This is the eight piece in a series looking at how the issues identified in KEI’s annual “10 Issues to Watch for on the Korean Peninsula” series and other issues of note developed in 2022. The original “10 Issues” piece can be found here. Partisan shifts in Korea can give rise to subtle—and not-so-subtle—differences in Seoul’s…
January 3, 2023
In May of this year, the United States introduced a draft UN Security Council Resolution (S/2022/431) that would have responded to a North Korean ICBM test on March 24. By chance, the formal Chinese and Russian rejection of the proposal—which included additional sanctions on Pyongyang--came in the wake of a landmark decision taken by the…
August 11, 2022
In the last two posts on Korea and the war in Ukraine, I showed that Moon administration moved relatively quickly to join the international sanctions regime and was rewarded by inclusion on Russia’s "unfriendly nations" list. I also argued that the costs of standing on international legal principle were softened by the fact that the…
July 8, 2022
Korea-Russia economic relations are redolent of Ricardo’s classic observations about trade between Britain and Portugal in the mid-19th century, which generated the very concept of comparative advantage. Korea is an advanced industrial state with a deep manufacturing base and far-flung global production networks. Russia relies heavily on the export of raw materials, and by no…