

Will the “Comfort Women” Agreement Reduce Japan-ROK Mutual Distrust?

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On December 28, 2015, the Japanese and South Korean governments announced their agreement on the “comfort women” issue. This sudden breakthrough 70 years after the end of WWII and 24 years after the issue in 1991 had become a fundamental diplomatic issue for the two countries proved to be a great surprise not only for the two societies but also for international society. One question being asked is why at this particular time did the two governments find a way to reach the agreement. Another is would this agreement signify some kind of big change in bilateral relations, which had been intensely split over the history question before this point.

Before considering these questions, it is first necessary to consider what has been driving the obsession with historical memory questions in this bilateral relationship.¹ For this, I reflect on three factors. First, today’s historical consciousness issues are not simply a result of events prior to the conclusion of WWII. Many issues, beginning with the “comfort women” one, that are known as contentious, historical memory divisions in bilateral relations today, are problems that aroused heated arguments beginning only in the 1980s or early 1990s. They did not, to the same degree, draw attention continuously from the end of the war. Second, one reason for this kind of intensification of historical consciousness issues in Japan-ROK relations is due to the lowering for both countries of the importance of the other country against the background of the transformation in the security environment after the end of the Cold War. In addition, in this period, with the economic development and globalization of South Korea widening its options, there was less necessity for cooperation between the two countries.

Third, along with the reduced salience of this relationship, historical memory issues that had long been present served to deepen mutual distrust. In Japan, feelings of distrust toward South Korea intensified in 2012 following President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Takeshima/Dokdo Islands. Similarly, South Korean feelings of distrust were aggravated, playing a role in hardening mutual emotions about a range of historical memory issues. The December 2015 agreement and what led to it need to be seen in this context. This paper draws heavily on public opinion polls, reflecting on long-term changes.

FROM HISTORICAL QUESTIONS TO TREATY QUESTIONS

Looking back before the end of the Cold War at the narratives in Japanese and South Korean textbooks, we find a huge discrepancy in consciousness of the period of Japanese control over the peninsula. Japanese textbooks not only treated very simply the time of Japan’s advance onto the continent with the Sino-Japanese and Sino-Russian wars, and the colonization of Korea, they had almost nothing to say about conditions on the Korean Peninsula during the time of Japan’s control. In Japanese society interest has remained extremely low in Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula. For many Japanese, the period of this control has little significance for Japanese history in the time frame from the Meiji Restoration to the defeat at the end of WWII.

The lack of interest in this period, however, has gradually changed. One main reason is the heightened interest in historical consciousness inside both Japan and South Korea. In South Korea from the early 1980s in circles of historians, a large-scale reexamination of historical consciousness has been occurring on both the left and the right, and a lively debate

has unfolded.² A similar thing is happening in Japan. Before the 1970s, the colonial era and WWII were discussed mainly as objects of nostalgia, and from the mid-70s, they became objects for confessions. Progressive researchers and the media were raising their voices in a quest for taking responsibility. To understand the situation in both states, it is important to recognize that this was a time of large-scale change in both societies from the prewar to the postwar generation. We saw this happen in the transition from the Park Chung-hee to the Chun Doo-hwan regime in South Korea. A generation that did not bear direct responsibility for colonial control nor WWII era events occupied mainstream society which made the search for responsibility for past events easier (through people who did not know the substance of the reality), and began a “historical rediscovery” event by event. Historical consciousness in both countries became a matter of a new generation uncovering the facts that they did not know and impeaching the views of the “old generation.”

Along with this “rediscovery” of history in both countries, there were lively debates on historical consciousness, finally arousing interest in the historical consciousness of the other country concerning the shared attention to the era of colonialism and WWII. The first dispute over historical textbooks, which erupted in 1982, was a representative expression of this.³ Japanese and South Koreans both discovered that on various themes of historical consciousness they had big differences, which became the object of sharp contention. At the same time that they were rediscovering history, both countries found that they had growing doubts about the way the past had been treated in their country to that point. They strongly criticized the “old generation’s” compromise management of control over the colony, and this was easily linked to criticism of the existing political forces in each country. Representative expressions of these views were forced migration of Korean labor mobilized during WWII, which peaked in the 1990s, and the question of “comfort women” serving the military, which continues to today.


