



## From Security Alliance to Comprehensive Technology-Centered Partnership


By Scott Snyder

The Joe Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol administrations have embraced the expansion of economic cooperation within the alliance between the United States and South Korea, or the Republic of Korea (ROK), leading to an unprecedented strengthening of the relationship. The development of the economic dimension of the relationship has included significant inward Korean investment into the United States, which has reached upwards of USD 140 billion during the Biden administration, mainly in the areas of chips, batteries, and clean technology.<sup>1</sup> These investment flows, stimulated by the US commitment to promote its clean energy transition under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), have supported the expansion of the US-ROK alliance from a security-centered alliance in which the one-way US commitment to defend South Korea from external aggression was the primary alliance mission to a mutual relationship in which South Korean investment in the United States creates US jobs and enables South Korea's integration into US markets alongside longstanding US security commitments.

The emergence of South Korea as a valued technology partner of the United States is powered not only by the Korean desire to expand its exposure to economic opportunities in the United States but also by the convergence in views between the Biden and Yoon administrations regarding the securitization of technology. This development is a direct response to the perceived threat posed by China's aspirations for global economic leadership and its threats to weaponize economic interdependence for its own benefit. Shared concerns about China's rising influence and expanded security concerns around China's efforts to achieve technological leadership have fueled US-South Korean efforts to strengthen bureaucratic coordination, integration, and alignment of efforts among like-minded countries in the technology sphere.<sup>2</sup> As part of its strategy of revitalizing alliances with like-minded countries to gird for technological competition with China, the Biden administration has enlisted allies to work together to both strengthen economic security and supply chain resiliency and deepen the integration of research and development (R&D) efforts to develop the critical and emerging technologies (CETs) of the future. South Korea has willingly joined those efforts as part of its own embrace of the global comprehensive strategic alliance with the United States and as an important element of its own aspirations to become a global pivotal state.<sup>3</sup>

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Thus, the Yoon administration's embrace of a foreign policy framework that prioritizes expanded alliance cooperation with the United States has generated an *era of institutionalization* in the US-ROK alliance, characterized by a broadening and deepening of governmental consultative efforts to align regulatory incentives, coordinate export controls to promote supply chain resiliency, and deepen coordination in response to emerging threats and chokepoints in alliance cooperation.

The broadening and deepening of the alliance was manifest during President Yoon's state visit to Washington, DC, in April 2023, when at least a dozen new institutionalized mechanisms were announced through which the US and South Korean governments are aligning aspects of economic and trade policy and functional cooperation in space, cyber, and commercial policy coordination.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, the US and South Korean national security advisors announced ambitious plans to upgrade technology cooperation "in strategic technologies that will be of greatest consequence to bolstering economic prosperity; enhancing resilience against supply chain disruptions; and securing competitive advantages for our two nations and like-minded partners."<sup>5</sup> The areas selected for cooperation through the inauguration of a US-ROK Next Generation CET Dialogue include semiconductor supply chains and technology; biotechnology; batteries and clean energy technology; quantum science and technology; digital connectivity; and artificial intelligence (AI).<sup>6</sup> These efforts to develop an integrated platform for research and development of upstream technologies signify the expansion of a partnership among like-minded countries intended to preserve technological superiority over common adversaries.

### **Purposes and Prospects for Alliance Coordination on Critical and Emerging Technologies**

This issue of *Korea Policy* examines the commitments of the two governments to cooperate on the development of critical and emerging technologies. There is no question that the formal identification of these areas and the designation of these pathways for cooperation have opened the way for deeper government-to-government coordination and have provided guidance for mobilizing cooperation that will extend to non-governmental educational and private sector actors across many different fields. The most ambitious and complicated component of this effort that potentially requires the greatest long-term commitment involves the building out of government-led and private-sector-supported frameworks for joint work on critical and emerging technologies in a wide range of areas.

