



# Contemporary American Public Attitudes on U.S.-South Korea-Japan Trilateral Cooperation

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# Foreword

This study is the result of a collaborative effort from the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) in the United States, the East Asia Institute (EAI) in South Korea, and the Asia Pacific Initiative (API) in Japan. Together, the three partnering organizations developed a common survey questionnaire based on a mutually agreed set of core questions, which each organization adapted and deployed in their respective countries. All surveys were conducted online in August 2025.

For implementation, KEI worked with YouGov and EAI partnered with Hankook Research. API managed its own survey deployment independently. Although the three institutions coordinated on the overall content, each retained the flexibility to include or exclude questions to address issues of national interest specific to each country.

The outcome is a rich dataset spanning the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Respondents in all three countries answered a shared set of core questions, enabling meaningful cross-national comparison, while additional country-specific questions provide deeper insights into unique domestic contexts. KEI, EAI, and API will release their results over the coming months as they complete their analysis. The first installment is this KEI report, which focuses primarily on American public opinion, though it also references selected findings from the EAI and API surveys.



# Executive Summary

The August 2023 trilateral summit at Camp David marked a historic milestone in U.S.-South Korea-Japan relations, establishing new frameworks for crisis consultation, information-sharing, joint military exercises, and cooperation on critical supply chains. While the summit reflected growing bipartisan support in Washington for trilateral cooperation, skepticism remains about unresolved historical issues between Seoul and Tokyo, which could limit long-term progress.

This report examines American public attitudes toward trilateral cooperation, with selective comparisons to Korean and Japanese perspectives on issues of key interest in the Indo-Pacific. The findings highlight both opportunities and constraints for sustaining deeper collaboration.

## Key Findings

- **Positive Views of Allies:** A majority of surveyed Americans view South Korea (62 percent) and Japan (78 percent) favorably. Favorability strongly shapes whether these countries are seen as partners or competitors, and it correlates with positive assessments of bilateral relations and economic ties.
- **Trust as a Critical Variable:** Most Americans trust South Korea (58 percent) and Japan (69 percent). Trust is linked to support for maintaining or increasing allied defense spending, while also reducing demands for greater cost-sharing—a dynamic that underscores the mediating role of trust in burden-sharing debates.
- **Shared Threat Perceptions:** Americans broadly align with Koreans and Japanese in identifying Russia, China, and North Korea as top threats, though the allies prioritize these differently. On Taiwan, nearly half of surveyed Americans remain unsure about the likelihood of conflict and prefer diplomacy and indirect aid over direct U.S. military intervention.
- **Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Questions:** Americans generally view U.S. security commitments as robust, but remain divided on whether South Korea and Japan should develop nuclear weapons or host U.S. nuclear deployments. Public opinion reveals no clear consensus on these sensitive issues.
- **Trade and Tariffs:** Roughly 45 percent oppose Trump-era tariffs on South Korea and Japan, but a bipartisan majority supports free trade. While Republicans show more tolerance for tariffs, both parties broadly endorse open markets, suggesting resilience in the foundation for economic cooperation.

The American public broadly supports strong ties with South Korea and Japan, but attitudes are conditional. Trust and fairness strongly influence views on defense spending, cost-sharing, and alliance modernization. On flashpoints like Taiwan or nuclear armament, however, Americans reveal uncertainty and ambivalence, underscoring the need for ongoing dialogue and leadership to shape consensus.

These findings offer U.S. policymakers reasons for both optimism and caution. While the trilateral framework enjoys wide support in principle, its long-term success depends on cultivating public trust, managing historical sensitivities, and aligning strategies on the region's most pressing security and economic challenges. Public opinion, though not determinative, remains a critical constraint that leaders must navigate with care to sustain the spirit of the Camp David Principles.

*“Public opinion is a mysterious and invisible power, to which everything must yield. There is nothing more fickle, more vague, or more powerful; yet capricious as it is, it is nevertheless much more often true, reasonable, and just, than we imagine.”*

Napoleon Bonaparte<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

The United States, South Korea, and Japan share much in common, but forging a unified foreign policy among them has often been difficult. A major stumbling block has been disagreements between South Korea and Japan about the historical issues.<sup>2</sup> This is perhaps the reason why the trilateral summit at Camp David in August 2023 is touted as a historic accomplishment.<sup>3</sup>

The meeting resulted in a joint statement, which formalized mechanisms for rapid consultations and information-sharing during crisis situations.<sup>4</sup> The three countries also committed to enhancing joint military exercises and establishing consultative bodies for critical supply chains, focusing on semiconductors, minerals, and energy security.<sup>5</sup>

There is now broad bipartisan support in Washington for trilateral cooperation.<sup>6</sup> Experts in the foreign policy and national security communities echo the sentiment that trilateral cooperation is integral to the United States’ regional security strategy, reinforcing existing alliances while building new minilateral coalitions to address issues of mutual concern in the region.<sup>7</sup> They further contend that the arrangement strengthens intelligence-sharing, allied force readiness, and deterrence, along with economic resilience and supply chains.<sup>8</sup>

Skeptics, however, question the impact and longevity of this effort. For this school of thought, efforts to expand trilateral cooperation are likely to remain suboptimal as long as historical issues remain unresolved.<sup>9</sup> This is because mutual mistrust will only hinder joint initiatives. One commonly cited example is the 2018 ruling by a South Korean court that required specific Japanese companies to provide compensation to victims forced into labor during World War II. The event led to tit-for-tat economic and diplomatic escalation, which culminated in Japan restricting semiconductor material exports to South Korea and the South Korean government threatening to withdraw from a critical military intelligence-sharing agreement.<sup>10</sup>

What does the American public think about the value of trilateral cooperation and believe the United States, South Korea, and Japan should do together, if anything at all? This report is part of a broader series examining public attitudes toward various issues relevant to trilateral coordination and cooperation. This volume puts the spotlight on American public opinion but considers Korean and Japanese public perspectives on specific topics where comparative insights from the three countries prove useful.

Key findings from this report are as follows:

- Americans view South Korea (62 percent) and Japan (78 percent) positively, and favorability strongly shapes whether these countries are seen as trusted partners or competitors.
- While most Americans trust South Korea (58 percent) and Japan (69 percent), higher trust is linked to greater support for enhanced defense spending but less pressure on alliance cost-sharing.
- Both allies (South Korea and Japan) are considered vital U.S. interests, with broad alignment on top threats (Russia, China, and North Korea), though South Koreans focus most on North Korea while Japanese prioritize China.
- China is seen as a common threat, but Americans remain split and uncertain on the question of a Taiwan contingency and prefer diplomacy and aid over direct military action.
- Americans broadly accept U.S. security commitments for its allies in the region but remain evenly divided on whether South Korea and Japan should have independent nuclear weapons or host U.S. nuclear deployments.
- Roughly 45 percent oppose Trump's tariffs on both South Korea and Japan, and a bipartisan majority continues to support free trade despite partisan differences in rhetoric on tariff.