Even when there was an explosion of historical consciousness, bilateral relations of that period—at the very least, good diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Seoul—might be sustained. For example, when Nakasone Yasuhiro visited the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985, despite fierce criticism in the South Korean media and a formal protest from the ROK government, it had no big influence on the existing good ties between the Nakasone and Chun Doo-hwan administrations. In 1983 Nakasone had made the first visit by a Japanese prime minister to South Korea, and in 1984 Chun made the first official visit of a South Korean president to Japan. There was little harm to relations from the Yasukuni visit.

Entering the 1990s there was a big change in Japan-ROK relations, especially in 1991 when the “comfort women” issue rose to the forefront. On August 14, there was the coming out of the first former “comfort woman” in South Korea, and through the start of a court case against the Japanese government in December, this developed into a diplomatic issue between the two countries. In January 1992 the ROK government shifted from the joint stance it formerly had taken with the Japanese government that the fundamental treaty between the two states had completely resolved the issues between them, as the ROK expounded the view that the “comfort women” issue was not included in the concerns negotiated in 1965 and lies outside the framework of that agreement. This shift by the ROK had great significance in the evolving relationship of the two concerning historical consciousness. Their difference over history was no longer only a matter of consciousness about the past; it transformed into a question of interpretation of the 1965 treaty, which served as the foundation of the bilateral

relationship.⁴ Moreover, this current of treating issues as outside the treaty framework spread to South Korean atomic bomb victims, Koreans left behind in Sakhalin, and finally through the Korean Supreme Court and Constitutional Court it developed to encompass conscripted labor who were mobilized during the final period of Japanese rule. As for the impact this split on historical consciousness had on public opinion in the two states, we turn next to that.


THE BREAKDOWN OF MUTUAL TRUST

Over the past 20 years, the two states have had conflicting interpretations of the treaty that is the foundation of their relationship; however, this did not heavily influence public sentiments. For example, as seen in Figure 1, Korean views regarding Japan consistently were at a more negative level than Japanese views of South Korea, but I do not think that this level was much affected by historical consciousness. Rather, in 2011 after Japan had suffered great destruction from the East Japan earthquake, Korean opinion toward it rose appreciably.



Source: Korea Gallup, <http://www.gallup.co.kr/> (last visited on January 28, 2016)

The fact that the growth in historical consciousness did not have great impact is even more evident when we look at Japanese public opinion. Figure 2 presents the results of a survey by Japan's Cabinet office of Japanese consciousness toward South Korea. Despite the diplomatic opposition on historical matters from the 1990s, positive attitudes were consistently on the rise until 2012. For both countries 2012 proved to be a turning point when feelings toward the other country sharply deteriorated, and prior to 2016 there was no sign of a turnaround.




Source: Gaiko ni Kansuru Yorochosa, Naikakufu, <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index-gai.html> (last visited on January 28, 2016)

Usually, the cause of this change is attributed to the visit of President Lee Myung-bak in August 2012 to Takeshima/Dokdo and his statement afterwards about seeking an apology from the Emperor.⁵ However, such conditions, as rare as they were, could be seen before. There has been opposition over this island from the time of the establishment of the ROK in 1948, and in 2006 the Japanese government had planned to send a surveying ship to the vicinity of the island, raising the possibility that a clash could have occurred at any instant. What was primary in the 2012 situation was that South Korea had difficulty in explaining their behavior that provoked the Japanese and thereby hurt Japanese feelings toward the ROK.

Why did such a big change occur in mutual attitudes? The key to grasping this, as seen in Figure 3, is the fact that the level of mutual trust fell sharply at this time. In particular, there was a dramatic downturn with 2012 as the turning point in the Japanese level of trust toward South Korea. My hypothesis is that while opposition over historical consciousness had long continued at the political level, what was different prior to 2012, especially on the Japanese side, was that there remained a high level of trust toward the other side such that deterioration of diplomatic relations between the two countries did not lead to worsening public attitudes. If relations were troubled, this was a problem for politicians and diplomats, not reason for mutual antipathy in the public.


