



Shifting Grounds:
Public Opinion and the Future of
Trilateral Cooperation in the
United States, South Korea, and Japan

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Executive Summary

The August 2023 trilateral summit at Camp David marked a historic milestone in U.S.-South Korea-Japan relations, establishing new frameworks for crisis consultation, information-sharing, military exercises, and cooperation on critical supply chains. Two years on, the durability of that achievement is being tested by a turbulent second Donald Trump administration, rising Chinese assertiveness, an entrenched North Korean nuclear program, and unresolved historical tensions between South Korea and Japan. Whether the Camp David framework endures will depend not only on the decisions of leaders but on the publics whose support sustains them.

This report presents findings from comprehensive public opinion surveys conducted in the United States, South Korea, and Japan in August 2025. It examines where the three countries' publics converge, where they diverge, and what those patterns mean for the future of trilateral cooperation.

Key Findings

Alliance Commitment Outlasts Political Friction: Despite deeply unfavorable views of President Trump in both allied capitals (73 percent in South Korea; 70 percent in Japan), 73 percent of South Korean respondents view the United States favorably as a country, and 86 percent of Japanese respondents affirm the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Both publics clearly distinguish between frustration with current U.S. leadership and their support for the alliance itself.

Shared Threat Perception Anchors Cooperation: Majorities in all three countries identify China, North Korea, and Russia as their primary security concerns, providing a common strategic rationale for deeper coordination, even when the relative rankings differ. Americans view both South Korea (62 percent) and Japan (78 percent) favorably, and majorities consider both as trustworthy partners.

The South Korea-Japan Axis Is the Structural Weak Point: Both publics acknowledge the importance of the bilateral relationship (87 percent in South Korea; 54 percent in Japan), but underlying trust is underdeveloped. This survey suggests that a majority of Japanese citizens hold unfavorable views of South Korea and identify trust as a precondition for progress. In South Korea, attitudes toward Japan are heavily shaped by ideological and partisan orientation, leaving trust-building vulnerable to changing political winds in Seoul.

Divergent Views on Nuclear and Taiwan Contingencies: Publics in all three countries prefer diplomatic and humanitarian responses to a Taiwan contingency over direct military involvement, but perceptions of the threat's imminence vary sharply. Roughly 72 percent

of South Koreans believe a conflict is imminent, compared with more uncertain publics in the United States and Japan. On nuclear armament, 68 percent of South Koreans support an indigenous nuclear weapons program if North Korean nuclearization continues, while the American and Japanese publics remain closely divided.

Broad Opposition to Tariffs, Continued Support for Free Trade: Majorities in all three countries continue to endorse the free trade norms that have underpinned the postwar international order. Strong pluralities in the United States (45 percent) and South Korea oppose Trump-era tariffs on allied partners, while nearly 77 percent of the Japanese respondents answered negatively. The gap between current policy and public preference is itself a finding of consequence.

Eight months after this survey went into the field, the pressures it documented have not eased. The Trump administration's tariff posture toward allied partners remains controversial in both Seoul and Tokyo, the North Korean nuclear program remains as strong as ever, and the strategic logic that brought the three governments to Camp David has only sharpened. The data show that the South Korean and Japanese publics have, so far, been able to hold the alliance steady amid U.S. unpredictability. Policymakers who treat the Camp David framework as a finished accomplishment rather than an active investment will find that public support, while durable, is also finite.

Introduction

The relationship between the United States, South Korea, and Japan stands at a critical juncture. The trilateral summit at Camp David in August 2023 was a historic accomplishment when it was announced.¹ The meeting resulted in a joint statement that formalized mechanisms for rapid consultations and information-sharing during crisis situations.² The three countries also committed to enhancing joint military exercises and establishing joint consultative bodies for critical supply chains, focusing on semiconductors, minerals, and energy security.³

There is now broad bipartisan support in Washington for U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation.⁴ Experts in the foreign policy and national security community agree that trilateral cooperation is integral to U.S. national security strategy in the Indo-Pacific, reinforcing existing alliances while building new minilateral coalitions to address issues of mutual concern in the region.⁵ It is also believed that the arrangement would strengthen intelligence-sharing, allied force readiness, and deterrence while strengthening economic resilience and supply chains.⁶

However, the durability of that achievement is already being tested. The return of the Donald Trump administration has introduced new strains across the U.S. alliance network through tariffs, demands for greater defense spending, and an unpredictable diplomatic style that has unsettled allies and adversaries alike. At the same time, China's growing military assertiveness, broadening conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, North Korea's entrenched nuclear posture, and the looming specter of a potential contingency in Northeast Asia continue to raise the stakes for coordinated trilateral action. Whether the Camp David momentum can be sustained will depend not only on the decisions of the leaders but on public support within the three countries.

Public opinion is often dismissed in foreign policy analysis on the assumption that citizens are rarely well-informed about the details of international affairs. But there is ample evidence that public sentiment shapes, constrains, and—at times—determines policy outcomes. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the Brexit referendum, and a growing body of comparative research suggest that the public can shape policy outcomes. In the case of the U.S.-South Korea-Japan partnership—which requires sustained domestic political support—public attitude is an integral part of the story.

This report presents findings from comprehensive public opinion surveys conducted in the United States, South Korea, and Japan in August 2025. The results offer a nuanced—and at times, varied—picture of how people in these three democracies agree or disagree on issues of common importance. The survey data show a robust foundation for shared threat

perception. For instance, majorities in all three countries identify China, North Korea, and Russia as their primary security concerns, providing a common rationale for deeper cooperation, even though the relative rankings of those threats differ. Americans hold broadly favorable views of both South Korea (62 percent) and Japan (78 percent), and an overwhelming majority considers both allies trustworthy. South Koreans show strong support for trilateral military cooperation (79 percent) and pragmatism about advancing ties with Japan despite persistent historical grievances. These are not trivial findings. They suggest that the public foundation for trilateral engagement is more durable than skeptics may admit.

Yet, the surveys also reveal vulnerabilities that policymakers cannot afford to overlook. The Japanese public is notably more ambivalent than its counterparts. A majority holds unfavorable views of South Korea—nearly half doubt the sufficiency of U.S. extended deterrence, and 17 percent now identify the United States as a security threat, which is larger than those who see South Korea as a potential threat.

Across all three countries, the data reveal no clear consensus on how to respond to a Taiwan contingency, with opinion consistently leaning toward humanitarian and diplomatic responses rather than direct military involvement. On nuclear armament, despite widespread pessimism about North Korean denuclearization, opinion across all three countries remains sharply and almost evenly divided. And on trade, strong pluralities in both the United States and South Korea oppose Trump's tariffs on allied partners, even as majorities in both countries affirm their support for the free trade norms that have governed the postwar international order, revealing a significant gap between current policy and underlying public preferences.

The sections that follow examine these dynamics in detail, including American public attitudes toward South Korea and Japan, South Korean perceptions of the United States and Japan, Japanese attitudes toward the United States and South Korea, and questions on trilateral cooperation that bind all three perspectives together. The goal of the report is not merely to describe what the public thinks, but to illuminate what those attitudes mean for the future of one of the most consequential—and consequently fragile—security partnerships.

Methodology

Surveys from the three countries were administered by three partnering organizations: the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), the East Asia Institute (EAI), and the

International House of Japan (IHJ). Each organization partnered with polling organizations within their country after coordinating on the questionnaire survey design.

The United States

The fieldwork for the U.S. survey was conducted by YouGov in collaboration with KEI from August 8 to 19, 2025, through an online survey. In total, 1,658 respondents were interviewed, from which a final dataset of 1,500 adults was constructed. The respondent pool was matched to a politically representative modeled frame of U.S. adults, drawing on multiple benchmark datasets, including the American Community Survey (ACS) Public Use Microdata Sample files, public voter records, the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration supplements, the 2020 National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, and the 2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES). These sources ensured that the sample reflected demographic and political distributions, including the 2020 presidential vote.

To refine representativeness, YouGov employed propensity score matching. Matched cases were weighted to the frame using a logistic regression that incorporated age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and region. Respondents were grouped into deciles of estimated propensity scores and post-stratified accordingly. Final weights were further adjusted based on the 2020 and 2024 presidential vote choice, as well as gender, age, race, and education. This layered weighting process corrected for sampling and response imbalances and closely aligned the dataset with national benchmarks.

The resulting survey provides a nationally representative sample of U.S. public opinion with a margin of error of ± 2.85 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.

South Korea

EAI's survey was conducted in South Korea by Hankook Research from August 18 to 20, 2025. The target population was adults aged eighteen and older nationwide, with respondents drawn from the firm's master sample of 970,000 individuals, focusing on a political-social panel of about 70,000. Using web-based survey methods, the study applied proportional quota sampling by region, gender, and age (based on July 2025 census data) to secure representativeness. A total of 1,585 respondents participated, yielding a response rate of 27.6 percent from 7,134 invitations sent. The survey has a reported margin of error of ± 2.5 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level.

Japan

IHJ conducted the Japanese portion of the 2025 trilateral public opinion survey through an online research platform. The fieldwork took place from August 19 to 20, 2025. A quota sampling method was applied to balance respondents by gender and age group, with sample cells covering men and women across seven age brackets (eighteen to nineteen, twenties, thirties, forties, fifties, sixties, and seventies and older). The planned sample size was 1,000 respondents, and the final dataset included 1,037 valid cases. The sampling structure ensured proportional representation across demographic categories, making the survey broadly reflective of Japan's adult population.


The United States

Scholars often question the role of the public in shaping foreign policy outcomes, given the assumption that they are neither well-informed nor directly involved in the decision-making process.⁷ There is ample evidence, however, suggesting otherwise. A study by researcher Eric Larson, for instance, found that public opposition to the Vietnam War was one of the leading causes behind the U.S. withdrawal from the conflict.⁸ At times, the public not only influences but also is a decision-maker. This was the case in the Brexit decision, which was largely the result of a national referendum in 2016. Although the results came as a shock due to support for “Remain” seeming strong leading up to the vote, the “Leave” campaign gained momentum in the late stages of the historic event.⁹ There are also more recent comparative studies, which suggest that attitudes toward other leaders and countries can directly influence foreign policy and even the bilateral relationship itself.¹⁰

Given the numerous empirical bases for taking the public’s role seriously in policy decisions, it is reasonable to examine public opinion in matters related to foreign policy. In this case, we decided to dig deeper into American public opinion on the issue of U.S policy in Northeast Asia and the implications for U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation.

We begin with the U.S. data, which reveals that the American public holds generally favorable views toward these two longstanding Northeast Asian allies. Interestingly, they do not appear to hold strong opinions about the leaders of these two countries. In particular, the data shows that over 60 percent of respondents do not have an opinion about either the president of South Korea (64 percent) or the prime minister of Japan (62 percent), but more than 60 percent hold favorable views about South Korea (62 percent) and Japan (78 percent).

Figure 1.1. Impression of Countries and Leaders: South Korea and Japan




This finding is notable given its correlation to individual assessments about the overall state of bilateral relations. For instance, among individuals who viewed South Korea unfavorably, 41 percent thought that the relationship was “bad.” Among those who saw South Korea as “favorable,” 55 percent saw the relationship as being good. For Japan, 38 percent of those who held an “unfavorable” impression assessed the overall relationship as being bad. Meanwhile, 61 percent of those with a “favorable” impression of Japan assessed the relationship between the United States and Japan as good.

A similar relationship can be observed in U.S. public assessments about economic ties with these two countries. That is, respondents who did not have a favorable impression of South Korea or Japan also tended to see both countries as *competitors*, whereas respondents who saw South Korea or Japan favorably also saw them as *partners*. To be more precise, 43 percent of individuals who saw South Korea unfavorably tended to see the country as a competitor to the United States (See Figure 1.2). Conversely, 44 percent of those who saw South Korea in a “favorable” light tended to see the country more as a partner (“complementary”). In short, the lesson here is that perception matters.

Figure 1.2. Impression of South Korea and Economic Relations

Q: What is your impression of South Korea?


Q: In terms of the economic relationship between South Korea / Japan and the United States, which do you think is closer to A or B? (A) The economies of the two countries are complementary (B) The economies of the two countries are competitive



Trust


Francis Fukuyama defines trust as a foundational element of social and economic prosperity, defining it as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms.”¹¹ In international relations, trust is one of the factors that determines the likelihood of cooperation or conflict and the effectiveness of diplomacy. Professor Andrew Kydd, for instance, argues that trust among states is integral to forming reliable alliances, making credible commitments, and avoiding security dilemmas.¹² Professor Brian Rathbun also suggests that trust is a necessary ingredient in international institutions and effective diplomacy that results in win-win outcomes.¹³ There is little doubt, therefore, of the importance of trust in relations among countries such as the United States, South Korea, and Japan. When we asked respondents to consider this issue, an overwhelming majority considered South Korea (58 percent) and Japan (69 percent) to be “trustworthy” allies (See Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3. Trust in South Korea and Japan



When we look more closely, we find a correlation between trust and attitudes toward defense spending and cost-sharing. More specifically, among those who stated that Japan was a “trustworthy partner,” over 74 percent supported either “maintaining” or “increasing” Japan’s defense spending. This is significantly larger than the 51 percent (-24 percentage points) who thought Japan was an “untrustworthy partner” but should also maintain or increase their defense spending. Among respondents who viewed South Korea as a “trustworthy partner,” 76 percent supported “maintaining” or “increasing” its defense spending. Only 40 percent (-35 percentage points) of those who thought South Korea was “untrustworthy” thought the same. In short, more trust is associated with more defense spending. That is, Americans tend to support increased defense spending only among countries that they trust.

Figure 1.4. Trust and Defense Spending




To provide some perspective on these numbers, when respondents were asked whether South Korea should significantly *increase* its defense budget, over 35 percent said it should. In comparison, nearly 22 percent said South Korea *should maintain* its budget, and just under 5 percent said it should decrease its defense spending. The distribution was similar in Japan, with over 33 percent supporting an increase in defense spending, 25 percent supporting the same level of spending, and 3.7 percent supporting a decrease in defense spending. On the question of defense cost-sharing, 49 percent stated that Japan is paying too much (12 percent) or the right amount (37 percent), while 45 percent stated that South Korea is paying too much (11 percent) or the right amount (34 percent). Only about 12–14 percent thought either country was paying too little.

If we add trust to this equation, 58 percent of respondents who said they considered South Korea a trustworthy partner thought the country was paying too much or just the right amount for U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula. Among those who considered Japan to be trustworthy, 61 percent stated that Japan was paying just the right amount or paying too much for U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ).

Figure 1.5. Trust and Burden-Sharing

Q: Do you think South Korea / Japan is a trustworthy partner for the United States?
 Q: The United States has recently requested a significant increase in the defense budget of its allies. Do you think it is necessary for South Korea / Japan to significantly _____ its defense budget?



Interestingly, trust appears to have an unexpected effect on these two variables. In one instance, more trust means increased defense spending, and in the other, less burden loading. Typical understanding of burden-sharing is that it is necessarily associated with increased defense spending. That is, Americans prefer that South Korea and Japan increase defense spending because they want the allies to bear a heavier share of the burden of stationing U.S. troops in their respective countries. But the findings suggest that the public does not hold a sophisticated view that necessarily connects burden sharing to defense spending. For most Americans, “trust” is the determining factor behind tolerating increased defense spending by other countries. Burden loading is also unnecessary if the allies are trustworthy partners. In short, “trust” is the mediating factor between these two variables, which explains why Americans think that South Korea and Japan ought to increase their defense spending even though they also believe that both countries are paying too much or just the right amount for U.S. troop basing in their respective countries (See Figure 1.5). The logic appears consistent: trustworthy allies should feel free to strengthen their own defense through increased spending, and they need not carry more burden for U.S. troops in their country.

This finding suggests that it would bode well for South Korea and Japan to work on building trust with the United States as they look to advance their interests, which are not necessarily incompatible with American public attitudes on issues such as burden-sharing.


