NATIONAL IDENTITY APPROACHES TO EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Japan’s National Identity Gaps: A Framework for Analysis of International Relations in Asia

Gilbert Rozman
On December 26 China’s leadership commemorated the 120th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth by bowing before his statue at the mausoleum in his honor on Tiananmen Square. On December 27 Abe Shinzo became the first prime minister since Koizumi Junichiro to visit the Yasukuni Shrine with few in doubt about the historical revisionist thinking behind his visit. Memories that in the 1980s had appeared to be consigned to the “dustbin of history” had come roaring back at enormous cost to prior trust that China was putting Maoism far behind it and Japan was leaving militarism in the past. These were not isolated incidents of recognition of the deep roots of individual leaders and elites, but powerful signals of reconstructed national identities at odds with what had been widely anticipated during the heyday of Sino-Japanese relations, bound to exacerbate bilateral gaps between identities. Confident of its rising power, China was prepared to be more defiant of world opinion as well as assertive in reclaiming its socialist identity in the face of public apathy or dissent, while Japan’s leadership was already treated as a pariah in China and South Korea but had an electoral mandate for the coming three years; so it was ready to be defiant as well. Below I concentrate on how sources in Japan frame relations with the states critical to its national identity, focusing on writings from late 2013 as identity gaps were intensifying.

The framework applied in this chapter represents the third stage in the analysis of how national identities impact international relations. The first stage involves comparisons of identities, including the introduction of a six-dimensional framework, and examination of their evolution in relation to general attitudes toward foreign relations. The second stage incorporates the concept of national identity gaps, focusing on how bilateral relations are shaped by obsessions about how “significant others” figure into mutual perceptions of national identity. In the third stage, individual countries are evaluated for how their array of national identity gaps influences their debates on identity and pattern of international relations. While I have taken some tentative steps to analyze Chinese views of a mixture of national identity gaps, in this first systematic attempt to advance to the third stage I assess the case of Japan. In doing so, I build on the foundation established in my recent article on how four Japanese schools of thought are debating three current challenges for national identity. Below, I proceed with discussions of the four schools in late 2013 and range across six objects of national identity gaps, highlighting two of them (China and South Korea), taking account two others (the United States and ASEAN), and making reference to two additional objects of identity gaps (North Korea and Russia).

At the end of 2013 multiple national identity gaps drew awareness beyond anything seen earlier. Although individual gaps had increasingly become the center of attention, this was an unprecedented overlap in concern over many gaps that matter for Japan’s national identity. The announcement by China in late November of an Air Defense Information Zone (ADIZ) overlapping with Japan’s zone in the East China Sea and ratcheting up the tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute showcased Japan’s most alarming gap. If many saw this as a realist struggle over territory, Japanese as well as Chinese pointed to an identity divide over history and even ideology. Earlier in November back-to-back visits by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to Seoul and Tokyo put the identity gap with South Korea fully in the spotlight, as President Park Geun-hye used the occasion to lash out again against Japan, defying U.S. efforts to help its allies find a path forward. To many in Japan there was also renewed concern about the identity gap with the United States in response to U.S.
policy statements regarding China, notably those made by Vice President Joe Biden during his stops in Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul in early December. Later in that month Abe hosted the ten ASEAN states in a summit that raised interest in whether an identity overlap with ASEAN could revive Japan’s goal of Asianism, a longstanding aspiration that Abe had reasserted in visits to all ten states over the year. In November a 2+2 meeting of foreign and defense ministers brought Russian officials to Tokyo for the first consultations of this kind, intensifying interest in a breakthrough in bilateral relations with special significance due to Russia’s past place in Japanese thinking, which Abe and President Vladimir Putin had promised to pursue. Finally, in December North Korea’s execution of Jang Song-taek reignited alarm that a state threatening Japan was taking an even more extreme course of militarism. All of these developments were followed closely in Japan, fueling debates on national identity, not just the usual realist concerns.

This chapter comprises three parts. First, I review the national identity framework and the role of national identity gaps with special attention to relations in East Asia and Japan’s place in them. Second, I identify Japan’s four schools of thought in the context of foreign policy challenges while also focusing on the six national identity gaps as discussed in late 2013 Japanese sources, concentrating on gaps with China and South Korea, and weighing the mix of attitudes toward internationalism centered on the United States and what is left of Asianism centered on ASEAN. Third, I compare how the four schools are searching for their own view on these identity gaps in order to steer foreign policy and national identity in their direction. At the end, I draw conclusions about applying this framework

**THE NATIONAL IDENTITY FRAMEWORK AND THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY GAPS**

National identity is a narrative about how one’s country is distinctive and superior. It is transformed not only through top-down initiatives and, in some countries, contestation over domestic policies that legitimate a way of thinking, but also through changes in the way other salient countries are perceived as threatening or reinforcing to one’s national identity. As an example, during the Cold War anti-communism, centering on views of the Soviet Union was a major force in debates over national identity in Japan as well as the United States. Using a six-dimensional framework to specify national identity, I compare countries, trace changes over time, and estimate the scale of national identity gaps with a small number of other countries that loom as “significant others.” For each dimension, I suggest its relevance to the identity gaps in East Asia, especially to Japan’s place in them.

