1970s—and create a small NATO in East Asia, which undermines regional and global security. Various Chinese netizens have echoed the narrative and promoted strengthened China-Russia strategic cooperation to safeguard regional peace and security jointly.

Such rhetoric is expected. For some, it shows UNC modernization’s effectiveness alongside the development of a broader minilateral security architecture. Pyongyang now faces and must condemn more multilateral partners. Beijing, too, is watching an array of states in Europe and the Indo-Pacific more overtly call out and push back against its assertive and destabilizing behavior. However, a more restrained perspective would counsel against mischaracterizing or overselling the UNC’s purpose and capacities. It risks accelerating a potential crisis for which it may not be properly prepared, provides adversaries fodder to distort public understanding, and takes escalatory counteractions (which, admittedly, they show every indication of taking anyway). After all, many of the critiques Pyongyang and Beijing level against the UNC resonate in South Korea and elsewhere.

The Bigger Picture

UNC modernization’s complications reflect the turbulent institutional history of a command that has meant different, sometimes contradictory things to its various stakeholders at different points in time. For Washington, it provided a mechanism to command multinational forces and garner international legitimacy for its participation in the Korean War. However, U.S. officials deemphasized and even sought ways to scrap the UNC in the 1970s—as important functions were transferred to Seoul or the U.S.-ROK alliance—yet moved to reenergize it following the end of the Cold War.

The ROK was once abjectly dependent upon the UNC. But given Seoul’s remarkable transformation, it bucks any attempts to restrict its hard-won agency. Nonetheless, Seoul cannot avoid that its one and only ally, upon whom it has depended for its ultimate national security for its entire sovereign existence, still commands the UNC. Finally, UNC member states have undergone stark undulations in their own commitments. After the Korean War, some left the command and never returned. Others departed but then rejoined yet with widely varying levels of commitment. Moreover, there is a significant legal gray area surrounding the command, given its multiple stakeholders, tenuous connection to the United Nations, and complicated institutional evolution.

Nevertheless, efforts are undoubtedly underway to enhance the UNC. If there is political will and continuity in the effort, it can be more proactively transformed and even, to an extent, redefined. However, careful, consistent, and cohesive communication between Seoul, Washington, and UNC member states and with their publics about the purpose the UNC serves and—importantly, does not serve—will be critical.