

Chinese Views of Korean History to the Late 19th Century

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In the tradition of imperial China and communism, Chinese publications see history as a morality tale. In the case of Korean history to the late decades of the nineteenth century there are essentially three actors: virtuous China, evil Japan, and variable Korea. There are three critical periods which receive the bulk of attention: the 7th century, the late 16th century trailing into the 17th century change of dynasty in China, and the last decades of the 19th century. The narrative advances the notion of competing visions of regional order, contrasting Chinese and Japanese frameworks and examining Korean policies in light of the choices made between these options.

Official Chinese narratives couch today's opportunities in historical context. A battle rages between socialism and capitalism, offering China a unique prospect to tip the balance.¹ This is not only a present-day challenge; it is a struggle over consciousness of history—a campaign against “historical nihilism” that disagrees with orthodoxy in support of communist party legitimacy and the rectitude of Chinese civilization. A speech given by Xi Jinping in July 2010 at the Central Party School and only recently made available leaves no doubt about the tight censorship imposed on publications about history.² South Korea's history is especially sensitive as the poster-child for the benevolence of the imperial Chinese regional order, the battleground for the key war fought by China to maintain its surroundings against capitalist encroachment, and a chief testing grounds for the rejuvenation of China against U.S. hegemonism and Western civilization. Premodern history is an inseparable part of this agenda.

How official Chinese thinking treated Korean premodern history did not become a matter of concern during the first decade after normalization of PRC-ROK relations. It was assumed that outdated narratives in the tradition of socialist realism would be replaced, given that much of communist hagiography failed the test of “seeking truth from facts” or only seemed to linger due to sensitivity toward North Korea. History writings from normalization to the early 2000s were less tendentious, as Chinese authors lacked a clear narrative from which to draw required deductions.³

World attention took little interest in Chinese views of history, especially before the revolutionary era. A 1997 book on history, cognition, and peace in East Asia covered perceptions of other countries but left aside Chinese narratives.⁴ When a collection of articles on memories of WWII appeared in 2014, Chinese thinking was again not a major theme, even as I pointed to Chinese writings on premodern times to showcase their significance. I wrote that they “idolize the order led by imperial China” and accuse South Korea of making a “direct challenge to China's civilization and its positive influence but also to mutual understanding at a time when South Koreans are proceeding to erase traces of its legacy.” The nation, arguably most shaped by Chinese civilization—after all it considered itself the purest case of Confucianism—is distancing itself from China and its interpretation of that posed a big challenge.⁵

When the Koguryo controversy burst into the limelight in 2004, it was a wake-up call for South Koreans, who interpreted China's unexpected thinking about ancient history as a danger signal for bilateral relations and China's approach to the future of North Korea. Yet, diplomats soon set this aside, and many were comforted to see it as an aberration by historians in Northeast China unlikely to gain ascendancy.⁶ It was not until six years later—in the midst of a downturn in Sino-ROK relations—that there were concrete indications

of Chinese policies reflecting such thinking. Xi Jinping later brought history more to the forefront of ideology and demonstrated more clearly the impact of sinocentrism backed by views on past regional relations. Recent Chinese articles cited in this chapter reveal a morality tale disguised as history.

Examining these writings on Korea's past, I put them in the context of Xi's national identity rhetoric and foreign policy. The underlying assumption is that China built a regional order centered on itself with room for neighboring states to pursue their own national interests in accord with civilizational ethics that promoted stability.⁷ Historical studies insist, however, that Korea was not content: with individual states turning to Japan rather than Tang China or breaking with the etiquette of the Ming China-led order in their dealings with Japan after trying to form a micro-order of their own incorporating the Jurchens, or by abandoning the traditional order when China was weakening in the late 19th century. All of these manifestations of a Korean "superiority complex" ended badly, requiring armed intervention by China to rescue their country. The choice between China and Japan is essentialized as Korea's fate.⁸

Implicit in historical writings are parallels to the situation on the Korean Peninsula in the 2010s as well as implications that South Koreans lack a correct view of their past that could guide them to make the correct foreign policy choices. They fail to appreciate China's historic contributions to Korea, insufficiently link Japan's past perfidy to its lingering threat, and have succumbed to Western ways of thinking. Interpreting history and national identity in this manner, Chinese sources link this to ongoing bilateral relations, blaming Seoul for the tensions that have been rising.