Discussion

The results present a compelling case for why governments across all three countries may benefit from sustained public diplomacy efforts, as favorable impressions of the countries appear to drive positive assessments of bilateral relationships. But more importantly, the data also suggests that the American public cares about trust when it comes to U.S. policy on allied defense spending and burden-sharing. Trust appears to soften U.S. demands for greater financial contributions while simultaneously sustaining support for allied defense capacity, so South Korea and Japan stand to gain more from being seen as reliable, cooperative partners than from transactional compliance with cost-sharing formulas. As U.S. domestic politics increasingly scrutinize alliance commitments, cultivating public goodwill could prove to be one of the most durable forms of diplomatic capital South Korea and Japan can bank on.

Common Interests and Threats


One way to assess the nature of the trilateral relationship and forecast its longevity is to gauge how people perceive national interests and threats. When asked to choose countries or regions that are the “most vital interests to the United States,” the top choices included South Korea (42 percent) and Japan (48 percent). Between the two were the European Union (47 percent), the United Kingdom (45 percent), China (44 percent), and the Middle East (42 percent).

Figure 1.6. Perceived Interests and Threats to the United States



Key threats for the United States were Russia (71 percent), China (55 percent), and North Korea (55 percent). The fact that these three countries were also identified as top threats in South Korea and Japan suggests an overlapping security interest. What was different, however, was the relative order of these concerns. Most South Koreans were concerned about North Korea (91 percent), followed by China (73 percent) and Russia (49 percent). For Japan, China was the most important threat (69 percent), followed by North Korea (55.1 percent) and Russia (52.3 percent).

Figure 1.7. Threat Assessment



This result is generally consistent with the qualitative assessment of the threat level, which the survey questionnaire also asked the respondents to rate (See Figure 1.7). Russia topped the list as the “critical threat” (just under 43 percent), followed by China (over 36 percent) and North Korea (29 percent).

China and Taiwan


One common threat at the top of the list for all three countries is China. From a U.S. national security perspective, it takes precedence given the centrality of the “pacing challenge” in the U.S. national security strategy since 2017.¹⁴ This is not to downplay the persistent threat posed by North Korea, but survey respondents from all three countries have consistently named China as one of their top two “threats.”¹⁵

A Taiwan contingency looms large in discussions of the China challenge.¹⁶ When asked about the likelihood of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, 42 percent of U.S. respondents said it was likely, and 49 percent said they did not know or were unsure. Perhaps the most important finding was that 49 percent of respondents from the United States stated that they either “do not know” or were “not sure” whether there will be a

cross-strait military conflict in the near future. This suggests that the issue of a Taiwan contingency scenario is less about probability and more about mitigation or prevention.

When asked what the United States should do if China invades Taiwan, the findings show no clear consensus on an appropriate policy response. There is more support for encouraging “allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to send their troops to defend Taiwan” (28 percent), but this is lower than support for providing “military aid or weapons” (34 percent) or encouraging “allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to provide military aid to Taiwan” (34 percent). The greatest support is for providing direct “humanitarian assistance” (37 percent) and encouraging “allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to provide humanitarian assistance to Taiwan” (35 percent). Economic assistance, either directly (30 percent) or by encouraging allies (33 percent), received about the same level of support. In other words, there is little to no clear consensus on exactly which option would be most preferred for the United States.

Figure 1.8. Policy Options on Taiwan for the United States and U.S.-South Korea-Japan



When it came to a trilateral joint response, there was no clear support for any single option. Still, a diplomatic response (37 percent) was shown to be more preferable than an economic (33 percent) or military (30 percent) response, albeit marginally so. Again, “no response” (9 percent) is the least preferred option.

Together, these results suggest that Americans do not favor U.S. military engagement in a Taiwan contingency scenario. Instead, they prefer diplomacy and indirect support for Taiwan. There is also no clear preference among these favored options. Even in the case of a joint response, the American public appears split on exactly what the three countries should do together. This shows that a Taiwan contingency poses a difficult problem for the American public and that there is no clear national consensus on this issue.

Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Armament

When speaking of alliances, the question of U.S. extended deterrence cannot be ignored. Although the issue of “alliance modernization” was not settled at the first summit between President Trump and President Lee Jae Myung on August 25, there is growing recognition of the need to adjust U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula to align with evolving strategic priorities and the security environment in Northeast Asia.¹⁷ As emphasized by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Xavier Brunson, alliance modernization is an adaptive response to the evolving regional security environment.¹⁸ From General Brunson’s point of view, the focus is “not about numbers” but on capabilities such as Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTs) and fifth-generation fighters. While changes to the U.S. force posture have been considered in the past, recent developments point to a more distributed and dispersed force presence across Northeast Asia, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.¹⁹ Regional allies did not welcome this change.²⁰


When we asked about their views on the sufficiency of the U.S. commitment to its allies, nearly twice as many respondents (32 percent) thought it was sufficient as those who did not (17 percent). But for the most part, 51 percent of respondents did not have a strong opinion on this issue—roughly 28 percent said they did not know, and 23 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. This means that, under current conditions, there is no strong political rationale for strengthening U.S. commitments in the region.

An obvious concern among allies is the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from the region. One way to address this problem is to allow countries such as South Korea and Japan to build their own deterrent capabilities. Two options that have been raised in this regard are indigenously developed nuclear weapons or the deployment of U.S.-controlled and -operated nuclear weapons to the region. When asked about South Korea developing its own nuclear capabilities, over 32 percent of surveyed Americans were supportive, compared to 34 percent who were opposed. The attitude was similar for Japan, with 33 percent in support and 35 percent opposed. On the question of deploying U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korea and Japan, the sentiment was similar.

Figure 1.9. Indigenous Nuclear Armament vs. Deployment of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Korea or Japan

Q: If North Korea does not abandon its nuclear program, do you/would you support or oppose South Korea / Japan developing its own nuclear weapons?

Q: Do you/would you support or oppose basing U.S.-controlled and operated nuclear weapons in South Korea / Japan?



A subsequent comparison of these two sets of questions shows that the answers for both questions are correlated (See Figure 1.9). In short, Americans do not differentiate between deploying U.S. nuclear weapons to these countries and the development of nuclear capabilities by the two countries. What is also notable is that there is no clear preference for either option, with an equal share of respondents opposing, supporting, or having no clear opinion.

Finally, it is also important to take note of the fact that the general opinion and attitude on the nuclear issue are split among survey respondents, even though nearly 54 percent believe that it is “not likely at all” for North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in the next five to ten years.

Taken together, we can reason that while the American public is not adequately informed about the security dynamic in this region, the majority believes that the U.S. security commitment (i.e., extended deterrence) is robust and that even though the majority believes that North Korea is unlikely to denuclearize, there is no clear position on whether they would support or oppose nuclear weapons in South Korea or Japan.

Discussion

The data suggest that American perceptions of national interest and shared threats provide a strong basis for trilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia. Nearly half of U.S. respondents identified South Korea and Japan as vital to U.S. national interests, alongside traditional partners such as the European Union and the United Kingdom. All three countries identify China, North Korea, and Russia as their primary security concerns, though with notable differences in relative weighting of those threats—North Korea ranks first for South Korean

respondents, China for Japanese respondents, and Russia for American respondents. The broad commonality in threat perception can still serve as the basis for alliance cohesion and coordinated security planning. Policymakers seeking to deepen trilateral cooperation can appeal to these overlapping security interests to justify enhanced burden-sharing, joint exercises, and diplomatic coordination, particularly with respect to China and North Korea.


On issues related to Taiwan and nuclear deterrence, however, the American public is less clear. While 42 percent of Americans consider a cross-strait military conflict likely, nearly half admitted uncertainty. Regarding the desired level of involvement, the data indicate a preference for humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. There is no clear consensus on this issue, however. Similarly, on the question of allied nuclear armament, opinion is almost evenly split between those who support and those who oppose. This suggests that there is room for greater debate and discussion on this issue.

Trade and Tariffs

One issue that has drawn significant attention in the Trump administration's foreign policy is trade and tariffs.²¹ Within the first year of his term, President Trump has moved swiftly to introduce various tariff measures, some of which are still being challenged in the courts. Administration officials regularly cite the benefits of tariffs, including better trade terms and increased revenue. In our survey, however, we found three interesting patterns. One is that a plurality of respondents opposed the Trump administration's tariffs.

Figure 1.10. Sentiments on Tariffs by Country

Q: How do you think the following should be changed if at all? Tariffs on goods imported to the United States from...



The second observation is that public opinion on tariffs did not differ depending on the target—there were similar shares of respondents who opposed tariffs against South Korea (43 percent) and Japan (46 percent) (See Figure 1.10). However, there were notable demographic differences as previous research on this issue has shown.²² Namely, self-identifying Republicans and conservatives were far more supportive of tariffs than self-identifying Democrats and liberals; the latter group was also more supportive of U.S. influence over South Korea and Japan with respect to their trade and investment activities with China.

An interesting finding, however, is that nearly 57 percent of respondents support the standard rule of free trade, which has served as the international norm since the end of World War II. Even though there was a statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republicans on the question of free trade rules, the nominal magnitude of this difference is relatively small enough that it is reasonable to state that both generally support open trade. More specifically, over 70 percent of Democrats and 58 percent of Republicans supported free trade rules. Similar observations apply to ideological orientation. While there is a statistically significant difference, the nominal magnitude does not change the conclusion that conservatives and liberals generally support free trade rules. This finding is consistent with previous research showing that Republicans

(unlike Democrats) tend to support mercantilist or export-led protectionist policies, favoring protectionism against imports and supporting unrestricted exports of U.S. goods and services.²³ Essentially, Republican voters oppose open trade but support protectionist policies, such as tariffs on imports.

Discussion

General opposition to Trump's tariffs on South Korea and Japan signals that the administration's tariff agenda carries meaningful political risk, particularly if the economic costs become more visible to American consumers and businesses. The result suggests that the American public holds different views about tariffs depending on whether the target country is a friend or foe. This finding undermines one of the administration's implicit assumptions that economic pressure can be applied to allies without broader reputational or political consequences. For South Korean and Japanese policymakers navigating trade negotiations with Washington, this public ambivalence is worth noting. That is, there is *no* strong popular mandate for aggressive tariff measures against these two countries, suggesting there may be diplomatic space to push back or seek negotiated outcomes without fear of alienating the American public.

Perhaps more important for the long-term trajectory of trade policy is the finding that strong majorities in both the United States and South Korea continue to support free trade rules and norms, even though partisan differences on tariffs remain sharp. This underlying pro-free trade consensus suggests that the Trump administration's trade policy may be more politically fragile than it appears, particularly if it is perceived as departing from the postwar international economic order that Americans broadly endorse. For trilateral economic relations, this opens the door to trade cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan as a reaffirmation of rules-based norms that both Democratic and Republican voters support. Doing so could help insulate the economic dimensions of the alliance from the volatility of domestic partisan politics and provide a more lasting foundation for trade and investment ties among the three countries.

Japan


Japanese Views Toward the United States and U.S.-Japan Relations

U.S.-Japan Relations

The inauguration of the second Trump administration has presented a series of challenges for allies, including Japan.²⁴ The test of the U.S.-Japan relationship was on full display during summit meetings between President Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.²⁵ However, the two leaders were able to smooth over differences.²⁶

It is interesting to see, therefore, that the survey question related to overall impressions of the United States shows the Japanese public less inclined (than South Koreans) to see the United States in favorable terms. In particular, the data shows that only about 40 percent of the Japanese respondents see the United States favorably, while 34 percent do not. Roughly 25 percent were unable to state an opinion, suggesting that approximately 60 percent of the Japanese public did not view the United States favorably (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Japanese Impressions of the United States




Among those who viewed the United States favorably, 31 percent said the United States was an important security partner. When asked to state the reason for seeing the United States unfavorably, 29 percent stated that it was because the United States had a strong self-centered America-First stance, and 41 percent stated that it was because they had a negative impression of the U.S. president. When asked specifically about President Trump, 70 percent had an unfavorable impression while only about 15 percent saw him favorably.

There was a split in the overall assessment of the bilateral relationship, with 42 percent rating it good and nearly 35 percent rating it bad (See Figure 2.2). Around 23 percent saw the relationship as being neither good nor bad. This seems to show that the Japanese public is less complacent when it comes to how the United States manages its relationship with Japan.

This does not necessarily mean that the Japanese public does not see the benefits or values of Japan’s relations with the United States. When asked about the importance of Japan’s bilateral relationship with the United States, nearly 86 percent agreed that it was important. However, the results suggest that the future outlook on the relationship may not be as positive. Indeed, when asked to assess the future of U.S.-Japan relations, only about 55 percent thought that the relationship would either improve (24 percent) or stay the same (31 percent). Nearly 45 percent thought the relationship would worsen.

Figure 2.2. U.S.-Japan Relations




Economy and Trade

One of the challenges both Japan and South Korea have faced with the United States concerns trade and investment.²⁷ When asked about U.S. regulations on trade and investment with China, 50 percent expressed opposition, and only about 27 percent were supportive. Close to 23 percent did not have an opinion. On the question of tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, 77 percent were opposed, and only 7 percent expressed support (See Figure 2.2).

And yet, when asked to identify the regions that are important to Japan’s economy, 66 percent said the United States, followed by China, ASEAN, and the European Union—all at a distant second, each clustered at around 37 percent. India was third at 35 percent. Only about 28 percent named South Korea as an important country for Japan’s economy.

Figure 2.3. Economic Relations and Trade



The U.S.-Japan and South Korea-Japan economic comparison is also instructive. While 60 percent see the U.S.-Japan economic relationship as complementary, only 38 percent say the same of the South Korea-Japan relationship, and 36 percent view it as competitive (Figure 2.3). This near-even split suggests that economic normalization between Seoul and Tokyo, however desirable, remains psychologically incomplete at the public level.

Discussion

Similar to the survey data from South Korea, the Japanese public’s view of Japan’s relations with the United States appears tepid if not frayed. The data suggests that the Japanese public acknowledges the value of the relationship, but there is also skepticism and distrust of U.S. leadership. This translates into a delicate situation for Japanese


policymakers, who must manage domestic public sentiment while preserving an alliance that remains the cornerstone of Japan’s security architecture.

The reference to the Lee-Takaichi summit is a subtle but important signal. When traditional U.S. allies begin smoothing over their own bilateral differences *because* of shared concerns about Washington, it suggests that U.S. credibility as an anchor of regional stability is being quietly but meaningfully tested.²⁸ The alliance endures, but the goodwill that has long buffered any harm to the alliance may be fraying.

Japanese Attitudes Toward South Korea


One unintended consequence of having a more challenging relationship with the United States is the emergence of closer cooperation between South Korea and Japan. For instance, the two countries recently agreed to swap liquefied natural gas (LNG) and conduct closer cooperation on energy security to deal with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz due to the conflict in the Middle East.²⁹ It is worth noting that this is happening amid a more progressive government in Seoul and a more hardline conservative administration in Tokyo, a recipe for a more contentious Korea-Japan relationship in recent years.³⁰

Figure 2.4. Impression of South Korea



To consider the sustainability and even strengthening of this relationship, we look to see how the Japanese public thinks about South Korea. When asked about their impression of South Korea, only about 25 percent had a favorable impression, while 51 percent did not. Roughly 24 percent was neutral (Figure 2.4). When asked to state the reason for seeing South Korea favorably, 33 percent stated that it was because of South Korea’s culture, and 20 percent stated that it was because they saw South Korea as an important security partner. When it came to reasons for not seeing South Korea favorably, nearly 27 percent stated that it was because they did not have a good impression of South Korea’s national character and temperament, 28 percent stated that it was because of disputes over historical issues, and 27 percent stated that it was because of anti-Japanese demonstrations in South Korea. When asked about President Lee Jae Myung, only 11 percent had a favorable impression. Around 39 percent held a negative impression, while 50 percent did not have any opinion (See Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5. South Korea-Japan Bilateral Relations and Historical Disputes




Putting personal impressions aside, what do the Japanese people think of the bilateral relationship itself? When asked to assess whether the Korea-Japan relationship is a good or bad one, 40 percent said that it was bad, while 32 percent said that the relationship was good. Around 28 percent did not have an opinion.