### *Evaluating Efforts to Expand Cooperation on Critical and Emerging Technologies*

The papers in the first part of this issue analyze the development of the semiconductor supply chain, as well as R&D in emerging technologies such as AI and quantum mechanics, cooperation on new technologies in the context of efforts to address climate change, and efforts to collaborate more deeply on joint R&D in biotechnology.

Soyoung Kwon of George Mason University evaluates the emergence of US-South Korean coordination on semiconductor supply chains, including the Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue within the alliance and the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) more broadly, describing how rising techno-nationalism has led to the prioritization for decoupling from China and resiliency as alliance priorities. Kwon notes that differing policy and business interests and levels of exposure to the Chinese market may serve as an inhibition or even a source of friction between the United States and South Korea while both countries have deepened cooperation to promote resiliency of semiconductor supply chains based on their mutual interests and expectations for expanded mutual prosperity. Kwon recommends further dialogue to deepen semiconductor supply chain cooperation, public-private partnerships, institutional development within the semiconductor supply chain ecosystem, and coordination on export controls and investment screening mechanisms to promote supply chain resiliency.

Sanghyun Han evaluates the progress and development of US-South Korea cooperation in the development of AI and quantum technologies. Han concludes that the United States and South Korea are well-suited to enhance cooperation on AI, with a primary initial focus on government-level coordination among agencies and national laboratories to promote a common approach to standardization and government-led tie-ups with the private sector and critical educational institutions to promote joint research. However, due to South Korea's more limited capabilities in quantum technologies, cooperation in this area is limited primarily to the promotion of long-term research collaboration and the development of public-private partnerships.

Elan Sykes explains how addressing climate change has led to US-South Korea public-private collaboration on a variety of solutions, including battery supply chains, clean hydrogen, and the development of the civilian nuclear power sector. Sykes describes, in concrete terms, how governmental coordination to support R&D and the provision of incentives for market development can effectively stimulate the private sector to provide solutions and drive the sector's expansion by pursuing clean energy pragmatism in pursuit of the adaptation to low carbon emission technologies.

Finally, Zeena Nisar explores US-South Korea cooperation in the spheres of biotechnology and biomanufacturing. As with other sectors, the desire to enhance resiliency to reduce or eliminate dependency on China has been an active motive behind biotechnology-related cooperation between the United States and South Korea, as well as technological cooperation with India. Nisar outlines the alignment of the research and innovation ecosystems of both countries in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and biomanufacturing through the promotion of research tie-ups between research institutions and the facilitation of biotech investments in the pharmaceutical sector, addressing supply chain vulnerabilities in active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) and contract development and manufacturing organization (CDMO). Nisar also describes US-South Korea cooperation on agricultural biotechnology, including the alignment of regulatory systems and standards.

### *Evaluating US-South Korean Defense Cooperation in Space, Cyber, and the Defense Industrial Base*

The expansion of technological cooperation, in turn, has implications for future-oriented defense cooperation between the two allies in both emerging and longstanding areas. Such implications include space and cyber cooperation as well as the alignment of industrial bases to support efficient and technologically superior procurement both within the US-ROK alliance and in the context of technology development and defense cooperation with Australia and the United Kingdom under AUKUS. The papers contained in the second part of this issue examine the pathways, opportunities, and constraints that will guide efforts to deepen cooperation across these areas.

Space and cyber, first identified as “frontier” areas for alliance cooperation during the Barack Obama administration in 2015, appear to have gained significant new momentum in recent years. US-South Korea cooperation in these areas has deepened as South Korea has developed new capabilities and as competitors and adversaries have made progress in ways that expand the threats and risks of non-cooperation.