The Context of Xi's National Identity Rhetoric and Foreign Policy

Historical narrative is often an offshoot of some political agenda, and in communist ideology it is an essential element of an unquestioned national identity showing the righteousness of national policies. The 2008-10 Internet "culture wars" on who is entitled to claim UNESCO sites were enflamed by Chinese authorized publications casting history and the way it is treated today in a zero-sum light.⁹ The continued way Korean history was treated even after Lee Myung-bak was gone and political ties had been mended exposed the superficiality of the "honeymoon" between Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye.¹⁰ Instrumental to this messaging was Xi's assertiveness about national identity, boosting sinocentrism as the historical core of identity to the twentieth century. It became incontrovertible that China had benevolently managed its neighborhood, forging a harmonious region under the unimperialistic leadership of China. Just as the history of Chinese communism is whitewashed of negative elements, so too has the history of dynastic China's foreign relations been culled of incriminating evidence—a trend that began even when Confucianism was condemned and then intensified when it was tightly embraced as a positive force.

South Korea presents a challenge for Chinese historians as for those writing more broadly about national identity. It is a dangerous outpost of a Western worldview, as seen from China, in the values Koreans espouse, in their outlook on past inequality between states, and in their aspirations to build pride in past Korean achievements. The ongoing sinocentric

narrative lauds the regional architecture that kept Korea in a subordinate status, denigrates Western thinking about history, and attributes the main, premodern achievements and cultural symbols of Korea to participation in the China-led regional order. This divide makes history a battleground in China's effort to shape the future order of East Asia, notably the rhetoric to make it "harmonious."

National identity in China has a multi-layered ideological dimension, including not only socialism centered on the twentieth century and anti-imperialism starting from the nineteenth century, but also Confucianism, roughly 180 degrees removed from Mao's verdict on it, and sinocentrism, for which Korea is a prime example. Virtuous China is, in this ideological understanding, the source of civilizational beneficence, of strategic protectiveness, and of economic unselfishness in this unassailable rhetoric. There is an unmistakable legacy of communist thought in this outlook on national identity, which makes consciousness of North Korea's communist heritage a factor in the approach to South Korea's thinking about history as well as its U.S. alliance.¹¹ Yet, the divide with North Korean views of history to the 1900s is unbridgeable too.

Korean history presents an opportunity for Chinese to pinpoint a villain in contrast to China's benevolence. This, of course, is Japan. In the national identity dimension of external relations, China appears as a protector and even savior. It offers a world order that provides peace and stability in contrast to what Japan threatened or did. In 2014-16 when Xi Jinping was striving to align South Korea closely with China in condemning Japan's historical revisionism with implications for its illegitimate steps at military strengthening, the battle over Seoul's historical acknowledgements was in full force, but this should not be seen as only limited to the period of the 1890s to 1940s. For China, Korea's insubordination about the harmonious, China-centered, regional order is proof of distorted attitudes toward China both in the past and the present. The Sino-ROK national identity gap has an ineradicable premodern component.

Deference starts with symbolic boundaries such as not inviting the Dalai Lama to South Korea despite the shared Buddhist tradition. It proceeds to avoidance of the historical and cultural themes of high sensitivity to Chinese authorities, which also become lightning rods for public arousal against South Korea. Yet, there is no way to escape the entanglement of Korean and Chinese national identity themes, leaving no room for prideful Koreans to find common ground on such emotionally charged items as the provenance of the Koguryo state. If room for a shared outlook appears unimaginable for the Korean War and Cold War era and has proven elusive and easier for the joint humiliation in the half century leading to 1945, then the prospects are likely to be best for the long period in the late nineteenth century when three things potentially bring China and Korea closer: 1) demonization of Japan; 2) adoration of Confucianism; and 3) pride in the legacy of an Asian community that can be revived.

The problem with appeals to these shared historical memories is that Chinese insist on narrow, self-serving interpretations of them, threatening both to Korean national identity and to future mutual respect. South Koreans do not demonize Japan in the manner of a zero-sum framework of benevolent imperial China against malevolent Japan. Confucianism has been twisted by China in ways that contradict its meaning in Korea, undermining its continued value as a component of national identity. Also, the Asian "community of common destiny" sought by Xi Jinping poses a direct threat to South Korean autonomy and,

arguably, sovereignty. Thus, premodern history has failed to become the starting point for shared identity to which other elements could have been added. Chinese writings show little interest in looking for commonalities that could bridge existing differences instead of imposing their own narrow scheme.