South Korea-Japan Relations

However, when asked about the *importance* of the bilateral relationship for Japan, 54 percent acknowledged that it is important. Only 30 percent said it is not important. The remaining 16 percent said it was neither or they did not know. Among those who saw this relationship as being important, 34 percent cited “deep geographical and cultural connection” as the main reason, while nearly 40 percent singled out the importance of “security cooperation” (Figure 2.4). Among those who answered that it was not important, 27 percent cited “the lack of progress on historical issues,” while 23 percent stated that it was “because South Korea is not an important economic partner,” and 20 percent stated that South Korea’s “values linked with South Korea’s legal, diplomatic, and public attitudes are different” from those of Japan. This suggests that while the Japanese public does not have a strong affinity toward South Korea or see the relationship as necessarily positive, they acknowledge its importance for Japan’s national interests.

Figure 2.6. Importance of South Korea-Japan Relations



In terms of specific issues the two countries can prioritize, there was no clear consensus, but 23 percent highlighted the importance of “restoring or building trust,” followed by 17 percent who wanted to focus on “strengthening security cooperation to address the North Korean nuclear issue.” Resolution of historical disputes (13 percent), expanding youth exchanges (13 percent), and advancing economic cooperation (10 percent) were also cited as important but received less attention (Figure 2.5). It is interesting that the Japanese

public placed a higher priority on “trust” than on historical, economic, or security issues, suggesting that the public cares more about foundational drivers of the bilateral relationship than about interests. This is somewhat different from the South Korean survey data, which suggests that the public is more interested in a pragmatic, two-track approach to South Korea-Japan relations, treating historical and territorial issues separately from other strategic issues. Instead, the Japanese public appears to prioritize trust-building as an important requirement for moving ahead on all of these issues, suggesting that the problem is primarily a trust deficit rather than material gains on issues of mutual importance.

Given the above finding, it is understandable why 39 percent did not have an opinion when asked about the Japanese government’s approach toward South Korea and why 36 percent disapproved. Only 24 percent approved of the Japanese government’s handling of the relationship. Likewise, even though the previous South Korean administration made significant concessions on historical issues to improve relations with Japan, approximately 50 percent of the Japanese survey respondents disapproved of the South Korean government’s stance toward Japan, and only 16 percent approved. Nearly 34 percent did not have an opinion.

Looking toward the future, 26 percent thought the relationship would improve over the next three to five years, while 29 percent believed it would worsen. Nearly 45 percent said that the relationship would remain unchanged.

Culture and Soft Power

Given the role that culture seems to play in shaping a positive impression of South Korea, the survey also asked how interested the respondent was in South Korean popular culture, to which 67 percent answered that they were not interested, while 26 percent stated that they were. Yet, 44 percent of respondents agreed that South Korean popular culture helped improve the country’s image in Japan, while 36 percent stated culture did not have much impact. Together, these results suggest that the Japanese public acknowledges the impact of South Korean soft power on the broader impression of South Korea, but the public does not appear genuinely interested in its content.

Historical and Territorial Disputes

If the above analysis is correct, resolving historical and territorial disputes is less consequential for the bilateral relationship than the deeper question of trust when it comes to South Korea-Japan relations. When asked about the relationship between historical issues and future bilateral cooperation, only 21 percent stated that “cooperation will not be possible until historical issues are sufficiently resolved.” An equal share (21

percent) of respondents stated that “cooperation should proceed even if they are kept separate from historical issues” (Figure 2.5). Roughly 29 percent stated that “cooperation can advance even though some historical issues remain unresolved.” Meanwhile, 28 percent seemed resigned to the fact that “historical issues cannot be resolved.” What this means is that nearly eight in ten Japanese people think that resolving historical issues is not pertinent to enhancing cooperation with South Korea.

Interestingly, when asked about the importance of the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute for South Korea-Japan relations, 76 percent acknowledged that it was an important issue. Approximately 13 percent did not express an opinion, and only 10 percent stated that it was not an important issue. Together, the results imply that while these issues are important, they should not get in the way of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Discussion

Despite growing geopolitical pressure pushing South Korea and Japan closer together, the Japanese public remains deeply ambivalent about its neighbor, with a majority (51 percent) holding an unfavorable view of South Korea due to historical grievances, national character perceptions, and perceived anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea. Still, 54 percent acknowledge the relationship’s importance, primarily on security grounds. This gap between affinity and strategic recognition is the defining feature of Japanese public opinion on South Korea: the public understands *why* the relationship matters without particularly *wanting* it to flourish. Notably, the Japanese public appears to prioritize trust-building over resolving specific historical or economic disputes, which is a contrast to South Korea’s more pragmatic, issue-separating approach, suggesting that the public from both countries are not seeing eye-to-eye on the fundamental basis of the bilateral relationship.

On national security, the data reveals a public quietly reassessing its strategic assumptions. While China, North Korea, and Russia remain top threats for Japan, the fact that 17 percent identify the United States as a threat (marginally higher than the 15 percent who say the same of South Korea) is a remarkable signal of eroding confidence in Washington. This unease extends to extended deterrence, with nearly half the Japanese public doubting the sufficiency of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. On Taiwan, 77 percent recognize a cross-strait contingency as critical to Japan’s national interest, but the public remains cautious about direct military involvement, with a plurality favoring logistical support over combat participation.

The data show that public skepticism is already running high on multiple fronts. If the Trump administration continues to strain the alliance through tariffs, burden-sharing demands, and unpredictable diplomacy, Japanese policymakers will find it increasingly

difficult to defend the relationship domestically as the number of people viewing the United States as a security threat continues to creep upward.


Perhaps most consequentially, the survey hints at a Japan that is beginning to contemplate a more autonomous strategic posture.³¹ The combination of doubts about U.S. extended deterrence, ambivalence toward combat involvement in a Taiwan contingency, and strong opposition to both Japanese and South Korean nuclear armament points to a public that has not found a coherent vision for its national security but is growing uncomfortable with the existing one. This strategic uncertainty, multiplied across relations with the United States and South Korea, represents the most significant long-term risk. A Japan that begins to question its principal ally and its closest regional partner is a Japan whose strategic bearing is becoming increasingly precarious.

National Security

One issue that binds Japan's concerns about relations with the United States and South Korea is national security. While there is some effort to coordinate trilaterally, the model of a multilateral treaty-bound alliance like NATO has not emerged in Northeast Asia. Part of the reason has to do with the difficulty of relations among U.S. allies in the region (i.e., South Korea and Japan). However, recent shifts in U.S. regional policies, along with the emergence of a rising threat by China and the persistent threat posed by North Korea, could potentially impact how the Japanese public thinks about their country's national security interests. There are some signs that this thinking may, in fact, be undergoing some significant changes.

For instance, when we take a closer look at the Japanese public's threat perception, they see China (69 percent), North Korea (55 percent), and Russia (52 percent) as the three greatest threats to Japan. What is striking is that there were more people identifying the United States (17 percent) as a threat than South Korea (15 percent) (See Figure 2.7). Clearly, the thinking about both the United States and South Korea is undergoing significant change under the current geopolitical realities.

Figure 2.7. National Security, Taiwan, North Korea, and Security Cooperation



U.S. Extended Deterrence and Burden-Sharing

When asked about the U.S. nuclear umbrella, nearly 50 percent of the Japanese public seems to think that the United States fails to provide “sufficient protection for Japan against military threats from China and North Korea.” Only about 33 percent think that the U.S. extended deterrence is sufficient, and 17 percent do not have a strong opinion one way or the other. When asked about USFJ (i.e., the presence of 55,000 U.S. troops in Japan), nearly 50 percent agreed that they contribute to regional peace and security. Roughly 33 percent do not.

On the issue of burden-sharing, nearly 57 percent of the Japanese public believed Japan was contributing too much to U.S. troop basing in Japan. Approximately 20 percent think that Japan is contributing the right amount. Just under 4 percent think that Japan should contribute more.

As to whether Japan should increase its own defense spending, only about 34 percent think Japan should increase its defense spending. Meanwhile, 33 percent think that Japan should maintain its current level of spending, and just under 17 percent think that Japan should reduce its defense budget. Roughly 16 percent do not have a strong opinion.

Taiwan

One regional security issue of concern for the Japanese government has been the possibility of a Taiwan contingency. While the Korean public appears to overweigh the potential risks of this scenario, the Japanese public seems to be more reserved. When asked how the respondent assesses the likelihood of a cross-strait military conflict, only about 42 percent thought it was likely. Nearly 19 percent thought it was unlikely, while 39 percent stated that they did not know. However, approximately 77 percent of the respondents stated that a Taiwan contingency is of critical importance to Japan’s national interest. Only about 6 percent stated that it was not important.

When asked how a Taiwan contingency might impact Japan, 31 percent cited the economic impact from disruptions to shipping lanes (18 percent) and semiconductor supply chain (13 percent), 28 percent mentioned associated security risks to Okinawa, and 13 percent were worried about the pressure on democratic systems and impact on the international liberal order.

If a Taiwan contingency were to occur, 41 percent of the Japanese public stated that U.S. forces should intervene militarily in coordination with allies. Roughly 22 percent thought that Taiwan should defend its own territory and the United States should provide indirect support. Around 13 percent thought that Taiwan and allies should fend off the Chinese attack while the United States should provide indirect support. Only 9 percent thought the

United States should intervene militarily by itself. Approximately 14 percent thought that neither the United States nor its allies should intervene militarily.

Assuming that the United States intervenes, the Japanese survey also asked what the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) should do. Only 10 percent of respondents stated that JSDF should join the fight. Meanwhile, 22 percent stated that JSDF should only provide rear support (i.e., communications, intelligence, and surveillance), 27 percent thought that the JSDF should not join the fight but only provide logistical support for the U.S. military and send humanitarian aid to Taiwan, and 26 percent thought that Japan should not be involved at all. Roughly 14 percent did not have an opinion.

When asked how the United States, South Korea, and Japan should respond to a Taiwan contingency, 36 percent thought the three countries should respond diplomatically. Around 24 percent preferred coercive diplomacy (i.e., sanctions or financial pressures), and 12 percent supported military intervention. Approximately 8 percent thought the three countries should not coordinate on this issue. Notably, nearly 20 percent did not have a clear opinion.

North Korea

Aside from Taiwan, another serious national security problem for Japan is North Korea. To address the question of North Korea's growing nuclear threat, 43 percent placed the highest priority on joint intelligence-sharing with South Korea. Around 18 percent favored strategic dialogue and policy consultations with South Korea in addition to intelligence-sharing, 12 percent thought South Korea and Japan should consider forming an "alliance," and 9 percent opposed any form of cooperation.

When asked about Japan's nuclear armament, 63 percent opposed and 24 percent favored this option. When a similar question was posed about South Korea's potential nuclear armament, 65 percent opposed and 15 percent supported this option.

Regional Security and Trilateral Cooperation

Although the North Korean nuclear issue is important, broader regional security is a top concern for Japan, given how quickly and broadly the geopolitical landscape is changing with U.S. retrenchment in the Trump 2.0 era.³² One of the questions the Japanese survey explored was what Japan should do with South Korea to address broader regional security concerns. Nearly 28 percent of respondents said that the two countries should cooperate closely across a wide range of issues with the United States. Around 29 percent prioritized diplomatic dialogue over military cooperation, and 12 percent favored cooperation in

specific areas such as intelligence-sharing and missile defense. Only 10 percent favored acting individually.

Because trilateral cooperation was chosen as the modal option for the largest group of respondents, we delved deeper into this issue by asking about various modes of cooperation. On the issue of security cooperation (e.g., missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and joint training), for instance, 52 percent supported closer trilateral cooperation while only about 28 percent were opposed. Among those who answered in the affirmative, 57 percent identified containing Chinese military expansion and influence as their main reason for increasing trilateral security cooperation. Around 53 percent identified the North Korean nuclear threat, and 42 percent thought that trilateral cooperation was critical to strengthening the U.S.-centered regional security architecture. Approximately 21 percent saw the value of trilateral cooperation in deepening trust and cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Among those who opposed trilateral cooperation, 61 percent thought that it would heighten regional tensions, and 44 percent thought it would exacerbate tensions with China, leading to undesirable outcomes for Japan's economy and security. Roughly 41 percent pointed out the issue of trust due to divergent understandings of history, and 35 percent mentioned concerns about Chinese retaliation.

Discussion

The data reveal a Japanese public navigating a profound strategic paradox: it perceives an increasingly dangerous regional environment but is reluctant to commit to measures such as higher defense spending, active combat roles, or deeper trilateral cooperation, which would most directly address those risks. This hesitancy does not appear to be driven solely by pacifism. Instead, it appears to reveal a rational and uncomfortable reality that the costs of a more assertive posture could work against Japan's interests. But the danger of this precarious position is that it leaves Japan dependent on U.S. security guarantees, which the public increasingly doubts. If Washington's reliability continues to erode, this gap between threat perception and strategic action will become increasingly untenable.

Japanese public attitudes about trilateral cooperation are particularly consequential for the region's long-term security future. The fact that the modal response favors broad U.S.-South Korea-Japan cooperation and that 57 percent of those supporters cite Chinese military containment as the primary rationale signals that geopolitical pressure is slowly doing what decades of diplomacy could not: generating a genuine public appetite for deeper trilateral coordination. However, the 41 percent of opponents who cite historical distrust between South Korea and Japan as a barrier reveals that this appetite remains fragile. The window for institutionalizing trilateral security cooperation may be opening, but it is being pulled in opposite directions—by the urgency of external threats on one side,

and unresolved internal tensions within the Korea-Japan relationship on the other. How quickly and decisively governments act within that window will likely determine whether Northeast Asia develops a more coherent and collective defense posture or continues to rely on a hub-and-spokes model that is showing increasing signs of stress.

South Korea

South Korean Views Toward the United States and U.S.-South Korea Relations

Does South Korean public sentiment reflect the mix of emotions described above when it comes to how they think about the United States and Japan relative to other regional neighbors? The answer is that “it depends.” For instance, on questions that are technically more complex or require the respondent to make a weighted assessment about the bilateral relationship, the sentiment appeared less impacted by partisan or ideological lenses. On questions that asked the respondent to make judgment calls about implications for national security or matters of trust, the South Korean public showed ideological and partisan divides, which reflects the role of emotion in framing highly politicized and polarizing issues.

Military Threat

We begin with the question of military threat. When asked to identify which country poses the greatest military threat to South Korea, 93 percent named North Korea and 76 percent named China. Russia was a distant third at 48 percent. Approximately 35 percent chose Japan, and 16.8 percent chose the United States. One interesting result was that ideological and partisan differences mattered in most cases, with exceptions for China and North Korea. For instance, over 22 percent of self-identifying progressives and 20 percent of Democratic Party supporters saw the United States as a military threat, while only about 9 percent of conservatives and less than 5 percent of People Power Party supporters thought the same. Similarly, nearly 49 percent of progressives and 46 percent of Democratic Party supporters saw Japan as a threat compared to 25 percent of conservatives and less than 19 percent of People Power Party supporters. Clearly, partisanship and ideology are important in shaping people’s views about these countries.

Economic Relationship


Respondents were also asked to identify countries that have an important economic relationship with South Korea. Nearly 94 percent answered the United States, followed by China as a distant second at 73.9 percent. Japan was considered the third most important at 63.6 percent. Roughly 33.5 percent thought Europe was next most important, followed by ASEAN (29.7 percent) and India (22.9 percent). Russia only registered 20.2 percent. This result stands in stark contrast to some South Korean elite views about the relative importance of Russia.³³ The public clearly sees Russia as more of a threat than an important economic partner for South Korea. In fact, the benefits of engagement with

Russia are valued less than engagement with ASEAN or India. Finally, partisan or ideological differences were relatively low for this issue.

Figure 3.1. Threats, Economic Importance, and U.S.-South Korea Relations


South Korea Survey: Security Threats, Economic Relations & Views on the US

N = 1,585 South Korean adults, 2025



South Korean Views on the US and Korea-US Relations

N = 1,585 | % selecting each response



Note: Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
Source: Survey of South Korean adults, 2025

Note: Multiple-response questions (top row) allow >100% totals.
Stacked bars show single-response distributions.

