



Cosponsorship of North Korea Bills in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1993–2009

by Jungkun Seo

(Mr. GILMAN) *Mr. Speaker, I rise to voice my strong support for H. Con. Res. 213, regarding North Korean refugees who are detained in China and forcibly returned to North Korea where they face torture, imprisonment, and execution. I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) for bringing this important resolution before us today.*

(Congressional Record, H3418, June 11, 2002)

(Mr. PAUL) *Mr. Speaker, I rise to introduce the United States-Korea Normalization Resolution of 2003. . . , which expresses the sense of Congress that, 60 years after the Korean War, the U.S. security guarantee to South Korea should end, so should the stationing of American troops in South Korea. I hope my colleagues will join me by supporting and co-sponsoring this legislation.*

(Congressional Record, E239, February 13, 2003)

Introduction

Why do some members of the U.S. Congress seek greater involvement in U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea, while other members do not? This paper closely examines the incentives and motivations of members of the House of Representatives in sponsoring or cosponsoring bills and resolutions addressing issues surrounding North Korea. When it comes to U.S. foreign-policy making in the post-Cold War era, pluralistic and cross-cutting voting contexts have emerged for members of Congress. Consequently, lawmakers have increasingly become interested in taking and publicizing their foreign policy positions through cosponsoring bills and resolutions. Research is still scant, however, on the incentives and impacts of cosponsorship activities on foreign-policy making. Trying

to fill this gap, this article explores congressional politics toward North Korea policy in the post-Cold War period.

The case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) provides an excellent test of diverse hypotheses of cosponsorship activities by House members. Preventing nuclear proliferation and promoting human rights have become key foreign policy agendas for the United States since the end of the Cold War. It is widely agreed that Pyongyang continues to be one of the most troubling and provocative regimes with respect to nuclear threats, missile threats, and human rights abuses. As a rare empirical study of U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea from the perspective of congressional politics, this article analyzes cosponsorship decisions by members of the House of Representatives from the 103rd Congress (1993–95) through the 110th Congress (2007–09).

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I offer a brief overview of how the end of the Cold War changed U.S. foreign-policy-making processes, emphasizing new voting contexts for members of Congress concerning the issues of human rights and nuclear nonproliferation. Then the existing literature on bill cosponsorship and its impacts on the congressional politics of U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea is reviewed. After proposing several hypotheses about members' reasons for cosponsoring North Korea bills and resolutions, I use logistic regression analysis to test what determines House members' cosponsorship of bills addressing U.S. foreign policy toward the DPRK.

Bill cosponsorship proves to be a valuable tool for House members who have high stakes in the issues of human rights, religious freedom, and nuclear nonproliferation. This is particularly true when those types of legislation do not come to the floor for up-or-down votes for final passage.¹ Indeed, bills in Congress that address North Korea have rarely reached the stage of floor voting. Empirical findings reveal that the cosponsorship deci-

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sion on the issue of North Korea is largely influenced by the constituency that members of Congress represent, members' own religious affiliations and seniority, and membership on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Finally, I suggest some concluding remarks to highlight the importance of bill cosponsorship in shaping U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea in the post-Cold War era.

U.S. Congress and Foreign-Policy Making in the Post-Cold War Era

From Wildavsky's famous observation of the "two presidencies" to Howell's recent introduction of "power without persuasion,"² there is general agreement that the U.S. president is dominant in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Wildavsky, in his seminal article on presidential power over foreign policy, elaborates on a normative distinction between foreign and domestic policy presidencies.³ Emphasizing the Cold War imperatives, Wildavsky contends that presidential power should be strong and independent over the issue of national security. Thus, members of Congress are supposed to agree that it is not their job to determine the nation's defense policies. In addition, according to Wildavsky, voters' expectations and their demand for the president to be a single voice over foreign affairs have forged active leadership by the White House and forced Capitol Hill to take a backseat.

Howell's examination of executive orders and agreements highlights another route of U.S. foreign-policy making.⁴ Executive orders and executive agreements in security and trade policy, detouring around congressional constraints, have become essential tools for the president since the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. At the same time, contrary to the framers' intentions and expectations, both chambers in Congress have found their advisory roles and funding powers increasingly irrelevant in major foreign-policy-making processes.⁵ Recent studies, including by Fleisher and others,⁶ proclaim that the absolute level of presidential authority over foreign affairs has steadily declined since the second Reagan administration. Yet the notion of the "president as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations" is still effective.⁷

Within this institutional context of foreign-policy making, bipartisanship became the norm during the Cold War congresses.⁸ Putting behind the era of partisan disagreement over U.S. foreign policy, President Harry Truman and Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) crafted a postwar bipartisanship, calling for politics to "stop at the water's edge." As Divine suggests, during the critical election of 1948, Truman's skillful management of the Berlin crisis

and Thomas Dewey's decision of "me-tooism" regarding foreign policy further consolidated the Cold War consensus over containment policy and liberal internationalism.⁹ After Dewey's surprising electoral defeat, the Senate minority leader, Robert Taft (R-OH), known as "Mr. Republican" for his conservative principles, decided to break with bipartisanship. The Midwestern conservative led the Republican Party's attack against the Truman administration over the spread of communism at home and abroad.¹⁰ In the end, however, the election to the presidency of an internationalist, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in 1952 and the death of Senator Taft the following year brought to a dramatic end a long-standing tradition of U.S. isolationism.¹¹

This so-called Cold War consensus over the active role of the United States in foreign affairs began to collapse in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.¹² President Lyndon B. Johnson's and the Democratic Party's confidence in managing both defense budget and welfare spending together suffered a huge blow in the Americanization process of a remote war in Southeast Asia. Mintz and Hicks asserted that "military Keynesianism" lost its political support¹³ so that northern and southern Democrats came to split and engage in an intramural fight over the guns-versus-butter debate.¹⁴ In the meantime, beginning in the late 1950s the Republican Party also experienced a foreign policy position shift and reputation change from being the party of deficit hawks to becoming the party of defense hawks.¹⁵ President Eisenhower's delicate efforts to balance between "solvency and security" became no longer sustainable as Ronald Reagan seized on the military buildup at the expense of a budget deficit to subvert the "evil empire" through the Strategic Defense Initiative and the rollback policy against communist regimes in Latin America.¹⁶ In essence, while bipartisanship played a pivotal role in containing the Soviet influence and combating the Cold War, intraparty challenges and interparty competitions had created lasting ripples in the nation's foreign policy debate.