The ideology dimension in the 1990s was thought to be a thing of the past after the Cold War had ended. Japan’s foreign policy in the postwar era was often described as bereft of ideology: mercantilist, pragmatic, and a product of a standoff between conservatives and progressives, whose ideological leanings were cancelled out by the other’s presence. For China lying low in accord with Deng Xiaoping’s dictum and South Korea democratized and quickly shedding its past obsession with anti-communism, economics appeared to be the driver of foreign policy with a pragmatic penchant for narrowing identity differences.
Many expected a liberal outlook on ideology, prizing freedom (of politics, markets, and society) to spread without serious encumbrances. Japan was assumed to be Asia’s leader. This picture of liberalism supportive of regional and global integration was misleading. In Japan as well as in China and elsewhere, the view prevailed that the United States was using globalization for its own ideological ends, which had to be resisted by widening the identity gap with it. When the LDP regained its dominance in 1996 after the weakening of progressive parties, Japan’s conservatives were less encumbered about asserting their ideology. As China gained confidence with double-digit economic growth and the end of most sanctions imposed after June 4, 1989, the ideological priorities of the Communist Party rose to the fore. In 2013 Abe Shinzo and Xi Jinping each carried these ideological drives to transform national identity to new heights. The former has a revisionist agenda that extends well beyond the historical dimension, while the latter champions the “China Dream” as a combination of socialism, Confucianism/sinocentrism, and anti-imperialism. In their rival visions, the other country figures importantly as a target useful for boosting one’s own national identity, widening the gap, and creating a downward spiral in which demonization of the other is convenient for desired intensification of one’s own identity.

Apart from ideology, the temporal dimension is a principal concern in the intensification of national identity in both Japan and China. Many in Japan thought that over time the weight of historical memory would diminish, but it has grown, provoked at times by the top leaders of Japan defiant of outside opinion and aroused by leaders in China and also South Korea playing the “history card.” The temporal dimension has seen widening gaps as post-normalization efforts at reconciliation and post Cold War economic integration are being overshadowed by accusations that Japan has reverted to pre-1945 militarism, that China has succumbed to pre-Deng Xiaoping communism, and that South Korea is incapable of escaping from emotions whipped up a half century ago against Japan. In this thinking, the post-Cold War decades have not brought a new era because identities are rooted in previous periods, stretching back to images of premodern divides in East Asia. The Yasukuni Shrine is a symbol of the temporal dimension for Japan and its neighbors.

The sectoral dimension includes political and economic identity, but gaps in the region are now centered on cultural national identity. The earlier notion that a shared legacy of Confucianism and Chinese culture (including Chinese characters in their writing systems) would be an advantage in going beyond economic regionalism to forge a community proved incorrect. Instead, each side is drawing sharp civilizational lines between states, especially Japan and its neighbors, allowing little room for mutual acceptance. These divides are compounded by China’s dichotomy between Eastern and Western civilization, seeing the latter as contaminating Japan as well as South Korea in addition to other sources of a civilizational gap. Culture wars eclipsed attempts at cultural understanding, such as the visits of Japan and China’s leaders in 2007-08 to Qufu and Nara respectively. This gap will not be easy to narrow since narratives in East Asian countries are prone to showcase a clash of civilizations.

On the vertical dimension, prospects for sister-city relations and other civil society ties have faded in the face of condemnations of each other’s internal social organization. In Japan, China is seen as communist, led by leaders intent on thwarting ethnic identities, media
freedoms, and cross-societal networks once viewed with optimism as mechanisms for a transition away from authoritarianism. In China, Japanese society is no longer the victim of militarism to 1945 but a willing collaborator in it and in its ongoing revival. If a decade ago the “Korea wave” was perceived as a sign that Japanese were recognizing the similarities of their society and Korea, today’s “hate Korea wave” movement signals a perceived gap in vertical identity. Economic ties are not leading to narrow social divides. Blame is readily assigned to states that arouse public opinion due to social susceptibility.