Bilateral Relationship

When asked to assess the overall state of the relationship between the United States and South Korea, nearly 28 percent stated that it was poor, over 54 percent answered neutral, and 18 percent answered that it was good. When asked about overall impressions of the United States, nearly 73 percent answered that they have a favorable impression of the country. Notably, when asked about the respondent's impression of President Trump, over 73 percent stated that they had a bad impression. The partisan and ideological differences were less pronounced than in questions that asked the respondent to name the United States as a military threat or economic partner. Clearly, the South Korean public appears sophisticated enough to differentiate the country from its leader.

Trust

On the question of trust, 66 percent of South Korean respondents answered that the United States is trustworthy, while 30 percent answered that it is not. Unlike the previous question, differences along ideological and partisan lines were more pronounced. For instance, only about 55 percent of progressives agreed that the United States was trustworthy, while nearly 77 percent of conservatives stated the same. 59 percent of Democratic Party supporters thought the United States was trustworthy, while nearly 80 percent of People Power Party supporters said the same. In the Korean case, trust appears to vary depending on political and ideological orientation.

Defense Spending and Burden Sharing

When the respondent was asked whether they would support South Korea increasing its defense spending to meet U.S. demands, nearly 43 percent expressed support, while nearly 52 percent did not. There were large ideological and partisan differences, as over 70 percent of progressives opposed supporting a defense budget increase, compared to nearly 39 percent of conservatives. Nearly 58 percent of conservatives supported increased spending, while less than 27 percent of progressives thought the same. Nearly twice the percentage of People Power Party supporters (60 percent) supported an increased defense budget compared to Democratic Party supporters (31 percent).


When asked about burden-sharing, over 85 percent of respondents stated that South Korea was either contributing too much (51.4 percent) or just the right amount (34.5 percent) for the basing of USFK. There were partisan and ideological differences when it came to general assessments about the magnitude of South Korea's contribution. More specifically, twice as many conservatives and conservative party supporters were likely to state that South Korea contributed "enough" toward burden-sharing in comparison to

progressives and progressive party supporters who thought that South Korea was too generous.

Trade and Investment

Given that trade accounts for over 80 percent of the South Korean economy, trade performance is a top issue of concern and interest for the South Korean public. Not surprisingly, when asked how the respondent felt about free trade and the liberal international order, 71 percent expressed support for free trade. This suggests that recent moves by the United States to walk away from global rules-based trade are not likely to be welcomed. On the issue of U.S.-imposed export controls against China, for instance, nearly 58 percent expressed opposition and only about 34 percent supported this measure. Finally, when asked about the Trump administration’s tariffs, nearly 81 percent disapproved and about 14 percent approved. Overall, the South Korean public appears to support more liberalized trade—whether with the United States or China—and over eight in ten oppose U.S. tariffs on South Korean exports.

Figure 3.2. Views on Trade



Discussion

In summary, the survey data show that the majority of South Koreans recognize the importance of the bilateral relationship with the United States, but there are clear signs of concern and even departure from the U.S. position on specific policy matters such as burden-sharing and trade. For instance, over 70 percent of South Koreans maintained a positive impression of the United States, with over nine in ten South Koreans seeing the United States as the “most important economic partner” and nearly seven in ten naming the United States as a “trustworthy” country. Yet, only about two in ten South Koreans think the overall state of the bilateral relationship is good. On the question of burden-

sharing and trade, over 85 percent stated that South Korea was carrying enough or too much of the burden for U.S. troop basing on the peninsula. Roughly 71 percent of surveyed respondents also supported continued promotion of free trade, and over 80 percent opposed U.S. tariffs against South Korean exports.

What this suggests is that specific policy differences have yet to translate into the South Korean public's broader assessment of the relationship with the United States. So far, the trend, relative to other countries, is still favorable, and the overall impression of the United States is holding. However, there are clear signs of a break on policy matters, which appears to be driven by partisan and ideological differences.


South Korean Views of Japan

Bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan have always been a challenge, given the unresolved historical and territorial issues that often get in the way of cooperative engagement. There are numerous examples of how these issues are invoked for domestic political reasons. In more recent years, overtures by the conservative South Korean administration have helped thaw this relationship, and the more demanding posture by the United States toward its allies appears to have worked to draw even the unlikeliest of partners closer together. We look to see how the South Korean public is digesting this trend.

Impression and Bilateral Relations

When asked about their impression of Japan, respondents were somewhat mixed, with over 44 percent expressing that they had a good impression and nearly 42 percent stating that they had a bad impression. There are strong ideological and partisan differences, with over 51 percent of progressives and 48 percent of Democratic Party supporters stating that they have a negative impression of Japan; only 18 percent of conservatives and 21 percent of People Power Party supporters stated the same. When we look at the opposite response, nearly 70 percent of conservatives and 73 percent of People Power Party supporters and 39 percent of progressives and 40 percent of Democratic Party supporters stated that they had a good impression of Japan.

Figure 3.3. Impression of Japan




The reason cited by over 71 percent of those who had a bad impression of Japan was history. Among those who answered that they had a good impression of Japan, the main reasons include “Japan being an advanced economy” (14 percent), “democratic governance” (15 percent), “having courteous and diligent national character” (32 percent), “culture” (10 percent), and food and shopping (11 percent). What this suggests is that while there are varied reasons why South Koreans feel an affinity toward Japan, historical and territorial issues are the main drivers of negative sentiments.

On the assessment of the bilateral relationship itself, nearly 60 percent of the respondents saw the relationship as being neutral, and 30 percent saw it as being bad. Interestingly, there was no partisan or ideological divide on this assessment.

When asked to assess the importance of South Korea-Japan relations, over 87 percent acknowledged that it was important, and only about 10 percent stated that it was not important. Among those who answered that the relationship is important, over 40 percent recognized that it was “due to deep historical, geographical, and cultural linkage as a neighboring country,” and nearly 32 percent stated that “Japan is an important trade partner and that there is a great degree of mutual dependence from an industrial and economic standpoint.”

Figure 3.4. Importance of Relations with Japan



On the question regarding future outlook on Korea-Japan relations, most respondents were sanguine, with 51 percent stating that relations will improve marginally, and nearly 10 percent thought they would improve significantly. Roughly 15 percent thought it would remain unchanged, while only 14 percent thought it would get worse.


Together, what these results show is that views on Japan differed along partisan and ideological lines, with progressives and Democrats leaning more on historical issues, which they named as the main reason for being guarded about cooperating with Japan, while conservatives and People Power Party supporters expressed a variety of reasons for wanting to strengthen bilateral relations. It is encouraging, however, that the public understood the pragmatic value of cooperating with Japan more broadly, with over 87 percent acknowledging the importance of Korea-Japan relations. Still, the public was also realistic about the future prospects for this relationship.

Economic Relations

One reason why the South Korean public may value improving relations with Japan is the potential economic windfall from better relations. To test this idea, the South Korean survey asked the respondents to assess whether the South Korean and Japanese economies are complementary or competitive. Over 61 percent stated that the two

countries maintain a competitive economy. Nearly 34 percent thought that it was mutually beneficial.

Figure 3.5. Views on South Korea-Japan Relations



When asked to choose what South Korea and Japan should work together to accomplish, 35 percent stated that the two countries should “resolve the historical issue,” nearly 22 percent identified “North Korea and national security interests,” roughly 17 percent named “trust building,” and 19 percent named “cooperation on trade, investment, and emerging technology to promote mutual economic interests.”

Foreign Policy

Given the above analysis, it is worth considering how the South Korean public feels about the manner in which the South Korean and Japanese governments have managed the relationship. When asked about the approach that the two governments have taken toward the relationship, nearly 43 percent thought the Japanese government was doing a good job, while nearly 42 percent were negative on this assessment. Nearly 16 percent remained neutral. With respect to the South Korean government’s handling of the bilateral relationship, over 55 percent was positive and only 29 percent negative.

History and Territory

Historical and territorial disputes are defining features of South Korea-Japan relations. As the above data indicates, these are the issues that prevent South Korea and Japan from being able to work more closely in areas of mutual interest. We explored how South Koreans feel about this issue by more directly asking about the best way to manage such disputes. Notably, 35 percent of respondents stated that the two countries should focus on issues of mutual interest while keeping historical issues unresolved, and 40 percent stated that historical issues should be addressed along with other issues of mutual interest. Only 20 percent thought that the historical issue needed to be resolved before the two countries could move forward with their bilateral relationship. Together, what this suggests is that roughly 55 percent of South Koreans support not having the historical issue be a barrier to cooperation on issues of mutual interest. But nearly 60 percent believed that historical issues needed to be addressed in some way. What is interesting about these results is that the response did not markedly differ along generational, ideological, or partisan lines.

This is not to downplay the relative importance of these issues. When asked to assess the importance of the territorial dispute surrounding Dokdo/Takeshima, 93 percent agreed that this is “important.” However, South Koreans appear to maintain a rather pragmatic perspective on the bilateral relationship with Japan that keeps one eye on issues of relevance to national identity and the other on national interest.

Discussion

What emerges most clearly from the data is a kind of dual consciousness among South Koreans. On the one hand, there is strong recognition of the historical and territorial dispute, acknowledged by 93 percent of respondents, which confirms that issues of national identity and sovereignty are vitally important. On the other hand, the fact that over 55 percent of respondents would support moving forward on issues of mutual interest without first resolving historical disputes suggests that this identity-consciousness does not translate into a preference for paralysis. South Koreans are capable of maintaining a rather complex mix of these tensions simultaneously, rather than demanding that one be settled before the other can proceed.

The ideological and partisan differences are striking but not surprising. The gap between progressive and conservative respondents on this question is wide enough to suggest that views of Japan have become something of a proxy for broader political identity in South Korea. This is why domestic actors have exploited this issue for political reasons. Yet, what complicates this picture is the relative absence of partisan divergence when respondents

were asked to assess the bilateral relationship itself or the importance of resolving historical issues alongside other priorities. This suggests that while Japan may be a political symbol, South Koreans are signaling that the relationship with Japan is a structural reality.


The economic dimension deserves particular attention. The fact that over 61 percent of respondents view the two economies as being competitive rather than complementary is a telling indicator of how South Koreans frame the relationship in material terms—less as a partnership of mutual reinforcement and more as a contest.

Taken together, the picture that emerges is one of a public that is neither naively optimistic nor hostile toward Japan, but one that has come to accept the reality of the relationship. The historical wounds are real, and the territorial sensitivities are genuine, but there is recognition that the relationship matters (affirmed by nearly 87 percent), which provides a lasting foundation for engagement. Whether that momentum can be sustained will depend on whether leaders in both countries can resist the temptation to reach for history when the domestic political calculus makes it convenient to do so.

South Korean Views of Trilateral Cooperation

Given the pragmatic attitude the South Korean public appears to favor when it comes to relations with Japan, the data is also likely to show a supportive public opinion toward trilateral cooperation. Indeed, when asked about trilateral military cooperation, nearly 79 percent expressed approval. When asked about the reason for supporting trilateral military cooperation, 74 percent cited “North Korean denuclearization and stability of the Korean Peninsula” as the main reason. Over 64 percent were worried about “deterring China’s rise.” Nearly 30 percent cited the importance of “strengthening U.S.-entered regional security system,” and around 29 percent stated that it was “necessary to strengthen Korea-Japan relations.”


Figure 3.6. Trilateral Security Cooperation



Taiwan

One of the critical issues facing the region is the looming possibility of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. When asked whether the respondent thought China would initiate a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the near future, over 72 percent answered in the affirmative. Approximately 19 percent answered in the negative, and nearly 9 percent did not agree or disagree.

Figure 3.7. North Korea, Taiwan, and Nuclear Armament



When asked whether cross-strait tensions are an important issue for South Korea, over 86 percent answered affirmatively, while only 5.7 percent answered negatively. Finally, when asked what the United States should do in the event that the Chinese military takes action against Taiwan, 11 percent answered that the United States should intervene by itself to defend Taiwan, while nearly 36 percent answered that the United States should cooperate with allies to intervene militarily. In contrast, 32 percent stated that Taiwan should defend itself.

When asked what South Korea should do in the event that the United States intervenes militarily in Taiwan, over 39 percent answered that “South Korean military should limit its role to logistical support for U.S. forces and humanitarian assistance to Taiwan.” Nearly 29 percent answered that “the South Korean military should focus on supporting U.S. forces in communications, intelligence, and reconnaissance roles, without being deployed to combat areas.” Only 8.5 percent answered that the South Korean military should fight alongside U.S. soldiers in battle. Over 16 percent stated that “South Korea should not get involved militarily.” In general, most South Koreans believed that South Korean support for

Taiwan should be minimized or limited, but less than two in ten stated that South Korea should not intervene militarily at all.

Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation

One of the gravest national security threats is nuclear North Korea. Since the signing of the armistice, the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee have maintained peace on the Korean Peninsula. How do South Koreans feel about these issues, given that North Korea continues to build its capability and the United States continues to request South Korea to do more with respect to its own defense against North Korea?

One question that touches on this issue is how South Koreans feel about South Korea and Japan's bilateral approach to security cooperation. Only 13 percent stated that they oppose any kind of security cooperation between the two countries. Additionally, 38 percent supported information-sharing, while 26 percent stated that the two countries must move beyond information-sharing and establish a policy framework to address the North Korean threat. Nearly 17 percent even agreed that South Korea and Japan should consider forming an alliance to deal with North Korea.

When asked about the adequacy of U.S. extended deterrence against the threats posed by China and North Korea, nearly 57 percent thought it was adequate, and nearly 34 percent did not think it was enough. When asked what the surveyed respondents thought about South Korea possessing nuclear weapons in the event that North Korea does not denuclearize, nearly 68 percent were supportive, and only 21 percent were opposed. When asked what the respondent thought about Japan possessing nuclear weapons under the same conditions, 19 percent supported, and nearly 65 percent opposed this idea.

Discussion

If the economy did not provide a strong rationale for cooperation, national security certainly appears to provide a very strong basis. First, we see an overwhelming support for trilateral military cooperation (nearly 79 percent). Threat perception provides the best explanation. North Korean denuclearization remains the most important concern, followed by China's rise, for nearly two-thirds of respondents. This represents a meaningful shift in how South Koreans are beginning to frame the regional security environment—less as a problem with Pyongyang and more as a broader contest of power in which Seoul must position itself thoughtfully. The U.S.-centered regional architecture is valued, but as a means to specific ends rather than as an end in itself.

The findings related to Taiwan are among the most revealing. The fact that over 72 percent of South Koreans believe China will initiate a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the near future speaks to a level of threat perception that has clearly outpaced official diplomatic caution on the issue. And the near-universal recognition (over 86 percent) that such a conflict would carry direct implications for South Korea suggests that the public has already internalized what policymakers in Seoul have been reluctant to state openly.

Conclusion: Moving Beyond Washington

The most important analytical insight from this set of three surveys is the rejection of the most obvious observation about the promise of trilateral cooperation. On the surface, the numbers appear to tell a story of alliances under pressure: 70 percent of Japanese hold an unfavorable view of President Trump, 73 percent of South Koreans say the same, and both publics express deep frustration with U.S. trade policy, burden-sharing demands, and diplomatic unpredictability. These are significant findings, but they speak to dissatisfaction with the current U.S. leadership rather than to the erosion of alliance commitments.

Unfavorable impressions of a sitting U.S. president are not the same as a verdict on the relationship itself, and the data from all three countries make this distinction. In Japan, 86 percent of respondents affirm the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship. In South Korea, 73 percent hold a favorable impression of the United States as a country. Both publics have demonstrated the capacity to distinguish between the institution and the individual, between the alliance and its current steward. In other words, the data reveals a relationship strain, but it also reaffirms the centrality of the partnership with the United States, rooted in decades of security cooperation and economic interdependence that has not yet broken.