The end of the Cold War suddenly shifted the foreign-policy-making environment. It was changed from a simple zero-sum game of U.S.-USSR rivalry into a multifaceted and complex playing field for various states and actors.¹⁷ The Cold War era made the public as well as policymakers interpret foreign affairs mostly through the lens of bipolarity, but the post-Cold War world brought back into politics a diverse set of domestic interests and concerns over international issues. The disappearance of the Soviet threat effectively revealed a new political dynamic: various interest groups, active social movements, and U.S. voters came to put forward their own foreign policy preferences. Combined with the era of

globalization, the post–Cold War foreign policy issues have evolved and enlisted a diverse set of issues, such as nuclear nonproliferation, the environment, human rights, religious freedom, and even consumer protection.

This new policy environment has posed both opportunities and challenges to Congress and its members. “Congress resurgent,” as described by Ripley and Lindsay, has come to play a more active and independent role in foreign-policy making.¹⁸ Starting with a sense of disillusionment about the “imperial presidency” during the course of the Vietnam War,¹⁹ members of Congress began to vote down major foreign policy initiatives by the president; one example is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999. The advent of an active Congress after the end of the Cold War intentionally or unintentionally facilitated the “demise of the two-presidencies” in the 1990s.²⁰

Some challenges are also evident. Newly emerging foreign policy agendas after the end of the Cold War introduced a “pluralistic” and “cross-cutting” voting context to members of Congress.²¹ The liberal-conservative dichotomy often gave way to an unholy coalition of members with extreme ideologies, members who have often successfully pursued their distinctive foreign policy objectives. For example, various domestic interests over human rights, religious freedom, and the environment made “strange bedfellows” for building a coalition to deny China most-favored-nation trade status during the 1990s.²² Traditional pro-business Republicans have found themselves at odds with their socially conservative colleagues, while Democrats in favor of a traditional, engagement foreign policy have had a hard time embracing labor-union-friendly copartisans calling for tough actions against China.²³ In essence, as Fearon explains, these domestic-based electoral and partisan competitions might end up producing a “sub-optimal” foreign policy outcome, which was rarely seen during the Cold War period.²⁴

Cosponsoring Bills and Resolutions about North Korea in the U.S. House

Lawmakers as single-minded seekers of reelection constantly take positions on policy issues.²⁵ They cast roll-call votes, appear in the media, make public statements, and join the bills and resolutions in legislative processes. When it comes to position taking by members of Congress in the post–Cold War era, two distinct dimensions are worth noticing. First, lawmakers on Capitol Hill try to be active on foreign policy issues that rouse a significant number of constituents back in their districts, knowing that voters’ dissatisfaction will potentially bruise mem-

bers’ electoral chances. Second, a substantial number of foreign policy measures debated in Congress do not necessarily require members to cast a final-passage, do-or-die vote. Instead, many foreign policy bills and resolutions often fail to reach the floor. As a result, simple position taking in the legislative process proves to be enough for members of Congress to show that they are not out of touch. In essence, congressional members tend to rely on legislative activities that are neither controversial nor compelling.

Under these circumstances, examining representatives’ cosponsorship of bills that address North Korea issues offers an excellent test ground for the assessment of congressional responses to post–Cold War international relations. Since 1978 any number of cosponsors of proposed bills and resolutions is permitted in legislative process. As Campbell points out, cosponsoring activities “have become an integral part of the legislative process in both houses of Congress.”²⁶ Substantial efforts are made by bill sponsors to enlist their colleagues. In addition, the number of cosponsors often indicates how extensively and intensively members of Congress support proposed bills and resolutions in the lawmaking process.

Existing literature of bill cosponsorship elaborates on how representatives utilize cosponsorship activities as an effective tool for advancing their goals and strategies in Congress. The motivations include low-cost position-taking strategies,²⁷ a signaling tool for coalition building and policymaking,²⁸ and policy entrepreneurship via reputation building.²⁹ It is surprising, however, that few studies exist on the incentives and motivations of bill cosponsorship over U.S. foreign policy.

Basically, the bills and resolutions about North Korea that members of Congress have sponsored and cosponsored are about two topics: nuclear nonproliferation issues and human rights abuses (for the full list, see the Appendix). From the 103rd Congress (1993–94) through the 110th Congress (2007–08), a total of 26 bills and resolutions addressed issues directly related to North Korea.³⁰ Out of 26 bills and resolutions that addressed North Korea exclusively, there have been 14 measures (54 percent) that either condemned North Korea for its nuclear program development and missile launches or called for North Korea’s return to the Agreed Framework of 1994.³¹ Responding to North Korea’s first nuclear weapons threat in 1993, for example, two senior lawmakers, one from each party—Rep. Pete Stark (D-CA) and Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-NY)—introduced House resolutions that expressed strong opposition to North Korea and delivered strong bipartisan support to President Bill Clinton as he was trying to stop North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Also,

when the Republicans took over Congress in 1995 for the first time since 1954, after the Contract-with-America election, policymakers in East Asia became nervous and suspicious about the future of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Nebraska Republican Douglas Bereuter, then the chair of the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, introduced a joint resolution in the House to declare for the continuation of U.S. foreign policy toward the DPRK.