In general, the survey reveals that the American public holds broadly favorable and trusting views of both South Korea and Japan, with more than six in ten respondents expressing positive impressions of each country. These favorable views extend beyond simple sentiment, shaping perceptions of the bilateral relationships and economic partnerships. Those with positive impressions overwhelmingly see South Korea and Japan as partners and judge the overall relationship as “good,” while unfavorable views are strongly associated with seeing them as competitors and relations as “bad.” Trust, in particular, emerges as a mediating factor between attitudes on defense- and cost-sharing. Americans who see Seoul and Tokyo as trustworthy partners are far more likely to support maintaining or increasing their defense spending, while simultaneously expressing less demand for these countries to contribute more to U.S. troop costs. This suggests that trust encourages expectations of stronger allied defense capabilities while tempering burden-sharing demands.

On security matters, Americans recognize China, North Korea, and Russia as the most pressing threats, broadly aligning with South Korean and Japanese threat perceptions, though the allies prioritize these dangers differently. The concern over a possible Taiwan contingency also illustrates both convergence and uncertainty—while South Koreans see conflict in the Taiwan Strait as highly likely, Americans are more ambivalent, with nearly half unsure about its likelihood. The report suggests that this is an accurate reflection of U.S. policy regarding Taiwan, which is focused more on deterrence and risk management rather than on policy forecasts. The striking finding, however, is that U.S. public opinion does not reveal a consensus on a

preferred response to this contingency. Instead, Americans lean toward indirect measures such as humanitarian aid and military assistance. There is also a preference for allies to act, rather than for direct U.S. troop deployment. This caution extends to nuclear policy as well. Although a majority agrees on the effectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence, public opinion on nuclear weapons for South Korea and Japan remains split, with no clear distinction made between independent programs and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets.

On trade, partisan divides surface in attitudes toward tariffs, but a broad bipartisan consensus continues to support free trade, reinforcing the long-standing U.S. orientation toward open markets.

Taken together, these findings suggest that while the American public is generally supportive of strong ties with South Korea and Japan, trust and favorability remain critical variables shaping how they evaluate burden-sharing, defense modernization, and economic cooperation in the context of great power competition with China.

## Methodology

YouGov conducted an online survey in the United States in collaboration with KEI from August 8 to August 19, 2025. To ensure a balanced sample, YouGov initially interviewed 1,658 people and selected 1,500 respondents who best represented the United States. The sample was weighted using various U.S. Census and election data, including the American Community Survey (ACS) public use microdata file, the 2020 Current Population Survey, the 2020 National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, and the 2020 CES surveys, among others, aligning the sample along key demographics features such as age, gender, education, race, and voting behavior. These adjustments are intended to make the sample reflect the national population. The survey's margin of error is  $\pm 2.85$  percentage point with 95 percent confidence.

## Favorability

Ample evidence suggests that public opinion can influence policy decisions. A 1996 study by researcher Eric Larson, for instance, showed that public opposition to the Vietnam War was one of the leading causes behind the U.S. withdrawal from the conflict.<sup>11</sup> At times, the public not only influences; they become the decision-makers. This was the case in 2016, for example, when a majority of voters in the United Kingdom opted to leave the European Union via a national referendum.<sup>12</sup> Other more recent examples include a cross-national comparison of public attitudes about how overall perception of foreign leaders and countries can influence foreign policies and even bilateral relationships.<sup>13</sup> (See Figure 1)

In our data, the American public appears to hold a generally favorable view of “South Korea” and “Japan,” but they appear to have less of an opinion about the respective leaders from these two countries. The data shows that over 60 percent of respondents do not have an opinion about either South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (64 percent) or Japanese Prime



Minister Shigeru Ishiba (62 percent), but more than 60 percent hold favorable views about South Korea (62 percent) and Japan (78 percent).

Still, when compared to other leaders around the world, both President Lee and Prime Minister Ishiba are received favorably among Americans. (See Figure 2)


While favorability may not be important in all instances, there appears to be a connection between this variable and individual perception about the overall state of the bilateral relationship (See Figure 3). For instance, among individuals who viewed South Korea unfavorably, 41 percent thought that the relationship was “bad.” Among those who saw South Korea as “favorable,” 55 percent saw the relationship as being “somewhat good” or “very good.” For Japan, 38 percent of those who held an “unfavorable” impression assessed the overall relationship as being “very bad” or “somewhat bad.” Additionally, 61 percent who had a “favorable” impression of Japan assessed the relationship between the United States and Japan as being “somewhat good” or “very good.” (See Figure 3)

Similar correlations can be observed in assessments of the economic relationship. Respondents who did not have a “favorable” impression of Korea or Japan also had the tendency to see both countries as competitors, while respondents who saw the two countries favorably considered them partners. To be more precise, 43 percent of individuals who saw Korea unfavorably tended to see the country as a competitor to the United States. (See Figure 4) Conversely, 44 percent of those who viewed Korea in a “favorable” light tended to see the country as an economic partner (“complementary”).


This relationship also held true for Japan. Among respondents who held “unfavorable” views about Japan, 56 percent stated the economic relationship was “competitive.” Among those who viewed Japan “favorably,” 51 percent thought the relationship was “complementary.”

## Trust

Francis Fukuyama defines “trust” as a foundational element of social and economic prosperity, defining it as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms.”<sup>14</sup> In international relations, trust is one of the factors that determines the likelihood of cooperation or conflict and the effectiveness of diplomacy. Andrew Kydd, for instance, argues that trust among states is integral to forming reliable alliances, making credible commitments, and avoiding security dilemmas.<sup>15</sup> Brian Rathbun also suggests that trust is a necessary ingredient in international institutions and effective diplomacy that results in win-win outcomes.<sup>16</sup> Thus, trust is an important factor when it comes to relations between countries like the United States, South Korea, and Japan. When we asked the respondents to think about this issue, an overwhelming majority considered South Korea (58 percent) and Japan (69 percent) to be “trustworthy.” (See Figure 5)



Here, we look to see if trust could be correlated to issues seminal for cooperation with South Korea and Japan. One interesting correlation revealed from our data was the relationship between attitudes on defense spending and alliance cost-sharing in South Korea and Japan. More specifically, among those who stated that Japan was a “trustworthy partner,” over 74 percent supported either maintaining or increasing Japan’s defense spending. This is significantly larger than the 51 percent (-24 percentage point) of those who thought Japan was an “untrustworthy partner” but should also maintain or increase their defense spending. Among respondents who viewed South Korea as a “trustworthy partner,” 76 percent supported maintaining or increasing its defense spending. Only 40 percent (-35 percentage points) of those who thought South Korea was “untrustworthy” thought the same about what it should do with its defense spending. In short, more trust is associated with more defense spending.



Trust was also shown to be related to alliance cost-sharing. Those respondents who thought the two countries were “trustworthy partners” tended to think that these countries were already “paying too much” or “the right amount” for stationing U.S. troops in their country; that is, they are comfortable with /less contributions from these countries. Among those individuals who perceived South Korea and/or Japan as being “untrustworthy partners,” respondents were more likely to think that they were paying “too little.” (See Figure 7)

More specifically, the results show that 58 percent of respondents who stated that they considered South Korea to be a “trustworthy partner” thought that the country was paying “too much” or “just the right amount” for U.S. troops based on the Korean Peninsula. Only 37 percent of those who considered South Korea to be an “untrustworthy partner” thought the same. Among those who considered Japan to be “trustworthy,” 61 percent stated that Japan was paying “just the right amount” or paying “too much” for U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). Only 33 percent thought the same among those who considered Japan to be an “untrustworthy partner.”