The horizontal dimension refers to attitudes toward both the international and regional communities as well as to the United States. The widening Sino-U.S. split is one factor in this dimension becoming more problematic for Japan’s relations with its neighbors. Yet, Sino-Japanese differences over regionalism have widened in stages from the early 2000s, as have differences over the global order. On this dimension, there is a sharp distinction between the deepening Sino-Japanese gap and the generally narrowing ROK-Japanese gap, since South Korea also supports a U.S.-led global system and fears sinocentrism. Yet, deep suspicions of each other’s thinking about regionalism add to ROK-Japan mistrust.

National identities have intensified, contributing to widening identity gaps. The Chinese leadership has aroused the public and then pointed to its strong feelings as reason for not compromising on symbols of identity. Abe’s electoral victories owe something to newly aroused national identity, although economic frustration and then renewed confidence from Abenomics play a large role. Park has chosen to intensify national identity as well, finding Japan a convenient target. If the overall national identity gap is considered to be the sum of the estimated gap in the above five dimensions and serves as a measure of the intensity of the bilateral gap, then at the beginning of 2014 the intensity of Japan’s gap with China is at a level unseen since normalization of relations, exceeding the peaks reached in 2005 and 2010 over specific issues. Meanwhile, the ROK-Japan gap, which had been narrowing in 2008-11, reversed course, and it is now quite wide, but not on all dimensions. Japan’s gap with North Korea remains very wide, much more than with South Korea. In contrast, Japan’s gaps with the United States, ASEAN, and Russia have all narrowed, even as they remain important for a comprehensive understanding of how gaps are interrelated in the debate over identity. Whether made more precise by public opinion polls, media content analysis, or other means, these gaps are driving tensions.

**Comparisons of Responses of Four Schools of Thought to Bilateral Identity Gaps**

Reviewing Japanese discussions of international relations, I have identified four schools of thought: *kokkashugi* (statism), *minzokushugi* (ethnic nationalism), *kokusaishugi* (internationalism), and *heiwashugi* (pacifism). Their views on current foreign policy questions can be found in daily newspapers and monthly journals, and on the shelves of bookstores in Japan. The Abe cabinet has a heavy representation of the first two schools, even when it was steered toward *kokusaishugi* by advisors such as the first head of the new National Security Council, Yachi Shotaro. Although the influence of *heiwashugi* receded...
after the Cold War, it was somewhat revived by the DPJ in 2009, became linked to anti-nuclear energy sentiments after September 11, 2011, and has found new life as opposition to a still suspect Abe on national identity issues in 2013, as in its resistance to the Secrecy Law passed at the end of the year with aspects seen as shielding the government far more than in the United States from having to share information on security and foreign policy.

In late 2013 Japan faced an unprecedented overlap in foreign policy challenges. In my recent article, I compared the responses of the four schools to the overall national security challenge, to the challenge of TPP in an anticipated 21st century economic order, and to the challenge of incorporating values into diplomacy. Here I concentrate on responses to national identity gaps with China and South Korea as well as with four other countries or regional groupings of significance for identity issues in Japan’s foreign policy. The six dimensions of identity are in play to differing degrees in relations with the six countries.

Laid low by the Fukushima disaster in 2011, Japan was blindsided by the actions of both China and South Korea in 2012, and in 2013, taking an assertive posture, faced a hostile environment with no sign of amelioration. The details of these bilateral relations need no repetition here, given the extensive, ongoing news coverage. What merits close scrutiny is the nature of the national identity gap between Japan and its two important neighbors, showcasing how deteriorating relations have been interpreted and what must be done in order to improve the situation. Attention has lingered on the role of island disputes, the Yasukuni Shrine, and the comfort women issue as symbols of troubled relations, but this chapter puts them in a broader context by considering various dimensions of identity.

**The National Identity Gap with China**

Chinese relations with Japan have deteriorated sharply, but explanations for this negative transformation with far-reaching implications for the reordering of East Asia are usually too narrow and event-driven to capture the driving forces behind it. In 2005 as relations between these two countries hit a new low since 1972, explanations centered on visits by the Japanese prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine. Five years later relations suffered a bigger blow explained by tensions over a Chinese ship ramming a Japanese coast guard vessel. Then in 2012 the deepest slump in relations yet was attributed to China’s reaction to the nationalization of property on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. The assumption each time was that if a particular incident had not occurred, relations would not have suffered a blow. Viewing this bilateral relationship through the lens of national identities, especially as an example of a sharp national identity gap, opens the way to systematic analysis. The Sino-Japanese relationship, this approach concludes, was imperiled by forces internal to each country, long gathering strength, and also manifest in relations with other countries.