Promoting human rights in North Korea has emerged as another benchmark issue for the U.S.–North Korea relationship, particularly since the 107th Congress (2001–02), when some representatives began to “express the sense of Congress” urging family reunions and protecting North Korean refugees.³² Among others, HR 4011 in the 108th Congress, introduced by Rep. James Leach (R-IA) and cosponsored by 29 lawmakers, immediately drew great attention because of its far-reaching consequences. After the Senate passed an amendment added by Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) by unanimous consent, the House agreed to the Senate amendment by voice vote so that the bill became the North Korean Human

Rights Act of 2004, which was reauthorized in 2008.³³ In essence, the law declares that “[T]he human rights of North Koreans should remain a key element in future negotiations between the United States, North Korea, and other concerned parties in Northeast Asia.”³⁴

Table 1 provides the list of House members who cosponsored bills and resolutions about North Korea in Congress at least twice from 1993 through 2008.³⁵ The top two members of Congress who have tirelessly engaged in North Korea issues are Ed Royce (R-CA), cochair of the Korea Caucus in Congress, and Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), chair of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights. These two Republican members symbolize lawmakers’ incentives and motivations regarding North Korea: they make electoral connections and act as issue advocates.

Royce represents California’s 40th congressional district, where Asians and Latinos constitute roughly 50 percent of the population. Orange County, part of Royce’s district, is one of the biggest Korean-American communities in the entire country. Smith, who has represented New

Table 1: Members of Congress Who Cosponsored More Than One Bill about North Korean Issues 1993–2009

Number of Cosponsorships	Democrats	Republicans
10		Royce (CA), Smith (NJ)
8		Rohrabacher (CA), Ros-Lehtinen (FL)
7		Chabot (OH)
6	Ackerman (NY)	Bereuter (NE), Gilman (NY)
5	Markey (MA)	Burton (IN), Leach (IA), McCotter (MI)
4	Berman (CA), Hastings (FL), Schiff (CA), Sherman (CA)	Cox (CA), Hyde (IL), Kim (CA), Knollenberg (MI), Pitts (PA), Wilson (SC)
3	Abercrombie (HI), Brown (OH), Case (HI), Hoeffel (PA), Honda (CA), Watson (CA), Wexler (FL)	Tom Davis (VA), English (PA), King (NY), Kirk (IL), Kuhl (NY), Poe (TX), Wolf (VA)
2	Becerra (CA), Blumenauer (OR), Chandler (KY), Crowley (NY), Danny Davis (IL), Evans (IL), Gonzalez (TX), Gutierrez (IL), Kucinich (OH), Lantos (CA), Lee (CA), McGovern (MA), Meeks (NY), Napolitano (CA), Payne (NJ), Schakowsky (IL), Wu (OR)	Ballenger (NC), Calvert (CA), Jo Ann Davis (VA), DeLay (TX), Diaz-Balart (FL), Flake (AZ), Franks (AZ), Gallegly (CA), Goodling (PA), Horn (CA), Issa (CA), Manzullo (IL), McCaul (TX), Meyers (KS), Putnam (FL), Sanford (SC), Sessions (TX), Shimkus (IL), Souder (IN), Tancredo (CO), Wamp (TN), Watts (OK), Weller (IL), Young (AK)

Source: Author’s calculation; data from Library of Congress–THOMAS, <http://thomas.loc.gov/>.

Jersey's 4th district since 1981, has successfully established his foreign policy entrepreneurship, with a focus on human rights promotion around the world. Briefly, it is hardly surprising to see an Orange County member of Congress and another member who is a leading voice on human rights issues taking on the cosponsorship of a bill addressing North Korean issues.

The runners-up for cosponsorship honors—they cosponsored North Korea measures eight times from 1993 through 2008—are again two Republicans, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) and Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL). Rohrabacher, representing the coastline of Huntington Beach and Costa Mesa in California, is one of the most colorful and conservative members in the lower chamber (his DW-NOMINATE score was 0.826 in the 110th Congress).³⁶ Also, as a high-profile critic of the Chinese government, Rohrabacher has actively participated in cosponsorship activities regarding North Korea's human rights violations. Ros-Lehtinen, author of the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008, serves as ranking Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the 111th Congress (2009–10). In 2008, she was strongly opposed to the Bush administration's decision to remove North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Figure 1 presents a set of states represented by 77 House members who engaged in the cosponsorship of bills and resolutions about North Korean issues more than two times from 1993 through 2008. Obviously, the model state is California (17 members), followed by Illinois (9), New York (6), Florida (5), Texas (5), Pennsylvania (4), Ohio (3), Virginia (3), Arizona (2), Hawaii (2), Indiana (2), Massachusetts (2), Michigan (2), New Jersey (2), Oregon (2), and South Carolina (2). States such as Oklahoma and Tennessee have only one House member respectively (Rep. Watts and Rep. Wamp), who cosponsored North Korea bills two times. For members of Congress always keeping in mind their “re-election constituency,” a top priority is to translate constituents' interests into voting decisions.³⁷ One simple understanding of this linkage between voters and members can be found in the census data for the Korean population in various states. *Figure 2* shows data from Census 2000 that indicates that the Korean population is largest in California and New York, followed by New Jersey, Illinois, Washington State, Texas, Virginia, and Maryland. A great deal of overlap exists between representatives' cosponsorship activities regarding North Korea issues and Korean-American voters' locations across the U.S. states. In short, like many other issues managed by Congress, the fact of electoral connection holds up solidly over North Korea issues.