Interestingly, trust appears to work in an unexpected way for these two variables. In one instance, more trust means increased defense spending, and in the other instance, more trust means less burden-sharing for these countries. A typical understanding of burden-sharing is that it is necessarily associated with increased defense spending. That is, Americans would

prefer South Korea and Japan to increase defense spending because they want the allies to bear a heavier load of the burden for stationing U.S. troops in their respective countries.

But the survey results suggest that “trust” can be a mediating factor between these two variables, which explains why Americans think that South Korea and Japan ought to increase their defense spending even though they also believe both countries are paying too much or just the right amount. (See Figure 8)

Could this mean that the desire for South Korea and Japan to increase defense spending is not impacted by U.S. demands? Not necessarily. Evidence suggests that the relationship between attitudes on defense spending in South Korea and Japan is strongly correlated. Regression analysis of these two variables also suggests that both trust and attitudes on cost-sharing are significant factors when it comes to attitudes on defense spending, meaning that trust can play a role in shaping views about allied contributions to burden-sharing and defense spending, but it is not the only factor in these considerations.

The EAI and API surveys, conducted in South Korea and Japan, respectively, suggest that 53 percent of South Koreans and nearly 57 percent of Japanese people believe that they are “paying too much” for basing of U.S. troops in their respective countries.<sup>17</sup> One way to address this challenge is by fostering trust and building mutual confidence among the three countries, thereby creating a more persuasive basis for burden-sharing acceptable to all sides.

## Common Interests and Threats

Aside from overall favorability and trust, one way to assess the nature of the relationship and forecast the longevity of the relationship among the three countries is by gauging how people perceive national interest and threats.

When asked to choose countries or regions that are “most vital interests to the United States,” the top choices included South Korea (42 percent) and Japan (48 percent). Between the two countries were the European Union (47 percent), the United Kingdom (45 percent), China (44 percent), and the Middle East (42 percent). (See Figure 9)

Key threats for the United States were Russia (71 percent), China (59 percent), and North Korea (55 percent). The fact that these three countries were also mentioned as top threats in South Korea and Japan suggests that there is an overlapping security interest. What was different, however, was some variation in the relative ordering of these concerns. Most South

| Threats         | Key Threat Perception in |              |              |
|-----------------|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|
|                 | U.S.                     | Japan        | S. Korea     |
| <b>China</b>    | <b>58.6%</b>             | <b>68.7%</b> | <b>73.0%</b> |
| <b>Russia</b>   | <b>70.3%</b>             | <b>52.3%</b> | <b>49.4%</b> |
| <b>N. Korea</b> | <b>54.4%</b>             | <b>55.1%</b> | <b>91.3%</b> |

Koreans were concerned about North Korea (91.3 percent), followed by China (73 percent) and Russia (49.4 percent). For 68.7 percent of the Japanese public, China was the most important threat, followed by North Korea (55.1 percent) and Russia (52.3 percent).

This result is generally consistent with the qualitative assessment of the threat level, which we also asked the respondents to rate. (See Figure 10) Russia topped the list as the “critical threat” (just under 43 percent), followed by China (over 36 percent) and North Korea (29 percent).

## China

One common threat at the top of the list for the United States, South Korea, and Japan is China. For U.S. policymakers, China is paramount, consistent with its status as the “pacing challenge” in national security strategies since 2017.<sup>18</sup> Survey respondents from the United States, South Korea, and Japan all name China among the top national security threats.<sup>19</sup>

When we think of China, a Taiwan contingency looms large.<sup>20</sup> When asked about the likelihood of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, 42 percent of U.S. respondents thought this was likely, and 49 percent answered that either they did not know or were not sure. In mirror surveys conducted in South Korea and Japan by KEI’s partnering institutes, nearly *twice* as many South Koreans (72 percent) thought that the likelihood of a cross-strait conflict was high, while approximately a similar number of Japanese respondents (42 percent) felt the same.

### Perceived Likelihood of Conflict in the Taiwan Strait

|       |       |          |
|-------|-------|----------|
| 42.1% | 42.2% | 72.1%    |
| U.S.  | Japan | S. Korea |

Perhaps the most important finding from a policy perspective was that a plurality (49 percent) of U.S. respondents stated that they either “do not know” or were “not sure” whether there will be a cross-strait military conflict in the near future. What this suggests is that for Americans, the Taiwan issue is less about probability and more about mitigation or prevention. (See Figure 11)

With respect to what the United States should do if a Taiwan contingency does arise, the findings show that there is no clear consensus on an appropriate policy response aside from non-intervention (13 percent) or unilateral military intervention through troop deployment (16 percent). There is more support for encouraging “allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to send their troops to defend Taiwan” (28 percent), but this is still less support than providing “military aid or weapons” (34 percent) or encouraging “allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to provide military aid to Taiwan” (34 percent).

The greatest support is for either providing direct “humanitarian assistance” (37 percent) or encouraging “allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to provide humanitarian assistance to Taiwan” (35 percent). Economic assistance, either directly (30 percent) or by encouraging allies (33 percent), received about the same level of support. Basically, there is

little to no consensus on which of these options would be the most preferable for the United States. (See Figure 12)

When it came to a joint response by the United States, South Korea, and Japan, there was no clear support for any single option, but a diplomatic response (37 percent) is shown to be preferable to economic (33 percent) or military (30 percent) responses, albeit marginally so. Again, “no response” (9 percent) is the least preferred out of all options.

Together, these results suggest that Americans may not favor U.S. military engagement in a Taiwan contingency scenario. Instead, they prefer diplomacy and indirect support for Taiwan as far as a U.S. response is concerned; however, there is no clear preference among these favored options. Even in the case of a joint trilateral response, the American public appears split on exactly what the three should do together. This shows that a Taiwan contingency is a difficult problem for the American public, and there is no clear national consensus about this issue.

## **Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Armament**

The issue of U.S. extended deterrence is closely linked to the China question. Although the August 25 summit between Trump and Lee left the issue of “alliance modernization” unresolved, momentum is building around the need to adapt U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula to shifting strategic priorities and the changing security environment in the region..<sup>21</sup> As emphasized by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) commander General Xavier Brunson, alliance modernization is an adaptive response to the evolving regional security environment..<sup>22</sup> From his point of view, the focus is “not about numbers” but about capabilities, like Multi-Domain Task Force (MDT) and fifth-generation fighters. While USFK has considered changes to its force posture in the past, recent developments point to a more distributed and dispersed force presence across the Indo-Pacific..<sup>23</sup>

The previous administration in Seoul maintained a more nuanced and cautious approach to alliance modernization and extended deterrence..<sup>24</sup> When we asked the survey respondents about their view on the sufficiency of U.S. commitments to its allies, nearly twice as many respondents (32 percent) believed these commitments were sufficient compared to those who did not (17 percent). Approximately 28 percent said that they did not know and 23 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. (See Figure 13)

One way to address fears of the issue of abandonment is nuclear weapons, either indigenous to South Korea and/or Japan or deployed in the respective countries by the U.S.. When asked about South Korea developing its own nuclear capabilities, over 32 percent of American respondents were supportive, compared to 34 percent opposed. The attitude was not very different for Japan with 33 percent in support and 35 percent opposed. On the question of deploying U.S. controlled and operated nuclear weapons to South Korea and Japan, sentiment was similar.