The Ancient Period

Chinese writings on Korean history, even the ancient period, approach it from the angle of regional history. Integrative forces in East Asia are assumed to be busy at work at an early date.¹² The *tianxia* order is viewed as in place with China its sole, unrivaled center. Yet, states within the boundaries of present-day Korea are seen as seeking support to defy that order, even to make themselves the center of an order usurping the existing one. The Koguryo state expanded exchanges with Japan in this pursuit during the Tang era, seeking strategic backing when Silla and Baekje were drawing together and finding support from Tang troops. One article accuses Japan of trying to forge its own *tianxia* order, shifting to help Baekje attack Silla. But it ended up on the losing side and was finally driven out by the Tang, readers are informed.¹³

The message suggested in writings on this decisive period in Korean history is that China saved Korea from an undesirable fate. This is sometimes echoed in writings on contemporary international relations. In 2012, citing one such source from 2010, I summarized the argument that “Koreans should look back with gratitude to their good fortune, rather than with resentment, insisting on their own superiority and determination to remove the legacy of Chinese culture.”¹⁴ Already Japan was eager to establish an alternative regional order with negative consequences for Korea as well as China, and the Koreans were not sufficiently on guard but finally escaped.

Much has been written about the Koguryo dispute and its deeper meaning.¹⁵ There has been exploration of China’s motives in claiming the state that straddled today’s North Korea and Northeast China as part of its own tradition, as if this were not the forerunner of modern Korea. One interpretation is that this strengthens China’s claims to legitimacy for control over a border area, i.e., what remained Manchuria in the 19th century. Another explanation is that this muddles the question of North Korea’s sovereignty, along with socialism leaving in doubt whether South Korea has the right to take control of reunification. An even more sinister interpretation is that the issue of full sovereignty is put in question for the entire Korean Peninsula. There is no reason to expect clarity in Chinese sources on these choices in today’s climate.

Koguryo remains a thorn in Sino-ROK relations nearly a decade and a half after it emerged as the focus of conflict. Korean dramas could no longer broach this period in a manner befitting national identity. Chinese no longer sought to assuage concern by arguing that this issue had been raised locally without official authorization. Not looking for common ground, Chinese have simply dismissed Korean thinking as if it is one more manifestation of narrow nationalism arousing emotions toward China. As the great power, China has shown no need to approach the national identity gap with its less powerful neighbor with sensitivity in order to gain its trust. Historians should have no trouble sticking to facts in recalling what is known from the extant records, but they are pressed into the service of a far-reaching sinocentric agenda.

The Medieval Period

The so-called *hua-yi* (China-barbarian) order is treated as essentially sacrosanct, assuming that there is no reason to overturn it. When in the 1590s it is challenged, some Chinese argue that it was not just Japan with its expansionist ambitions that did so, but also Korea that harbored designs on establishing its own *hua-yi* order. According to Liu Yongnian and Xie Xiangwei, pursuant to the expansion of a China-centered order, both Korea and Japan had a sense of superiority themselves and intended to bring the other side into their own order. Each sought to include the other in its own smaller regional order. At fault is not only Japan's aspirations to be a "small China" (*xiao Zhonghua*), as Silla also had called itself in the 7th century, but Korea's deceit in conducting independent diplomacy with Japan, contrary to what was permitted in the existing regional order.¹⁶ Actually, Koreans from the mid-16th century had acted in a manner that made relations with China tenuous, violating the existing protocol, readers are told, after Japan had broken altogether from the tribute system. Policy toward the Jurchens and the Ryukyus was indicative of this effrontery. At its core, this is a denial of autonomous diplomacy as well as of armed actions such as Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea. Yet, after Korea ignored the attitudes of the Ming, it eventually had to turn to the Ming for help, revealing the importance of sticking to the existing regional order as the foundation of peace and stability. Its disloyalty, e.g., getting embroiled in a dispute with Japan over Tsushima, had led to painful results from which only appealing for China's help finally rescued Korea.