Something new appears to have been taking place in regard to historical consciousness. The other side’s untrustworthy behavior became more startling, not just at the elite level, and hope was lost that the two nations could resolve their historical memory problems.⁶



Source: Yomidas Rekishikan, <https://database.yomiuri.co.jp/rekishikan/> (last visited on January 28, 2016)


REASSESSMENTS AMID SHIFTING RELATIONS WITH CHINA

I start by looking at Japan, for which data are relatively abundant. For the 2012 turning point in feelings of friendship and trust toward South Korea to a sense of opposition toward South Korea, we need to understand the linkage to Sino-Japanese relations. Increasingly, Japanese perceived that China and South Korea were forming one camp, using the issue of historical consciousness in concert to attack Japan. We can verify with data South Korea’s image in Japan in regard to China. For example, Figure 4 shows friendship toward South Korea and its mutual relationship to attitudes of friendship toward the United States, Russia, and China.



Source: Gaiko ni Kansuru Yoronchosa, Naikakufu, <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index-gai.html> (last visited on January 28, 2016)


What is clear is that coming out of the Cold War era, Japanese feelings toward South Korea were mainly of friendship, as the ROK had mutual relations with the United States. Entering the 2000s, however, this situation was changing, and after 2005 a high degree of linkage with China could be observed. We can see something like this in the data on mutual trust shown in Figure 5. We see linked movement from 2011 in the level of trust toward China and South Korea, which to that time had not been connected.



Source: Yomidas Rekishikan, <https://database.yomiuri.co.jp/rekishikan/> (last visited on January 28, 2016)

In the background of a deterioration of friendship and trust among Japanese toward South Korea, we discern a linkage between the evolution of historical consciousness issues and Sino-Japanese relations, which after 2010 rapidly deteriorated as a result of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) question. In other words, issues that had to that time been seen as specific to Japan-ROK relations were reconceptualized amid the shifting power balance in Northeast Asia. They were now seen in an entirely new meaning. As seen in Figure 6, historical consciousness in Japan-ROK relations was gradually not seen in the vein of the opposition between these two countries but interpreted as part of the vein of opposition between Japan and China plus South Korea.

Figure 6. Percentage of Japanese Media Articles on the Historical Disputes Between Japan & South Korea in which Issues with China are also Included



Source: Yomidas Rekishikan, <https://database.yomiuri.co.jp/rekishikan/> (last visited on January 28, 2016)

This kind of rethinking by the Japanese people was occurring amid South Korea's visibly improving relations with China after the Park administration took office. As Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga said in July 2014, "Any attempt by China and South Korea to coordinate in picking apart past history unnecessarily and making it an international issue is utterly unhelpful for building peace and cooperation in the region."⁷ As a result of the spread of the "theory of South Korea leaning to China" in Japan, the understanding soon spread that South Korea is a "country in the other camp," standing beside China opposed to Japan on the Senkaku issue and others. More than a friendly state which is an ally through the intermediary role of the United States, South Korea was rather reconceived as a latent enemy which could not be trusted and supports China, which is antagonistic to Japan and to the United States, which is the ally of Japan. Then, the Japanese government and media, and even more public opinion, which interpreted Japan-ROK relations in this way, finally aroused a strong reaction from South Korea. For example, a South Korean journalist stationed in Washington expressed the following dissatisfaction with Japanese reporters who clung to the "theory of South Korea leaning to China." "Not only today, at news conferences of the foreign ministry, if Japanese reporters have the opportunity they repeatedly raise questions intimating there is a widening distance in ROK-U.S. relations. At various seminars convened in Washington, DC, the same thing occurs over and over." In this atmosphere, historical consciousness questions should be understood as increasing the distance between Japan and South Korea in the midst of the greater international structural confrontation in East Asia, which further exacerbated Japan-ROK distrust. In turn, this influenced diplomatic relations between the two countries.