A subsequent comparison of answers for these two sets of questions shows that the answers for both questions are correlated. (See Figure 14) In short, the results suggest that Americans do not differentiate deploying U.S. nuclear weapons to these countries or the development of these capabilities by the countries themselves. What is also notable is the fact that there is no clear preference about these issues—an equal share of respondents oppose, support, and have no opinion.

There is less diversity of opinion on North Korea, however. Nearly 54 percent of survey respondents believe that it is “not likely at all” that North Korea abandons its nuclear program in the next five to ten years.

Overall, the results suggest that most Americans regard U.S. commitments under extended deterrence is robust even though they may not be deeply informed about the regional security dynamics. The majority also doubt that North Korea will denuclearize, but express no clear consensus as to whether they would support or oppose nuclear weapons in South Korea or Japan.

## Trade and Tariffs

Trade and tariffs have emerged as a central focus of the Trump administration’s foreign policy.<sup>25</sup> In his first nine months in office, President Trump moved quickly to impose a range of tariff measures, several of which remain under legal challenge. Administration officials frequently highlighted tariffs as a tool for securing better terms of trade and generating government revenue. In our survey, however, we found three interesting patterns. One is that a plurality of respondents (nearly 45 percent) expressed opposition to these tariffs. (See Figure 15)

The second observation is that the sentiment on tariffs made little to no difference whether the target is South Korea or Japan. A similar share of respondents opposed tariffs on South Korea (43 percent) and Japan (46 percent). However, there were notable demographic differences as previous research on this issue has shown.<sup>26</sup> Namely, self-identified Republicans and conservatives are far more supportive of tariffs than self-identified Democrats and liberals—the latter group was also more supportive of U.S. influence over South Korea and Japan with respect to these countries’ trade and investment activities with China.

**56.62%**  
of Americans  
**support**  
economic order centered  
on the standard **rules**  
**of free trade**, which  
was the prevailing  
international norm since  
the end of World War II.

An interesting finding, however, is that nearly 57 percent of U.S. respondents stated that they support the standard rule of free trade, which was the international norm since the end of World War II. Even though there was a statistically significant

## North Korea

**53.76%**

of Americans think that  
N. Korea is **“not  
likely at all” to  
give up its  
nuclear  
weapons.**



difference between self-identified Democrats and Republicans on the question of free trade rules, the nominal magnitude of this difference is small enough that it is reasonable to state that both Republicans and Democrats generally support open trade. (See Figure 14) More specifically, 58 percent of Republican and over 70 percent of Democratic respondents supported free trade rules.

Similar observation is made about ideological orientation. While there is a statistically significant difference, the nominal magnitude does not change the conclusion that conservatives and liberals generally support free trade rules. This finding is consistent with results from previous research which showed Republicans (unlike Democrats) supporting mercantilist or export-led protectionist policies, where they favor protectionism for imports while also supporting unrestricted export of U.S. goods and services.<sup>27</sup> Essentially, what this means is that Republican voters are not going to oppose open trade, but they will support protectionist policies such as tariffs against imports.

## Conclusion

The Camp David trilateral summit underscored the promise of deeper U.S.-South Korea-Japan cooperation, but public opinion data remind us that sustaining this momentum will require more than elite-level consensus. This report focused primarily on American public attitudes, which showed that Americans are generally supportive of both South Korea and Japan, viewing them as trusted partners and vital to U.S. interests, yet these positive attitudes are nuanced. Trust and favorability play critical roles in shaping views on defense spending, burden-sharing, and the perception of economic partnership. This means that policymakers seeking to strengthen trilateral coordination must recognize that public sentiment is not uniform, but conditional and anchored in whether South Korea and Japan are seen as reliable and fair-minded partners.

Yet, the findings suggest there could be limits to public consensus. For instance, Americans are unclear about how their country should respond to regional flashpoints like a Taiwan contingency. Americans prefer diplomacy and indirect support over direct military involvement, even as they acknowledge the sufficiency of extended deterrence. There is also no clear consensus on allied nuclear armament, which suggests that these are all problems that require further debate and consideration.

On trade, partisan divides over tariffs persist, but the enduring bipartisan commitment to free trade suggests a strong foundation for economic cooperation. Taken together, KEI's findings indicate that while the trilateral framework between the United States, South Korea, and Japan enjoys broad public support in principle, its long-term viability depends on cultivating trust, demonstrating fairness in burden-sharing, and building alignment on how to manage the most difficult security challenges. For U.S. policymakers, strengthening trilateral ties is both a strategic necessity and a test of sustaining public confidence at home, which is critical to success at diplomacy abroad.

Public opinion is hardly a deterministic factor when it comes to policy choice. But it is an important constraint. As James Madison once put it, “public opinion sets bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free one.”<sup>28</sup> Understanding these bounds will go a long way toward understanding the limits of the choices that our policymakers have when it comes to trilateral cooperation and allied relations.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Napoleon Bonaparte, G De Liancourt, and James Alexander Manning, *Political Aphorisms: Moral and Philosophical Thoughts Of The Emperor Napoleon* (Samuel Bagster & Sons, 1848), 242.

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<sup>3</sup> The White House, “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” August 18, 2023, <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/>; U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Japan, “Trilateral Leaders Summit: U.S.–Japan–South Korea,” accessed August 23, 2025, <https://jp.usembassy.gov/trilateral-leaders-summit-us-japan-south-korea/>.

<sup>4</sup> Bruce Klingner, “2023 Camp David Summit Strengthened Allied Cooperation Against Indo–Pacific Threats,” *The Heritage Foundation*, September 8, 2023, <https://www.heritage.org/china/report/2023-camp-david-summit-strengthened-allied-cooperation-against-indo-pacific-threats/>.

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
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# Figures

**Figure 1. Americans tend to see Japan and Korea favorably but they do not know much about the leaders from these countries**



**Figure 2. Americans tend to recognize unfavorable leaders better than favorable ones. But President Lee Jae Myung and Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru are generally more favored.**


Q: In terms of overall favorability, how would you rate the leaders of the following countries?



**Figure 3. Americans that view allies favorably, also think the relationship is “good”**

Q: What is your impression of South Korea?


Q: What do you think of the current relationship between South Korea and the United States?



**Figure 4. Americans that view allies favorably, think they are *partners*; Americans that view allies unfavorably, think they are *competitors*.**

Q: What is your impression of South Korea?


Q: In terms of the economic relationship between South Korea / Japan and the United States, which do you think is closer to A or B? (A) The economies of the two countries are complementary (B) The economies of the two countries are competitive





**Figure 5. Most Americans consider South Korea and Japan as trustworthy partners**


Q: Do you think South Korea / Japan is a trustworthy partner for the United States?



**Figure 6. Americans who view allies as more “trustworthy partners” tend to think that they should increase their defense budget.**

Q: Do you think South Korea / Japan is a trustworthy partner for the United States?


Q: The United States has recently requested a significant increase in the defense budget of its allies. Do you think it is necessary for South Korea / Japan to significantly increase its defense budget?