The article charges that Korea had been coveting its own regional order for a long time, arousing friction with the Ming over the Jurchens and then seeking tribute from Tsushima in a burgeoning dispute with Japan. Korea's defiant exchanges with Japan are variously viewed as seeking to bring Japan into Korea's own *hua-yi* circle, as Japan was seen as the barbarian side: in an effort to save Tsushima, a vassal facing war or even as a way to save face for the Korean king. In any case, these accusations suggest that China could not accept Korea as a sovereign state not only in premodern times, when the *sadae* relationship has been deemed benevolent in forging a civilized order with a functional ritual system supportive of peace and stability, but today as well. Inequality between states does not seem to be a problem for the Chinese analysts. The idea that a Chinese hub and spokes does not allow room for full-fledged Japan-Korea bilateral ties is not questioned in these works.

Joining the *huayi* order, as Japan did in the 7th-9th centuries, is regarded as a source of transferring civilization, which others may proceed to emulate as Japan did in its relations with the Ainu. Yet, some are tempted to go too far. With the Ming in decline in the second half of the 16th century, neighbors even saw a chance to adjust the East Asian regional order. Long-cradled ambitions had risen to the surface, targeting the edges of the empire, such as the Ryukyus. Japan and Korea each saw the other as inferior and a target for one's own order-building, leading them both to violate the existing order. Actions were not just based on differentials in power, but on one's civilizational assumptions. Thus, the Japanese annexation of Korea in a later period is not accidental, the article concludes, without having to add that Korean as well as Japanese attitudes in the 2010s are outgrowths of such erroneous thinking and are barriers to the reemergence of a natural China-centered order. The charges of self-serving thinking based on ethnic superiority are, of course, not leveled at China.

Wang Guidong asked why did the Qing leaders, after the battle of 1637 with Korea, not obliterate Korea?¹⁷ The Qing made Korea their first vassal state but limited their demands despite heavy financial impositions. Although there were differences from the way past dynasties dealt with Korea, the Qing once ruling over China accepted a compliant Korea's acquiescence to its authority. The article omits discussion of how Koreans questioned the Qing's legitimacy and quietly cast doubt on the *sadae* order, taking the perspective that Korea was more truly Confucian than the upstart Qing.

The morality tale of rapacious Japan attacking innocent Korea and being saved by a benevolent China is complicated by charges against Korea as culpable in its dealings with Japan and others, unsavoriness in Qing-Korean relations before and after the dynastic changeover, and accusations against signs of Korean uneasiness with and even undermining of the sinocentric order during the Qing era. Many of these criticisms appear in publications tracing the roots of Korean actions in the 1890s.

One finds in Chinese publications a long-term outlook on history, suggesting that the civilizational underpinnings persist from one era to the next and that commonalities exist in aspirations for power. There is no indication of fault by any Chinese dynasty in managing external relations or conceptualizing the regional order. Impugning the motives of Koreans as well as Japanese serves a simplistic historical narrative, while also carrying implications for unwelcome policy choices by these nations of late.

The Nineteenth Century

The nineteenth-century story of Korean history adds more actors to the mix and is unavoidably encapsulated in a broader narrative of China's decline and inability to project power or offer a path to modernity. Much could be written about the Korean dilemma of losing China as a bulwark of regional order and the inevitability of eying other, modernizing states as essential partners. Yet, the Chinese narratives on this era blame Korea's choices without striving to understand the circumstances clearly.

One example is Jin Chenggao's analysis of a switch in Korean thinking toward China over roughly half a century from the mid-1870s as Koreans shifted from *sadae* to "leave China, open the country" as well as "join Japan, exclude Qing." In 1876 Korea was forced to enter the whirlpool of modern capitalist civilization, readers are told. Koreans awakened to a world of richer and more civilized states than China after long embracing traditional Chinese thought as their political foundation. One faction stuck firmly to the old thought, seeking to purge what was new and stop any social reforms. A second sought to use the West but keep China as the foundation. The third group was reformist. Harking back to past socialist jargon, the author sees a struggle between feudalism and capitalist culture, a split in the feudal classes, and the rise of patriotic independence thinking opposed to both feudalist and capitalist forces. China was in decline, and Japan was quick to reform; so, the struggle soon became one between these two countries. Feudal Qing China sought to retain its position, while capitalist Japan aimed to annex Korea, readers are told. It was both a battle of aggression vs. anti-aggression and feudalism vs. capitalism. China's stance was non-interference, but from the early 1880s with this goal still in mind it started to use barbarian

against barbarian, as the Russo-Japanese competition was building, seeking a balance of power to maintain its framework in Korea. It strove to preserve Korean sovereignty and secure its own Northeast China borders. Feudal China could not prevail in Korea. Only a different China could assist Korea in restoring an order that had served it well and would serve it again once aggressors were driven away.