Regarding US-South Korea cooperation in space, Katherine Melbourne and Sam Wilson outline how the development of South Korean capabilities, such as the successful testing of a space-launch vehicle and the launch of a suite of low orbital earth satellites, are enabling South Korea to become an increasingly engaged partner in the space sector. This encompasses cooperation on space exploration and the growth of the commercial space sector. Melbourne and Wilson discuss the ways in which South Korea’s latest space development plans have developed, parallels with US space infrastructure and priorities, and

prospects for expanding cooperation in a range of areas, including a proliferated network of payloads; position, navigation and timing (PNT) capabilities; the development of space situational awareness and protection of space assets through environmental warning and forecasting; and joint space exploration.

Primarily in response to North Korea's aggressive deployment of a suite of cyber capabilities for both resource capture and intelligence gathering purposes, Jenny Jun and So Jeong Kim chart the extensive evolution of US-South Korea cooperation in cybersecurity policy and its implementation through cyber policy consultations and senior steering groups, the adoption of bilateral advisories and sanctions against North Korean entities, the conduct of a joint cybersecurity drill, and the establishment of trilateral cybersecurity cooperation dialogues with Japan. The main driver for this activity has been the need to respond to the expansion of North Korea's cybertheft and malware and the country's efforts to secure new platforms for its illicit cyber workforce. Jun and Kim also outline efforts by the United States and South Korea to align their respective deterrence doctrines for adaptation to the cybersecurity domain.

Bo Ram Kwon discusses South Korea's policy approach toward defense industrial cooperation and alignment with the United States in the incorporation of new technologies into the defense industrial base. Kwon discusses the 2023 US National Defense Industrial Strategy as a departure point for analyzing ways in which US efforts to enhance supply chain resilience and strategic alignment with its allies are creating new opportunities for US-South Korea defense cooperation and South Korea's institutional adjustments to take advantage of those new opportunities. Kwon also analyzes the ways in which reliance of defense procurement on commercial technologies and the emergence of China as a threat to military supply chains have influenced both US strategy and the opportunities for US-South Korea defense industrial cooperation. Kwon discusses the development of US-South Korean institutional arrangements, including Security of Supply Arrangements (SOSAs), naval maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), and reciprocal defense procurement arrangements (RDP-A) as ways in which the United States and South Korea are institutionalizing and integrating mechanisms for defense procurement going forward.

Finally, Wade Huntley and Yosep Kim examine prospects for South Korea to engage in technological development under Pillar Two of AUKUS, with a focus on promising areas of cooperation. The paper outlines Korean reactions to the announcement of AUKUS, including mixed responses to the arrangement's ambitious plans for nuclear submarine development and production, considering South Korea's own intermittent debates over whether to develop a

nuclear-powered submarine. Huntley and Kim also review the menu of potential Pillar Two projects and prospects for South Korean cooperation therein, including undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, AI, cyber, hypersonic, and electronic warfare capabilities, as well as the potential for cooperation on innovation and information sharing.

### *Envisioning and Managing Comprehensive Integration for the Long Term*

The task of simply enumerating the new dimensions of coordination between the US and South Korean governments underscores that there is now an extensive array of inter-governmental consultations undergirding the relationship that itself requires centralized coordination via the respective national security offices of the two presidents and that reflects unprecedented depth, complexity, and levels of integration.<sup>7</sup> The expansion of the scope of the alliance to include technologically driven economic competition as a critical dimension of its core mission is binding the two allies together in new ways, but it is also generating new challenges, complexities, and risks.

For instance, the US effort to reshore, friendshore, and ally-shore global supply chains across a wide range of sectors requires the establishment of government-led public-private partnerships. These partnerships are assumed to embrace the same strategic objective of countering the threat from Chinese aspirations to dominate the production of critical technologies and from the momentum China has gained in modernizing its defense capabilities. But private sector actors used to seeking global supply chain efficiencies are being required to adapt to the securitization of the US-China technology competition by pursuing redundancy and safety of supply chains over efficiency and profitability. Companies are being asked to cooperate with allied governments to navigate demands to refashion global supply chains to minimize strategic risks while also preserving profitability. The task of setting new rules of the road in response to a changing security environment requires both intensified policy dialogue between governments and expanded cooperation with the private sector to achieve these objectives.