**Figure 7. Americans who view allies as more “trustworthy partners” tend to see them contributing either the “right amount” or “too much” to U.S. troop basing.**

Q: Do you think South Korea / Japan is a trustworthy partner for the United States?

Q: South Korea / Japan pays about \$1 billion / \$2 billion annually for the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Korea / Japan. What do you think about the current level of def




**Figure 8. Americans believe that South Korea and Japan should increase their defense budget but they also believe that they are paying too much or the right amount for U.S. troops based in their countries.**




**Figure 9. Americans think that Korea and Japan are vital to the interest of the United States. Russia, China, and North Korea are considered top threats.**


Q: Which country or region do you think is of most vital interest to the United States? Please select all that apply.  
Q: Which country or region do you think poses a military threat to the United States? Please select all that apply.



**Figure 10. 42.6 percent of Americans think Russia is the “critical threat” followed by China (36.4 percent) and North Korea (29 percent).**




**Figure 11. For the Americans, the question of Taiwan contingency is less about whether it will happen but what to do if and when it does.**






**Figure 12. Americans appear split in terms of what to do about the Taiwan contingency if it arises. But no response and direct military intervention through troop deployment are the least preferred response.**




**Figure 13. Americans appear split on the question about development of indigenous nuclear weapons in Korea and Japan, and deployment of US nuclear weapons to these countries.**



*Q: Do you/would you support or oppose basing U.S.-controlled and operated nuclear weapons in South Korea / Japan?*


■ Oppose ■ Support ■ Don't Know



**Figure 14. When support for indigenous nuclear armament is compared to support for deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea and Japan, we find that the response for these two questions are correlated**


*Q: If North Korea does not abandon its nuclear program, do you/would you support or oppose South Korea / Japan developing its own nuclear weapons?*

*Q: Do you/would you support or oppose basing U.S.-controlled and operated nuclear weapons in South Korea / Japan?*




**Figure 15. 45% of Americans are *opposed* to Trump tariffs against Korea and Japan; and are split on the question of exercising influence over Japan and South Korea when it comes to their trade and investment practices with China.**

*Q: What do you think about the Trump administration's second term tariffs on Korea / Japan exports (e.g., steel, aluminum, automobiles)?*



*Q: Do you support or oppose the U.S. having influence over Japan and South Korea's trade and investment relationships with China?*




**Figure 16. Average support for tariff and free trade rule differs mostly along partisan and ideological lines. As previous studies have also shown gender differences might also matter.**

Q: What do you think about the Trump administration's second term tariffs on Korea/Japan (e.g., steel, aluminum, automobiles)?

Q: Do you support or oppose the U.S. having influence over Japan and South Korea's trade and investment relationships with China?

Q: Since the end of World War II, international institutions have supported an economic order centered on the standard rules of free trade. Do you think the United States should continue to support these rules?



Note: the category of answers for the three questions were: 1 = Strongly oppose, 2 = Somewhat oppose, 3 = Neither oppose nor support, 4 = Somewhat support, 5 = Strongly support, 6 = Don't Know; these entries were consolidated so that 1 = Oppose, 2 = Neither Oppose Nor Support, 3 = Support. Don't Know was not included in the mean or standard deviation calculation.

# Appendix I

## Methodology

### Korea Economic Institute of America and YouGov

YouGov, in coordination with KEI, conducted the U.S. portion of the 2025 trilateral survey from August 8 to August 19, 2025. In total, the survey recorded responses from 1,658 Americans, from which a final dataset of 1,500 adults was constructed. The respondent pool was matched to a politically representative modeled frame of U.S. adults, drawing on multiple benchmark datasets, including the American Community Survey (ACS) public use microdata file, public voter file records, the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration supplements, the 2020 National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, and the 2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES). These sources ensured that the sample reflected demographic and political distributions, including the 2020 presidential vote.

To refine representativeness, YouGov employed propensity score matching. Matched cases were weighted to the frame using a logistic regression that incorporated age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and region. Respondents were grouped into deciles of estimated propensity scores and post-stratified accordingly. Final weights were further adjusted based on 2020 and 2024 presidential vote choice, as well as gender, age, race, and education. This layered weighting process corrected for sampling and response imbalances and aligned the dataset closely with national benchmarks.

The resulting survey provides a nationally representative sample of U.S. public opinion with a margin of error of  $\pm 2.85$  percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level.

### East Asia Institute and Hankook Research

Hankook Research conducted the East Asia Institute (EAI) portion of the survey mentioned in this report between August 18 and August 20, 2025. The target population was adults aged 18 and older nationwide, with respondents drawn from the firm's master sample of 970,000 individuals, focusing on a political–social panel of about 70,000. Using web-based survey methods, the study applied proportional quota sampling by region, gender, and age (based on July 2025 census data) to secure representativeness. A total of 1,585 respondents participated, yielding a response rate of 27.6 percent from 7,134 invitations sent. The survey has a reported margin of error of  $\pm 2.5$  percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level.

### Asia Pacific Initiative

Asia Pacific Initiative conducted the Japanese portion of the 2025 trilateral public opinion survey independently using its own online research platform. The fieldwork occurred between August 19 to August 20, 2025. A quota sampling method was used to balance respondents by gender

and age group, with sample cells covering men and women across seven age brackets (18–19, 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, and 70+). The planned sample size was 1,000 respondents, and the final dataset included 1,037 valid cases. This structure ensured proportional representation across demographic categories, making the survey broadly reflective of Japan’s adult population.

## Appendix II

### Survey Questionnaire and Relative Frequency (Unit: %)

#### Impression of S. Korea

*What is your impression of South Korea?*

|                      | All  | N    |
|----------------------|------|------|
| Very unfavorable     | 5%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat unfavorable | 9%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat favorable   | 45%  | 1500 |
| Very favorable       | 17%  | 1500 |
| Don't know           | 23%  | 1500 |
| N                    | 1500 |      |

#### Impression of President Lee Jae Myung

*What is your impression of President Lee Jae Myung of South Korea?*

|                      | All  | N    |
|----------------------|------|------|
| Very unfavorable     | 6%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat unfavorable | 8%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat favorable   | 19%  | 1500 |
| Very favorable       | 3%   | 1500 |
| Don't know           | 64%  | 1500 |
| N                    | 1500 |      |

#### Relationship between S. Korea and US

*What do you think of the current relationship between South Korea and the United States?*

|               | All  | N    |
|---------------|------|------|
| Very bad      | 3%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat bad  | 9%   | 1500 |
| Average       | 28%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat good | 25%  | 1500 |
| Very good     | 12%  | 1500 |
| Don't know    | 23%  | 1500 |
| N             | 1500 |      |

### S. Korea trustworthiness

*Do you think South Korea is a trustworthy partner for the United States?*

|                        | All  | N    |
|------------------------|------|------|
| Very untrustworthy     | 6%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat untrustworthy | 10%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat trustworthy   | 37%  | 1500 |
| Very trustworthy       | 21%  | 1500 |
| Don't know             | 26%  | 1500 |
| N                      | 1500 |      |

### Economic relationship between S. Korea and US (Scale)

*In terms of the economic relationship between South Korea and the United States, which do you think is closer to A or B?*

|  | All  | N*   |
|--|------|------|
| 1 - (A) The economies of the two countries are complementary | 8%   | 1499 |
| 2  | 30%  | 1499 |
| 3  | 19%  | 1499 |
| 4 - (B) The economies of the two countries are competitive   | 4%   | 1499 |
| Don't know   | 38%  | 1499 |
| N  | 1499 |      |

(\* Note: Where sample weighted total does not equal 1,500, there were missing values.)