Analyses of Congressional Cosponsorship of Bills Addressing North Korea Issues

Data and Methods

To press further the question of what makes some members of Congress actively join bill cosponsorship activities toward North Korea policymaking, this section provides empirical analyses of members' cosponsorship activities. The dependent variable is the decision to cosponsor North Korea bills and resolutions by House members from the 103rd Congress (1993–94) through the 110th Congress (2007–08). To examine who in Congress has been vocal on the North Korea agendas and why, I code a cosponsorship choice on any North Korea bills and resolutions as 1 and no cosponsorship as 0. As the dependent variable is dichotomous, I employ logistic regression analysis to determine statistical significance of members' motivations to cosponsor the North Korea measures.


Independent Variables

Representing California and New York. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, members of Congress from the states with large Korean populations seem to be highly interested in taking positions and publicizing their positions on North Korea. Thus, I chose and incorporated into a set of independent variables the two states, California and New York, where almost 466,000 Koreans are reported to live, according to the 2000 U.S. census.³⁸ It is hypothesized that representatives from California and New York are more likely to be cosponsors of North Korea bills and resolutions than other members in the chamber.

Jewish members of Congress. This is one of the most interesting sources for the analyses of House members' cosponsorship activities toward North Korea. At first glance, Jewish members appear to have no direct relationship on Korea issues. Yet it is Jewish lawmakers who are often preoccupied with foreign policy agendas such as nuclear nonproliferation and human rights promotion.³⁹ Consequently, it is no accident that a significant number of Jewish members sit on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In addition, as numerous reports find the Pyongyang regime tied and close to Iran and Syria over nuclear programs and repressive toward political and religious freedoms, Jewish members of Congress appear to be concerned about the DPRK. For testing this hypothesis of Jewish members and North Korea, a member is coded 1 if Jewish and 0 otherwise.⁴⁰


Ideology and seniority. What is interesting about the role of ideology in post-Cold War foreign-policy making

Figure 1: Members of Congress Who Cosponsored North Korea Measures, by State, 1993–2009



Source: Author's calculation, Data collected from www.thomas.loc.gov

Figure 2: Korean Population, by State, in the United States, 2000



Source: Census 2000, U.S. Census Bureau

is the emergence of the so-called ends-against-the-middle coalition.⁴¹ Both conservative and liberal members have a high stake in securing a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and promoting higher standards of human rights in North Korea. These strange bedfellows, such as Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) and Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA), tend to build coalitions, trying to make their voices heard. The stronger the ideological convictions that a member holds, the more likely a member is to join North Korea policymaking legislation as a cosponsor.⁴² Also, according to the literature on cosponsorship in Congress, it is hypothesized that junior members of the House get involved in North Korea bills and resolutions more actively than senior members. A common explanation is that backbenchers, more than senior members, are at a legislative career stage requiring more publicity on policy positions.⁴³

Committee membership and party influence. To a large extent, it seems natural that if a House member is sitting on the Foreign Affairs Committee or Armed Services Committee, that member is more likely than members of other committees to engage in issues related to North Korea. Especially the subcommittees dealing with matters of nuclear threats, international terrorism, and

human rights abuses tend to attract members across the aisle who sign up for foreign affairs. The variable is coded 1 for members of the House Foreign Affairs or Armed Services Committees, 0 otherwise.

Finally, some research suggests that the so-called national security credibility gap between the two political parties in the United States has been closing since the Iraq War blunder by the Bush administration.⁴⁴ The Republican Party, however, has long been considered more hawkish over foreign policy than the Democratic Party. Thus, it is hypothesized that Republican members of Congress will throw their cosponsorship support behind bills that condemn North Korean nuclear ambitions and human rights abuses.

Findings

Table 2 reports the results of the multivariate logistic regression analysis for the House members when all of the influences hypotheses are included into one model. The evidence shows that the model performs well. The overall fit of the model (Pseudo R²) is solid throughout the test. In addition, percentage correctly predicted is consistently high, ranging from 86.2 percent to 95.2 percent.

Table 2: Logistical Regression Analysis Predicting Influences on Cosponsorship Activity Regarding North Korea Issues in Congress, 1993-2009

<i>Influences</i>	103 rd Cong (1993-95)	104 th Cong (1995-97)	105 th Cong (1997-1999)	106 th Cong (1999-2001)	107 th Cong (2001-03)	108 th Cong (2003-05)	109 th Cong (2005-07)	110 th Cong (2007-2009)
<i>CA & NY</i>	.674 ** (.340)	1.627 *** (.663)	-.170 (.658)	-.133 (.602)	1.064 *** (.355)	-.137 (.543)	-.048 (.412)	.422 (.475)
<i>Jewish member</i>	.929 ** (.458)	-1.077 (1.643)	- ^a	1.390 * (.822)	-.947 (.622)	.170 (.746)	.439 (.592)	2.424 *** (.788)
<i>Extreme Ideology</i>	-.133 (.875)	4.301 ** (1.865)	1.613 (1.414)	3.391 *** (1.420)	2.091 ** (.992)	.893 (1.198)	.107 (.895)	-2.243 ** (1.118)
<i>Foreign Affairs Committee</i>	.075 (.454)	4.874 *** (.772)	.339 (.672)	2.549 *** (.543)	2.816 *** (.407)	3.142 *** (.484)	2.706 *** (.357)	2.553 *** (.439)
<i>Armed Services Committee</i>	.016 (.445)	-.605 (1.105)	.954 ** (.494)	.492 (.819)	.364 (.488)	- ^a	-.427 (.534)	.100 (.493)
<i>Republican</i>	-.359 (.307)	- ^a	1.588 *** (.640)	.637 (.573)	-1.487 *** (.375)	-.008 (.059)	-.007 (.031)	3.606 *** (.703)
<i>Years in Chamber</i>	-.001 (.005)	.021 (.039)	-.046 (.039)	.062 ** (.029)	.009 (.020)	.073 *** (.024)	-.017 (.021)	-.014 (.024)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.902 *** (.377)	-5.659 *** (1.187)	-4.607 *** (.900)	-6.478 *** (1.068)	-3.111 *** (.571)	-4.883 (.813)	-2.302 (.534)	-4.153 *** (.802)
<i>Log-likelihood</i>	-167.74	-43.616	-79.047	-61.574	-132.02	-71.87	-136.64	-108.94
<i>Percent correctly predicted</i>	86.2%	94.4%	94.4%	95.2%	87.7%	92.8%	88.0%	90.8%
<i>Pseudo-R²</i>	.04	.49	.11	.23	.25	.28	.20	.28
<i>N</i>	434	232	411	416	435	376	434	435