As a next step in deepening cooperation between governments, the two governments are pursuing a roadmap for close cooperation in R&D and standardization of approaches to the development of future technologies. This effort is ambitious and far-reaching, but the scope and nature of the effort generate new challenges, including how to establish a balance between government coordination for achieving greater synergy and private-sector-based competition that drives innovation.

## **Categories of Technology-Driven Cooperation Within the Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance**

The papers in this volume illustrate that as government-to-government dialogues broaden and deepen, there are four types of cooperation that reflect the respective needs and motives behind the pursuit of more frequent government-to-government policy dialogues between the allies on particular issues. Each type of cooperation has slightly different implications, depending on the issue area.

The first type of cooperation involves convergence or alignment in response to the shared perception or identification of China as a common threat. However, the focus on China may be stated or unstated as part of the rationale for enhancing coordination, depending on the issue area. For instance, a major premise underlying US-South Korea cooperation on critical and emerging technologies—such as semiconductors, batteries, and biotechnology—is that such cooperation will enable the United States and its allies to maintain a critical lead in the development of new technologies, deny China certain technologies that might strengthen its defense industrial base, eliminate supply chain vulnerabilities resulting from inclusion of Chinese components in the supply chain that comprises the allied defense industrial base, and link US and allied capabilities to develop upstream technological innovations.

The United States and South Korea may be motivated to pursue aligned actions in cybersecurity in response to a set of specific threats from China and North Korea, and US-China competition is an often-unstated rationale motivating US-led multilateral cooperation in space development. China is the “pacing threat” driving efforts to restructure the US defense industrial base and to incorporate contributions from allies as a means by which to redistribute financial burdens and enhance efficient technology development.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the aim of AUKUS is explicitly to deepen cooperation to maintain an edge over China in defense technologies and through the joint development of an effective nuclear submarine force.

A second type of cooperation involves the institutionalization of government-to-government policy dialogues. Such efforts to hold more frequent policy dialogues enhance the capacity of alliance partners to make a unified response to an external threat. The proliferation of government-led dialogues on cybersecurity shows a willingness to coordinate on issues while preserving their capacity to undertake separate and parallel responses. Institutional coordination mechanisms stitch governmental partners together, but in this type of policy dialogue, the level of cooperation stops short of a combined and integrated response. Governmental coordination that is short of forging an

integrated response may be the best option for governments in instances where the level and capacity of responses between partners is unequal or when cooperation is desirable, but respective parties prefer to maintain a degree of freedom of action. For instance, the United States and South Korea have identified quantum as an area of potential technology development, but the differential in capabilities between the United States and South Korea may preclude full-scale coordination. Additionally, South Korea may have interests or exposure to third-country markets such as China in an area like semiconductors that might make coordination desirable but would preclude deeper integration.

A third type of cooperation involves the creation of combined mechanisms in which both sides work together in an integrated fashion to achieve a unified policy response. The CET dialogue identifies a variety of public- and private-sector-led policy responses, including the establishment of long-term institutional cooperation in upstream R&D on AI and quantum, private-sector-based alliances in biotechnology, and government and private-sector tie-ups on applications of clean technologies in the areas of batteries, hydrogen, and civil nuclear power production. US-South Korea defense industrial cooperation to enhance supply chain resiliency involves the integration of technology development, weapons production, and maintenance and repair of defense articles. Significant progress has been made toward joint responses to North Korean malicious cyber activities, including the release of joint advisories, application of joint sanctions, and interdiction to claw back some portion of North Korea's cyber loot. The integration of operations and development of a combined response bind allies together at a level that may make policy adjustments more difficult in the event that a political transition leads to a leader in the United States or South Korea who wants to pursue a different policy approach.