### S. Korea defense budget

*The United States has recently requested a significant increase in the defense budget of its allies. Do you think it is necessary for South Korea to significantly increase its defense budget?*

|  | All  | N    |
|--|------|------|
| South Korea should decrease its defense budget               | 5%   | 1500 |
| South Korea should maintain its defense budget               | 22%  | 1500 |
| South Korea should marginally increase its defense budget    | 20%  | 1500 |
| South Korea should significantly increase its defense budget | 15%  | 1500 |
| Don't know   | 39%  | 1500 |
| N  | 1500 |      |

### **S. Korea defense cost sharing**

*South Korea pays about \$1 billion annually for the cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea as part of a defense cost sharing agreement between itself and the U.S. What do you think about the current level of defense cost sharing?*

|  | All  | N    |
|--|------|------|
| South Korea is paying too much         | 11%  | 1499 |
| South Korea is paying the right amount | 34%  | 1499 |
| South Korea is paying too little       | 14%  | 1499 |
| Don't know                             | 41%  | 1499 |
| N                                      | 1499 |      |

### **Impression of Japan**

*What is your impression of Japan?*

|                      | All  | N    |
|----------------------|------|------|
| Very unfavorable     | 2%   | 1499 |
| Somewhat unfavorable | 6%   | 1499 |
| Somewhat favorable   | 43%  | 1499 |
| Very favorable       | 35%  | 1499 |
| Don't know           | 13%  | 1499 |
| N                    | 1499 |      |

### **Impression of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba**

*What is your impression of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba of Japan?*

|                      | All  | N    |
|----------------------|------|------|
| Very unfavorable     | 2%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat unfavorable | 5%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat favorable   | 23%  | 1500 |
| Very favorable       | 9%   | 1500 |
| Don't know           | 62%  | 1500 |
| N                    | 1500 |      |



### Relationship between Japan and US

*What do you think of the current relationship between Japan and the United States?*

|               | All  | N    |
|---------------|------|------|
| Very bad      | 1%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat bad  | 6%   | 1500 |
| Average       | 24%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat good | 28%  | 1500 |
| Very good     | 22%  | 1500 |
| Don't know    | 20%  | 1500 |
| N             | 1500 |      |

### Japan trustworthiness

*Do you think Japan is a trustworthy partner for the United States?*

|                        | All  | N    |
|------------------------|------|------|
| Very untrustworthy     | 2%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat untrustworthy | 7%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat trustworthy   | 38%  | 1500 |
| Very trustworthy       | 31%  | 1500 |
| Don't know             | 22%  | 1500 |
| N                      | 1500 |      |

### Economic relationship between Japan and US (Scale) -- question\_12

*In terms of the economic relationship between Japan and the United States, which do you think is closer to A or B?*

|  | All  | N    |
|--|------|------|
| 1 - (A) The economies of the two countries are complementary | 12%  | 1500 |
| 2  | 30%  | 1500 |
| 3  | 21%  | 1500 |
| 4 - (B) The economies of the two countries are competitive   | 7%   | 1500 |
| Don't know   | 30%  | 1500 |
| N  | 1500 |      |

### Japan defense budget

*The United States has recently requested a significant increase in the defense budget of its allies. Do you think it is necessary for Japan to significantly increase its defense budget?*

|  | All  | N    |
|--|------|------|
| Japan should decrease its defense budget               | 4%   | 1500 |
| Japan should maintain its defense budget               | 26%  | 1500 |
| Japan should marginally increase its defense budget    | 19%  | 1500 |
| Japan should significantly increase its defense budget | 15%  | 1500 |
| Don't know   | 37%  | 1500 |
| N  | 1500 |      |

### Japan defense cost sharing

*Japan pays about \$2 billion annually for the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan as part of a defense cost sharing agreement between itself and the U.S. What do you think about the current level of defense cost sharing?*

|                                  | All  | N    |
|----------------------------------|------|------|
| Japan is paying too much         | 12%  | 1499 |
| Japan is paying the right amount | 37%  | 1499 |
| Japan is paying too little       | 13%  | 1499 |
| Don't know                       | 37%  | 1499 |
| N                                | 1499 |      |

### Vital interest to US

*Which country/countries or region/regions do you think are of vital interest to the United States? Select as many or as few as you think.*

|   | All | N    |
|---|-----|------|
| Vital interest to US - South Korea                            | 43% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - China                                  | 44% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - Japan                                  | 48% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - Russia                                 | 31% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - Association of Southeast Asian Nations | 23% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - U.K.                                   | 45% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - European Union                         | 47% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - India                                  | 29% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - Australia                              | 32% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - Africa                                 | 21% | 1500 |

|                                      |      |      |
|--------------------------------------|------|------|
| Vital interest to US - Middle East   | 41%  | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - South America | 29%  | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - Other         | 4%   | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - None          | 4%   | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US - Don't know    | 21%  | 1500 |
| N                                    | 1500 |      |

### **Military threat to US**

*Which country/countries or region/regions do you think pose a military threat to the United States? Select as many or as few as you think.*

|  | All  | N    |
|--|------|------|
| Military threat to US - North Korea    | 54%  | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - China          | 59%  | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - Japan          | 4%   | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - Russia         | 70%  | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - South Korea    | 5%   | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - India          | 5%   | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - Middle East    | 35%  | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - European Union | 2%   | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - Vietnam        | 5%   | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - Other          | 3%   | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - None           | 5%   | 1500 |
| Military threat to US - Don't know     | 14%  | 1500 |
| N                                      | 1500 |      |

### **Vital interest to US (economic perspective)**

*From an economic perspective, which country/countries or region/regions do you consider to be of vital interest to the United States? Select as many or as few as you think.*

|  | All | N    |
|--|-----|------|
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - China  | 50% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - South Korea                                    | 35% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - Japan  | 49% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) | 23% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - India  | 33% | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - Russia   | 13% | 1500 |

|  |      |      |
|--|------|------|
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - European Union | 47%  | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - United Kingdom | 40%  | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - Other          | 2%   | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - None           | 4%   | 1500 |
| Vital interest to US (economic perspective) - Don't know     | 25%  | 1500 |
| N  | 1500 |      |

### Joint response during military conflict in Taiwan Strait

*In the event of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait (the body of water separating the island of Taiwan from China), in your opinion what level of joint response is most appropriate for the United States, Japan, and South Korea? Select all that apply.*

|   | All  | N    |
|---|------|------|
| A joint response is not necessary, and each country should respond individually.  | 9%   | 1500 |
| The three countries (i.e., the US, Japan, and South Korea) should coordinate a diplomatic response (e.g., by issuing a joint statement, etc.)                           | 37%  | 1500 |
| The three countries (i.e., the US, Japan, and South Korea) should coordinate an economic response (e.g., by trade, financial assistance, economic sanctions, etc.)      | 33%  | 1500 |
| The three countries (i.e., the US, Japan, and South Korea) should coordinate a joint military response. (i.e., military blockade, sending combat troops or ships, etc.) | 30%  | 1500 |
| Don't know  | 29%  | 1500 |
| N   | 1500 |      |