The data also shows that the public in all three countries shares a lot of common ground, countering stories of friction that often dominate the headlines. In all three countries, for instance, the public sees China, North Korea, and Russia as primary security concerns, providing a common strategic rationale for deeper cooperation even though the relative ordering of those threats differs. Equally significant are the converging views on trade. A majority in all three countries supports the free trade norms that have governed the postwar international order, and broad pluralities in both the United States and South Korea oppose Trump-era tariffs on allied partners, with Japan showing an emphatic 77 percent opposition. This underlying pro-free trade consensus across all three countries suggests that the economic dimensions of the trilateral relationship rest on shared values.

If the findings show that the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan relationships are rooted in something deeper than a single presidency, the question is whether Seoul and Tokyo trust each other sufficiently to sustain the trilateral relationship. And here, the data tells a more mixed story, optimistic but still challenging. On the question of the relationship's value, both publics are clear. Around 54 percent of Japanese respondents acknowledge that the South Korea-Japan relationship is important, with nearly 40 percent of that group citing security cooperation as the primary reason. On the South Korean side, an even more emphatic 87 percent affirm the importance of relations with Japan. These are not trivial. They suggest that both publics have arrived, through different paths and with different emotional textures, at a shared recognition that the bilateral relationship matters for their respective national interests. The strategic case for cooperation has been internalized at the public level in both countries—a more solid foundation than the headline sentiment numbers might suggest.

Where the data reveals a gap is on the question of trust, and the nature of that gap differs between the two countries. In Japan, the trust deficit appears to be a broadly shared public condition that cuts across the political spectrum. It is worth noting that 51 percent hold an unfavorable view of South Korea, and only 25 percent view their neighbor favorably. Most tellingly, when Japanese respondents are asked what the two countries most need to prioritize, they do not name history, economics, or security; they name trust itself, identifying it as the foundational condition for progress on other issues.

In South Korea, the trust picture is structurally different. The broad public recognition of Japan's importance coexists with a trust dynamic that is heavily mediated by ideological and partisan orientation. Conservatives are more willing to extend trust to Japan and to support cooperation, while progressives are more guarded, with historical grievances serving as the primary lens through which they frame the relationship. This means that in South Korea, the trust gap is driven more by political orientation. Trust can be high or low depending on which coalition drives decision-making in Seoul. The fact that about 50 percent of the Japanese public does not support any political party explains why this dynamic is nonexistent in Japan.³⁴ The practical implication is that bilateral trust-building remains vulnerable to reversal in South Korea when domestic political winds shift.

It is worth noting, however, that the conditions for changing this dynamic may be more favorable now than ever. The partisan structure of trust in South Korea suggests that cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo is not possible. Yet, the current moment features something unusual: a progressive administration in Seoul and a conservative government in Tokyo finding common ground because of a combination of external pressures stemming from U.S. unpredictability, Chinese assertiveness, and North Korea's nuclear

program. The recent South Korea-Japan energy security agreement is a concrete illustration of this dynamic. When strategic necessity overrides ideology, cooperation can thrive. The data suggests that the publics in both countries understand this, even if they have not fully embraced it. South Koreans broadly affirm the relationship's importance even as many harbor historical grievances. Japanese respondents support trilateral cooperation even as a majority views South Korea unfavorably. In both cases, there is a gap between sentiment and strategic judgment—and that gap is where political leadership can operate.

The nuclear question, however, serves as a reminder that not all of the trilateral framework's fault lines run along the South Korea-Japan axis. On the question of extended deterrence and nuclear armament, the three publics diverge in ways that could, under certain conditions, become significant. South Koreans stand out sharply, with 68 percent supporting indigenous nuclear armament under conditions of continued North Korean nuclearization. This result reflects both the rising security concern on the peninsula and a growing frustration with the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. The American and Japanese publics, by contrast, are far more evenly and inconclusively split on this question.

Regarding Taiwan, all three publics converge in preferring diplomatic and humanitarian responses over direct military involvement, but the depth of threat perception differs markedly: over 72 percent of South Koreans believe a Chinese military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is imminent, compared to a far more uncertain American and Japanese public. These divergences do not undermine the trilateral framework, but they do suggest differing views on this issue.

The conclusion that emerges is therefore more targeted and more actionable than the conventional framing suggests. The trilateral framework does not primarily need rescuing from the unpredictability of the United States. The South Korean and Japanese publics have already demonstrated their capacity to maintain the alliance, even when the United States is at its most disruptive. The data also show that all three publics share more than enough strategic common cause to justify deeper cooperation. What the framework urgently needs is investment in the one relationship that remains structurally underdeveloped: the bilateral trust between South Korea and Japan, which would allow the third side of the triangle to become genuinely load-bearing. As long as that side remains weak, the entire architecture remains dependent on Washington as its essential mediating force, which means that any future U.S. disengagement—however temporary—risks returning the South Korea-Japan relationship to its historical mean.

Ironically, the data suggests that the window for change is open, precisely because the external environment is creating conditions that push stakeholders away from the status quo. In both South Korea and Japan, there is shared threat perception, a common commitment to open trade and rules-based norms, and recognition of the practical value of bilateral relations. All of these represent a foundation for a more hopeful outlook on trilateral cooperation. The most important lesson here is that the alliances are strong enough to persevere through these difficult times (for now), but building self-sustaining trust between South Korea and Japan will remain critical for the long-term outlook on trilateral cooperation. That trust will not build itself. The leaders must have the acuity to look beyond Washington and take advantage of this opportunity while the window remains open.

Japan Survey Questionnaire

We will ask about the United States (hereafter “US”). What impression do you have of the US?

		N
Very favorable impression	4%	38
Somewhat favorable impression	37%	382
Somewhat unfavorable impression	28%	290
Very unfavorable impression	6%	67
Neither / Cannot say	25%	260
N		1037

Most Important Reason

[Please select up to 2 reasons, in order of importance, for your favorable impression of the US.]

		N
Because of favorable national character and temperament	5%	22
Because of high economic and technological capabilities	14%	58
Because I can relate to values such as diversity, freedom, and democracy	15%	62
Because of leadership in the international community	16%	67
Because of cultural appeal in film, music, and sports	11%	46
Because of many opportunities for studying abroad, research, and business	3%	13
Because they are an important partner for Japan’s security	31%	130
Because it is attractive as a travel destination	2%	10
Because of a favorable impression of the US President	2%	10
Other	0%	2
No particular reason	0%	0
N		420

2nd Most Important Reason

[Please select up to 2 reasons, in order of importance, for your favorable impression of the US.]

		N
Because of favorable national character and temperament	4%	15
Because of high economic and technological capabilities	18%	76
Because I can relate to values such as diversity, freedom, and democracy	13%	53
Because of leadership in the international community	19%	79
Because of cultural appeal in film, music, and sports	11%	48

Because of many opportunities for studying abroad, research, and business	5%	21
Because they are an important partner for Japan's security	19%	78
Because it is attractive as a travel destination	5%	21
Because of a favorable impression of the US President	3%	13
Other	0%	1
No particular reason	4%	15
N		420

Most Important Reason [Please select up to 2 reasons, in order of importance, for your unfavorable impression of the US.]		
	All	N
Because I do not have a favorable impression of the national character and temperament	2%	6
Because of many social problems such as economic disparity, racial discrimination, gun culture, and drug abuse	9%	33
Because of a strong self-centered stance such as "America First"	29%	103
Because society is becoming divided and unstable	3%	11
Because of poor public safety	6%	22
Because of negative historical memories regarding Japan, such as the atomic bombings	10%	34
Because of an unfavorable impression of the US President	41%	147
Other	0%	1
No particular reason	0%	0
N		357

2nd Most Important Reason [Please select up to 2 reasons, in order of importance, for your unfavorable impression of the US.]		
		N
Because I do not have a favorable impression of the national character and temperament	4%	14
Because of many social problems such as economic disparity, racial discrimination, gun culture, and drug abuse	22%	78
Because of a strong self-centered stance such as "America First"	26%	93
Because society is becoming divided and unstable	7%	25
Because of poor public safety	8%	29
Because of negative historical memories regarding Japan, such as the atomic bombings	6%	23
Because of an unfavorable impression of the US President	24%	84
Other	0%	0
No particular reason	3%	11
N		357

How do you feel about the current Japan-US relationship?

		N
Very good relationship	1%	14
Somewhat good relationship	41%	425
Somewhat bad relationship	31%	321
Very bad relationship	4%	40
Neither / Do not know	23%	237
N		1037

How important is the current Japan-US relationship for Japan?

		N
Extremely important	39%	402
Somewhat important	47%	488
Not very important	5%	56
Not important at all	1%	7
Neither / Do not know	8%	84
N		1037

How do you think the Japan-US relationship will change in the future?

		N
Will improve significantly	1%	15
Will somewhat improve	22%	230
Will somewhat worsen	41%	420
Will worsen significantly	4%	44
Will remain about the same	32%	328
N		1037

What impression do you have of US President Donald Trump?

		N
Very favorable impression	3%	30
Somewhat favorable impression	12%	122
Somewhat unfavorable impression	36%	374
Very unfavorable impression	34%	353

Neither / Do not know	15%	158
N		1037

What do you think about tariffs introduced by the second Trump administration (e.g., on automobiles, steel, aluminum)?		
		N
Strongly in favor	1%	14
Somewhat in favor	6%	63
Somewhat opposed	37%	387
Strongly opposed	39%	407
Neutral	16%	166
N		1037

The US is trying to restrict Japan and South Korea's trade/investment with China. What do you think?		
		N
Strongly in favor	8%	82
Somewhat in favor	19%	193
Somewhat opposed	33%	345
Strongly opposed	17%	176
Neutral	23%	241
N		1037

What impression do you have of South Korea?		
		N
Very favorable impression	2%	25
Somewhat favorable impression	22%	232
Somewhat unfavorable impression	32%	333
Very unfavorable impression	19%	196
Neither / Cannot say	24%	251
N		1037

Most Important Reason [Please select up to 2 reasons, in order of importance, for your favorable impression of South Korea.]		
		N
Because of favorable national character and temperament	8%	20

Because of high economic and technological capabilities	5%	12
Because I can relate to values such as diversity, freedom, and democracy	11%	28
Because of leadership in the international community	0%	1
Because of cultural appeal in film, music, and sports	33%	86
Because of many opportunities for studying abroad, research, and business	1%	3
Because they are an important partner for Japan's security	20%	52
Because it is attractive as a travel destination	19%	49
Because of a favorable impression of the South Korean President	0%	1
Other	2%	5
No particular reason	0%	0
N		257

2nd Most Important Reason

[Please select up to 2 reasons, in order of importance, for your favorable impression of South Korea.]

		N
Because of favorable national character and temperament	7%	18
Because of high economic and technological capabilities	9%	22
Because I can relate to values such as diversity, freedom, and democracy	10%	25
Because of leadership in the international community	1%	2
Because of cultural appeal in film, music, and sports	18%	47
Because of many opportunities for studying abroad, research, and business	7%	18
Because they are an important partner for Japan's security	13%	34
Because it is attractive as a travel destination	25%	64
Because of a favorable impression of the South Korean President	1%	3
Other	2%	4
No particular reason	8%	20
N		257

Most Important Reason

[Please select up to 2 reasons, in order of importance, for your unfavorable impression of South Korea.]

		N
Because I do not have a favorable impression of the national character and temperament	27%	142
Because of conflicts over historical recognition such as comfort women and wartime labor issues	28%	150
Because of territorial conflicts over Takeshima	12%	64
Because anti-Japan demonstrations and statements are reported	27%	143
Because of an unfavorable impression of the South Korean President	5%	29
Other	0%	1

No particular reason	0%	0
N		529

2nd Most Important Reason [Please select up to 2 reasons, in order of importance, for your unfavorable impression of South Korea.]		
		N
Because I do not have a favorable impression of the national character and temperament	15%	78
Because of conflicts over historical recognition such as comfort women and wartime labor issues	27%	141
Because of territorial conflicts over Takeshima	24%	126
Because anti-Japan demonstrations and statements are reported	25%	132
Because of an unfavorable impression of the South Korean President	7%	36
Other	1%	3
No particular reason	2%	13
N		529

How do you feel about the current Japan-South Korea relationship?		
		N
Very good relationship	1%	9
Somewhat good relationship	31%	320
Somewhat bad relationship	30%	308
Very bad relationship	11%	114
Neither / Do not know	28%	286
N		1037

How important is the current Japan-South Korea relationship for Japan?		
		N
Extremely important	12%	128
Somewhat important	42%	433
Not very important	17%	174
Not important at all	13%	139
Neither / Do not know	16%	163
N		1037

Most Important Reason
 [Select up to 2 reasons, in order of importance, for considering Japan-South Korea relations important.]

		N
Because of shared basic values such as democracy and market economy	8%	45
Because of deep geographical and cultural connections	34%	189
Because a security cooperation relationship is necessary	40%	223
Because of strong economic interdependence	13%	71
Because they are a partner capable of cooperating on global challenges such as climate change and economic crises	6%	31
Other	0%	2
No particular reason	0%	0
N		561

2nd Most Important Reason
 [Select up to 2 reasons, in order of importance, for considering Japan-South Korea relations important.]

		N
Because of shared basic values such as democracy and market economy	20%	111
Because of deep geographical and cultural connections	24%	132
Because a security cooperation relationship is necessary	19%	108
Because of strong economic interdependence	19%	104
Because they are a partner capable of cooperating on global challenges such as climate change and economic crises	12%	69
Other	0%	0
No particular reason	7%	37
N		561

1st Reason
 [Select up to 2 reasons for not considering Japan-South Korea relations so important.]

		N
Because I do not think South Korea is an important economic partner for Japan	23%	73
Because I do not think South Korea is an important security partner for Japan	13%	42
Because there are major value differences in diplomacy, judicial decisions, and public opinion formation	20%	64
Because there is no progress on historical issues, making it difficult to strengthen relations	27%	84
Because I feel South Korea does not value its relationship with Japan	15%	47
Other	1%	3
No particular reason	0%	0
N		313

2nd Reason [Select up to 2 reasons for not considering Japan-South Korea relations so important.]		
		N
Because I do not think South Korea is an important economic partner for Japan	21%	67
Because I do not think South Korea is an important security partner for Japan	14%	43
Because there are major value differences in diplomacy, judicial decisions, and public opinion formation	23%	71
Because there is no progress on historical issues, making it difficult to strengthen relations	22%	69
Because I feel South Korea does not value its relationship with Japan	17%	52
Other	1%	4
No particular reason	2%	7
N		313

How do you expect Japan-South Korea relations to change in the next 3-5 years?		
		N
Will improve significantly	1%	15
Will somewhat improve	25%	257
Will somewhat worsen	21%	216
Will worsen significantly	8%	83
Will remain about the same	45%	466
N		1037

Top Priority Goal [In Japan-South Korea relations, which goals should Japan prioritize? Select up to 2 in order of importance.]		
		N
To strengthen security cooperation to address North Korea's nuclear issues	17%	172
Advance economic cooperation in trade, investment, and advanced technology	10%	106
Aim for resolution of historical issues	13%	136
Restore and build mutual trust	23%	242
Expand exchanges among younger generations	13%	134
To jointly protect universal values such as democracy and human rights	9%	93
To cooperate on global challenges such as climate change and pandemics	3%	27
Other	3%	27
Do not know	10%	100
N		1037

2nd Priority Goal

[In Japan-South Korea relations, which goals should Japan prioritize? Select up to 2 in order of importance.]

		N
To strengthen security cooperation to address North Korea's nuclear issues	15%	154
Advance economic cooperation in trade, investment, and advanced technology	14%	141
Aim for resolution of historical issues	12%	129
Restore and build mutual trust	19%	197
Expand exchanges among younger generations	9%	95
To jointly protect universal values such as democracy and human rights	10%	108
To cooperate on global challenges such as climate change and pandemics	7%	68
Other	2%	20
Do not know	12%	125
N		1037

How do you evaluate the current Japanese government's stance toward South Korea?

		N
Highly positive evaluation	2%	17
Somewhat positive evaluation	22%	232
Somewhat negative evaluation	21%	218
Completely negative evaluation	16%	165
Neither / Do not know	39%	405
N		1037

How do you evaluate the current South Korean government's stance toward Japan?