FROM “GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION” TO “PEOPLE TO PEOPLE OPPOSITION”

In a May 2015 joint survey of public opinion by *Asahi Shimbun* and *DongA Ilbo*, we can see the impact on attitudes in both Japan and South Korea of the China questions being linked to historical consciousness in Japan and, subsequently, affecting attitudes toward South Korea. As in other surveys, this one shows only a low level of friendliness toward each other. On the Japanese side only about 10 percent of respondents answered that they “like” South Korea, and 54 percent stated that over the past five years their impression of South Korea had worsened. The situation on the Korean side was even worse, with only 5.4 percent answering that they “like” Japan, while 59.4 percent asserted that their image of it had worsened over this time frame. Behind these figures, one finds no relationship between the degree of friendliness shown by Japanese and the political character of South Korea, as seen in Table 1, and almost no relationship between friendliness to Japan and its political character on the Korean side, as shown in Table 2.

Table 1. South Korean Ideological Positions & Attitudes Toward Japan (as a percentage)

	Like	Dislike	Neither
Conservative	3.9	58.4	36.7
Centrists	8.1	41.3	49.6
Progressive	4.9	46.3	48.2
Don't Know, No Answer	5.4	5.4	48.3

Source: *Dongailbo Guggyojeongsanghwa 50nyeon, dongailbo-asahisinmun gongdong yeolonjosa gyeolgwa bogoseo*, Research & Research, June 1, 2015.

Table 2. South Korean Support for the Government & Attitudes Toward Japan (as a percentage)

	Like	Dislike	Neither	Don't Know or No Answer
Support the government	11	29	59	2
Do not support the government	10	23	65	1
Do not know or no answer	8	18	68	7


Source: *Dongailbo Guggyojeongsanghwa 50nyeon, dongailbo-asahisinmun gongdong yeolonjosa gyeolgwa bogoseo*, Research & Research, June 1, 2015.

Until the December 28, 2015 “comfort women” agreement, South Korean political parties in and out of power have had the same stance on questions of historical consciousness, such as on “comfort women” and the territorial question, therefore it is not surprising that conservatives and progressives think alike when it comes to Japan’s posture on these matters. But in Japan the parties’ positions are split when it comes to historical consciousness issues and especially “comfort women.” The governing LDP and Komeito follow the government’s position that the 1965 Japan-South Korea fundamental treaty fully resolved all questions concerning the rights to compensation in bilateral ties. In contrast, the DPJ, which is the leading opposition party, while agreeing with the basic government position, takes a moderate stance that it is necessary to make certain “efforts” in order to resolve these questions. In greater contrast, the

Communist Party and Social Democratic Party, also in the opposition, similar to the South Korean government, say it is necessary for the Japanese government to pay compensation on the “comfort women” question. At the political elite level in Japan there is great divergence on this issue.

While Japan’s political elite is split on important questions dealing with South Korea, supporters of the government are not alike in their thinking, as seen in Figure 7. Even 63 percent of the supporters of the Communist Party, which continuously since the 1990s has strongly criticized the government on the “comfort women” issue, back the government’s position today. We can see that more than the political elite, public opinion has coalesced around a unified understanding in relation to South Korea. A situation had arisen where the people of Japan and South Korea had, across the board, lost trust in each other, transcending their support for political parties and their ideology.

Figure 7. The Japanese Government Claims that Legal Problems Concerning South Korean Comfort Women Have Already Been Settled & Finally by the Agreement Between the Two Countries in 1965. Do You Support This Claim?




Source: Dongailbo Guggyojeongsanghwa 50nyeon, dongailbo-asahisinmun gongdong yeolonjosa gyeolgwaga bogoseo, Research & Research, June 1, 2015.

What, then, was the impact of the December 28, 2015 agreement on attitudes? The fact that the South Korean government abandoned its quest for legal compensation on the “comfort women” issue means that the two governments have resolved the most important question that they were facing regarding historical consciousness. Since the divergence in their interpretations of the 1965 treaty had sprung from their divide on the “comfort women” issue, if the South Korean government takes a similar stance on the other historical consciousness questions facing the two governments, it will be very easy to resolve them. In the same manner, by means of funds and apologies—in exchange for funds to assist different types of victims of Japanese colonial control and Japanese government official apologies, the South Korean government would declare that it had forsaken further demands—it would be possible to apply the same format to other issues.