### US response during military conflict in Taiwan Strait

*In the event of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait (the body of water separating the island of Taiwan from China), what should be the response of the United States? Select all that apply.*

|   | All  | N    |
|---|------|------|
| The U.S. should send troops to defend Taiwan  | 16%  | 1500 |
| The U.S. should not intervene   | 13%  | 1500 |
| The U.S. should provide military aid or weapons to Taiwan   | 34%  | 1500 |
| The U.S. should provide economic aid to Taiwan  | 30%  | 1500 |
| The U.S. should provide humanitarian assistance to Taiwan   | 37%  | 1500 |
| The U.S. should encourage allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to send their troops to defend Taiwan        | 28%  | 1500 |
| The U.S. should encourage allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to provide military aid to Taiwan            | 34%  | 1500 |
| The U.S. should encourage allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to provide economic aid to Taiwan            | 33%  | 1500 |
| The U.S. should encourage allies in the region like South Korea and/or Japan to provide humanitarian assistance to Taiwan | 35%  | 1500 |
| Don't Know  | 28%  | 1500 |
| N   | 1500 |      |

### Agree/Disagree - China will engage in a military conflict in Taiwan Strait

*Do you agree or disagree? China will engage in a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait (the body of water separating the island of Taiwan from China), or nearby area in the near future.*

|                            | All  | N    |
|----------------------------|------|------|
| Strongly disagree          | 2%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat disagree          | 7%   | 1500 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 21%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat agree             | 30%  | 1500 |
| Strongly agree             | 12%  | 1500 |
| Don't know                 | 28%  | 1500 |
| N                          | 1500 |      |

### **Agree/Disagree - US commitment sufficient to guarantee security**

*Do you think that the U.S.'s commitment to defending its allies through various means including the use of nuclear weapons is sufficient to guarantee the security of \_\_\_\_\_ in response to military threats from China or North Korea?*

| <b>Total</b>               | All  | N    |
|----------------------------|------|------|
| Strongly disagree          | 7%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat disagree          | 10%  | 1500 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 23%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat agree             | 23%  | 1500 |
| Strongly agree             | 9%   | 1500 |
| Don't know                 | 28%  | 1500 |
| N                          | 1500 |      |
|                            |      |      |
| <b>Korea</b>               | All  | N    |
| Strongly disagree          | 6%   | 502  |
| Somewhat disagree          | 9%   | 502  |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 23%  | 502  |
| Somewhat agree             | 26%  | 502  |
| Strongly agree             | 8%   | 502  |
| Don't know                 | 28%  | 502  |
| N                          | 502  |      |
|                            |      |      |
| <b>Japan</b>               | All  | N    |
| Strongly disagree          | 7%   | 515  |
| Somewhat disagree          | 10%  | 515  |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 20%  | 515  |
| Somewhat agree             | 24%  | 515  |
| Strongly agree             | 12%  | 515  |
| Don't know                 | 27%  | 515  |
| N                          | 515  |      |
|                            |      |      |
| <b>Northeast Asia</b>      | All  | N    |
| Strongly disagree          | 9%   | 483  |
| Somewhat disagree          | 11%  | 483  |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 25%  | 483  |
| Somewhat agree             | 19%  | 483  |
| Strongly agree             | 7%   | 483  |

|            |     |     |
|------------|-----|-----|
| Don't know | 28% | 483 |
| N          | 483 |     |

### Trump administration's second term tariffs on exports

*What do you think about the Trump administration's second term tariffs on \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., steel, aluminum, automobiles)?*

| <b>Total</b>               | All  | N    |
|----------------------------|------|------|
| Strongly oppose            | 32%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat oppose            | 13%  | 1500 |
| Neither support nor oppose | 14%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat support           | 14%  | 1500 |
| Strongly support           | 11%  | 1500 |
| Don't know                 | 15%  | 1500 |
| N                          | 1500 |      |
|                            |      |      |
| <b>Korea</b>               | All  | N    |
| Strongly oppose            | 30%  | 730  |
| Somewhat oppose            | 12%  | 730  |
| Neither support nor oppose | 16%  | 730  |
| Somewhat support           | 15%  | 730  |
| Strongly support           | 11%  | 730  |
| Don't know                 | 14%  | 730  |
| N                          | 730  |      |
|                            |      |      |
| <b>Japan</b>               | All  | N    |
| Strongly oppose            | 33%  | 770  |
| Somewhat oppose            | 13%  | 770  |
| Neither support nor oppose | 13%  | 770  |
| Somewhat support           | 13%  | 770  |
| Strongly support           | 11%  | 770  |
| Don't know                 | 17%  | 770  |
| N                          | 770  |      |

### **Support/Oppose - US influence over Japan and S.Korea's relationships with China**

*Do you support or oppose the U.S. having influence over Japan and South Korea's trade and investment relationships with China?*

|                            | All  | N    |
|----------------------------|------|------|
| Strongly oppose            | 12%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat oppose            | 12%  | 1500 |
| Neither support nor oppose | 25%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat support           | 19%  | 1500 |
| Strongly support           | 10%  | 1500 |
| Don't know                 | 23%  | 1500 |
| N                          | 1500 |      |

### **Support/Oppose - free trade rules**

*Since the end of World War II, international institutions have supported an economic order centered on the standard rules of free trade. Do you think the United States should continue to support these rules?*

|                            | All  | N    |
|----------------------------|------|------|
| Strongly oppose            | 2%   | 1500 |
| Somewhat oppose            | 4%   | 1500 |
| Neither support nor oppose | 15%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat support           | 25%  | 1500 |
| Strongly support           | 32%  | 1500 |
| Don't know                 | 22%  | 1500 |
| N                          | 1500 |      |

### **Likelihood of N.Korea abandoning nuclear program**

*How likely do you think that North Korea will abandon its nuclear program in the next five to ten years?*

|                   | All  | N    |
|-------------------|------|------|
| Not likely at all | 54%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat unlikely | 18%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat likely   | 7%   | 1500 |
| Very likely       | 2%   | 1500 |
| Don't know        | 20%  | 1500 |
| N                 | 1500 |      |



**Support/Oppose - for S.Korean nuclear weapons**

*If North Korea does not abandon its nuclear program, do you/would you support or oppose South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons?*

|                  | All  | N    |
|------------------|------|------|
| Strongly oppose  | 17%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat oppose  | 18%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat support | 23%  | 1500 |
| Strongly support | 10%  | 1500 |
| Don't know       | 33%  | 1500 |
| N                | 1500 |      |

**Support/Oppose - for Japan nuclear weapons**

*If North Korea does not abandon its nuclear program, do you/would you support or oppose Japan developing its own nuclear weapons?*

|                  | All  | N    |
|------------------|------|------|
| Strongly oppose  | 18%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat oppose  | 18%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat support | 22%  | 1500 |
| Strongly support | 11%  | 1500 |
| Don't know       | 31%  | 1500 |
| N                | 1500 |      |