		N
Highly positive evaluation	1%	9
Somewhat positive evaluation	15%	154
Somewhat negative evaluation	28%	286
Completely negative evaluation	23%	239
Neither / Do not know	34%	349
N		1037

How do Japan-South Korea historical issues and future cooperation relate? Select the closest view.

		N
I think cooperation will not progress unless historical issues are sufficiently resolved	21%	216
I think resolution can be approached by advancing cooperation even with some issues remaining	30%	308
I think cooperation should proceed even if separated from historical issues	21%	219
I think historical issues are difficult to resolve regardless of cooperation	28%	294
N		1037

How important is the Takeshima / Dokdo territorial dispute for Japan-South Korea relations?

		N
Extremely important	35%	362
Somewhat important	41%	429
Not very important	8%	80
Not important at all	2%	23
Neither / Do not know	14%	143
N		1037

What impression do you have of South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, who took office in June 2025?

		N
Very favorable impression	1%	8
Somewhat favorable impression	10%	101
Somewhat unfavorable impression	23%	237
Very unfavorable impression	16%	169
Neither / Do not know	50%	522
N		1037

Economically, which countries or regions do you consider important for Japan? (Select all that apply)

		N
United States	66%	689
United Kingdom	26%	265
China	37%	387
India	36%	372
ASEAN	37%	384
Australia	31%	325
South Korea	28%	294
Russia	12%	125

EU	37%	385
Africa	12%	124
Middle East	19%	202
South America	10%	102
Other []	1%	7
Do not know	17%	173
N		1037

Regarding the Japan-US economic relationship: (A) Complementary or (B) Competitive — which is closest to your view?

		N
Closer to A	14%	140
Somewhat closer to A	46%	481
Somewhat closer to B	15%	153
Closer to B	7%	72
Neutral	18%	191
N		1037

Regarding the Japan-South Korea economic relationship: (A) Complementary or (B) Competitive — which is closest to your view?

		N
Closer to A	6%	63
Somewhat closer to A	31%	326
Somewhat closer to B	20%	207
Closer to B	16%	165
Neutral	27%	276
N		1037

The free trade system supported the post-WWII international economic order. Do you think this should continue?

		N
Strongly agree	16%	166
Somewhat agree	47%	489
Do not really agree	12%	125
Completely disagree	3%	32
Neutral	22%	225
N		1037

Which countries or regions do you feel are a threat to Japan? Select all that apply.

		N
China	69%	712
North Korea	55%	571
Russia	52%	542
South Korea	15%	151
Vietnam	7%	70
India	8%	87
Middle East	8%	80
EU	2%	23
United States	17%	173
Other []	1%	6
Do not know	13%	133
N		1037

Does the US “nuclear umbrella” sufficiently protect Japan against military threats from China and North Korea?

		N
Strongly agree	4%	37
Somewhat agree	30%	307
Do not really agree	34%	352
Completely disagree	16%	161
Neutral	17%	180
N		1037

Under SOFA, approximately 55,000 US troops are stationed in Japan. Do they contribute to Asia-Pacific peace and security?

		N
Strongly agree	8%	85
Somewhat agree	41%	428
Do not really agree	25%	258
Completely disagree	9%	89
Neutral	17%	177
N		1037

Japan bears approximately \$2 billion annually for US forces. What do you think about the current level of defense cost-sharing?

		N

Japan should bear more	4%	38
Think the current level is appropriate	20%	205
Japan is bearing too much	57%	588
Do not know	20%	206
N		1037

The US recently requested NATO allies to significantly increase defense budgets. What do you think about Japan's defense budget?

		N
Japan should significantly increase its defense budget	7%	76
Japan should somewhat increase its defense budget	26%	274
Japan should maintain its defense budget at the current level	33%	341
Japan should reduce its defense budget	17%	175
Neutral	16%	171
N		1037

Do you think a China-Taiwan military conflict or crisis may occur within the next few years?

		N
Think it will happen	42%	437
Do not think it will happen	19%	194
Do not know	39%	406
N		1037

How important is the risk of Taiwan Strait military tension or conflict for Japan's national interests (security and economy)?

		N
Extremely important	39%	400
Somewhat important	38%	399
Not very important	5%	49
Not important at all	2%	16
Do not know	17%	173
N		1037

If a Taiwan Strait military conflict occurs, select the most serious impact for Japan.

		N
Economic losses from disruption of maritime shipping lanes	18%	190

Security risks to the Nansei Islands (Okinawa / Senkaku)	28%	293
Destabilization of the Korean Peninsula situation	8%	84
Economic impact from disruption of semiconductor supply from Taiwan	13%	139
Pressure on democratic systems and impact on the liberal order	13%	134
Other []	0%	4
No particularly serious impact	2%	22
Do not know	16%	171
N		1037

If a Taiwan contingency occurs, what response should the US take? Select the most desirable option.

		N
US forces should intervene militarily to defend Taiwan unilaterally	9%	98
US forces should intervene militarily in coordination with allies	41%	429
Taiwan should primarily defend itself; US should only provide indirect support	23%	235
Taiwan and allies should primarily defend; US should provide indirect support	13%	134
Neither the US nor allies should militarily intervene in Taiwan's defense	14%	141
N		1037

If the US militarily intervenes in a Taiwan Strait conflict, how much should Japan be involved? Select one acceptable level.

		N
JSDF should join combat at the front lines alongside US forces as much as possible	10%	107
JSDF should not approach combat zones; focus on combat support for US forces (communications, intelligence, surveillance)	22%	230
JSDF should not engage in direct combat; limited to logistical support for US forces and humanitarian aid to Taiwan	27%	285
Japan should not be militarily involved in any form	26%	270
Do not know	14%	145
N		1037

If a Taiwan Strait conflict occurs, select the most appropriate joint initial response for Japan, the US, and South Korea.

		N
Diplomatic response (e.g., ceasefire mediation, UN Security Council condemnation)	36%	378
Economic sanctions (e.g., trade restrictions, financial sanctions)	24%	249
Military intervention (e.g., weapons supply, joint exercises, maritime/air surveillance)	12%	128
The three countries should not coordinate; each should respond independently	8%	78
Do not know	20%	204

N		1037
How should Japan and South Korea cooperate to prepare for East Asian security concerns? Select the closest view.		
		N
(Also cooperating with the US) Japan and South Korea should closely cooperate across a wide range of fields including military to enhance regional deterrence	28%	289
Japan and South Korea should cooperate in specific areas such as intelligence sharing and missile defense	12%	129
Japan and South Korea should prioritize diplomatic dialogue over military cooperation	29%	297
Japan and South Korea should each handle through their own diplomatic efforts; security cooperation is not very necessary	10%	101
Do not know	21%	221
N		1037

North Korea's nuclear/missile threat is growing. What do you think about Japan-South Korea security cooperation? Select the closest view.		
		N
Even for dealing with North Korea, I oppose Japan-South Korea security cooperation	9%	90
Japan-South Korea intelligence sharing is necessary to address North Korea's military threat	43%	441
In addition to intelligence sharing, strategic dialogue and policy consultations for joint response are needed	18%	185
In the future, a Japan-South Korea alliance should also be considered	12%	128
Do not know	19%	193
N		1037

If North Korea's nuclear threat continues, what do you think about Japan independently acquiring nuclear weapons?		
		N
Strongly in favor	8%	85
Somewhat in favor	16%	161
Somewhat opposed	19%	201
Strongly opposed	44%	452
Neutral	13%	138
N		1037

If North Korea's nuclear threat continues, what do you think about South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons for security?		
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		N
Strongly in favor	3%	34
Somewhat in favor	12%	127
Somewhat opposed	24%	250
Strongly opposed	41%	424
Neutral	19%	202
N		1037

What do you think about strengthening Japan-US-South Korea security cooperation (intelligence sharing, missile defense, joint training)?

		N
Strongly in favor	13%	134
Somewhat in favor	39%	402
Somewhat opposed	14%	150
Strongly opposed	13%	137
Neutral	21%	214
N		1037

Select all reasons you think Japan-US-South Korea security cooperation should be strengthened.

		N
To address North Korea's nuclear/missile issues and stabilize the Korean Peninsula	53%	285
To contain China's military rise and expansion of influence	57%	303
To maintain and strengthen the US-centered regional security system	43%	228
To deepen trust and cooperation between Japan and South Korea	21%	115
Other []	1%	3
N		536

Select all reasons you oppose strengthening Japan-US-South Korea security cooperation.

		N
Because Japan-US-South Korea military cooperation may further heighten regional tensions	44%	126
Because deterioration of relations with China is undesirable for Japan's economy and security	32%	91
Because there are concerns about Chinese backlash and retaliatory measures	25%	72
Because differing historical perceptions make it difficult to build security trust	29%	84
Other []	2%	5
N		287

Which political party do you currently support the most? (Select one)

		N
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	11%	111
Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP)	7%	72
Japan Innovation Party	4%	46
Komeito	2%	16
Democratic Party for the People (DPP)	9%	89
Japanese Communist Party (JCP)	2%	25
Reiwa Shinsengumi	2%	24
Sanseito	7%	77
Japan Conservative Party	4%	42
Team Mirai	2%	16
Social Democratic Party (SDP)	0%	5
Other Parties []	1%	9
No party supported	49%	505
N		1037

Korea Survey Questionnaire

Countries/Regions Posing Military Threats

Which countries or regions do you consider a military threat to South Korea? Please select all that apply.

		N
North Korea	91.3%	1447
China	73%	1157
Japan	34.5%	547
Russia	49.4%	783
United States	15.4%	244
India	0.9%	14
Middle East	3.9%	62
European Union (EU)	0.5%	8
Vietnam	0.8%	13
Don't know	2.4%	38
N		1585

Economically Important Countries/Regions

Which countries or regions do you consider especially important for South Korea's economic relations? Please select all that apply.

		N
China	73.9%	1171
United States	93.7%	1485
Japan	63.6%	1008
ASEAN	29.7%	471
India	22.9%	363
Russia	20.2%	320
European Union (EU)	33.5%	531
United Kingdom	11.4%	181
Other	0.8%	13
Don't know	1.7%	27
N		1585

Impression of the United States

What impression do you have of the United States?

N

① Very unfavorable impression	2.7%	43
② Somewhat unfavorable impression	20.2%	320
①+② Unfavorable impression (net)	22.9%	363
③ Somewhat favorable impression	45.6%	723
④ Very favorable impression	27.2%	431
③+④ Favorable impression (net)	72.9%	1155
Neither / Don't know	4.2%	67
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Impression of President Donald Trump
 What impression do you have of US President Donald Trump?

		N
① Very unfavorable impression	23.4%	371
② Somewhat unfavorable impression	49.7%	788
①+② Unfavorable impression (net)	73.1%	1159
③ Somewhat favorable impression	18%	285
④ Very favorable impression	4.3%	68
③+④ Favorable impression (net)	22.4%	355
Neither / Don't know	4.5%	71
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on the Korea-US Relationship.
 How would you describe the current state of relations between South Korea and the United States?

		N
① Very bad	3.3%	52
② Somewhat bad	24.3%	385
①+② Bad (net)	27.7%	439
③ Neither good nor bad	54.3%	861
④ Somewhat good	16%	254
⑤ Very good	2%	32
④+⑤ Good (net)	18%	285
Total	100%	1585
Mean	2.9%	46
N		1585

Table 6

Views on the Korea-US Partnership

Do you consider the United States to be a reliable partner for South Korea?

		N
① Not reliable at all	3.3%	52
② Not very reliable	26.9%	426
①+② Not reliable (net)	30.2%	479
③ Somewhat reliable	51.5%	816
④ Very reliable	14.8%	235
③+④ Reliable (net)	66.3%	1051
Neither / Don't know	3.5%	55
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on the Korea-US Economic Relationship

Regarding the economic relationship between South Korea and the United States, which view — A or B — is closest to your own?

		N
① Closer to A	10.9%	173
② Somewhat closer to A	47.7%	756
①+② (A) The two countries' economies are complementary	58.6%	929
③ Somewhat closer to B	22.1%	350
④ Closer to B	15%	238
③+④ (B) The two countries' economies are competitive	37.1%	588
Neither / Don't know	4.4%	70
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on Increasing the Defense Budget

The United States has recently been requesting NATO allies to significantly increase their defense budgets. Do you think South Korea should significantly increase its defense budget?

		N
① Strongly disagree	9.6%	152
② Somewhat disagree	42.2%	669
①+② Disagree (net)	51.8%	821
③ Somewhat agree	34.3%	544
④ Strongly agree	8.3%	132
③+④ Agree (net)	42.6%	675

Neither / Don't know	5.6%	89
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on Defense Cost-Sharing for US Forces in Korea

South Korea contributes approximately \$1 billion annually toward the cost of stationing US forces in Korea. What do you think about the current level of defense cost-sharing?

	All	N
Appropriate	31.9%	506
South Korea is bearing too much	53%	840
South Korea is not bearing enough	4.1%	65
Don't know	11%	174
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on US Restrictions on Korea/Japan-China Trade and Investment

What do you think about the United States restricting South Korea and Japan's trade and investment relations with China (e.g., in the semiconductor sector)?

	All	N
① Strongly oppose	11.3%	179
② Somewhat oppose	46.3%	734
①+② Oppose (net)	57.6%	913
③ Somewhat support	25.5%	404
④ Strongly support	8.2%	130
③+④ Support (net)	33.7%	534
Neither / Don't know	8.7%	138
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on the Second Trump Administration's Tariffs

What do you think about the second Trump administration imposing high reciprocal tariffs and additional tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobile exports from Korea/Japan to the United States?

	All	N
① Strongly oppose	27%	428
② Somewhat oppose	53.9%	854
①+② Oppose (net)	80.9%	1282

③ Somewhat support	11.6%	184
④ Strongly support	2.4%	38
③+④ Support (net)	14.1%	223
Neither / Don't know	5%	79
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on Korea's Trade Direction (Protectionism vs. Free Trade)

Protectionism accompanied by tariffs has been re-emerging recently. Do you think your country should continue to support a world economic order based on free trade?

		N
① Strongly disagree	3%	48
② Somewhat disagree	18.1%	287
①+② Disagree (net)	21.1%	334
③ Somewhat agree	52.9%	838
④ Strongly agree	18.2%	288
③+④ Agree (net)	71.1%	1127
Neither / Don't know	7.8%	124
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Reasons for Unfavorable Impression of Japan (1st Priority)

What are the reasons for your unfavorable impression of Japan? Please respond up to 2 reasons in order of importance.

		N
Because Japan has not properly reflected on its history of aggression against Korea	71.4%	419
Because of the Dokdo territorial dispute	13.6%	80
Because of the perceived duplicitous national character of Japanese people	3.1%	18
Because of concerns about Japan's military buildup	0.9%	5
Because historical issues such as comfort women and forced labor remain unresolved	8.3%	49
Because of anti-Korean sentiment (Kenkan) among Japanese people	2.2%	13
No particular reason	0.5%	3
Total	100%	587
N		587

Reasons for Unfavorable Impression of Japan (1st + 2nd Priority)

What are the reasons for your unfavorable impression of Japan? Please respond up to 2 reasons in order of importance.

	All	N
Because Japan has not properly reflected on its history of aggression against Korea	82.8%	486
Because of the Dokdo territorial dispute	48%	282
Because of the perceived duplicitous national character of Japanese people	15.3%	90
Because of concerns about Japan's military buildup	1.9%	11
Because historical issues such as comfort women and forced labor remain unresolved	41.2%	242
Because of anti-Korean sentiment (Kenkan) among Japanese people	9.6%	56
Other	0.2%	1
No particular reason	0.5%	3
N		587

Reasons for Favorable Impression of Japan (1st Priority)

What are the reasons for your favorable impression of Japan? Please respond up to 2 reasons in order of importance.