When the Qing dynasty stepped up its interference in 1882 it had a positive effect, but it damaged the China image in Korea, fueling the reform school's call to "join Japan, expel the Qing." The Qing obstructed modernization reforms, could not protect Korea, and could not develop bilateral relations, readers are told, despite the insistence that China's effect was positive. Korea needed to find its own path toward independence. Only then on the basis of equality and Korean sovereignty could its bilateral relations be rebuilt, the article concludes, but it leaves these concepts ill-defined and avoids criticism of the old China-led order.¹⁸ In the final analysis, Koreans recognized that only standing with China against Japan in the resistance from the 1920s was the pathway to achieve the civilizational, strategic, and political balance that they had been seeking since losing the security of the old order.

Hahm Chaibong has written that Korea was torn between a longstanding and deeply entrenched understanding of civilization—drawn from China but centered more on its past than on the Qing—which was unsustainable, as notions of race and nation were taking hold.¹⁹ Defensive of Confucian civilization, many Koreans in the earliest decades of interaction with the West were slow to embrace race and nation, which delayed the adoption of a national identity capable of mobilizing the mass of people. Modernity proved to be an irresistible civilization. Chinese writers, however, ignore such categories of analysis, as they insist on the outworn concept of feudalism and the all-purpose notion of capitalism for the modernity that was being introduced. Linguistic fidelity to traditional socialist categories leaves recent publications blind to modern social science analysis of historical periods as in the case of Korea.

The Chinese narrative dismisses alternatives to China's regional order as negative: imperialist, exploitative, and at odds with national aspirations. There is no liberal order based on equality among countries, no mutual respect for national interests. China may have lost its appeal for Koreans, but this did not mean that what other countries offered was in Korea's interest. Only by repudiating them and fighting for socialism in place of capitalism would Korea eventually escape from this dilemma. This is the rote message that is conveyed regarding the situation Korea faced from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the revolutionary upsurge decades later.

The struggle for Korea was not just against imperialist powers in favor of self-determination. There was no alternative to regaining a regional system amid the continuing great power struggles under way. The nineteenth century saw China unable to protect the Korean Peninsula—Japan prevailed, Russia tried to prevail, and the United States later became the hegemon imposing its regional system. In time, however, China would again be capable of protecting the peninsula, while offering a regional system favorable to it, Chinese authors argue in many writings.²⁰

Great power conflicts from the 19th century sacrificed small countries, leaving little hope until recently, argue Chinese sources. China's revival offers promise of peace and stability. Koreans may have lost confidence in China in the nineteenth century and been deceived

by Japan. They should refocus on great power balancing and on how China will continue to rise, while appreciating the historical contribution China made to Korea. This view from the 1990s foreshadows what is argued of late with ever more certainty and more obvious implications for international relations.²¹

Conclusion

Chinese publications on Korean history, before Japanese imperialism swept across East Asia and the Chinese Communist Party, with assistance from the Soviet Union and collaboration with Korean communists, became the centerpiece in writings on China and its environs, would appear to be an easy place to find objective analysis. The history of sinocentric relations with neighboring states has generally gained a favorable response in Western historiography, while Japan's treatment of Korea in the late sixteenth century and three centuries later has drawn condemnation. If the memories in Korea are ambivalent, Chinese could accentuate a shared Confucian tradition beneficial to both nations in many, undisputed ways. Showing respect for core elements of South Korean national identity would come with little cost to what is most valued in Chinese national identity. The foundation exists for accentuating the harmonious character of Sino-Korean history to reinforce newfound harmony.

Acceptance of modern principles of state-to-state relations in reflecting on what was not ideal in the past could also be accomplished without meaningful self-abasement. That past Sino-Korean relations were hierarchical and left matters of sovereignty in some doubt is not a more serious blemish than is found elsewhere in premodern times. Acknowledging flaws in the old order in recognition of the importance of forging new bilateral relations on modern principles should be standard fare for modern social scientists. Yet, Chinese writers appear to be compelled to justify and even glorify China's record as if it alone warrants pride and can serve as a model for the future. Hagiography slips into coverage in ways that can discredit the analysis.