The question remains whether this format can be applied by the two governments in the future. According to a Korean Gallup poll, 54 percent of Koreans perceive the agreement as a “mistake,” and an even larger 58 percent consider that it is necessary to “renegotiate” the deal. In the case of Japanese, 59.7 percent responded that they approve of the agreement, and 64.1 percent view the removal of the “comfort women statue” in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul, which lies outside of the main agreement, as a necessary condition. In contrast, in the poll on the South Korean side, 72 percent are opposed to its removal as a reason for why they object to carrying out the agreement.⁸

Even more important is how the people of both countries will interpret the agreement in the future. According to the same poll, 81.2 percent of Japanese foresee, despite this agreement, that the “comfort women” issue will be rekindled between the two countries. In the background is deep distrust of South Korea, to the point that many Japanese expect that it will be broken by the Korean side “moving the goalposts.” Distrust exists on the Korean side too. The same South Korean Gallup poll found that 72 percent of Koreans did not think that the “apology” by Abe read by Foreign Minister Kishida at the foreign ministers’ meeting reached the level of an “apology.” After all, it did not take the form of a Japanese government apology; so it was not a genuine apology. We can find the same situation in Japan. Many people expect that the South Korean government will not fulfill the agreement or they will bring up the issue against Japan, as Figure 8 shows.⁹




Source: Masaki Hata, “Jugunianfugoi no nikkangoi ni kansuru risutojikkenn keka no hokoku,” http://www2.kobe-u.ac.jp/~108j055j/hata_song20151230.pdf (last visited on March 18, 2016).

However much distrust persists, the situation following the “comfort women” agreement is different in some respects. As opposed to the case of Japan, where the agreement did not result in a big change in existing public understanding of historical consciousness issues and South Korea, in South Korea it resulted in a split of public opinion. One can see despite some improvement in friendliness to South Korea, distrust toward how the South Korean


side will fulfill the terms of the agreement—and the fact that the distrust toward South Korea transcends political party and ideology—has not been wiped away. The ruling and opposition political parties support the deal, and it is not seen as causing a divide in political circles.

For Japan, another important element is the reaction of the nationalists, who are an important political base for the Abe government, because they have criticized past deals with South Korea on the issue. It is said that they are influential in the policy making process of the government; however, they failed to express any severe criticism toward the agreement.¹⁰ For example, Hata Ikuo, one of the most influential conservative historians in Japanese society, spoke on a TBS radio program on January 5, as follows, “I am frustrated with the agreement but I believe that it must be a product of deep thinking by the prime minister.” This is typical of the discourse of Japanese nationalists about the agreement. Abe is their hope to realize their ideology, and it is hard for them to find an alternative among influential politicians in Japan. Hence, they cannot deny any diplomatic results achieved by the prime minister.

The situation in South Korea differs greatly because this agreement has the effect of splitting public opinion in regard to historical consciousness issues. Support for the agreement is closely related to support for the Park administration: 54 percent of those who favor the



Source: Korea Gallup, <http://www.gallup.co.kr/> (last visited March 18, 2016)



Source: Realmeter, <http://www.realmeter.net/> (last visited March 5, 2016)

administration back the agreement, while 80 percent of those who do not oppose the agreement, as Figure 9 shows. Supporters of the foremost opposition party are 80 percent against. Thus, the agreement has aroused a domestic political struggle in South Korea unlike in Japan, but it did not result in much change in the support level of the president.

As seen in Figure 10, despite the unpopularity among the people of this agreement between the Japanese and South Korean governments, it seems comparatively easy to carry out the agreement in South Korea. Filtered through the domestic political divide, since the agreement has little impact on the support level of the government, there is no serious barrier. In Japan, it is the same: there are no barriers to support for the administration. Regarding this agreement, one can see a split in the nationalist media that has taken the most hard-line posture. For example, right after the agreement in the issue of *Will*, a representative nationalist journal, published in January, there was a clear division pro and con among commentators, who, to that point, had been unified in support of the Abe administration. A similar tendency could be found in other nationalist media. There is little possibility that there will be a large opposition force to the Abe administration from those taking a clear stance opposed to this agreement.

Then, why did such an unpopular agreement barely damage the political bases of the two governments? It is simply because the historical disputes are never a serious concern for the public in the two countries, if compared with other issues. As we saw in the South Korean parliament elections in April 2016, which occurred just four months after the unpopular agreement, the main concerns of the people were domestic issues, especially ones related to their economy. Moreover, even among international issues, the historical issues with Japan were never regarded as important, compared with other issues such as the nuclear test and missile launches of North Korea or the arguments regarding the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system, which was strongly pushed by the U.S. government.