**Support/Oppose - US nuclear weapons in S.Korea**

*Do you/would you support or oppose basing U.S.-controlled and operated nuclear weapons in South Korea?*

|                  | All  | N    |
|------------------|------|------|
| Strongly oppose  | 16%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat oppose  | 16%  | 1500 |
| Somewhat support | 24%  | 1500 |
| Strongly support | 8%   | 1500 |
| Don't know       | 35%  | 1500 |
| N                | 1500 |      |

**Support/Oppose - US nuclear weapons in Japan**

*Do you support or oppose basing U.S.-controlled and operated nuclear weapons in Japan?*

|                 | All | N    |
|-----------------|-----|------|
| Strongly oppose | 17% | 1499 |
| Somewhat oppose | 17% | 1499 |

|                  |      |      |
|------------------|------|------|
| Somewhat support | 25%  | 1499 |
| Strongly support | 9%   | 1499 |
| Don't know       | 32%  | 1499 |
| N                | 1499 |      |

### Threat posed by countries

*How would you rate the threat posed by the following countries?*

| <b>China</b>    | All  | N    |
|-----------------|------|------|
| Critical threat | 36%  | 1500 |
| Moderate threat | 32%  | 1500 |
| Minor threat    | 13%  | 1500 |
| Not a threat    | 7%   | 1500 |
| Don't know      | 11%  | 1500 |
| N               | 1500 |      |

| <b>Russia</b>   | All  | N    |
|-----------------|------|------|
| Critical threat | 43%  | 1500 |
| Moderate threat | 33%  | 1500 |
| Minor threat    | 10%  | 1500 |
| Not a threat    | 4%   | 1500 |
| Don't know      | 10%  | 1500 |
| N               | 1500 |      |

| <b>North Korea</b> | All  | N    |
|--------------------|------|------|
| Critical threat    | 29%  | 1500 |
| Moderate threat    | 35%  | 1500 |
| Minor threat       | 18%  | 1500 |
| Not a threat       | 6%   | 1500 |
| Don't know         | 12%  | 1500 |
| N                  | 1500 |      |

| <b>Iran</b>     | All  | N    |
|-----------------|------|------|
| Critical threat | 27%  | 1500 |
| Moderate threat | 34%  | 1500 |
| Minor threat    | 18%  | 1500 |
| Not a threat    | 9%   | 1500 |
| Don't know      | 13%  | 1500 |
| N               | 1500 |      |

| <b>Venezuela</b> | All  | N    |
|------------------|------|------|
| Critical threat  | 3%   | 1500 |
| Moderate threat  | 11%  | 1500 |
| Minor threat     | 28%  | 1500 |
| Not a threat     | 37%  | 1500 |
| Don't know       | 21%  | 1500 |
| N                | 1500 |      |
|                  |      |      |
| <b>Mexico</b>    | All  | N    |
| Critical threat  | 4%   | 1500 |
| Moderate threat  | 10%  | 1500 |
| Minor threat     | 23%  | 1500 |
| Not a threat     | 52%  | 1500 |
| Don't know       | 12%  | 1500 |
| N                | 1500 |      |
|                  |      |      |
| <b>Canada</b>    | All  | N    |
| Critical threat  | 1%   | 1500 |
| Moderate threat  | 5%   | 1500 |
| Minor threat     | 9%   | 1500 |
| Not a threat     | 74%  | 1500 |
| Don't know       | 11%  | 1500 |
| N                | 1500 |      |

## Demographics

### Birth Year

|           | All    | N    |
|-----------|--------|------|
| 1930-1935 | 0.27%  | 4    |
| 1935-1940 | 0.66%  | 10   |
| 1940-1945 | 1.87%  | 28   |
| 1945-1950 | 3.65%  | 55   |
| 1950-1955 | 6.13%  | 92   |
| 1955-1960 | 8.17%  | 123  |
| 1960-1965 | 8.48%  | 127  |
| 1965-1970 | 8.96%  | 134  |
| 1970-1975 | 7.43%  | 111  |
| 1975-1980 | 6.02%  | 90   |
| 1980-1985 | 11.84% | 178  |
| 1985-1990 | 9.11%  | 137  |
| 1990-1995 | 5.99%  | 90   |
| 1995-2000 | 10.61% | 159  |
| 2000-2005 | 7.78%  | 117  |
| 2005-2010 | 3.04%  | 46   |
| N         |        | 1500 |

### Gender

|        | All    | N    |
|--------|--------|------|
| Male   | 48.98% | 735  |
| Female | 51.02% | 765  |
| N      |        | 1500 |

### Race - US

|                   | All    | N    |
|-------------------|--------|------|
| White             | 62.63% | 939  |
| Black             | 11.58% | 174  |
| Hispanic          | 13.13% | 197  |
| Asian             | 5.07%  | 76   |
| Native American   | 0.93%  | 14   |
| Middle Eastern    | 0.30%  | 5    |
| Two or more races | 4.12%  | 62   |
| Other             | 2.23%  | 33   |
| N                 |        | 1500 |

**Education**

|                      | All    | N    |
|----------------------|--------|------|
| No HS                | 6.76%  | 101  |
| High school graduate | 30.71% | 461  |
| Some college         | 20.09% | 301  |
| 2-year               | 8.99%  | 135  |
| 4-year               | 20.80% | 312  |
| Post-grad            | 12.65% | 190  |
| N                    |        | 1500 |

**Family income**

|                       | All    | N    |
|-----------------------|--------|------|
| Less than \$10,000    | 7.21%  | 108  |
| \$10,000 - \$19,999   | 7.28%  | 109  |
| \$20,000 - \$29,999   | 9.45%  | 142  |
| \$30,000 - \$39,999   | 6.95%  | 104  |
| \$40,000 - \$49,999   | 7.58%  | 114  |
| \$50,000 - \$59,999   | 7.79%  | 117  |
| \$60,000 - \$69,999   | 6.56%  | 98   |
| \$70,000 - \$79,999   | 6.67%  | 100  |
| \$80,000 - \$99,999   | 6.68%  | 100  |
| \$100,000 - \$119,999 | 6.25%  | 94   |
| \$120,000 - \$149,999 | 7.13%  | 107  |
| \$150,000 - \$199,999 | 5.57%  | 84   |
| \$200,000 - \$249,999 | 2.32%  | 35   |
| \$250,000 - \$349,999 | 1.14%  | 17   |
| \$350,000 - \$499,999 | 0.59%  | 9    |
| \$500,000 or more     | 0.37%  | 6    |
| Prefer not to say     | 10.44% | 157  |
| N                     |        | 1500 |

**Party ID**

|             | All    | N    |
|-------------|--------|------|
| Democrat    | 29.83% | 447  |
| Republican  | 27.63% | 414  |
| Independent | 30.96% | 464  |
| Other       | 4.63%  | 69   |
| Not sure    | 6.95%  | 104  |
| N           |        | 1500 |

**Ideology**

|                   | All    | N    |
|-------------------|--------|------|
| Very liberal      | 10.98% | 165  |
| Liberal           | 17.52% | 263  |
| Moderate          | 31.56% | 473  |
| Conservative      | 19.55% | 293  |
| Very conservative | 10.00% | 150  |
| Not sure          | 10.38% | 156  |
| Weighted N        |        | 1500 |