It would seem natural that countries that had imbibed the Chinese model in building their state institutions and realized substantial achievements through the transfer of Chinese civilization would consolidate their gains and aspire to more autonomy and even a mini-tribute system on their own periphery. Recognition of the development trajectories of Korea and Japan, which were gaining rapidly on China in indicators of premodern development, would be a useful starting point for historical analysis, not the deceptive and often stagnant category of feudalism. Appreciation for national identity formation and how maintenance of China's identity should not preclude acceptance of Korean identity as it was evolving is also missing in Chinese sources.

Chinese publications are intent on conveying a morality tale. Class struggle is gone in versions since Deng Xiaoping changed the fundamental narrative. Nonetheless, a zero-sum approach to foreign policy puts virtuous China at odds with those seeking to distance themselves from the China-led order. This serves several purposes: for an authoritarian system it presents a simplistic vision typical for sustaining what is not to be questioned; for an aspiring regional hegemon it affirms the historical role of regional leadership without any tolerance for doubt; and for a state determined to shape the future of the Korean Peninsula it rejects alternative versions of lessons to be drawn from historical memories in favor of one clear-cut story-line.

Three questions appear to be answered, if indirectly, in the Chinese narrative about premodern Korea. First, which country should the Korean people trust in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity? The answer looking back to the history reported in Chinese sources is China, not Japan. Elsewhere, the U.S. role too is demeaned, but this takes us beyond the premodern era. Second, are Korean efforts to forge a regional order, whether as a balancer or as an intermediary in managing a balance of power, deserving of support? Given the ill-advised nature of how upstart Korea strove to separate itself from the China-led order, the answer obviously is “no.” Koreans must not only reconcile themselves to their fate but positively accept it as in their country’s own best interest. Third, in the whirlpool of intrigue over the North Korean nuclear weapons and missile programs, what echoes of earlier power struggles can be seen? Whether in the seventh century or sixteenth century when China came to the rescue or in the nineteenth century when tragedy struck because China could not play the savior role, Koreans should recognize the parallels to today.

There was a time not long ago when hope was placed on joint histories to narrow the wide gaps over memories aroused for political purposes. It was assumed that professional historians dedicated to objective standards of analysis would jointly in the course of academic exchanges find common ground on which to agree. While many doubted that any consensus could be achieved in perceptions of the sensitive decades of the first half of the twentieth century, the premodern period looked most promising. After all, shared Confucianism could be invoked. Yet, once the Koguryo dispute came to light, hopes were dashed in South Korea. Given recent Chinese writings on the entire sweep of Korean history to the late nineteenth century, no illusions should persist that the Sino-Korean divide can be bridged. As long as the foreign policy of China remains fixated on a sinocentric order inclusive of Korea and on a path to Korean unification conducive to that order, the gap over the premodern era of history has no prospect of narrowing.

Endnotes

¹ “Jinjin guazhu dayoukewei de lishi jiyuqi,” *Renmin Ribao*, January 15, 2018.

² “Party History and What the People Can’t Be Told,” *China Digital Times*, January 14, 2018, <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/01/translation-party-history-people-cant-told/>

³ See the index of titles over 10 years in Fudan daxue *Hanguo yanjiu zhongxin*, *Hanguo yanjiu luncong*, no. 10 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003).

⁴ Dalchoong Kim and Chung-in Moon, *History, Cognition, and Peace in East Asia* (Seoul: Yonsei Press, 1997).

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- ¹² Ceng Zhongbing, "Youguan Chaoxian Hanguo gudaishi yanjiu zhong ruokan wenti de sikao," *Chaoxian Hanguo lishi yanjiu*, no. 17 (2016): 15-25.
- ¹³ "Gaojuli Bohai Lishi Yanjiu," *Dongbeiya yanjiu luncong*, 2016, 45-56.
- ¹⁴ Gilbert Rozman, "History as an Arena of Sino-Korean Conflict and the Role of the United States," *Asian Perspective* 36, no. 2 (2012), 273. The quotation is from Wang Sheng, "Shixi dangdai Hanguo minzuzhuyi," *Xiandai guoji guanxi*, no. 2 (2010): 36-41.
- ¹⁵ See, for instance, Jae Ho Chung, "China's 'Soft' Clash with South Korea: The History War and Beyond," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 3 (May/June 2009) 468-83.
- ¹⁶ Liu Yonglian and Xie Xiangwei, "Huayi zhixu kuodahua yu Chaoxian Riben de jian xianghu renzhi de piancha," *Shijie lishi*, no. 2 (2015): 60-68.
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