A fourth type of cooperation involves the embeddedness of alliance cooperation into a broader ecosystem of like-minded countries moving together with a common purpose. Alongside the deepening of institutional cooperation within the US-ROK alliance, embeddedness involves cooperation with like-minded partners with similar threat perceptions and policy preferences that facilitate cooperation in a values-based multilateral framework. Governments have laid the foundation for trilateral cooperation on R&D among the United States, South Korea, and Japan in critical and emerging technologies. Likewise, the authors of this volume point to prospects for trilateral cooperation in cyber, space, and clean technologies. In addition, the establishment of the MSP and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) promotes multilateral supply chain resiliency and cooperation. Finally, the establishment of AUKUS, Korea's possible cooperation on technology development under Pillar Two, and the



possible development of a multilateral approach to defense industrial cooperation are instances in which the US-ROK alliance is increasingly embedded in broader multilateral cooperation frameworks.

### **Prospects for and Challenges to A Comprehensive Technology-Centered Alliance**

The papers presented in this volume of Korea Policy are intended to capture major changes in the depth of cooperation reflected in the intensification and expansion of policy dialogues between various parts of the governments of the United States and South Korea in the spheres of both technology development and the defense industrial base. The expansion of US-South Korean policy dialogues has been motivated by the alignment of US and South Korean threat perceptions around the emergence of China as a common threat and is intended both to deepen policy coordination and to encompass the development of an integrated response across a broader range of issues than ever before. In parallel with US efforts to develop policy coordination mechanisms with other like-minded countries, the expansion and inclusion of South Korea as a participant in dialogues on supply chain resilience and integration, as well as the development of critical and emerging technologies, also serves to embed the alliance within a broader multilateral network of like-minded countries with the aim of maintaining technological superiority over common adversaries. This effort is truly ambitious in the scope of envisioned cooperation in an effort to reframe the terms of competition in the global system around maintaining leadership in the production of the world's most cutting-edge technologies. But is a US-ROK technological alliance or a US-led drive among liberal democracies to maintain a competitive technological edge against China truly sustainable? There are at least four critical factors the papers identify that will flesh out the answer to this question.

#### *Maintaining a Technology-Centered Like-Minded Coalition*

First, will the United States, South Korea, and other like-minded alliance partners maintain a united view of the threat environment and especially of the paramount need to counter China's drive to achieve technological supremacy? Factors that may threaten allied solidarity in the face of China's drive for technology dominance include the lure of gains that might accrue from participation in the Chinese market at the expense of shared technology denial objectives, needs for capital that Chinese partners may be willing to provide in exchange for access through technology-oriented economic exchanges, and the possible emergence of differences between allies over the implementation

of export controls or other curbs on economic cooperation with China. China's development of competitive or superior technologies and applications in selected areas might pose a particular challenge to the solidarity of economic coordination between the United States and South Korea, especially if Korean firms are tempted to engage in tie-ups with Chinese firms as a means to gain access to such technologies.

China's policy shift toward discrimination against South Korean companies in China's domestic market represented both an instance of China's weaponization of economic interdependence to achieve political retaliation following the 2017 South Korea deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system and a shift in approach by the PRC government regulation of China's domestic markets towards a privileging of indigenous corporate innovation at the expense of foreign companies. South Korean companies such as Samsung and SK Hynix still have exposure to China due to their ownership of semiconductor plants in China that may become a source of political friction between allies if the Trump administration decides to remove exceptions to or to strengthen current US export control laws. As US export controls and curbs on foreign investment grow stronger, China may provide new incentives to outside companies, including South Korean firms, to procure needed foreign technologies. Moreover, if China is able to surpass the United States in the development of new technologies, South Korean firms may be sorely tempted to establish tie-ups with Chinese firms to gain access to newly developed world-leading technologies that would only be available through cooperation with China.