Notes: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01; Standard errors in parentheses; ^a = predicts failure perfectly so that the variable was dropped and not used for analyses

Three cases (Republicans for the 104th Congress, Jewish members for the 105th Congress, and Armed Services Committee members for the 108th Congress) completely predict members' cosponsorship decisions. In short, the results of Table 2 largely support the hypotheses to cover the dimensions of constituency, ideology, committee, and party.

The connection between constituents and representatives, with members from California or New York examined as a proxy measure, shows statistical significance in three out of eight congresses. As expected, in those three congresses, congressional members from the two big states heavily engaged in cosponsorship activities toward DPRK issues. With respect to members' own characteristics, being a Jewish member presents a statistical significance in predicting cosponsorship decisions over the question of North Korea. The signs are all correct. If a lawmaker is Jewish, that lawmaker turns out to be more active than other members in cosponsoring bills and resolutions on the subject of North Korea.

Ideological positions by House members often predict bill cosponsorship behavior regarding North Korea issues. In three congresses, both conservative and liberal members joined together to be on the same page on cosponsorship activities.⁴⁵ Also, seniority turned out to be a statistically significant factor during the 106th Congress (1999–2001) and the 108th Congress (2003–05). In other words, senior members became more interested than backbenchers in bills and resolutions addressing the North Korea problems. This is interesting and contrary to the existing literature on cosponsorship of domestic bills by members in diverse career stages in Congress. Because the existing studies have paid little attention to cosponsorship over foreign policy, one preliminary interpretation is that more experienced members with greater influence in the House tend to weigh in on North Korea as a limited but serious issue more than their junior colleagues.

Institutional conditions also matter for members' cosponsorship choices, as confirmed in Table 2. In particular, the House Foreign Affairs Committee membership ends up being one of the most powerful indicators of bill cosponsorship over the issues of North Korea. In six out of eight congresses, the Foreign Affairs Committee members played a statistically significant role in sponsoring North Korea bills and resolutions. This is not coincidental, as it is the House Foreign Affairs Committee that is in charge of congressional policymaking toward such for-

ign policy issues as preventing nuclear proliferation and protecting human rights in the international community.


What is rather surprising is the finding that the Armed Services Committee members have not actively adopted cosponsorship as a position-taking tool over security threats posed by Pyongyang. This contrast between the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Services Committee in the lower chamber reaffirms the current situation about the U.S.–North Korea relationship. More specifically, in spite of a high level of tension between the two countries, North Korea to date has largely been the subject of diplomatic efforts, not necessarily military actions. As a consequence, it has been issue territory for the Foreign Affairs Committee, not the Armed Services Committee in the House.

Figure 3 illuminates some details regarding partisan politics and cosponsorship approaches to North Korea issues by members of Congress. Republicans made distinctive rallies behind bill cosponsorship during two congresses (the 105th and the 110th), while the Democratic Party was a significant player for two congresses as well (the 103rd and the 107th). In other words, neither party in U.S. politics appears to “own” the issue of North Korea, at least for now.⁴⁶ Many complicated factors seem to contribute to the fact that party ownership of the DPRK issue is not clear-cut. The Republican Party has been concerned about security matters, including North Korea's nuclear and missile threats; at the same time, however, Democratic members of Congress have also shown a great deal of sympathy toward North Korean defectors and concern about human rights violations by the Pyongyang regime. In addition, most Jewish congressional members are Democrats, and they have worries about human rights violations in North Korea as well as the DPRK's potentially ominous export of nuclear materials to Iran.

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of the globalization era, an increasing number of foreign policy issues have drawn more of the attention of the U.S. domestic audience. In particular, media coverage of North Korea's missile launches, nuclear weapon development, and repression of human rights and religious freedom has infuriated the U.S. public.⁴⁷ The North Korean problem appears to require not only sensible international solutions but also sensitive domestic responses. As Cha and Kang point out, members of Congress face the question of North Korea as “one of the most divisive foreign policy issues for the United States and its allies in Asia.”⁴⁸

Figure 3: Number of Cosponsors and Party Breakdown of Bills and Resolutions about North Korea, 1993–2009



Source: Author’s calculation, Data collected from www.thomas.loc.gov

Although some critics suggest that Congress has been only provocative, not productive, in its handling of post–Cold War foreign policy, House members have undoubtedly provided a venue where North Korea issues have been discussed and debated. In this paper, I have conducted statistical analyses to ascertain the motivations of members of the U.S. House of Representatives in cosponsoring bills and resolutions regarding North Korea. The logistic regression analyses present evidence that the particular constituency, legislators’ own preferences, and institutional status are critical for members’ decisions to join cosponsorship activities toward the DPRK.

Four points stand out. First, the presence of large Korean populations clearly explains active cosponsorship activities by representatives regarding nuclear threats and human rights abuses by the Kim Jong-il regime. Second, both conservatives and liberals have shown some solid interest in together taking care of North Korea problems. Third, it is Jewish members who have actively and consistently over time participated in debates about North Korea—policymakers, interest groups, and lobbyists might find this assertive role played by the Jewish members quite interesting. Finally, House members on the Foreign Affairs Committee prove to be the most outspoken critics of the DPRK regime, whereas Armed

Services Committee members have not been particularly vocal during the North Korea debates in Congress.⁴⁹

These findings are important not only for what they demonstrate about cosponsorship decisions by House members over North Korea, but also for what they tell us about the way House members handle domestic concerns over the issues of nuclear threats and human rights. Obviously, the executive branch has been taking the driver’s seat in handling problems related to the DPRK regime. This does not necessarily mean that Congress has been simply ignoring the North Korea situation. Yet, given that the North Korea bills and resolutions have hardly reached the stage of an up-or-down final vote, some members try to express the sense of Congress by regularly publicizing their cosponsorship decisions. In sum, members of Congress often find bill cosponsorship to be an effective tool in the legislative process for highlighting their positions in the making of U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea.

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Appendix

The following information is from the Library of Congress—THOMAS, <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

103rd Congress (1993–95)

H.CON.RES.66

Condemning North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Sponsor: Rep Stark, Fortney Pete [D, CA-13] (introduced 3/16/1993), Cosponsors (43)

H.J.RES.292

To approve and encourage the use by the President of any means necessary and appropriate, including diplomacy, economic sanctions, a blockade, and military force, to prevent the development, acquisition, or use by us North Korea of a nuclear explosive device.

Sponsor: Rep Gilman, Benjamin A. [R, NY-20] (introduced 11/15/1993), Cosponsors (20)

104th Congress (1995-1997)

H.CON.RES.19

Expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to North-South dialogue on the Korean Peninsula and the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework.

Sponsor: Rep McInnis, Scott [R, CO-3] (introduced 1/25/1995), Cosponsors (11)

H.J.RES.83

Relating to the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and the obligations of North Korea under that and previous agreements with respect to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and dialogue with the Republic of Korea.

Sponsor: Rep Bereuter, Doug [R, NE-1] (introduced 3/30/1995), Cosponsors (1)

H.R.1987

To limit congressional travel to North Korea.

Sponsor: Rep Kim, Jay [R, CA-41] (introduced 6/30/1995), Cosponsors (17)

H.CON.RES.224

Concerning the infiltration of North Korean commandos into the sovereign territory of the Republic of Korea on September 18, 1996.

Sponsor: Rep Kim, Jay [R, CA-41] (introduced 9/27/1996), Cosponsors (2)

105th Congress (1997-99)

H.RES.554

To condemn North Korea's missile launch over Japan.

Sponsor: Rep Underwood, Robert A. [GU] (introduced 9/24/1998), Cosponsors (6)

H.CON.RES.341

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the commitment made by the United States, in conjunction with South Korea and Japan, to arrange financing and construction of 2 nuclear reactors for North Korea, and to provide fuel oil and other assistance to North Korea, should be suspended until North Korea no longer poses a nuclear threat to the peace and security of Northeast Asia or the United States.

Sponsor: Rep DeLay, Tom [R, TX-22] (introduced 10/8/1998), Cosponsors (17)

106th Congress (1999-2001)

H.R.1835

To impose conditions on assistance authorized for North Korea, to impose restrictions on nuclear cooperation and other transactions with North Korea, and for other purposes.

Sponsor: Rep Gilman, Benjamin A. [R, NY-20] (introduced 5/18/1999), Cosponsors (11)

H.R.4251

To amend the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 to enhance congressional oversight of nuclear transfers to North Korea, and for other purposes.

Sponsor: Rep Gilman, Benjamin A. [R, NY-20] (introduced 4/12/2000), Cosponsors (6)

H.RES.543

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the recent summit held by the Presidents of South Korea and North Korea.

Sponsor: Rep Hastings, Alcee L. [D, FL-23] (introduced 6/29/2000), Cosponsors (5)

H.R.4860

To provide for reports to Congress about proliferation by North Korea of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver such weapons, and for other purposes.

Sponsor: Rep Gilman, Benjamin A. [R, NY-20] (introduced 7/13/2000), Cosponsors (3)

107th Congress (2001-03)

H.CON.RES.77

Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the efforts of people of the United States of Korean ancestry to reunite with their family members in North Korea.

Sponsor: Rep Becerra, Xavier [D, CA-30] (introduced 3/22/2001), Cosponsors (38)

H.CON.RES.213

Expressing the sense of Congress regarding North Korean refugees who are detained in China and returned to North Korea where they face torture, imprisonment, and execution.

Sponsor: Rep Royce, Edward R. [R, CA-39] (introduced 8/2/2001), Cosponsors (34)

108th Congress (2003-05)

H.CON.RES.10

Condemning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for its failure to comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework of 1994.

Sponsor: Rep Hastings, Alcee L. [D, FL-23] (introduced 1/8/2003), Cosponsors (1)

H.R.367

To allow North Koreans to apply for refugee status or asylum.

Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [R, IL-6] (introduced 1/27/2003), Cosponsors (10)

H.CON.RES.18

Calling on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States to return to an interim level of compliance with the Agreed Framework of 1994 while a more comprehensive and mutually acceptable agreement can be negotiated by those two nations.