		N
Because Japan is an advanced country with a high standard of living	14.3%	119
Because Japan shares the same liberal democratic values	14.9%	124
Because of the kind and diligent national character of Japanese people	31.6%	263
Because of interest in Japanese popular culture including manga/anime, music, novels, and films	9.9%	82
Because of Japan's attractive food culture and shopping	10.6%	88
Because of interest in Japan's traditional culture	1.4%	12
Because of the high quality of Japanese products	5.1%	42
Through personal exchanges with Japanese people	3.2%	27
Other	0.6%	5
No particular reason	8.4%	70
Total	100%	833
N		833

Reasons for Favorable Impression of Japan (1st + 2nd Priority)

What are the reasons for your favorable impression of Japan? Please respond up to 2 reasons in order of importance.

	All	N
Because Japan is an advanced country with a high standard of living	22.5%	187
Because Japan shares the same liberal democratic values	25.7%	214
Because of the kind and diligent national character of Japanese people	46.6%	388
Because of interest in Japanese popular culture including manga/anime, music, novels, and films	20.2%	168
Because of Japan's attractive food culture and shopping	31.7%	264
Because of interest in Japan's traditional culture	5.9%	49
Because of the high quality of Japanese products	20.3%	169
Through personal exchanges with Japanese people	8.9%	74
Other	1.4%	12
No particular reason	8.4%	70
N		833

Impression of Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru
What impression do you have of Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru?

		N
① Very unfavorable impression	4.1%	65
② Somewhat unfavorable impression	28.4%	450
①+② Unfavorable impression (net)	32.5%	515
③ Somewhat favorable impression	30.4%	482
④ Very favorable impression	2.1%	33
③+④ Favorable impression (net)	32.5%	515
Neither / Don't know	35%	555
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on the Korea-Japan Relationship
How would you describe the current state of relations between South Korea and Japan?

		N
① Very bad	3.9%	62
② Somewhat bad	26.1%	414
①+② Bad (net)	30%	476
③ Neither good nor bad	59.4%	941
④ Somewhat good	9.6%	152

⑤ Very good	1%	16
④+⑤ Good (net)	10.6%	168
Total	100%	1585
Mean	2.8%	44
N		1585

Importance of the Korea-Japan Relationship
Do you think the current Korea-Japan relationship is important for South Korea?

		N
Not important	9.8%	155
Important	87.4%	1385
Neither / Don't know	2.8%	44
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Reasons for Considering Korea-Japan Relations Unimportant (1st Priority)
What are your reasons for considering the Korea-Japan relationship unimportant? Please respond up to 2 reasons.

		N
Because Japan's international standing has declined	21.5%	33
Because Japan is no longer an important trade partner	16.7%	26
Because of security-related disagreements with Japan on North Korea and China policies	10.1%	16
Because historical issues make meaningful cooperation with Japan difficult, so diplomatic efforts are not worthwhile	40.3%	62
Because Japan does not value its cooperation with South Korea	7.1%	11
No particular reason	4.4%	7
Total	100%	155
N		155

Reasons for Considering Korea-Japan Relations Unimportant (1st + 2nd Priority)
What are your reasons for considering the Korea-Japan relationship unimportant? Please respond up to 2 reasons.

		N
Because Japan's international standing has declined	35.3%	55
Because Japan is no longer an important trade partner	30.8%	48

Because of security-related disagreements with Japan on North Korea and China policies	24.9%	39
Because historical issues make meaningful cooperation with Japan difficult, so diplomatic efforts are not worthwhile	67.2%	104
Because Japan does not value its cooperation with South Korea	32.9%	51
No particular reason	4.4%	7
N		155

Reasons for Considering Korea-Japan Relations Important (1st Priority)

Why do you think the Korea-Japan relationship is important for South Korea's future? Please respond up to 2 reasons in order of importance.

		N
Because Japan is a neighboring country with deep historical, geographical, and cultural ties	40.2%	557
Because Japan is an important trade partner with significant economic and industrial interdependence	31.6%	438
Because Japan shares common values such as democracy	5.1%	71
Because as a US ally, Japan shares common security interests with South Korea	12.4%	172
Because Korea-Japan cooperation could serve as a new axis amid great power competition	5.7%	79
Because Japan is needed to strengthen efforts to contain China	1.3%	18
No particular reason	3.8%	53
Total	100%	1386
N		1386

Reasons for Considering Korea-Japan Relations Important (1st + 2nd Priority)

Why do you think the Korea-Japan relationship is important for South Korea's future? Please respond up to 2 reasons in order of importance.

		N
Because Japan is a neighboring country with deep historical, geographical, and cultural ties	52.6%	729
Because Japan is an important trade partner with significant economic and industrial interdependence	60.7%	841
Because Japan shares common values such as democracy	11.3%	157
Because as a US ally, Japan shares common security interests with South Korea	31.9%	442
Because Korea-Japan cooperation could serve as a new axis amid great power competition	28.4%	394
Because Japan is needed to strengthen efforts to contain China	7.6%	105

No particular reason	3.8%	53
N		1386

Views on the Future Outlook for Korea-Japan Relations		
How do you expect Korea-Japan relations to change over the next 3–5 years?		
		N
① Will worsen significantly	2%	32
② Will somewhat worsen	12.4%	197
①+② Will worsen (net)	14.3%	227
③ Will somewhat improve	51%	808
④ Will improve significantly	9.5%	151
③+④ Will improve (net)	60.5%	959
Will remain about the same	15.4%	244
Don't know	9.8%	155
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on the Korea-Japan Economic Relationship		
Regarding the economic relationship between South Korea and Japan, which view — A or B — is closest to your own?		
		N
① Closer to A	6.8%	108
② Somewhat closer to A	26.7%	423
①+② (A) The Korea-Japan economies are complementary	33.5%	531
③ Somewhat closer to B	34.9%	553
④ Closer to B	26.2%	415
③+④ (B) The Korea-Japan economies are competitive	61.1%	968
Neither / Don't know	5.4%	86
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Goals Korea-Japan Relations Should Pursue (1st Priority)		
What goals do you think Korea-Japan relations should pursue? Please respond up to 2 in order of importance.		
		N
Pursuing common security interests such as resolving the North Korean nuclear issue	21.6%	342

Pursuing common economic interests in trade, investment, and advanced technology	19.4%	307
Resolving historical issues between the two countries	35.1%	556
Restoring mutual trust between the two countries	16.5%	262
Upholding universal values such as democracy	3%	48
Addressing climate change and environmental challenges	1.1%	17
Don't know	3.2%	51
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Goals Korea-Japan Relations Should Pursue (1st + 2nd Priority)

What goals do you think Korea-Japan relations should pursue? Please respond up to 2 in order of importance.

		N
Pursuing common security interests such as resolving the North Korean nuclear issue	34.1%	540
Pursuing common economic interests in trade, investment, and advanced technology	42.2%	669
Resolving historical issues between the two countries	54.1%	857
Restoring mutual trust between the two countries	45.6%	723
Upholding universal values such as democracy	8.8%	139
Addressing climate change and environmental challenges	8.5%	135
Other	0.2%	3
Don't know	3.2%	51
N		1585

Evaluation of the Japanese Government's Attitude toward Korea-Japan Relations

How do you evaluate the current Japanese government's attitude toward improving Korea-Japan relations?

		N
① Very negative evaluation	6.5%	103
② Somewhat negative evaluation	35.2%	558
①+② Negative evaluation (net)	41.7%	661
③ Somewhat positive evaluation	37.9%	601
④ Very positive evaluation	4.9%	78
③+④ Positive evaluation (net)	42.8%	678
Neither / Don't know	15.5%	246
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Evaluation of the Korean Government's Attitude toward Korea-Japan Relations

How do you evaluate the current South Korean government's attitude toward improving Korea-Japan relations?

		N
① Very negative evaluation	2.9%	46
② Somewhat negative evaluation	26%	412
①+② Negative evaluation (net)	28.9%	458
③ Somewhat positive evaluation	48.6%	770
④ Very positive evaluation	6.8%	108
③+④ Positive evaluation (net)	55.4%	878
Neither / Don't know	15.7%	249
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues

What do you think about the relationship between Korea-Japan bilateral relations and historical issues?

	All	N
Future-oriented cooperation (security, economic, cultural, climate, etc.) cannot progress without resolving historical issues	35.3%	560
As future-oriented cooperation (security, economic, cultural, climate, etc.) is built, historical issues can also be gradually resolved	40.2%	637
Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the state of bilateral cooperation	20%	317
Don't know	4.5%	71
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Importance of the Dokdo Dispute in Korea-Japan Relations

How important do you think the territorial dispute over Dokdo is for Korea-Japan relations?

		N
① Not important	0.8%	13
② Not very important	3.4%	54
①+② Not important (net)	4.2%	67
③ Somewhat important	24.3%	385
④ Important	68.7%	1089

③+④ Important (net)	93%	1474
Neither / Don't know	2.8%	44
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on Strengthening Korea-US-Japan Trilateral Military Security Cooperation
 What do you think about the view that trilateral military security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan should be strengthened?

		N
① Strongly negative	2.5%	40
② Somewhat negative	10.2%	162
①+② Negative (net)	12.7%	201
③ Somewhat positive	51.2%	812
④ Strongly positive	27.6%	437
③+④ Positive (net)	78.8%	1249
Neither / Don't know	8.5%	135
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Reasons for Viewing Korea-US-Japan Trilateral Military Cooperation Negatively
 What are the reasons for your negative view? Please select all that apply.

		N
Because it will heighten tensions on the Korean Peninsula	58.5%	119
Because containing China does not align with our national interests	46.9%	96
Because China opposes it	6%	12
Because past historical experience makes it difficult to trust the other party	64.3%	131
Other	0.5%	1
N		204

Reasons for Viewing Korea-US-Japan Trilateral Military Cooperation Positively
 What are the reasons for your positive view? Please select all that apply.

		N
Because it is essential for North Korea's denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula	74.1%	925

Because it is necessary to check China's growing power	64.3%	802
To strengthen the US-centered regional security cooperation system	29.6%	369
Because it is needed as part of strengthening Korea-Japan relations	28.9%	361
Other	0.5%	6
N		1248

Views on the Direction of Korea-Japan Security Cooperation

North Korea's nuclear and missile threat is rapidly growing. What do you think about the direction of Korea-Japan security cooperation in response?

		N
Oppose Korea-Japan security cooperation even for addressing North Korea's nuclear issues	13.1%	208
Korea-Japan intelligence sharing is necessary to address North Korea's military threat	38%	602
In addition to intelligence sharing, a policy consultation mechanism for joint Korea-Japan response should be established	26%	412
Even for dealing with North Korea, a Korea-Japan alliance should be considered	16.9%	268
Don't know	5.9%	94
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on South Korea Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

If North Korea's nuclear threat persists, what do you think about South Korea and Japan acquiring nuclear weapons? (South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons)

		N
In favor	67.5%	1070
Opposed	21.1%	334
Don't know	11.4%	181
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on Japan Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

If North Korea's nuclear threat persists, what do you think about South Korea and Japan acquiring nuclear weapons? (Japan acquiring nuclear weapons)

		N
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In favor	19%	301
Opposed	64.7%	1025
Don't know	16.3%	258
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on Whether the US Nuclear Umbrella (Extended Deterrence) Is Sufficient for Korea's Security
 In response to military threats from China or North Korea, do you think the US nuclear umbrella (extended deterrence) is sufficient to guarantee South Korea's security?

		N
① Strongly disagree	4%	63
② Somewhat disagree	29.8%	472
①+② Disagree (net)	33.7%	534
③ Somewhat agree	46.1%	731
④ Strongly agree	10.6%	168
③+④ Agree (net)	56.7%	899
Neither / Don't know	9.5%	151
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on China Initiating Military Conflict in the Taiwan Strait
 Do you think China will initiate a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere in the near future?

		N
① Strongly disagree	1.6%	25
② Somewhat disagree	17.7%	281
①+② Disagree (net)	19.3%	306
③ Somewhat agree	51.8%	821
④ Strongly agree	20.3%	322
③+④ Agree (net)	72.1%	1143
Neither / Don't know	8.6%	136
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Importance of Taiwan Strait Tensions and Conflicts for Korea's National Interests
 How important do you think tensions and conflicts in the Taiwan Strait are for South Korea's national interests?

		N
① Not important	0.8%	13
② Not very important	5.7%	90
①+② Not important (net)	6.5%	103
③ Somewhat important	45.8%	726
④ Important	42.2%	669
③+④ Important (net)	88.1%	1396
Neither / Don't know	5.4%	86
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on How the US Should Respond in a Taiwan Contingency
If a Taiwan contingency occurs and China takes military action, what response do you think the United States should take?

		N
The US should intervene militarily on its own to defend Taiwan	11%	174
The US should intervene militarily in coordination with its allies	35.7%	566
Taiwan should primarily lead its own defense, and the US should provide indirect support	32%	507
Taiwan and its allies should lead the defense, and the US should provide indirect support	14.9%	236
Neither the US nor its allies should intervene militarily	6.3%	100
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Views on South Korea's Level of Involvement if the US Militarily Intervenes in the Taiwan Strait
If the United States militarily intervenes in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, to what extent should South Korea be involved?

		N
Korean forces should participate in combat alongside US forces	8.5%	135
Korean forces should focus on supporting US forces (communications, intelligence, surveillance) without entering combat zones	28.9%	458
Korean forces should be limited to logistical support for US forces and humanitarian aid for Taiwan	39.4%	624
South Korea should not be militarily involved	16.2%	257
Don't know	7%	111
Total	100%	1585

N		1585
Appropriate Level of Joint Korea-US-Japan Response in a Taiwan Strait Military Conflict		
If a military conflict occurs in the Taiwan Strait, what do you think is the most appropriate level of joint response by the US, Japan, and South Korea?		
	All	N
No joint response is necessary; each country should respond independently	11.6%	184
Should respond jointly through diplomacy (e.g., joint statements, etc.)	49.3%	781
Should respond jointly through economic means (e.g., trade, financial, or economic sanctions, etc.)	21%	333
Should intervene jointly through military means	8.1%	128
Don't know / No opinion	10.1%	160
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Occupation		
What is your occupation?		
		N
Farming, fishing, forestry (including family workers)	1.3%	21
Self-employed (businesses with 9 or fewer employees, family workers, carpenter shop owner, private taxi driver, etc.)	5.6%	89
Sales / service (shop clerk, salesperson, etc.)	6.1%	97
Skilled / technical worker (driver, lathe operator, carpenter, etc.)	4.1%	65
General laborer (civil engineering fieldwork, cleaning, security guard)	4%	63
Office / technical (general office worker, technical staff, K-12 teacher, navigator, etc.)	28.2%	447
Management / executive (senior civil servant grade 5+, company department head or above, school principal)	3.4%	54
Professional / freelance (university professor, doctor, lawyer, artist)	5%	79
Homemaker (primarily engaged in household duties)	17.2%	273
Student	6.1%	97
Unemployed / Not working	14%	222
Other	5%	79
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Highest Level of Education

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

		N
Elementary school or below	1%	16
Middle school	2%	32
High school	21.2%	336
Some college / Incomplete (including junior college)	12.6%	200
College / University graduate	51.9%	823
Graduate school or higher	11.3%	179
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Monthly Household Income

What is your approximate monthly total household income? Please select based on the monthly average of your entire household income including bonuses, interest, and rental income.

		N
Under 1M KRW	7.8%	124
1.01–2M KRW	8.5%	135
2.01–3M KRW	16.9%	268
3.01–4M KRW	17.3%	274
4.01–5M KRW	13.8%	219
5.01–6M KRW	11.7%	185
6.01–7M KRW	7.7%	122
7.01–8M KRW	5.3%	84
8.01–9M KRW	3.5%	55
9.01–10M KRW	2.9%	46
Over 10M KRW	4.7%	74
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

Ideological Orientation

How would you describe your ideological orientation? On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 = very progressive, 5 = centrist, and 10 = very conservative, please indicate your position.