Japan has had an abnormal national identity since 1945. The political divide between its conservatives unwilling to challenge a determined band of historical revisionists and its progressives enamored of pacifism and emboldened by the Constitution imposed during the U.S. Occupation is a reflection of an identity chasm yet to be resolved. In turn, China has had an abnormal national identity since 1978, under the sway of communists, who kept waiting for a chance to reassert an identity that has been downplayed, while being supportive of globalization in some dimensions. As China and Japan’s identities have been clarified in ways that many in each country see as bringing normalcy to their quest at home, the gap
between them has widened. Xi and Abe avail themselves of this gap to serve their particular group’s identity aspirations, as the four schools of Japanese thought respond for their own identity objectives to what is transpiring in these bilateral relations.

Japanese fervently hoped to construct relations with China from the time of normalization in 1972 on the basis of pragmatism, mutual economic advantage, a shared sense of what is threatening each other’s security, and eventually a forward-looking approach to forging an East Asian regional community. Yet, for many Japanese who wield political influence, eagerness to remove national identity from relations with China was accompanied by no less enthusiasm to restore national identity from its troubled state in the postwar era. The pretense that national identity was not at stake was belied by their obsession. Similarly, in China, Deng Xiaoping’s approach to international relations and economic development was trumpeted as the triumph of pragmatism, even including the way bilateral relations with Japan were advancing. However, for the Chinese Communist Party reasserting pride in its history along with forging a national identity to replace the wreckage of Maoism, left pragmatism toward Japan in a perilous state. Neither Japan’s conservative schools nor Chinese communists prioritized bilateral ties enough to jeopardize identity goals.

The kokkashugi school views China as a dangerous threat, but also as an opportunity to transform Japan’s national identity in a manner long desired. To make this case, it argues that: 1) what holds Japan back is its erroneous thinking under the continued spell of the heiwashugi group of traitors that have spread lies such as about the comfort women; 2) the United States is unreliable in defending Japan and has a national identity at odds with Japan that leaves in doubt acceptance of its “universal values”; 3) China is a “paper tiger” that does not pose a big threat and faces its own empire-threatening collapse; and 4) if Japan stands up, breaking free of the postwar regime’s stranglehold, it can, at last, defend its national interests, regain pride in its identity, and compete with China.9 In this outlook, postwar Japanese identity is treated as heiwashugi and equated with hating the state, and real independence is seen as breaking free of both pro-U.S. and pro-Chinese attitudes, in this way reviving the Japanese spirit (seishin) focused on the state, not the individual.

Reactions to China in Japan have signaled major changes in how Japan views national identity as a force in international relations, shifting from anti-communism in the 1960s, to idealism about an historic bond that transcends Cold War polarization in the 1970s, to Asianism under Japan’s leadership in the 1980s, to parallel pursuit of globalization under U.S. leadership and regionalism as China’s equal partner with Japan serving as the bridge in the 1990s, to management of a more assertive China in tandem with a stronger U.S. alliance in the 2000s, to reemergence as a “normal” country in opposition to hegemonism by China in the 2010s. All dimensions of national identity are at play. China opens the door for the kokkashugi school to re-center Japan’s national identity on a strong state or for the minshushugi school to at least prioritize a proud nation. Internationalists see it as a challenge that helps overcome not only pacifism but also the self-isolating right-wing identity obsessions since China’s growing threat shows the urgency of realist policies. At the same time, the diminishing circle of progressives sought to keep alive a pathway to an East Asian community, but their heiwashugi was at the mercy of Xi Jinping’s exclusive “China Dream” that became linked to gap widening with Japan and Abe’s instrumental use of the wider gap to press Japanese to abandon this outlook. In responding more intemperately to China than the United States
desired and visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, Abe made it clear that he would not give priority to *kokusaishugi*, but its boosters had nowhere else to turn but to Abe in the face of China’s protracted aggressive behavior.

The response in Japan to Abe’s Yasukuni visit saw the *kokusaishugi* forces in the lead, complaining that countless U.S. warnings had been dismissed and that Japan would be blamed for new troubles in the region. The *heiwashugi* camp was energized to condemn the implications for reverting to a vertical identity at odds with democratic, postwar Japan and putting the nail in the coffin of East Asian regionalism, inclusive of South Korea. The *kokkashugi* school was elated with this boost to its ideal national identity. That left the *minzokushugi* advocates in a quandary, approving of Abe’s restoration of pride in the nation but torn over how rash action threatening to disrupt a fragile environment in domestic and international opinion could make such pride too dependent on a narrow ideological goal. The newspapers were split, but the public still largely supported Abe.