### *Political Transition and the Sustainability of Technology-Driven Cooperation*

Second, will political leaders across the coalition of like-minded technological partners maintain commitments to deep policy integration required by the technology competition that the Biden administration has outlined? Political transitions in either the United States or South Korea—or both—may result in shifts in priorities that could threaten national commitments to the joint development of technologies. President Trump's penchant for transactional approaches to alliance partners may undermine the trust necessary to pursue a deep integration of joint technology projects. Meanwhile, a future South Korean president who seeks greater flexibility or distance from US objectives may feel unduly bound by institutional integration.

In this respect, the Biden administration has led an unprecedented approach to cooperation within alliances in the sphere of technology research and development that differs markedly from past US practice. Both the

establishment of AUKUS and the establishment of a framework for US-South Korea Next Generation on Critical and Emerging Technologies reflect an approach by the Biden administration that attempts to establish cross-national frameworks for the development of cutting-edge technologies, in contrast to the prior approach that pursued basic research on its own and enjoyed exclusive initial access to technologies that might be exploited and brought to market in various sectors. For instance, the US jealously guarded the ownership and development of proprietary technologies and maintained strict export control curbs under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). But the premise underlying joint research and development of critical and emerging technologies is that the US will cooperate with others in technology development. Such an approach acknowledges that technological innovation is increasingly taking place in the private sector and not primarily through government-funded research projects. But such an approach will require a loosening of US export control regulations to allies surrounding advanced technologies. It remains to be seen whether the Trump administration's America-first foreign policy framework will preclude the relaxation of technology controls that might enable wide multinational cooperation on research and development.

### *Government Framing of Technology Cooperation vs. the Role of the Private Sector*

Third, will the private sectors in each country follow the leadership of their respective governments to collaborate on technology development? The government-led drive for cooperation on critical technologies and supply chain resiliency requires unprecedented levels of public-private cooperation across the alliance. Governments may provide seed funding for specialized research and coordinate upstream cooperation with educational institutions within the alliance in addition to providing incentives to support business development in newly emerging critical technology sectors. However, private sector firms will naturally compete to capture technological innovations, develop new designs, and market new products that incorporate cutting-edge technological innovations as a major source of profits. The task of coordinating technological cooperation at the government level while also securing cooperation with the private sector is a very ambitious task.

As part of its focus on supply chain resilience, the Biden administration has reached out to both domestic and foreign private sector actors for consultations as it has developed industrial policies and enhanced export control and inward

investment regulations in a number of key sectors. These efforts to rebuild the US industrial base and strengthen regulations have necessitated active consultations with the businesses involved in critical sectors. But it is unclear whether greater government direction of and support for cutting-edge technologies will necessarily lead to or become an obstacle to the promotion of an effective innovation ecosystem. As Soyoung Kwon notes in her paper, “In technological cooperation, corporate interests do not always coincide with state interests.” As a result, there is a limit to the ability of governments to secure cooperation with the private sector, and such government-led coordination efforts have to involve the imposition of an attractive mix of cost-imposition and profit-enhancing measures in order to succeed.

### *Stretching the Concept of an Alliance*

Fourth, will expanding the concept of an alliance beyond its core security-centered logic add new layers of resiliency to the relationship or create added points of tension that might, in the end, serve to weaken or undermine the alliance itself? The papers in this volume point to several instances in which the expansion of traditional deterrence frameworks at the heart of the security alliance may generate tensions or conflicts requiring the attention of alliance managers even as the scope of the alliance is being enlarged.