		N
⊙ Progressive	1.8%	29
①	1.5%	24

②	6.8%	108
③	10.1%	160
④	9.5%	151
①+②+③+④ Progressive (net)	29.7%	471
⑤ Centrist	34.6%	548
⑥	12.5%	198
⑦	10.9%	173
⑧	7.3%	116
⑨	2.4%	38
⑩ Conservative	2.6%	41
⑥+⑦+⑧+⑨+⑩ Conservative (net)	35.7%	566
Total	100%	1585
Mean	5.1%	81
N		1585

Party Affiliation		
Which political party do you support? (Options presented in random order)		
		N
Democratic Party of Korea	37.3%	591
People Power Party	20.2%	320
Rebuilding Korea Party	3.8%	60
Reform Party	3.6%	57
Progressive Party	0.6%	10
Other party	0.8%	13
No	27.2%	431
Don't know	6.4%	101
Total	100%	1585
N		1585

U.S. Survey Questionnaire

Impression of S.Korea		
What is your impression of South Korea?		
		N
Very unfavorable	5%	75
Somewhat unfavorable	9%	135
Somewhat favorable	45%	675
Very favorable	17%	255
Don't know	23%	345
N		1500

Impression of President Lee Jae Myung		
What is your impression of President Lee Jae Myung of South Korea?		
		N
Very unfavorable	6%	90
Somewhat unfavorable	8%	120
Somewhat favorable	19%	285
Very favorable	3%	45
Don't know	64%	960
N		1500

Relationship between S.Korea and US		
What do you think of the current relationship between South Korea and the United States?		
		N
Very bad	3%	45
Somewhat bad	9%	135
Average	28%	420
Somewhat good	25%	375
Very good	12%	180
Don't know	23%	345
N		1500

S.Korea trustworthiness		
Do you think South Korea is a trustworthy partner for the United States?		
		N

Very untrustworthy	6%	90
Somewhat untrustworthy	10%	150
Somewhat trustworthy	37%	555
Very trustworthy	21%	315
Don't know	26%	390
N		1500

Economic relationship between S.Korea and US (Scale)

In terms of the economic relationship between South Korea and the United States, which do you think is closer to A or B?

		N*
1 - (A) The economies of the two countries are complementary	8%	120
2	30%	450
3	19%	285
4 - (B) The economies of the two countries are competitive	4%	60
Don't know	38%	570
N		1499

S.Korea defense budget

The United States has recently requested a significant increase in the defense budget of its allies. Do you think it is necessary for South Korea to significantly increase its defense budget?

		N
South Korea should decrease its defense budget	5%	75
South Korea should maintain its defense budget	22%	330
South Korea should marginally increase its defense budget	20%	300
South Korea should significantly increase its defense budget	15%	225
Don't know	39%	585
N		1500

S.Korea defense cost sharing

South Korea pays about \$1 billion annually for the cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea as part of a defense cost sharing agreement between itself and the U.S. What do you think about the current level of defense cost sharing?

		N
South Korea is paying too much	11%	165
South Korea is paying the right amount	34%	510
South Korea is paying too little	14%	210
Don't know	41%	615
N		1499

Impression of Japan

What is your impression of Japan?

		N
Very unfavorable	2%	30
Somewhat unfavorable	6%	90
Somewhat favorable	43%	645
Very favorable	35%	525
Don't know	13%	195
N		1499

Impression of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba

What is your impression of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba of Japan?

		N
Very unfavorable	2%	30
Somewhat unfavorable	5%	75
Somewhat favorable	23%	345
Very favorable	9%	135
Don't know	62%	930
N		1500

Relationship between Japan and US

What do you think of the current relationship between Japan and the United States?

		N
Very bad	1%	15
Somewhat bad	6%	90
Average	24%	360
Somewhat good	28%	420
Very good	22%	330
Don't know	20%	300
N		1500

Japan trustworthiness

Do you think Japan is a trustworthy partner for the United States?

		N
Very untrustworthy	2%	30
Somewhat untrustworthy	7%	105
Somewhat trustworthy	38%	570
Very trustworthy	31%	465
Don't know	22%	330

N	1500
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Economic relationship between Japan and US (Scale) -- question_12

In terms of the economic relationship between Japan and the United States, which do you think is closer to A or B?

		N
1 - (A) The economies of the two countries are complementary	12%	180
2	30%	450
3	21%	315
4 - (B) The economies of the two countries are competitive	7%	105
Don't know	30%	450
N		1500

Japan defense budget

The United States has recently requested a significant increase in the defense budget of its allies. Do you think it is necessary for Japan to significantly increase its defense budget?

		N
Japan should decrease its defense budget	4%	60
Japan should maintain its defense budget	26%	390
Japan should marginally increase its defense budget	19%	285
Japan should significantly increase its defense budget	15%	225
Don't know	37%	555
N		1500

Japan defense cost sharing

Japan pays about \$2 billion annually for the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan as part of a defense cost sharing agreement between itself and the U.S. What do you think about the current level of defense cost sharing?

		N
Japan is paying too much	12%	180
Japan is paying the right amount	37%	555
Japan is paying too little	13%	195
Don't know	37%	555
N		1499

Vital interest to US

Which country/countries or region/regions do you think are of vital interest to the United States? Select as many or as few as you think.

		N
Vital interest to US - South Korea	43%	645
Vital interest to US - China	44%	660

Vital interest to US - Japan	48%	720
Vital interest to US - Russia	31%	465
Vital interest to US - Association of Southeast Asian Nations	23%	345
Vital interest to US - U.K.	45%	675
Vital interest to US - European Union	47%	705
Vital interest to US - India	29%	435
Vital interest to US - Australia	32%	480
Vital interest to US - Africa	21%	315
Vital interest to US - Middle East	41%	615
Vital interest to US - South America	29%	435
Vital interest to US - Other	4%	60
Vital interest to US - None	4%	60
Vital interest to US - Don't know	21%	315
N		1500

Military threat to US

Which country/countries or region/regions do you think pose a military threat to the United States? Select as many or as few as you think.

		N
Military threat to US - North Korea	54%	810
Military threat to US - China	59%	885
Military threat to US - Japan	4%	60
Military threat to US - Russia	70%	1050
Military threat to US - South Korea	5%	75
Military threat to US - India	5%	75
Military threat to US - Middle East	35%	525
Military threat to US - European Union	2%	30
Military threat to US - Vietnam	5%	75
Military threat to US - Other	3%	45
Military threat to US - None	5%	75
Military threat to US - Don't know	14%	210
N		1500

Vital interest to US (economic perspective)

From an economic perspective, which country/countries or region/regions do you consider to be of vital interest to the United States? Select as many or as few as you think.

		N
Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - China	50%	750
Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - South Korea	35%	525
Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - Japan	49%	735
Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	23%	345

Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - India	33%	495
Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - Russia	13%	195
Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - European Union	47%	705
Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - United Kingdom	40%	600
Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - Other	2%	30
Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - None	4%	60
Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - Don't know	25%	375
N		1500

Joint response during military conflict in Taiwan Strait

In the event of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait (the body of water separating the island of Taiwan from China), in your opinion what level of joint response is most appropriate for the United States, Japan, and South Korea? Select all that apply.

		N
A joint response is not necessary, and each country should respond individually.	9%	135
The three countries (i.e., the US, Japan, and South Korea) should coordinate a diplomatic response (e.g., by issuing a joint statement, etc.)	37%	555
The three countries (i.e., the US, Japan, and South Korea) should coordinate an economic response (e.g., by trade, financial assistance, economic sanctions, etc.)	33%	495
The three countries (i.e., the US, Japan, and South Korea) should coordinate a joint military response. (i.e., military blockade, sending combat troops or ships, etc.)	30%	450
Don't know	29%	435
N		1500

US response during military conflict in Taiwan Strait

In the event of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait (the body of water separating the island of Taiwan from China), what should be the response of the United States? Select all that apply.

		N
The U.S. should send troops to defend Taiwan	16%	240
The U.S. should not intervene	13%	195
The U.S. should provide military aid or weapons to Taiwan	34%	510
The U.S. should provide economic aid to Taiwan	30%	450
The U.S. should provide humanitarian assistance to Taiwan	37%	555
The U.S. should encourage allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to send their troops to defend Taiwan	28%	420
The U.S. should encourage allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to provide military aid to Taiwan	34%	510
The U.S. should encourage allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to provide economic aid to Taiwan	33%	495
The U.S. should encourage allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to provide humanitarian assistance to Taiwan	35%	525
Don't Know	28%	420
N		1500

Agree/Disagree - China will engage in a military conflict in Taiwan Strait

Do you agree or disagree? China will engage in a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait (the body of water separating the island of Taiwan from China), or nearby area in the near future.

		N
Strongly disagree	2%	30
Somewhat disagree	7%	105
Neither agree nor disagree	21%	315
Somewhat agree	30%	450
Strongly agree	12%	180
Don't know	28%	420
N		1500

Agree/Disagree - US commitment sufficient to guarantee security

Do you think that the U.S.'s commitment to defending its allies through various means including the use of nuclear weapons is sufficient to guarantee the security of _____ in response to military threats from China or North Korea?

Total		N
Strongly disagree	7%	105
Somewhat disagree	10%	150
Neither agree nor disagree	23%	345
Somewhat agree	23%	345
Strongly agree	9%	135
Don't know	28%	420
N		1500
Korea		N
Strongly disagree	6%	30
Somewhat disagree	9%	45
Neither agree nor disagree	23%	115
Somewhat agree	26%	131
Strongly agree	8%	40
Don't know	28%	141
N		502
Japan		N
Strongly disagree	7%	36
Somewhat disagree	10%	52
Neither agree nor disagree	20%	103
Somewhat agree	24%	124
Strongly agree	12%	62
Don't know	27%	139
N		515

Northeast Asia		N
Strongly disagree	9%	43
Somewhat disagree	11%	53
Neither agree nor disagree	25%	121
Somewhat agree	19%	92
Strongly agree	7%	34
Don't know	28%	135
N		483

Trump administration's second term tariffs on exports

What do you think about the Trump administration's second term tariffs on _____ (e.g., steel, aluminum, automobiles)?

Total		N
Strongly oppose	32%	480
Somewhat oppose	13%	195
Neither support nor oppose	14%	210
Somewhat support	14%	210
Strongly support	11%	165
Don't know	15%	225
N		1500

Korea		N
Strongly oppose	30%	219
Somewhat oppose	12%	88
Neither support nor oppose	16%	117
Somewhat support	15%	110
Strongly support	11%	80
Don't know	14%	102
N		730

Japan		N
Strongly oppose	33%	254
Somewhat oppose	13%	100
Neither support nor oppose	13%	100
Somewhat support	13%	100
Strongly support	11%	85
Don't know	17%	131
N		770

Support/Oppose - US influence over Japan and S.Korea's relationships with China

Do you support or oppose the U.S. having influence over Japan and South Korea's trade and investment relationships with China?

		N
Strongly oppose	12%	180

Somewhat oppose	12%	180
Neither support nor oppose	25%	375
Somewhat support	19%	285
Strongly support	10%	150
Don't know	23%	345
N		1500

Support/Oppose - free trade rules

Since the end of World War II, international institutions have supported an economic order centered on the standard rules of free trade. Do you think the United States should continue to support these rules?

		N
Strongly oppose	2%	30
Somewhat oppose	4%	60
Neither support nor oppose	15%	225
Somewhat support	25%	375
Strongly support	32%	480
Don't know	22%	330
N		1500

Likelihood of N.Korea abandoning nuclear program

How likely do you think that North Korea will abandon its nuclear program in the next five to ten years?

		N
Not likely at all	54%	810
Somewhat unlikely	18%	270
Somewhat likely	7%	105
Very likely	2%	30
Don't know	20%	300
N		1500

Support/Oppose - for S.Korean nuclear weapons

If North Korea does not abandon its nuclear program, do you/would you support or oppose South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons?

		N
Strongly oppose	17%	255
Somewhat oppose	18%	270
Somewhat support	23%	345
Strongly support	10%	150
Don't know	33%	495
N		1500

Support/Oppose - for Japan nuclear weapons

If North Korea does not abandon its nuclear program, do you/would you support or oppose Japan developing its own nuclear weapons?

		N
Strongly oppose	18%	270
Somewhat oppose	18%	270
Somewhat support	22%	330
Strongly support	11%	165
Don't know	31%	465
N		1500

Support/Oppose - US nuclear weapons in S.Korea

Do you/would you support or oppose basing U.S.-controlled and operated nuclear weapons in South Korea?

		N
Strongly oppose	16%	240
Somewhat oppose	16%	240
Somewhat support	24%	360
Strongly support	8%	120
Don't know	35%	525
N		1500

Support/Oppose - US nuclear weapons in Japan

Do you support or oppose basing U.S.-controlled and operated nuclear weapons in Japan?

		N
Strongly oppose	17%	255
Somewhat oppose	17%	255
Somewhat support	25%	375
Strongly support	9%	135
Don't know	32%	480
N		1499

Threat posed by countries

How would you rate the threat posed by the following countries?

China		N
Critical threat	36%	540
Moderate threat	32%	480
Minor threat	13%	195
Not a threat	7%	105
Don't know	11%	165

N		1500
Russia		N
Critical threat	43%	645
Moderate threat	33%	495
Minor threat	10%	150
Not a threat	4%	60
Don't know	10%	150
N		1500
North Korea		N
Critical threat	29%	435
Moderate threat	35%	525
Minor threat	18%	270
Not a threat	6%	90
Don't know	12%	180
N		1500
Iran		N
Critical threat	27%	405
Moderate threat	34%	510
Minor threat	18%	270
Not a threat	9%	135
Don't know	13%	195
N		1500
Venezuela		N
Critical threat	3%	45
Moderate threat	11%	165
Minor threat	28%	420
Not a threat	37%	555
Don't know	21%	315
N		1500
Mexico		N
Critical threat	4%	60
Moderate threat	10%	150
Minor threat	23%	345
Not a threat	52%	780
Don't know	12%	180
N		1500
Canada		N
Critical threat	1%	15
Moderate threat	5%	75
Minor threat	9%	135
Not a threat	74%	1110
Don't know	11%	165

N		1500
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Demographics

Birth Year		
		N
1930-1935	0.27%	4
1935-1940	0.66%	10
1940-1945	1.87%	28
1945-1950	3.65%	55
1950-1955	6.13%	92
1955-1960	8.17%	123
1960-1965	8.48%	127
1965-1970	8.96%	134
1970-1975	7.43%	111
1975-1980	6.02%	90
1980-1985	11.84%	178
1985-1990	9.11%	137
1990-1995	5.99%	90
1995-2000	10.61%	159
2000-2005	7.78%	117
2005-2010	3.04%	46
N		1500

Gender

		N
Male	48.98%	735
Female	51.02%	765
N		1500

Race - US

		N
White	62.63%	939
Black	11.58%	174
Hispanic	13.13%	197
Asian	5.07%	76
Native American	0.93%	14
Middle Eastern	0.30%	5
Two or more races	4.12%	62
Other	2.23%	33
N		1500

Education		
		N
No HS	6.76%	101
High school graduate	30.71%	461
Some college	20.09%	301
2-year	8.99%	135
4-year	20.80%	312
Post-grad	12.65%	190
N		1500

Family income		
		N
Less than \$10,000	7.21%	108
\$10,000 - \$19,999	7.28%	109
\$20,000 - \$29,999	9.45%	142
\$30,000 - \$39,999	6.95%	104
\$40,000 - \$49,999	7.58%	114
\$50,000 - \$59,999	7.79%	117
\$60,000 - \$69,999	6.56%	98
\$70,000 - \$79,999	6.67%	100
\$80,000 - \$99,999	6.68%	100
\$100,000 - \$119,999	6.25%	94
\$120,000 - \$149,999	7.13%	107
\$150,000 - \$199,999	5.57%	84
\$200,000 - \$249,999	2.32%	35
\$250,000 - \$349,999	1.14%	17
\$350,000 - \$499,999	0.59%	9
\$500,000 or more	0.37%	6
Prefer not to say	10.44%	157
N		1500

Party ID		
		N
Democrat	29.83%	447
Republican	27.63%	414
Independent	30.96%	464
Other	4.63%	69
Not sure	6.95%	104
N		1500

Ideology		
		N

Very liberal	10.98%	165
Liberal	17.52%	263
Moderate	31.56%	473
Conservative	19.55%	293
Very conservative	10.00%	150
Not sure	10.38%	156
N		1500

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