The National Identity Gap with South Korea

South Korean relations with Japan have fluctuated more sharply, suffering a blow when Lee Myung-bak became obsessive about the “comfort women” issue from the end of 2011 and, especially, when he defied Japanese opinion by visiting Dokdo (Takeshima) Island in August 2012. After Park Geun-hye became president in February 2013 shortly after Abe Shinzo regained the prime minister’s post in Japan, relations remained at their nadir. Again, the assumption was that if leaders had exercised more caution, relations not only would have stayed calm, but actually were on an upward trajectory. In this case, I argue that the assumption was correct; however, I point to a less sharp national identity gap as continuing to threaten relations, while considering how national identities have been changing in order to assess what must be done to overcome the current divide.

Whereas in the *heiwashugi* camp one finds the view that Japan can find common ground with South Korea since the national identity gap is not so wide, the *kokkashugi* forces see South Korea as close to China’s historical viewpoint and a gap so wide that there is little point in trying to narrow it. As reflected in articles in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, the sense of utter hopelessness in 2013 extends to the *minzokushugi* camp. Losing the public relations fight in the United States to South Korea in the spring after Abe spoke provocatively, as in raising doubts that there is a common standard of “aggression,” Japan could fight more aggressively to make its case (as conservative camps argued), could avoid being entangled in such issues (as the *kokusaikashugi* camp preferred), or could renew what conservatives call “apology diplomacy” in line with the national identity legacy they want to eradicate.

In their obsession with the temporal dimension, the *kokkashugi* school insists that Japan saved Korea from its debilitating cultural legacy for modernization and fought against the Kim Il-sung forces for the benefit of the Korean people. Widening the gap over history, they write that South Koreans have a self-destructive view of their own history rooted in the humiliation of having lost their independence, and once they grew less dependent on Japan for economic cooperation in the 1990s, this identity was unreservedly vented.

The *kokusaishugi* camp envisions a way out with South Korea that reaffirms realism, but does not reopen Japan’s postwar diplomacy, which is well regarded. Appreciating what Kono,
Murayama, and Obuchi said in the 1990s in recognition of the immorality of past conduct, they draw the line at negating the postwar era and renegotiating normalization on the basis of legalistic rulings, such as those handed down by Korean courts. Fearful of devastating consequences for Japanese national identity and vulnerability to aggressive Chinese moves to reopen postwar agreements, internationalists think that there is another way forward with South Korea. They think that progress was being made, including in narrowing the bilateral identity gap, even on the “comfort women” issue. In 2012 the Noda cabinet was making sincere efforts, yet vague on the nature of the money being used, to get beyond the Korean court ruling through new forms of payment to these women from the government budget. Although they concur in blaming Lee Myung-bak and then Park Geun-hye for taking a self-righteous tone and moving beyond the bounds of seeking a compromise solution, they do not succumb to the hopelessness on the right as they await new prospects, perhaps with a U.S. role, for focusing on shared identity.

Searching for optimism in relations with South Korea, Asahi Shimbun pointed to the renewal after two years in November 2013 of “Diet member diplomacy,” which could be an opening wedge for joint efforts to make the 50th anniversary of normalization in 2015 a time of recommitment to improved relations. Seeking a U.S. role calming emotions, the newspaper claimed to detect signs in Japan in support of a new tone toward the South. By the spring of 2014, Barack Obama had arranged a trilateral summit and had visited both Tokyo and Seoul, breathing fresh life to security cooperation even if the impact on the Japan-ROK national identity gap remained very limited.

Writing off South Korea for its self-righteous “hate,” widening to an extreme the identity gap, Abe and his supporters were free to ignore its concerns and U.S. ones as well, in steps to intensify Japan’s national identity. When Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, he put an end to talk that some sort of deal, such as what Noda had been attempting in 2012, would be pursued to assuage Park’s hostility toward Japan. Yomiuri Shimbun articulated this sense of hopelessness, discussing “hate Japan” thinking, bringing up the example of a South Korean who called the atomic bombs dropped in 1945 “divine retribution” on Japan, writing pointedly about Park’s invitation to China to construct a statue to the “martyr” who in 1909 assassinated Ito Hirobumi, an icon of Japan’s history, and defying international etiquette by repeatedly attacking Japan in meetings with world leaders.

Whereas by the late 1990s China had become the primary foreign test of differences in Japanese thinking about international relations, South Korea is the more important test today. It is also a test of Japanese-U.S. relations, seen in pressure on Abe not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine but to prioritize improving relations with South Korea, followed by the defiant Abe visit at year’s end. The two conservative schools rally behind Abe’s move, but the internationalists are disappointed since the goal of changing national identity has been allowed to trump realism. The heiwashugi camp objects to this move as an effort to decisively shift the balance of Japan’s national identity, further marginalizing their views. Treating Park and South Korea as mired in “scold diplomacy” and beyond cooperation due to history education, the conservatives snubbed those who prioritized both universal values and internationalist security identity. As seen in the spillover of the Japan-South Korea dispute to Virginia, where Korean Americans made headway in eliciting promises to require textbooks to add “East Sea” next to “Sea of Japan,” the clash was spreading. Skillful U.S.
intervention finally managed to keep thing in check as Washington sought to change the subject from national identity to security threats facing both of its allies.