For instance, the traditional security logic of the alliance that relies on deterrence principles may not be readily applied to the cyber domain, as Jun and Kim illustrate in their discussion of the gaps between South Korea’s “offensive cyber defense” concept emphasizing retaliation and the US Defend Forward concept emphasizing prevention and managed competition. As previously noted, the logic underlying coordination and deterrence in the security domain may not be compatible with the logic and approaches employed in the economic sphere. Even the motives behind US and South Korean cooperation in space may not be fully aligned, as the US framework includes both multilateral cooperation on exploration and efforts to maintain a strategic advantage in the space domain, and the South Korean framework is primarily motivated by opportunities to participate in the space economy and to exploit new discoveries in space for economic gain. In this respect, the development of a global comprehensive security alliance encompassing many different domains would seem to be a step forward, but if newly emerging internal contradictions in the scope, purposes, and justifications for alliance cooperation are not properly managed, the expansion of the scope of the alliance might have the effect of weakening rather than strengthening the capacity and durability of the relationship.

## Concluding Thoughts

The Biden and Yoon administrations have emphasized a revitalization of the US-ROK alliance to an unprecedented degree as they have sought to expand and operationalize cooperation across many domains and on a global scale during what might be termed an era of institutionalization in alliance cooperation. The papers in this volume illustrate the progress that has been made, with a special focus on the deepening of cooperation on critical and emerging technologies and the impact of the focus on supply chain resiliency for efforts to revitalize and integrate the defense industrial bases of the two countries. US and South Korean alliance partners have become more closely aligned in response to the perception of a common threat from China, enhanced coordination through a wide range of inter-governmental consultations, and have even pursued the integration of R&D efforts to enhance contributions across a range of critical and emerging technology domains. The two sides have also sought to incorporate new technologies into their respective defense industrial base as well as to embed alliance-based cooperation efforts as part of trilateral US-South Korea-Japan coordination as well as between the US-ROK alliance and AUKUS.

As the alliance management baton passes from the Biden to the Trump administration, an important question will be whether the Biden administration's efforts to "lock in" institutionalized cooperation both within the alliance and through the implementation of minilateral groupings such as AUKUS and the US-South Korea-Japan partnership are sustainable through the US political transition. But such efforts to "lock in" institutionalized coordination across such a broad range of topics and embed the alliance within a latticework of US-led minilateral cooperation mechanisms will only be successful with "buy-in" from President Trump and his new administration. The Biden administration is leaving an expansive alliance architecture and an impressive array of government-to-government consultations; the question for the immediate future is how and whether the Trump administration decides to build on it.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup>“South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, updated October 25, 2024, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10165>.
- <sup>2</sup> Coordination as used here reflects the effort on the part of bureaucracies in the respective governments to consult and share views on respective policies and approaches to their formation. Integration means the development of a joint and combined response on the part of both governments to a particular issue. Alignment means the choice to pursue coordination and/or integration of policies in response to a common external threat.
- <sup>3</sup> The White House, “U.S.-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 21, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/>; Yoon Suk-yeol, “South Korea Needs to Step Up,” *Foreign Affairs*, February 8, 2022, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-korea/south-korea-needs-step-yoon-suk-yeol?check\\_logged\\_in=1](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-korea/south-korea-needs-step-yoon-suk-yeol?check_logged_in=1).
- <sup>4</sup> The White House, “Leaders’ Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Alliance Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” April 26, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/leaders-joint-statement-in-commemoration-of-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-alliance-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-republic-of-korea/>.
- <sup>5</sup> The White House, “Joint Fact Sheet: Launching the U.S.-ROK Next Generation Critical and Emerging Technologies Dialogue,” December 8, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/08/joint-fact-sheet-launching-the-u-s-rok-next-generation-critical-and-emerging-technologies-dialogue/>.
- <sup>6</sup> The White House, “Joint Fact Sheet: Launching the U.S.-ROK Next Generation Critical and Emerging Technologies Dialogue.”
- <sup>7</sup> This phraseology is primarily intended to describe a system of alliance coordination involving parallel coordination dialogues and mechanisms across a broad range of issues and branches of government.
- <sup>8</sup> US Department of Defense, “Official Talks DOD Policy Role in Pacing Threat, Integrated Deterrence,” June 2, 2021, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2641068/official-talks-dod-policy-role-in-chinese-pacing-threat-integrated-deterrence/>.