Sponsor: Rep Hastings, Alcee L. [D, FL-23] (introduced 1/28/2003), Cosponsors (6)

H.RES.109

Urging passage of a resolution addressing human rights abuses in North Korea at the 59th session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and calling on the Government of North Korea to respect and protect the human rights of its citizens.

Sponsor: Rep Smith, Christopher H. [R, NJ-4] (introduced 2/27/2003), Cosponsors (19)

H.CON.RES.81

Condemning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for its announcement that it has restarted a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and for the provocation caused by the interception of a United States Air Force reconnaissance plane by North Korean military aircraft.

Sponsor: Rep Hastings, Alcee L. [D, FL-23] (introduced 3/6/2003), Cosponsors (0)

H.R.4011 (the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004)

To promote human rights and freedom in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and for other purposes.

Sponsor: Rep Leach, James A. [R, IA-2] (introduced 3/23/2004), Cosponsors (29)

109th Congress (2005-07)

H.CON.RES.168

Condemning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the abductions and continued captivity of citizens of the Republic of Korea and Japan as acts of terrorism and gross violations of human rights.

Sponsor: Rep Hyde, Henry J. [R, IL-6] (introduced 5/26/2005), Cosponsors (29)

H.CON.RES.432

Calling on the Government of North Korea to cease all production of weapons of mass destruction, to cease proliferation of ballistic missiles, and to uphold its 1999 pledge to refrain from intercontinental ballistic missile testing, and for other purposes.

Sponsor: Rep Bordallo, Madeleine Z. [GU] (introduced 6/22/2006), Cosponsors (8)

H.R.5805

To promote nuclear nonproliferation in North Korea.

Sponsor: Rep Royce, Edward R. [R, CA-40] (introduced 7/13/2006), Cosponsors (42)

110th Congress (2007-09)

H.R.5834

To amend the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 to promote respect for the fundamental human rights of the people of North Korea, and for other purposes.

Sponsor: Rep Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [R, FL-18] (introduced 4/17/2008), Cosponsors (9)

H.R.3650

To provide for the continuation of restrictions against the Government of North Korea unless the President certifies to Congress that the Government of North Korea has met certain benchmarks.

Sponsor: Rep Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [R, FL-18] (introduced 9/25/2007), Cosponsors (43)

H.R.6420

To toll the congressional notification period for removing North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list.

Sponsor: Rep Sherman, Brad [D, CA-27] (introduced 6/26/2008), Cosponsors (6)

Endnotes

- ¹ One notable exception was the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. Still, the final version of the bill was passed by a voice vote, with each representative's position going unrecorded.
- ² See Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," *Trans-Action* 4 (December 1966); and William G. Howell, *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
- ³ Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies."
- ⁴ Howell, *Power without Persuasion*.
- ⁵ Glen S. Krutz and Jeffrey S. Peake, "The Changing Nature of Presidential Policy Making on International Agreements," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (2006): 391–409.
- ⁶ Richard Fleisher, Jon R. Bond, Glen S. Kurtz, and Stephen Hanna, "The Demise of the Two Presidencies," *American Politics Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2000): 3–25.
- ⁷ *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation*, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
- ⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origin of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Julian E. Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
- ⁹ Robert A. Divine, "The Cold War and the Election of 1948," *Journal of American History* 59, no. 1 (1972): 90–110.
- ¹⁰ Peter Trubowitz and Jungkun Seo, "Partisan Ambition and Scapegoat Theory: U.S.–China Relations in Political Perspective" (paper presented at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 3–6, 2009).
- ¹¹ James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972); Patrick Cronin and Benjamin O. Fordham, "Timeless Principles or Today's Fashion? Testing the Stability of the Linkage between Ideology and Foreign Policy in the Senate," *Journal of Politics* 61, no. 4 (1999): 967–98; Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
- ¹² Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, "Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States," *International Security* 32, no. 2 (2007): 7–44.
- ¹³ Alex Mintz and Alexander Hicks, "Military Keynesianism in the United States, 1949–1976: Disaggregating Military Expenditures and Their Determination," *American Journal of Sociology* 90, no. 2 (1984): 411–17.
- ¹⁴ David W. Rohde, "Partisanship, Leadership, and Congressional Assertiveness in Foreign and Defense Policy," in *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy*, ed. David A. Deese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
- ¹⁵ Benjamin O. Fordham, "The Evolution of Republican and Democratic Positions on Cold War Defense Spending," *Social Science History* 31, vol. 4 (2007): 603–36.
- ¹⁶ Eileen Burgin, "Representative's Decisions on Participation in Foreign Policy Issues," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (1991): 521–539; Daniel Wirls, *Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, *While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History 1974–2008* (New York: Harper Collins, 2008).
- ¹⁷ James M. Scott, ed., *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998).
- ¹⁸ Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).
- ¹⁹ Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
- ²⁰ Fleisher et al., "The Demise of the Two Presidencies."
- ²¹ David Skidmore and William Gates, "After Tiananmen: The Struggle over U.S. Policy toward China in the Bush Administration," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 27 (1997): 514–39.
- ²² Timothy Nokken, "The Ideological Ends against the Middle: House Roll Call Votes on Normal Trade Relation Status for China, 1990–2000," *Congress and the Presidency* 30 (2003): 153–70.
- ²³ Seo Jungkun, "Vote Switching over Foreign Policy in the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Politics Research* (July 2010, forthcoming).
- ²⁴ James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998) 289–313.
- ²⁵ David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
- ²⁶ James E. Campbell, "Cosponsoring Legislation in the U.S. Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (1982): 415–22.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*; Gregory Koger, "Position Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2003): 225–46.
- ²⁸ James L. Regens, "Congressional Cosponsorship of Acid Rain Controls," *Social Science Quarterly* 70, no. 2 (1989): 505–12; Daniel Kessler and Keith Krehbiel, "Dynamics of Cosponsorship," *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (1996): 555–66; Rick

K. Wilson and Cheryl D. Young, "Cosponsorship in the U.S. Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (1997): 25–43.

²⁹ Wendy J. Schiller, "Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Cosponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas," *American Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (1995): 186–203.

³⁰ To precisely gauge members' motivations, I have excluded bills and resolutions that only in part addressed issues related to North Korea. What is not included in the analysis, for example, is HR 3137 to prohibit assistance or reparations to Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, introduced on 17 September 2003 by Rep. Anthony Weiner (D-NY) and cosponsored by four other members.

³¹ In their efforts to recruit cosponsors, sponsors of bills often circulate "Dear Colleague" letters. Below is one example regarding HR 5805, the North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006:

Dear Colleague:

We are writing to invite you to cosponsor H.R. 5805, the "North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006." As you well know, on July 4th, North Korea launched a new Taepo Dong 2. The launch was preceded by three shorter-range ballistic missile launches, and then followed by three more. North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and long range ballistic missiles present a direct threat to the United States and our allies in Northeast Asia.

It is critical that we work to deny North Korea additional materials and technology that could advance its weapons and missile programs. Therefore, we have introduced legislation that would add North Korea to the list of countries currently covered by the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act. Under the legislation, the President would be authorized to impose sanctions on any foreign person believed to have transferred to North Korea goods, services, or technologies that could contribute to North Korea's ability to produce missiles, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction. These sanctions include prohibitions on U.S. government procurement opportunities for those identified as engaging in such activity and on the issuance of U.S. government export licenses to such persons.

If you have questions regarding the legislation, or would like to be added as a cosponsor, please contact Edward Burrier (majority, x61500) or Don MacDonald (minority, x55911) of the Subcommittee staff.

Sincerely,

EDWARD R. ROYCE

Chairman, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation

BRAD SHERMAN

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation

³² For a more detailed assessment, see Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, eds., *The North Korean Refugee Crisis: Human Rights and International Response* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2006).

³³ Rep. Leach, a moderate Republican from Iowa, praised the Senate efforts and remarked: "I deeply appreciate the efforts of the Senate to ensure that the 108th Congress speaks with a unanimous, bipartisan voice on these issues of shared concern. In this connec-

tion, I would like to express my particular gratitude to Senators Brownback, Bayh, Lugar, Biden and their capable staff members." See *Congressional Record* 150, no. 123 (4 October 2004).

³⁴ Jay Lefkowitz (in remarks to the Henry Jackson Society, London, 2007), laid out a broad perspective of U.S. foreign policy toward North Korean human rights promotion and suggested: "In the struggle for human rights in North Korea, we not only can help try to save the lives of the North Korean people, most immediately, but we can also try to help make the region and the world safer by helping to bring about a transformation in North Korea." Lefkowitz was appointed in 2005 as special envoy for human rights in North Korea.

³⁵ Another 95 members of the lower chamber got involved one time in cosponsorship activities toward North Korea.

³⁶ DW-NOMINATE scores gauge members' ideological standings; scores range from -1.00 (extreme liberal) to +1.00 (extreme conservative). DW-NOMINATE was developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal; for details, see their Web site, <http://voteview.com>.

³⁷ Richard F. Fenno Jr., *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

³⁸ For census data, I used the data from the Center for Korean-American and Korean Studies (CKAKS) at California State University, Los Angeles. The Web site was accessed on 1 March 2010; see <http://www.calstatela.edu/centers/ckaks/census.html>.

³⁹ For a recent detailed study of senators in support of Israel through sponsorship and cosponsorship, see Beth A. Rosenson, Elizabeth A. Oldmixon, and Kenneth D. Wald, "U.S. Senators' Support for Israel Examined through Sponsorship/Cosponsorship Decisions, 1993–2002: The Influence of Elite and Constituent Factors," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 5 (2009): 73–91; see also Geoffrey Layman, *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); and John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

⁴⁰ The list of Jewish members from the 103rd through the 110th congresses is available from CQ's *Politics in America*, various editions, Washington, D.C.

⁴¹ Duncan McRae Jr., *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting: Methods of Statistical Analysis* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Nokken, "The Ideological Ends against the Middle."

⁴² To measure this coalition between liberals and conservatives, I used absolute values of DW-NOMINATE scores from Poole and Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*, following Nokken, "The Ideological Ends against the Middle."

⁴³ Campbell, "Cosponsoring Legislation in the U.S. Congress"; and Koger, "Position Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House."

⁴⁴ Hannah Goble and Peter M. Holm, "Breaking Bonds? The Iraq War and the Loss of the Republican Dominance in National Security," *Political Research Quarterly* 62 (2009): 215–29.

⁴⁵ Yet, noticeably, the 110th Congress (2007–09) is an exception. Having lost majority status after the 2006 midterm elections, Republican members tried to stick together in cosponsoring North Korea measures, while Democratic liberals from the now majority party chose not to participate in cosponsorship to press North Korea. Their minority status in Congress might have induced moderate Republicans to join this position-taking opportunity over North Korea issues.

⁴⁶ John R. Petrocik, “Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study,” *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (1996): 825–50.

⁴⁷ According to Rasmussen Reports, 12 August 2009, 75 percent of Americans described North Korea as an enemy of the United States, while Iran was seen an enemy by 70 percent. In addition, 57 percent of U.S. voters in April 2009 favored a military response to eliminate North Korea’s missile-launching capability.

⁴⁸ Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

⁴⁹ Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Rep. Gary L. Ackerman (D-NY), along with former representatives Gilman (R-NY) and Leach (R-IA), have been the leading figures from the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

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