The National Identity Gaps with the United States and ASEAN

Kokubun Ryosei puts in perspective anticipation of the fortieth anniversary of Japan-ASEAN dialogue relations, which was celebrated with a summit in December 2013. It was the arena, from the time the United States was pulling away from Vietnam and Japan was establishing its production networks backed by substantial ODA, where leaders saw an opportunity to turn the weight of a great economic power into the status of a great cultural power and into a transition to a great political power. Southeast Asia also served as an arena for shaping relations with China: in 1972-92 as a model for how Japan could be a partner in a vertical order; in 1992 through the 2000s as a driver toward regionalism; and recently as the venue for intense competition. In 2013 Japan had raised its sights. Kokubun contrasts the new approach to the region with earlier ones as equal cooperation and expansion to non-economic cooperation. It is also characterized by Japan’s stress on ASEAN as a unit rather than bilateral relations and by its embrace of ASEAN centrality for a broad range of pursuits, something that contrasts with U.S. and Chinese approaches. Unlike in the past, Japan is prioritizing security, stressing values, and building on ties to ASEAN in reaching further to Australia and India. Yet, left unclear is whether it will avoid a backlash in ASEAN, which hesitates to be dragged into a policy that might be construed as containment of China, and how in its advocacy of collective security and universal values as well as in TPP Japan could avoid being seen as a middle power in the service of regionalism under the sway of U.S.-led globalization. Hopes that ASEAN will be of considerable value for bolstering Japan’s national identity may, thus, be inflated.

Boosters of TPP see it as opening the gates to internationalism centering on ties to the United States and ASEAN. After “two lost decades” leading to a negative image of Japan abroad and often at home too, TPP provides a chance to build on the restoration of self-confidence and improvement in Japan’s image in the international community in 2013. It would become a major part of the global flow of money, goods, and people—no longer a periphery as many perceived—; a world rule-maker, rather than the marginal state left as the G-8 lost clout when it was eclipsed by the G-20; and a major player in the 21st century economic order at a time China, left out of TPP, loses some of its centrality to that order. Establishing the TPP would also narrow the longstanding divide between Japan and the United States in economic national identity, which peaked during the trade disputes of the 1980s and early 1990s and is still felt after KORUS FTA solidified U.S.-ROK ties while Japan has remained an outlier in establishing FTAs. Much discussion of TPP in Japan is about its non-economic consequences. TPP negotiations and the early initiative behind it put the spotlight on Southeast Asia, raising some hopes that the new grouping would showcase an identity overlap with the region, joining in forging a high-level pact that achieves an unprecedented degree of integration and agreement on rules for a new era, which China’s FTAs with Southeast Asian states cannot match.

New security realities have paved the way for greater internationalism, focused on the United States but extending to Australia, India, and other states recognized as targets of defensive realignment. The fact of piggybacking on U.S. initiatives may be overlooked as Japanese seek to put their own identity spin on such outreach. This particularly applies to
wooing ASEAN, which is linked to efforts at least since the Fukuda Doctrine of the 1970s and even suggestive of some sort of shared values, if no longer Asian values that many in the 1980s-90s saw as a special identity bond distinct from universal values.

The opposition to TPP is more about rejection of narrowing the identity gap with the United States than about making a statement about ASEAN. For schools of thought on both the right and the left, the United States is an identity threat. For the kokkashugi advocates, it was the force that broke the spirit of the Japanese state, and a new opening that specifically targets state restrictions on market forces compounds the problem. For the heiwashugi camp, the security alliance with the United States denied Japan a unique role in bridging geopolitical differences, and saddling up closer with economics adding to the impact of alliance strengthening is not the solution. ASEAN lacks such significance.

Southeast Asia still has allure as the most promising arena for an independent Japanese foreign policy. U.S. rebalancing is welcome, but it is viewed with skepticism for both its staying power and its prospect of realizing a broader strategy than geopolitical goals. In a way, Japan is also rebalancing, refocusing on ASEAN after a decade when it had ceded the initiative to China. Given recent wariness about overdependency on China’s economy amid uncertain relations and China’s rise on the economic ladder, increased FDI in the Southeast Asian “developed developing countries” is already occurring. Not willing to concede that Japan had “lost” Southeast Asia, Abe threw himself into moves to regain a large role in the region. Various schools of thought saw this differently, asking how closely was this aligned with U.S. strategy? What was the intended balance between regionalism and globalism? And to what extent was this a response to China? The idea that ASEAN is cohesive and strong enough to forge in 2015 the integrated community that it has proposed or that Japan would benefit as its principal advocate begged the question of how Japan in the midst of multiple great powers could gain a leading role.

