Bilateral Competition and Cooperation Under New Leadership
In the first months of 2013 the leadership transitions in Northeast Asia were completed. After a year in office Kim Jong-un was consolidating his grip on power and clarifying, through belligerent actions after the successful test of a long-range missile had prompted a critical United Nations Security Council resolution, the legacy handed to him by Kim Jongil. Wrapping up the first year of a new term as president, Vladimir Putin proved that personal authority could refocus Russian foreign policy almost at will, intensifying anti-Americanism while expanding cooperation with China as he repressed the nascent forces of civil society through the charge that they are in the forefront of foreign subversion. In China, Xi Jinping added the post of president to that of party secretary, while sending China’s ships and planes into areas around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands considered in Japan to be its sovereign territory, as he stimulated talk of China’s rejuvenation—the China dream—in opposition to global or regional ideals. Recognizing that Putin was troubled by Kim’s provocations and Xi was still in the process of orchestrating China’s response, newly reelected Barack Obama sent Secretary of State John Kerry to Beijing as well as Seoul and Tokyo and National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon to Moscow for mid-April meetings vital in determining whether the new leadership teams would cooperate on North Korea.
This section contains the following chapters:
Introduction by Editor-in-Chief Gilbert Rozman
The United States and China
China and Russia
Sergey Radchenko, University of Nottingham
South Korea and Japan
Cheol Hee Park, Seoul National University
South Korea and the U.S.
Scott Snyder, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)