The same situation can be found in Japan. In the July 2016 Upper House elections, no media in Japan have found the issue of the relations with South Korea to be likely to have any importance. Given strong public interest in the economic performance of the government's monetary policies linked to "Abenomics," security issues concerning China, questions about U.S. military bases in Okinawa, or the prime minister's aggressive moves toward amending the Constitution, Japan-South Korean relations are easily forgotten by the Japanese public.

This is natural. For many people, past issues are never as important as present issues, which directly affect their everyday lives. Hence, even when we look back since 1990 when historical disputes between the two countries became serious diplomatic problems, there has been no government whose popularity was seriously damaged by the disputes. Yet, both governments have been afraid of the reactions of the people and avoided diplomatic concessions. But now we find that it was just a product of over-anxiety.

CONCLUSION

The December 2015 agreement was a big, diplomatic breakthrough even if the base of support for carrying it out remains fragile. As before, the agreement did not wipe away the distrust between the people of the two countries that has formed since 2012. This means that if something happens between Japan and South Korea or if the two sides do not carry out the agreement and it collapses, there will be a refocusing on distrust toward the other side with the possibility it will even intensify. Yet, the political environment has changed the situation to make it even easier than at first anticipated to carry out this deal. In Japan not only have parties in and out of power welcomed the agreement, it has been received well by public opinion, and no great barrier to its fulfillment is in sight. Even if in South Korea there is insufficient cooperation from the remaining "comfort women" and their supporting associations and, even more, the agreement has been the object of serious criticism, this situation has not shaken the support base of the administration.

This does not mean that the current political environment is guaranteed to last for a long time. The current administrations have already been in office for more than three years, and it is not known how long this stability will continue. The term of the South Korean president is limited to five years, and it is customary in the second half of the term for the level of support to drop appreciably. The current administration will have difficulty escaping from this pattern. This puts a burden on both governments to strive to fulfill the terms of the agreement early in the midst of what may be temporarily stable conditions, especially when great mutual distrust as before prevails in public opinion on both sides. We should expect efforts by both governments to use a precious opportunity effectively.

ENDNOTES

1. Kimura Kan, *Nikkan rekishi ninshiki mondai towa nanika?* (Tokyo: Mineruba shobo, 2014).
2. Yun Jong-Yeong, *Gugsa Gyogwaseo Padong* (Seoul: Hyeon, 1999); “Gugsa Gyogwaseo Padong (1),” *Silhag Sasang Yeongu*, 1995; “Gugsa Gyogwaseo Padong (2),” *Silhag Sasang Yeongu*, 1996; Sakai Toshiki, *Gendai Kankoku niokeru Rekishi Kyoiku no Seiritsu to Katto* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobo, 2003).
3. “Discovery of Disputes: Collective Memories on Textbooks and Japanese–South Korean Relations,” *Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 17, No.1 (Spring 2012).
4. Kimura Kan, *Nikkan rekishi ninshiki mondai towa nanika?*
5. Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, ed., “Hokokusho: Saikin no taigaiteki Kincho kankei no kaisho to Nihon niokeru tabunka kyosei no kakuritsu ni mukete,” *Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi*, 2014, pp. 1-6.
6. In Japan this situation was called “apology fatigue.” See, for example, author? *Hannichi no shinso* (Tokyo: Bunshun shinsho, 2014).
7. “Japan hits back at Beijing-Seoul WWII commemoration proposal,” *The Japan Times*, July 4, 2014.
8. Korea Gallup, “Deilli opinieon je193ho (2016nyeon 1wol 1ju) - Chongseon jijijeongdang, wianbu munje habui,” <http://www.gallup.co.kr/> (last visited on January 28, 2016)
9. Masaki Hata, “Jugunianfugoi no nikkangoi ni kansuru risutojikkenn keka no hokoku,” http://www2.kobe-u.ac.jp/~108j055j/hata_song20151230.pdf (last visited on March 18, 2016).
10. See also other editorials on Japanese nationalistic journals such as *Seiron*, *Voice*, or *Will* published after the agreement.