The National Identity Gaps with North Korea and Russia

When Jang Song-taek drew intensive coverage, the old Japanese obsession with the abductions issue was rarely mentioned. One source did indicate that he was the point man for Japanese efforts to resume talks on possible additional abductees, but its main concern was that after North Korea chose a parallel strategy of guns and butter in March 2013, the new developments meant that the military had won and guns would take precedence. If most sources showed little sympathy for China’s failed diplomacy with the North, Asahi Shimbun credited China with a strategy for working closely with Zhang to boost efforts at establishing special economic zones and introducing the market mechanism, following with resumption of the Six-Party Talks and relaxation of economic sanctions, and thus helping to stabilize the country and reduce its sense of isolation. It concluded that this failure was bad for China, while hinting that it was bad for Japan too, which could have benefited from Chinese-led diplomacy. Yomiuri Shimbun makes a similar point about the danger of this victory of hardline military leaders, but it leaves the impression that China’s strategy for restarting the Six-Party Talks on the basis of Sino-U.S. cooperation while North Korea is 90 percent reliant on China for foreign trade has drawbacks for Japan. This is less pointed than Sankei Shimbun warnings that a weak United States is falling for China’s maneuvering, which plays into a broader strategy of isolating Japan.
Russia has lost much of its significance for national identity, as Japanese tended to ignore it after negotiations stalled on the territorial issue in 2002. The fact that Putin and Abe had relaunched talks in an upbeat manner again raised the question of what an agreement would mean for Japan’s national identity. Failure when pursuit was taken seriously had intensified identity focused on a gap with the Soviet Union and then Russia. Many now have other identity concerns on their mind, but Abe’s pursuit of Putin persists, leading the conservative side to see an opening for the return of four islands and an identity coup and some internationalists to envision Putin turning somewhat from China to Japan, boosting Japan’s internationalist identity. Russia remains part of the national identity mix in 2014.

By concentrating on one symbol of the identity gap, Japan left the door open to reviewing its approach even in circumstances that seemed doubtful to others. When hopes rose for a breakthrough with Russia on the “Northern Territories,” however one-sided the evidence cited, the fact that Putin’s image was widening Russia’s gap with other states, even prior to his aggression against Ukraine in March 2014, did not seem to matter. Allowing the abduction issue to drive thinking about North Korea potentially had a similar effect. In late spring Abe was continuing to distance Japan from U.S.-led pressure on Putin for his aggressive behavior in Ukraine, after agreeing on some sanctions in awareness that the Russian precedent of changing territorial boundaries by force could be used by China.

**CONCLUSION**

Over a quarter century much has been written about national identity in China and Japan, but it has generally been missing five essentials that social scientists profess to welcome. First, it has been largely descriptive without a framework for analysis of these identities. Second, it has rarely been comparative, facilitating analysis of similarities and differences in various countries, including China and Japan. Third, it has lacked specificity to make possible estimates of the degree of change in identity over time, critical to the analysis of causality. Fourth, it has only been haphazardly linked to studies of international relations, allowing for analysis of how clashing national identities impact ties between countries of special significance for each other. Finally, the absence of all of these elements has made it difficult to formulate theories of national identity and identity gaps in dyadic relations. In my recent writings I have sought to add these five essentials, beginning with a six-dimensional framework and proceeding to examination of various national identity gaps.

Much has been written recently about historical tensions in Northeast Asia, taking a narrow approach to specific disputes, especially centered on Japan. To make progress in bilateral relations it is important to put them in a wider context. This would give one hope that a path forward can be found for ameliorating Japan-South Korea relations. After all, their national identity gap is much smaller than that between Japan and China, and they share universal values and national interests to a far greater degree. Given the U.S. role in handling historical issues affecting this relationship in the 1950s, there is reason to think that limited, but timely, U.S. involvement to try to refocus Japan-South Korean identity concerns as well as to boost trilateralism, could make a difference in 2014. In contrast, prospects for China-Japan relations are much grimmer. When the specific issues that have most troubled relations of late are put in the broader context of national identities, the conclusion is that the gap is
too wide to bridge. Also, there is little room for U.S. involvement, given the huge Sino-U.S. national identity gap. It follows that Japan’s gap with South Korea should be separated from the gap with China in a strategy that allows some role for the United States. Japan’s other identity gaps have only a secondary role.

Gaps with ASEAN, Russia, and North Korea are best seen in triangular or quadrangular context. ASEAN may have been viewed as the gateway to Asianism, a Japanese identity viewed as an alternative to the West, especially joining in a U.S.-centered identity. Yet, it is now the battleground with China, in which Japan is affirming U.S. values. Russia long was seen as the object of joint identity polarization with the United States, and then it was viewed as a target for a breakthrough to a “normal Japan” free of the legacy of defeat if a territorial deal could be reached. While some still cling to that improbable outcome, more recognize that it is now grouped with China as a joint target with the United States. In the case of North Korea, it too has been treated as a shortcut to acceptance in Asia apart from South Korea, but it should be seen as a source of shared identity with South Korea and the United States. Japan’s identity gaps have been artificially enlarged by illusions about recovering some of the identity lost in 1945 and achieving breakthroughs in Asia separate from the United States and South Korea. More clarity about what these gaps really signify and how Japan can manage them is needed. In the process, internationalism must gain relative to the other three schools of identity for Japan to make these changes.

*Kokkashugi* is the throwback to pre-1945, which isolates Japan in all of the identity gaps. Success in TPP negotiations and well-conceived U.S. efforts to boost universal values in joint statements would work against the revival of this statist approach. *Minzokushugi* is a reminder of the spike in Japanese national identity of the 1980s before the collapse of the bubble economy. Joint U.S.-South Korean efforts to reduce the identity gap between the two U.S. allies may keep this way of thinking under control. The more Japan recognizes what it has in common with South Korea, the less likely it is to insist on ethnic national feelings stressing homogeneity and separation from its regional background. In the case of *heiwashugi*, China and North Korea are making this untenable. We should expect no revival of pacifism, even if Abe has sought to misappropriate the label with his “active pacifism,” translated differently in English. *Kokusaishugi* is Japan’s best hope for foreign policy with all of its neighbors and the United States. Even Abe must pay lip service to it despite aspiring to something else. The challenge for U.S. diplomacy is to steer Abe more in this direction, using South Korea and ASEAN in the endeavor. To push back against Abe too strongly would make it easier for him to retreat to the two more conservative approaches, as would giving him a free hand with no resistance. U.S. pursuit of triangular relations relieves it of a one-on-one confrontation, while using outside pressure on Abe. This proved effective for Obama, but only in a preliminary way, in the spring of 2014.

In her chapter, Deepa Ollapally demonstrates the interplay of two national identity gaps for India, also showing how various schools of thought respond to these gaps in deciding on their foreign policy preferences. Similar to Japan, India faces China and the United States as it confronts national security challenges without being able to shake loose from strong disagreements about national identity. Comparisons of the two cases help to explain why the foreign policy outcome under the sway of national identity has diverged sharply.
ENDNOTES


8. Gilbert Rozman, “A National Identity Approach to Japan’s Late 2013 Thinking.”


ASIA’S SLIPPERY SLOPE: TRIANGULAR TENSIONS, IDENTITY GAPS, CONFLICTING REGIONALISM, AND DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE TOWARD NORTH KOREA

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: GILBERT ROZMAN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

■ South Korea’s Triangular Relations
  Japan-South Korea-U.S. Relations  
  Sue Mi Terry

  The Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo Triangle: Terra-centric Nordpolitik vs. Oceanic Realpolitik  
  Sung-Yoon Lee

  China-South Korea-U.S. Relations  
  Gilbert Rozman

  Russia, China, and the Korean Peninsula  
  Valery Denisov and Alexander Lukin

■ National Identity Approaches to East and South Asia
  Japan’s National Identity Gaps: A Framework for Analysis of International Relations in Asia  
  Gilbert Rozman

  National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors  
  Jiyoon Kim

  Bridging the Chinese National Identity Gap: Alternative Identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan  
  Syaru Shirley Lin

  Identity and Strategy in India’s Asia-Pacific Policy  
  Deepa M. Ollapally

■ Divergence on Economic Regionalism
  Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration: U.S. Strategy and Approach  
  Matthew P. Goodman

  Japan and Regional Integration Dominoes: Golden Opportunity or Another Political Failure?  
  Takashi Terada

  Korean Bridge: Balancing Asian Economic Regionalism Between the United States and China  
  Jin Kyo Suh

  China’s Choice: To Lead or to Follow on Asian Economic Integration  
  Zhang Xiaotong

■ New Thinking on Diplomacy Toward North Korea
  South Korea’s Search for a New Diplomatic Strategy Toward North Korea; Trustpolitik as a Goldilocks Approach?  
  Shin-wha Lee

  What to Do about North Korea  
  Mark Fitzpatrick

  Purge of Jang Song-Taek and its Impact on China’s Policy Toward North Korea  
  Zhu Feng and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga