NATIONAL IDENTITY APPROACHES TO EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
INTRODUCTION

The chapters in Section II explore changes in national identity in Asia in the shadow of both the U.S. struggle to reaffirm its leadership of the international community and China’s intense advocacy of a national and regional community in opposition to that community. Against the backdrop of a tug-of-war between these rivals over identity transformation, we observe responses along the borders of the PRC. Commonalities can be found in attitudes of avoidance of falling deeply into the sweep of one or the other power’s national identity, while there are also clear differences in how each of China’s neighbors is bolstering and even intensifying its own national identity. The areas covered—Hong Kong and Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and India—differ in the closeness of their bonds to the United States, the nature and intensity of the appeal by China, and the urgency each feels toward reaffirming a more distinct identity.

Section II incorporates dual coverage of Hong Kong and Taiwan, both of which are now rapidly integrating with the PRC, which is insistent that they share Chinese identity. Pressure is greatest of all on Hong Kong, whose sovereignty was transferred in 1997 to China, to become more Chinese in a manner defined by Beijing. Taiwan serves as a convenient comparison because it has more space to distance itself from Chinese identity since Beijing has not consummated its intention to impose its sovereignty.

Shirley Lin finds that instead of an increase in Chinese identity, as desired by China, local identities have intensified. She focuses on the widening gap between the two as well as the soft and hard approaches China uses to try to narrow them. Noting the deepening economic and social integration that would appear to work in China’s favor, Lin is careful to define the national identities she is covering and to point to survey data. For instance, she notes that a December 2013 poll showed that despite strong PRC efforts in Hong Kong at “patriotic education,” just 12 percent of young people are identifying as primarily Chinese, barely one-third the figure in 1997. In Taiwan the gap in identity is even more glaring, we are informed. Young people are identifying as non-Chinese or not exclusively Chinese, as indicated in a spring 2013 poll which found that nearly 90 percent of respondents under the age of 34 are identifying simply as “Taiwanese,” compared to 76 percent in the other three age groups. Various causes are indicated for the widening identity gaps before attention is shifted to strategies for narrowing these gaps, ranging from propaganda and education to sanctions and legislation. Looking ahead, Lin doubts that any of these strategies will work without a redefined, inclusive Chinese national identity, which is nowhere on the horizon.

The second chapter in Section II centers on South Korea’s recent rethinking of national identity in an environment where China’s shadow remains far enough away to turn attention from Chineseness to sinocentrism, both direct and indirect through North Korea, while the U.S. shadow is also blurred by identity sentiments linked to North Korea. In this context, Koreaness is acquiring new meaning, as separation from the outside world is rapidly declining. Jiyoon Kim anchors her analysis on attitudes seen in polling data toward North Korean detectors. Expecting that the rise of “civic identity” will change how people view unification, which is associated with strong ethnic identity, she first clarifies how these two poles of identity are changing. In 2013, “abiding by the Korean political and legal system” was identified as the most important measuring criterion for being Korean, and, unlike in the recent past, the least important factor was “having the Korean bloodline,” indispensible in ethnic nationalism. As
in Hong Kong and Taiwan, a generic ethnic identification is changing, infused with ideals for civil identity with implications for attitudes toward unification with others long perceived as sharing the same broad ethnic identity. A similarity is that the civic identity associated with North Korea as well as with China stands in sharp contrast to local ideals.

Kim observes that young people are more welcoming of North Korean defectors despite their weaker ethnic identity. A lower degree of ethnic identity helps a person to have a positive and sympathetic sentiment toward North Korean defectors as well as a more accommodating attitude toward immigrants from the United States, China, and Japan. Koreans stopped seeing North Korean defectors from the perspective of ethnic identity, but began to see them through the lens they use to see immigrants from other countries. About 70 percent of South Koreans, Kim shows, do not see North Korea as “one of us.” This has important implications for how reunification might proceed, dimming its prospects, similar to findings that identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan cast doubt on unification.

Elsewhere in Section II we observe the outward shift from proximity to China’s historical and cultural influence, introducing in another chapter a case study of recent Japanese thinking about national identity gaps with countries of the utmost significance. The backlash against China is intense, but instead of Japan drawing deeper into the U.S. orbit, the dominant school in Japanese national identity debate is prioritizing sharper rejection of the U.S.-led international community and also the associated regional community represented by South Korea (despite claims to favor both the U.S. alliance and the community it leads). My chapter on Japan is a second attempt to analyze how in late 2013 four schools of thought were debating current challenges to national identity. Whereas the prior attempt focused on views of national security, a 21st century economic order, and the role of values in diplomacy, this chapter ranges across six objects of national identity gaps, highlighting two of them—China and South Korea—taking account of two others—the United States and ASEAN—and making reference to two other objects of identity gaps—North Korea and Russia.

Although the Japanese case turns our attention away from ethnic identity with an impact on unification prospects, it also points to challenges associated with the shadow of China or even North Korea, while demonstrating the limits of internationalism as an identity, which some may want to juxtapose to civic identity. For Japan, we find evidence mostly in daily newspapers for a wider range of identity options, at one end an extreme version of ethnic identity centered on state pride linked to history, and at the other the postwar tradition of pacifism as distortion of internationalism with scant regard for responsibility in resolving international challenges. Yet, under Abe Shinzo, the main trend is a statist identity, which claims to favor the international community even as it treats bilateral gaps in identity in a manner that further accentuates Japan’s distinctiveness.

In discussing the national identity gap with China, I consider how it has weakened the school advocating pacifism and for a time strengthened the internationalist school, but Abe saw an opportunity to boost ethnic nationalism and, even more, statism, through an image of Japan under siege. Breaking down responses into six dimensions of national identity, I find that China opens the door to re-center Japan’s national identity on a strong state as well as to prioritize a proud nation, as internationalists are being outflanked. In the case of the identity gap with South Korea, success in branding it as mired in “scold diplomacy” and beyond
cooperation due to history education, allowed the conservatives to snub those who prioritized both universal values and internationalist security identity. In the first months of 2014 the national identity gap with the United States had widened, offering further evidence of how internationalism is too weak in current conditions of a country feeling itself under siege to withstand appeals to statism of an exclusive nation. Yet, other schools of thought retain a wide following, and Japan’s identity is in flux. The U.S. image also improved somewhat in the spring of 2014 through summits with Obama.

Section II concludes with India, the most distant of these cases from both the U.S. and Chinese identity shadows, but still, to a not inconsiderable extent, influenced by them. Chapter 8 demonstrates that this proud civilization still makes keeping its distance from the United States a priority. As observers anticipated victory at the polls of the intensely identity-conscious BJP, India appeared poised to join Japan in responding to the increasingly polarized environment by a distinctly autonomous and defiant national identity at odds with the international community, represented by the United States. Deepa Ollapally shows how realist explanations fall short on a range of Indian foreign policy issues related to the United States and China. Instead, a deep-rooted legacy of national identity prevails. She has the most expansive list of this group of authors of foreign policy perspectives linked to national identity, pointing to six groups that she combines into four schools. While she argues that pragmatists, represented by great power realists and liberal globalists, have gained strength over the past two decades, she finds that standard and soft nationalists now hold sway.

In looking closely at responses to the United States and China, Ollapally found that India became consumed with a debate about how the U.S. vision threatened its strategic autonomy, while it was averse to embracing the rebalance strategy. Also, in reacting to the widening trade deficit with China, government officials and industry leaders led the way in minimizing concern. She writes that India essentially spurned what realists would see as a “strategic opportunity” with the U.S. rebalance, and meanwhile, took a much more relaxed view of what realists (and more mercantilist economists) would see as a “threat” from the highly skewed trade deficit with China. She attributes these responses to the concept of autonomy in the global arena, born from a particular combination of colonial trauma and perceived civilizational status. Entrenched assumptions about national identity come with a longstanding view that it is the United States that poses a special danger of undermining that identity, she writes. She predicts that China will continue to fare well, with economic advantage in the forefront as seen by the liberal-globalist school, supported by the standard nationalist government and tacit support from some great power realists and soft nationalists. Without this identity prism, India’s policies would be hard to explain.

The failure of realism to take hold for India has a parallel in the weakness of Japan’s internationalism. In both of these cases covered in Section II, we find a country caught between a closer embrace offered by the United States and a potential threat coming from China. The choice made may appear more realist in Japan, but it too prioritizes autonomy. In these two important partners for forging a network to manage the rise of China in accord with internationalist principles, the affirmation of autonomy may come as a surprise to international relations theorists. National identity analysis is a valuable tool for incorporating discourse on foreign policy into scholarship.
In these four chapters we learn that if ethnic identity poses a major threat to civic identity, then the latter will intensify. In turn, it will have policy implications averse to regimes that count on ethnic identity to ensnarl those seen as compatriots. At the same time, if internationalism looms as the obvious realist choice in the face of new dangers from a great power rival, the alternative of autonomy and a strengthened state and ethnic identity can be more appealing given lingering past identities. The rise of China and prospects for sinocentrism are linked to these distinct responses, as is the success of the U.S. rebalance in forging a network of regional partners.
Japan’s National Identity Gaps: A Framework for Analysis of International Relations in Asia

Gilbert Rozman
On December 26 China’s leadership commemorated the 120th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth by bowing before his statue at the mausoleum in his honor on Tiananmen Square. On December 27 Abe Shinzo became the first prime minister since Koizumi Junichiro to visit the Yasukuni Shrine with few in doubt about the historical revisionist thinking behind his visit. Memories that in the 1980s had appeared to be consigned to the “dustbin of history” had come roaring back at enormous cost to prior trust that China was putting Maoism far behind it and Japan was leaving militarism in the past. These were not isolated incidents of recognition of the deep roots of individual leaders and elites, but powerful signals of reconstructed national identities at odds with what had been widely anticipated during the heyday of Sino-Japanese relations, bound to exacerbate bilateral gaps between identities. Confident of its rising power, China was prepared to be more defiant of world opinion as well as assertive in reclaiming its socialist identity in the face of public apathy or dissent, while Japan’s leadership was already treated as a pariah in China and South Korea but had an electoral mandate for the coming three years; so it was ready to be defiant as well. Below I concentrate on how sources in Japan frame relations with the states critical to its national identity, focusing on writings from late 2013 as identity gaps were intensifying.

The framework applied in this chapter represents the third stage in the analysis of how national identities impact international relations. The first stage involves comparisons of identities, including the introduction of a six-dimensional framework, and examination of their evolution in relation to general attitudes toward foreign relations. The second stage incorporates the concept of national identity gaps, focusing on how bilateral relations are shaped by obsessions about how “significant others” figure into mutual perceptions of national identity. In the third stage, individual countries are evaluated for how their array of national identity gaps influences their debates on identity and pattern of international relations. While I have taken some tentative steps to analyze Chinese views of a mixture of national identity gaps, in this first systematic attempt to advance to the third stage I assess the case of Japan. In doing so, I build on the foundation established in my recent article on how four Japanese schools of thought are debating three current challenges for national identity. Below, I proceed with discussions of the four schools in late 2013 and range across six objects of national identity gaps, highlighting two of them (China and South Korea), taking account two others (the United States and ASEAN), and making reference to two additional objects of identity gaps (North Korea and Russia).

At the end of 2013 multiple national identity gaps drew awareness beyond anything seen earlier. Although individual gaps had increasingly become the center of attention, this was an unprecedented overlap in concern over many gaps that matter for Japan’s national identity. The announcement by China in late November of an Air Defense Information Zone (ADIZ) overlapping with Japan’s zone in the East China Sea and ratcheting up the tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute showcased Japan’s most alarming gap. If many saw this as a realist struggle over territory, Japanese as well as Chinese pointed to an identity divide over history and even ideology. Earlier in November back-to-back visits by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to Seoul and Tokyo put the identity gap with South Korea fully in the spotlight, as President Park Geun-hye used the occasion to lash out again against Japan, defying U.S. efforts to help its allies find a path forward. To many in Japan there was also renewed concern about the identity gap with the United States in response to U.S.
policy statements regarding China, notably those made by Vice President Joe Biden during his stops in Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul in early December. Later in that month Abe hosted the ten ASEAN states in a summit that raised interest in whether an identity overlap with ASEAN could revive Japan’s goal of Asianism, a longstanding aspiration that Abe had reasserted in visits to all ten states over the year. In November a 2 + 2 meeting of foreign and defense ministers brought Russian officials to Tokyo for the first consultations of this kind, intensifying interest in a breakthrough in bilateral relations with special significance due to Russia’s past place in Japanese thinking, which Abe and President Vladimir Putin had promised to pursue. Finally, in December North Korea’s execution of Jang Song-taek reignited alarm that a state threatening Japan was taking an even more extreme course of militarism. All of these developments were followed closely in Japan, fueling debates on national identity, not just the usual realist concerns.

This chapter comprises three parts. First, I review the national identity framework and the role of national identity gaps with special attention to relations in East Asia and Japan’s place in them. Second, I identify Japan’s four schools of thought in the context of foreign policy challenges while also focusing on the six national identity gaps as discussed in late 2013 Japanese sources, concentrating on gaps with China and South Korea, and weighing the mix of attitudes toward internationalism centered on the United States and what is left of Asianism centered on ASEAN. Third, I compare how the four schools are searching for their own view on these identity gaps in order to steer foreign policy and national identity in their direction. At the end, I draw conclusions about applying this framework.

**THE NATIONAL IDENTITY FRAMEWORK AND THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY GAPS**

National identity is a narrative about how one’s country is distinctive and superior. It is transformed not only through top-down initiatives and, in some countries, contestation over domestic policies that legitimate a way of thinking, but also through changes in the way other salient countries are perceived as threatening or reinforcing to one’s national identity. As an example, during the Cold War anti-communism, centering on views of the Soviet Union was a major force in debates over national identity in Japan as well as the United States. Using a six-dimensional framework to specify national identity, I compare countries, trace changes over time, and estimate the scale of national identity gaps with a small number of other countries that loom as “significant others.” For each dimension, I suggest its relevance to the identity gaps in East Asia, especially to Japan’s place in them.

The ideology dimension in the 1990s was thought to be a thing of the past after the Cold War had ended. Japan’s foreign policy in the postwar era was often described as bereft of ideology: mercantilist, pragmatic, and a product of a standoff between conservatives and progressives, whose ideological leanings were cancelled out by the other’s presence. For China lying low in accord with Deng Xiaoping’s dictum and South Korea democratized and quickly shedding its past obsession with anti-communism, economics appeared to be the driver of foreign policy with a pragmatic penchant for narrowing identity differences.
Many expected a liberal outlook on ideology, prizing freedom (of politics, markets, and society) to spread without serious encumbrances. Japan was assumed to be Asia’s leader. This picture of liberalism supportive of regional and global integration was misleading. In Japan as well as in China and elsewhere, the view prevailed that the United States was using globalization for its own ideological ends, which had to be resisted by widening the identity gap with it. When the LDP regained its dominance in 1996 after the weakening of progressive parties, Japan’s conservatives were less encumbered about asserting their ideology. As China gained confidence with double-digit economic growth and the end of most sanctions imposed after June 4, 1989, the ideological priorities of the Communist Party rose to the fore. In 2013 Abe Shinzo and Xi Jinping each carried these ideological drives to transform national identity to new heights. The former has a revisionist agenda that extends well beyond the historical dimension, while the latter champions the “China Dream” as a combination of socialism, Confucianism/sinocentrism, and anti-imperialism. In their rival visions, the other country figures importantly as a target useful for boosting one’s own national identity, widening the gap, and creating a downward spiral in which demonization of the other is convenient for desired intensification of one’s own identity.

Apart from ideology, the temporal dimension is a principal concern in the intensification of national identity in both Japan and China. Many in Japan thought that over time the weight of historical memory would diminish, but it has grown, provoked at times by the top leaders of Japan defiant of outside opinion and aroused by leaders in China and also South Korea playing the “history card.” The temporal dimension has seen widening gaps as post-normalization efforts at reconciliation and post Cold War economic integration are being overshadowed by accusations that Japan has reverted to pre-1945 militarism, that China has succumbed to pre-Deng Xiaoping communism, and that South Korea is incapable of escaping from emotions whipped up a half century ago against Japan. In this thinking, the post-Cold War decades have not brought a new era because identities are rooted in previous periods, stretching back to images of premodern divides in East Asia. The Yasukuni Shrine is a symbol of the temporal dimension for Japan and its neighbors.

The sectoral dimension includes political and economic identity, but gaps in the region are now centered on cultural national identity. The earlier notion that a shared legacy of Confucianism and Chinese culture (including Chinese characters in their writing systems) would be an advantage in going beyond economic regionalism to forge a community proved incorrect. Instead, each side is drawing sharp civilizational lines between states, especially Japan and its neighbors, allowing little room for mutual acceptance. These divides are compounded by China’s dichotomy between Eastern and Western civilization, seeing the latter as contaminating Japan as well as South Korea in addition to other sources of a civilizational gap. Culture wars eclipsed attempts at cultural understanding, such as the visits of Japan and China’s leaders in 2007-08 to Qufu and Nara respectively. This gap will not be easy to narrow since narratives in East Asian countries are prone to showcase a clash of civilizations.

On the vertical dimension, prospects for sister-city relations and other civil society ties have faded in the face of condemnations of each other’s internal social organization. In Japan, China is seen as communist, led by leaders intent on thwarting ethnic identities, media
freedoms, and cross-societal networks once viewed with optimism as mechanisms for a transition away from authoritarianism. In China, Japanese society is no longer the victim of militarism to 1945 but a willing collaborator in it and in its ongoing revival. If a decade ago the “Korea wave” was perceived as a sign that Japanese were recognizing the similarities of their society and Korea, today’s “hate Korea wave” movement signals a perceived gap in vertical identity. Economic ties are not leading to narrow social divides. Blame is readily assigned to states that arouse public opinion due to social susceptibility.

The horizontal dimension refers to attitudes toward both the international and regional communities as well as to the United States. The widening Sino-U.S. split is one factor in this dimension becoming more problematic for Japan’s relations with its neighbors. Yet, Sino-Japanese differences over regionalism have widened in stages from the early 2000s, as have differences over the global order. On this dimension, there is a sharp distinction between the deepening Sino-Japanese gap and the generally narrowing ROK-Japanese gap, since South Korea also supports a U.S.-led global system and fears sinocentrism. Yet, deep suspicions of each other’s thinking about regionalism add to ROK-Japan mistrust.

National identities have intensified, contributing to widening identity gaps. The Chinese leadership has aroused the public and then pointed to its strong feelings as reason for not compromising on symbols of identity. Abe’s electoral victories owe something to newly aroused national identity, although economic frustration and then renewed confidence from Abenomics play a large role. Park has chosen to intensify national identity as well, finding Japan a convenient target. If the overall national identity gap is considered to be the sum of the estimated gap in the above five dimensions and serves as a measure of the intensity of the bilateral gap, then at the beginning of 2014 the intensity of Japan’s gap with China is at a level unseen since normalization of relations, exceeding the peaks reached in 2005 and 2010 over specific issues. Meanwhile, the ROK-Japan gap, which had been narrowing in 2008-11, reversed course, and it is now quite wide, but not on all dimensions. Japan’s gap with North Korea remains very wide, much more than with South Korea. In contrast, Japan’s gaps with the United States, ASEAN, and Russia have all narrowed, even as they remain important for a comprehensive understanding of how gaps are interrelated in the debate over identity. Whether made more precise by public opinion polls, media content analysis, or other means, these gaps are driving tensions.

Comparisons of Responses of Four Schools of Thought to Bilateral Identity Gaps

Reviewing Japanese discussions of international relations, I have identified four schools of thought: kokkashugi (statism), minzokushugi (ethnic nationalism), kokusaishugi (internationalism), and heiwashugi (pacifism). Their views on current foreign policy questions can be found in daily newspapers and monthly journals, and on the shelves of bookstores in Japan. The Abe cabinet has a heavy representation of the first two schools, even when it was steered toward kokusaishugi by advisors such as the first head of the new National Security Council, Yachi Shotaro. Although the influence of heiwashugi receded
after the Cold War, it was somewhat revived by the DPJ in 2009, became linked to anti-nuclear energy sentiments after September 11, 2011, and has found new life as opposition to a still suspect Abe on national identity issues in 2013, as in its resistance to the Secrecy Law passed at the end of the year with aspects seen as shielding the government far more than in the United States from having to share information on security and foreign policy.

In late 2013 Japan faced an unprecedented overlap in foreign policy challenges. In my recent article, I compared the responses of the four schools to the overall national security challenge, to the challenge of TPP in an anticipated 21st century economic order, and to the challenge of incorporating values into diplomacy. Here I concentrate on responses to national identity gaps with China and South Korea as well as with four other countries or regional groupings of significance for identity issues in Japan’s foreign policy. The six dimensions of identity are in play to differing degrees in relations with the six countries.

Laid low by the Fukushima disaster in 2011, Japan was blindsided by the actions of both China and South Korea in 2012, and in 2013, taking an assertive posture, faced a hostile environment with no sign of amelioration. The details of these bilateral relations need no repetition here, given the extensive, ongoing news coverage. What merits close scrutiny is the nature of the national identity gap between Japan and its two important neighbors, showcasing how deteriorating relations have been interpreted and what must be done in order to improve the situation. Attention has lingered on the role of island disputes, the Yasukuni Shrine, and the comfort women issue as symbols of troubled relations, but this chapter puts them in a broader context by considering various dimensions of identity.

The National Identity Gap with China

Chinese relations with Japan have deteriorated sharply, but explanations for this negative transformation with far-reaching implications for the reordering of East Asia are usually too narrow and event-driven to capture the driving forces behind it. In 2005 as relations between these two countries hit a new low since 1972, explanations centered on visits by the Japanese prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine. Five years later relations suffered a bigger blow explained by tensions over a Chinese ship ramming a Japanese coast guard vessel. Then in 2012 the deepest slump in relations yet was attributed to China’s reaction to the nationalization of property on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. The assumption each time was that if a particular incident had not occurred, relations would not have suffered a blow. Viewing this bilateral relationship through the lens of national identities, especially as an example of a sharp national identity gap, opens the way to systematic analysis. The Sino-Japanese relationship, this approach concludes, was imperiled by forces internal to each country, long gathering strength, and also manifest in relations with other countries.

Japan has had an abnormal national identity since 1945. The political divide between its conservatives unwilling to challenge a determined band of historical revisionists and its progressives enamored of pacifism and emboldened by the Constitution imposed during the U.S. Occupation is a reflection of an identity chasm yet to be resolved. In turn, China has had an abnormal national identity since 1978, under the sway of communists, who kept waiting for a chance to reassert an identity that has been downplayed, while being supportive of globalization in some dimensions. As China and Japan’s identities have been clarified in ways that many in each country see as bringing normalcy to their quest at home, the gap
between them has widened. Xi and Abe avail themselves of this gap to serve their particular group’s identity aspirations, as the four schools of Japanese thought respond for their own identity objectives to what is transpiring in these bilateral relations.

Japanese fervently hoped to construct relations with China from the time of normalization in 1972 on the basis of pragmatism, mutual economic advantage, a shared sense of what is threatening each other’s security, and eventually a forward-looking approach to forging an East Asian regional community. Yet, for many Japanese who wield political influence, eagerness to remove national identity from relations with China was accompanied by no less enthusiasm to restore national identity from its troubled state in the postwar era. The pretense that national identity was not at stake was belied by their obsession. Similarly, in China, Deng Xiaoping’s approach to international relations and economic development was trumpeted as the triumph of pragmatism, even including the way bilateral relations with Japan were advancing. However, for the Chinese Communist Party reasserting pride in its history along with forging a national identity to replace the wreckage of Maoism, left pragmatism toward Japan in a perilous state. Neither Japan’s conservative schools nor Chinese communists prioritized bilateral ties enough to jeopardize identity goals.

The kokkashugi school views China as a dangerous threat, but also as an opportunity to transform Japan’s national identity in a manner long desired. To make this case, it argues that: 1) what holds Japan back is its erroneous thinking under the continued spell of the heiwashugi group of traitors that have spread lies such as about the comfort women; 2) the United States is unreliable in defending Japan and has a national identity at odds with Japan that leaves in doubt acceptance of its “universal values”; 3) China is a “paper tiger” that does not pose a big threat and faces its own empire-threatening collapse; and 4) if Japan stands up, breaking free of the postwar regime’s stranglehold, it can, at last, defend its national interests, regain pride in its identity, and compete with China. In this outlook, postwar Japanese identity is treated as heiwashugi and equated with hating the state, and real independence is seen as breaking free of both pro-U.S. and pro-Chinese attitudes, in this way reviving the Japanese spirit (seishin) focused on the state, not the individual.

Reactions to China in Japan have signaled major changes in how Japan views national identity as a force in international relations, shifting from anti-communism in the 1960s, to idealism about an historic bond that transcends Cold War polarization in the 1970s, to Asianism under Japan’s leadership in the 1980s, to parallel pursuit of globalization under U.S. leadership and regionalism as China’s equal partner with Japan serving as the bridge in the 1990s, to management of a more assertive China in tandem with a stronger U.S. alliance in the 2000s, to reemergence as a “normal” country in opposition to hegemonism by China in the 2010s. All dimensions of national identity are at play. China opens the door for the kokkashugi school to re-center Japan’s national identity on a strong state or for the minshushugi school to at least prioritize a proud nation. Internationalists see it as a challenge that helps overcome not only pacifism but also the self-isolating right-wing identity obsessions since China’s growing threat shows the urgency of realist policies. At the same time, the diminishing circle of progressives sought to keep alive a pathway to an East Asian community, but their heiwashugi was at the mercy of Xi Jinping’s exclusive “China Dream” that became linked to gap widening with Japan and Abe’s instrumental use of the wider gap to press Japanese to abandon this outlook. In responding more intemperately to China than the United States
desired and visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, Abe made it clear that he would not give priority to kokusaishugi, but its boosters had nowhere else to turn but to Abe in the face of China’s protracted aggressive behavior.

The response in Japan to Abe’s Yasukuni visit saw the kokusaishugi forces in the lead, complaining that countless U.S. warnings had been dismissed and that Japan would be blamed for new troubles in the region. The heiwashugi camp was energized to condemn the implications for reverting to a vertical identity at odds with democratic, postwar Japan and putting the nail in the coffin of East Asian regionalism, inclusive of South Korea. The kokkashugi school was elated with this boost to its ideal national identity. That left the minzokushugi advocates in a quandary, approving of Abe’s restoration of pride in the nation but torn over how rash action threatening to disrupt a fragile environment in domestic and international opinion could make such pride too dependent on a narrow ideological goal. The newspapers were split, but the public still largely supported Abe.

The National Identity Gap with South Korea

South Korean relations with Japan have fluctuated more sharply, suffering a blow when Lee Myung-bak became obsessive about the “comfort women” issue from the end of 2011 and, especially, when he defied Japanese opinion by visiting Dokdo (Takeshima) Island in August 2012. After Park Geun-hye became president in February 2013 shortly after Abe Shinzo regained the prime minister’s post in Japan, relations remained at their nadir. Again, the assumption was that if leaders had exercised more caution, relations not only would have stayed calm, but actually were on an upward trajectory. In this case, I argue that the assumption was correct; however, I point to a less sharp national identity gap as continuing to threaten relations, while considering how national identities have been changing in order to assess what must be done to overcome the current divide.

Whereas in the heiwashugi camp one finds the view that Japan can find common ground with South Korea since the national identity gap is not so wide, the kokkashugi forces see South Korea as close to China’s historical viewpoint and a gap so wide that there is little point in trying to narrow it. As reflected in articles in Yomiuri Shimbun, the sense of utter hopelessness in 2013 extends to the minzokushugi camp. Losing the public relations fight in the United States to South Korea in the spring after Abe spoke provocatively, as in raising doubts that there is a common standard of “aggression,” Japan could fight more aggressively to make its case (as conservative camps argued), could avoid being entangled in such issues (as the kokusaikashugi camp preferred), or could renew what conservatives call “apology diplomacy” in line with the national identity legacy they want to eradicate.

In their obsession with the temporal dimension, the kokkashugi school insists that Japan saved Korea from its debilitating cultural legacy for modernization and fought against the Kim Il-sung forces for the benefit of the Korean people. Widening the gap over history, they write that South Koreans have a self-destructive view of their own history rooted in the humiliation of having lost their independence, and once they grew less dependent on Japan for economic cooperation in the 1990s, this identity was unreservedly vented.

The kokusaishugi camp envisions a way out with South Korea that reaffirms realism, but does not reopen Japan’s postwar diplomacy, which is well regarded. Appreciating what Kono,
Murayama, and Obuchi said in the 1990s in recognition of the immorality of past conduct, they draw the line at negating the postwar era and renegotiating normalization on the basis of legalistic rulings, such as those handed down by Korean courts. Fearful of devastating consequences for Japanese national identity and vulnerability to aggressive Chinese moves to reopen postwar agreements, internationalists think that there is another way forward with South Korea. They think that progress was being made, including in narrowing the bilateral identity gap, even on the “comfort women” issue. In 2012 the Noda cabinet was making sincere efforts, yet vague on the nature of the money being used, to get beyond the Korean court ruling through new forms of payment to these women from the government budget. Although they concur in blaming Lee Myung-bak and then Park Geun-hye for taking a self-righteous tone and moving beyond the bounds of seeking a compromise solution, they do not succumb to the hopelessness on the right as they await new prospects, perhaps with a U.S. role, for focusing on shared identity.

Searching for optimism in relations with South Korea, Asahi Shimbun pointed to the renewal after two years in November 2013 of “Diet member diplomacy,” which could be an opening wedge for joint efforts to make the 50th anniversary of normalization in 2015 a time of recommitment to improved relations.12 Seeking a U.S. role calming emotions, the newspaper claimed to detect signs in Japan in support of a new tone toward the South. By the spring of 2014, Barack Obama had arranged a trilateral summit and had visited both Tokyo and Seoul, breathing fresh life to security cooperation even if the impact on the Japan-ROK national identity gap remained very limited.

Writing off South Korea for its self-righteous “hate,” widening to an extreme the identity gap, Abe and his supporters were free to ignore its concerns and U.S. ones as well, in steps to intensify Japan’s national identity. When Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, he put an end to talk that some sort of deal, such as what Noda had been attempting in 2012, would be pursued to assuage Park’s hostility toward Japan. Yomiuri Shimbun articulated this sense of hopelessness, discussing “hate Japan” thinking, bringing up the example of a South Korean who called the atomic bombs dropped in 1945 “divine retribution” on Japan, writing pointedly about Park’s invitation to China to construct a statue to the “martyr” who in 1909 assassinated Ito Hirobumi, an icon of Japan’s history, and defying international etiquette by repeatedly attacking Japan in meetings with world leaders.13

Whereas by the late 1990s China had become the primary foreign test of differences in Japanese thinking about international relations, South Korea is the more important test today. It is also a test of Japanese-U.S. relations, seen in pressure on Abe not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine but to prioritize improving relations with South Korea, followed by the defiant Abe visit at year’s end. The two conservative schools rally behind Abe’s move, but the internationalists are disappointed since the goal of changing national identity has been allowed to trump realism. The heiwashugi camp objects to this move as an effort to decisively shift the balance of Japan’s national identity, further marginalizing their views. Treating Park and South Korea as mired in “scold diplomacy” and beyond cooperation due to history education, the conservatives snubbed those who prioritized both universal values and internationalist security identity.14 As seen in the spillover of the Japan-South Korea dispute to Virginia, where Korean Americans made headway in eliciting promises to require textbooks to add “East Sea” next to “Sea of Japan,” the clash was spreading.15 Skillful U.S.
intervention finally managed to keep thing in check as Washington sought to change the subject from national identity to security threats facing both of its allies.

The National Identity Gaps with the United States and ASEAN

Kokubun Ryosei puts in perspective anticipation of the fortieth anniversary of Japan-ASEAN dialogue relations, which was celebrated with a summit in December 2013. It was the arena, from the time the United States was pulling away from Vietnam and Japan was establishing its production networks backed by substantial ODA, where leaders saw an opportunity to turn the weight of a great economic power into the status of a great cultural power and into a transition to a great political power. Southeast Asia also served as an arena for shaping relations with China: in 1972-92 as a model for how Japan could be a partner in a vertical order; in 1992 through the 2000s as a driver toward regionalism; and recently as the venue for intense competition. In 2013 Japan had raised its sights. Kokubun contrasts the new approach to the region with earlier ones as equal cooperation and expansion to non-economic cooperation. It is also characterized by Japan’s stress on ASEAN as a unit rather than bilateral relations and by its embrace of ASEAN centrality for a broad range of pursuits, something that contrasts with U.S. and Chinese approaches. Unlike in the past, Japan is prioritizing security, stressing values, and building on ties to ASEAN in reaching further to Australia and India. Yet, left unclear is whether it will avoid a backlash in ASEAN, which hesitates to be dragged into a policy that might be construed as containment of China, and how in its advocacy of collective security and universal values as well as in TPP Japan could avoid being seen as a middle power in the service of regionalism under the sway of U.S.-led globalization. Hopes that ASEAN will be of considerable value for bolstering Japan’s national identity may, thus, be inflated.

Boosters of TPP see it as opening the gates to internationalism centering on ties to the United States and ASEAN. After “two lost decades” leading to a negative image of Japan abroad and often at home too, TPP provides a chance to build on the restoration of self-confidence and improvement in Japan’s image in the international community in 2013. It would become a major part of the global flow of money, goods, and people—no longer a periphery as many perceived; a world rule-maker, rather than the marginal state left as the G-8 lost clout when it was eclipsed by the G-20; and a major player in the 21st century economic order at a time China, left out of TPP, loses some of its centrality to that order. Establishing the TPP would also narrow the longstanding divide between Japan and the United States in economic national identity, which peaked during the trade disputes of the 1980s and early 1990s and is still felt after KORUS FTA solidified U.S.-ROK ties while Japan has remained an outlier in establishing FTAs. Much discussion of TPP in Japan is about its non-economic consequences. TPP negotiations and the early initiative behind it put the spotlight on Southeast Asia, raising some hopes that the new grouping would showcase an identity overlap with the region, joining in forging a high-level pact that achieves an unprecedented degree of integration and agreement on rules for a new era, which China’s FTAs with Southeast Asian states cannot match.

New security realities have paved the way for greater internationalism, focused on the United States but extending to Australia, India, and other states recognized as targets of defensive realignment. The fact of piggybacking on U.S. initiatives may be overlooked as Japanese seek to put their own identity spin on such outreach. This particularly applies to
wooing ASEAN, which is linked to efforts at least since the Fukuda Doctrine of the 1970s and even suggestive of some sort of shared values, if no longer Asian values that many in the 1980s-90s saw as a special identity bond distinct from universal values.

The opposition to TPP is more about rejection of narrowing the identity gap with the United States than about making a statement about ASEAN. For schools of thought on both the right and the left, the United States is an identity threat. For the kokkashugi advocates, it was the force that broke the spirit of the Japanese state, and a new opening that specifically targets state restrictions on market forces compounds the problem. For the heiwashugi camp, the security alliance with the United States denied Japan a unique role in bridging geopolitical differences, and saddling up closer with economics adding to the impact of alliance strengthening is not the solution. ASEAN lacks such significance.

Southeast Asia still has allure as the most promising arena for an independent Japanese foreign policy. U.S. rebalancing is welcome, but it is viewed with skepticism for both its staying power and its prospect of realizing a broader strategy than geopolitical goals. In a way, Japan is also rebalancing, refocusing on ASEAN after a decade when it had ceded the initiative to China. Given recent wariness about overdependency on China’s economy amid uncertain relations and China’s rise on the economic ladder, increased FDI in the Southeast Asian “developed developing countries” is already occurring. Not willing to concede that Japan had “lost” Southeast Asia, Abe threw himself into moves to regain a large role in the region. Various schools of thought saw this differently, asking how closely was this aligned with U.S. strategy? What was the intended balance between regionalism and globalism? And to what extent was this a response to China? The idea that ASEAN is cohesive and strong enough to forge in 2015 the integrated community that it has proposed or that Japan would benefit as its principal advocate begged the question of how Japan in the midst of multiple great powers could gain a leading role.

**The National Identity Gaps with North Korea and Russia**

When Jang Song-taek drew intensive coverage, the old Japanese obsession with the abductions issue was rarely mentioned. One source did indicate that he was the point man for Japanese efforts to resume talks on possible additional abductees, but its main concern was that after North Korea chose a parallel strategy of guns and butter in March 2013, the new developments meant that the military had won and guns would take precedence. If most sources showed little sympathy for China’s failed diplomacy with the North, *Asahi Shimbun* credited China with a strategy for working closely with Zhang to boost efforts at establishing special economic zones and introducing the market mechanism, following with resumption of the Six-Party Talks and relaxation of economic sanctions, and thus helping to stabilize the country and reduce its sense of isolation. It concluded that this failure was bad for China, while hinting that it was bad for Japan too, which could have benefited from Chinese-led diplomacy. *Yomiuri Shimbun* makes a similar point about the danger of this victory of hardline military leaders, but it leaves the impression that China’s strategy for restarting the Six-Party Talks on the basis of Sino-U.S. cooperation while North Korea is 90 percent reliant on China for foreign trade has drawbacks for Japan. This is less pointed than *Sankei Shimbun* warnings that a weak United States is falling for China’s maneuvering, which plays into a broader strategy of isolating Japan.
Russia has lost much of its significance for national identity, as Japanese tended to ignore it after negotiations stalled on the territorial issue in 2002. The fact that Putin and Abe had relaunched talks in an upbeat manner again raised the question of what an agreement would mean for Japan’s national identity. Failure when pursuit was taken seriously had intensified identity focused on a gap with the Soviet Union and then Russia. Many now have other identity concerns on their mind, but Abe’s pursuit of Putin persists, leading the conservative side to see an opening for the return of four islands and an identity coup and some internationalists to envision Putin turning somewhat from China to Japan, boosting Japan’s internationalist identity. Russia remains part of the national identity mix in 2014.

By concentrating on one symbol of the identity gap, Japan left the door open to reviewing its approach even in circumstances that seemed doubtful to others. When hopes rose for a breakthrough with Russia on the “Northern Territories,” however one-sided the evidence cited, the fact that Putin’s image was widening Russia’s gap with other states, even prior to his aggression against Ukraine in March 2014, did not seem to matter. Allowing the abduction issue to drive thinking about North Korea potentially had a similar effect. In late spring Abe was continuing to distance Japan from U.S.-led pressure on Putin for his aggressive behavior in Ukraine, after agreeing on some sanctions in awareness that the Russian precedent of changing territorial boundaries by force could be used by China.

CONCLUSION

Over a quarter century much has been written about national identity in China and Japan, but it has generally been missing five essentials that social scientists profess to welcome. First, it has been largely descriptive without a framework for analysis of these identities. Second, it has rarely been comparative, facilitating analysis of similarities and differences in various countries, including China and Japan. Third, it has lacked specificity to make possible estimates of the degree of change in identity over time, critical to the analysis of causality. Fourth, it has only been haphazardly linked to studies of international relations, allowing for analysis of how clashing national identities impact ties between countries of special significance for each other. Finally, the absence of all of these elements has made it difficult to formulate theories of national identity and identity gaps in dyadic relations. In my recent writings I have sought to add these five essentials, beginning with a six-dimensional framework and proceeding to examination of various national identity gaps.

Much has been written recently about historical tensions in Northeast Asia, taking a narrow approach to specific disputes, especially centered on Japan. To make progress in bilateral relations it is important to put them in a wider context. This would give one hope that a path forward can be found for ameliorating Japan-South Korea relations. After all, their national identity gap is much smaller than that between Japan and China, and they share universal values and national interests to a far greater degree. Given the U.S. role in handling historical issues affecting this relationship in the 1950s, there is reason to think that limited, but timely, U.S. involvement to try to refocus Japan-South Korean identity concerns as well as to boost trilateralism, could make a difference in 2014. In contrast, prospects for China-Japan relations are much grimmer. When the specific issues that have most troubled relations of late are put in the broader context of national identities, the conclusion is that the gap is
too wide to bridge. Also, there is little room for U.S. involvement, given the huge Sino-U.S. national identity gap. It follows that Japan’s gap with South Korea should be separated from the gap with China in a strategy that allows some role for the United States. Japan’s other identity gaps have only a secondary role.

Gaps with ASEAN, Russia, and North Korea are best seen in triangular or quadrangular context. ASEAN may have been viewed as the gateway to Asianism, a Japanese identity viewed as an alternative to the West, especially joining in a U.S.-centered identity. Yet, it is now the battleground with China, in which Japan is affirming U.S. values. Russia long was seen as the object of joint identity polarization with the United States, and then it was viewed as a target for a breakthrough to a “normal Japan” free of the legacy of defeat if a territorial deal could be reached. While some still cling to that improbable outcome, more recognize that it is now grouped with China as a joint target with the United States. In the case of North Korea, it too has been treated as a shortcut to acceptance in Asia apart from South Korea, but it should be seen as a source of shared identity with South Korea and the United States. Japan’s identity gaps have been artificially enlarged by illusions about recovering some of the identity lost in 1945 and achieving breakthroughs in Asia separate from the United States and South Korea. More clarity about what these gaps really signify and how Japan can manage them is needed. In the process, internationalism must gain relative to the other three schools of identity for Japan to make these changes.

*Kokkashugi* is the throwback to pre-1945, which isolates Japan in all of the identity gaps. Success in TPP negotiations and well-conceived U.S. efforts to boost universal values in joint statements would work against the revival of this statist approach. *Minzokushugi* is a reminder of the spike in Japanese national identity of the 1980s before the collapse of the bubble economy. Joint U.S.-South Korean efforts to reduce the identity gap between the two U.S. allies may keep this way of thinking under control. The more Japan recognizes what it has in common with South Korea, the less likely it is to insist on ethnic national feelings stressing homogeneity and separation from its regional background. In the case of *heiwashugi*, China and North Korea are making this untenable. We should expect no revival of pacifism, even if Abe has sought to misappropriate the label with his “active pacifism,” translated differently in English. *Kokusaiashugi* is Japan’s best hope for foreign policy with all of its neighbors and the United States. Even Abe must pay lip service to it despite aspiring to something else. The challenge for U.S. diplomacy is to steer Abe more in this direction, using South Korea and ASEAN in the endeavor. To push back against Abe too strongly would make it easier for him to retreat to the two more conservative approaches, as would giving him a free hand with no resistance. U.S. pursuit of triangular relations relieves it of a one-on-one confrontation, while using outside pressure on Abe. This proved effective for Obama, but only in a preliminary way, in the spring of 2014,

In her chapter, Deepa Ollapally demonstrates the interplay of two national identity gaps for India, also showing how various schools of thought respond to these gaps in deciding on their foreign policy preferences. Similar to Japan, India faces China and the United States as it confronts national security challenges without being able to shake loose from strong disagreements about national identity. Comparisons of the two cases help to explain why the foreign policy outcome under the sway of national identity has diverged sharply.
ENDNOTES


8. Gilbert Rozman, “A National Identity Approach to Japan’s Late 2013 Thinking.”


National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors

Jiyoon Kim
South Korea has traditionally valued ethnic homogeneity. While that mentality remains, the emergence of a demographic shift is challenging the way South Koreans view national identity, or “Koreaness.” The immigration influx in South Korea is reported to have surpassed 3.1 percent of the total population in 2013 and has been increasing for the past ten years.\(^1\)

As a new demographic composition emerges, we can cautiously predict that this phenomenon will have an influence on public understanding of Koreaness. For example, this new attitude toward national identity can be expected to influence perspectives on immigrants living in South Korea, fostering tolerance toward the presence of other ethnic groups and their acceptance as Koreans. Of course, the increased number of foreign workers and immigrants may induce more antagonistic feelings against them. A transformation in national identity appears unavoidable. On the one hand, the Korean people may cultivate a more ethnically oriented national identity in resistance to “outsiders.” On the other, “civic” national identity may overshadow the ethnic element. The change in national identity is anticipated to be followed by other important consequences, one of which is how people view unification with North Korea, which is closely associated with strong ethnic identity. Will the strengthened multiethnic character of society increase civic identity? Will the shift in national identity make people less supportive of unification? These are the guiding questions in this chapter.

This chapter investigates attitudes of South Koreans toward North Korean defectors in light of the recent changes of national identity taking place within South Korea. North Korean defectors are of interest because they can provide a proxy view of South Koreans toward North Korea. In particular, as they are the people who have fled from a country with which South Koreans share a history and ethnic bond, and ultimately with whom they expect to unify, how they are seen and treated attests to a broader set of views related to reunification.

North Korean defectors become South Korean citizens as soon as they register themselves at the resident center. From that point on, they receive the same status, responsibilities, and privileges as any ordinary South Korean. However, living in a completely different system is never an easy task, which makes them similar to other immigrants. Conflicts between North Korean defectors and South Koreans occur persistently and are likely to become an important social issue in the foreseeable future, much more so if unification should take place.

By focusing on changing views on national identity, I delve into the factors that influence the South Korean public’s attitude toward North Korean defectors. I first examine national identity shared by South Koreans in an increasingly multiethnic society. Then I analyze how North Korean defectors are perceived by South Koreans, in the context of their national identity. These analyses are deepened through the use of survey data. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the implications of the results for a unified Korea.

**The Korean National Identity**

The subject of South Koreans’ sense of national identity with regard to North Korean defectors is essentially a question of whether South Koreans see them as “us” or “them.” National identity is a loosely defined term, but according to Wiggins, et.al, it is a person’s belief or emotion toward a country or a nation to which she or he belongs.\(^2\) Numerous studies have been conducted based on Anthony Smith’s division of national identity into two components:
“civic identity” and “ethnic identity.”3 On the one hand, all citizens enjoy the same rights and responsibilities under the law, and civic culture is defined by education and socialization. On the other hand, the same ancestry, pre-historic myths, and memories play an indispensable role in forming the ethnic component of national identity. The civic and ethnic components are not mutually exclusive but often exist together. The overshadowing of one component can occur, but the two components are likely to coexist in many cases. Jones and Smith’s analysis of surveys demonstrates that nationalism in many countries is comprised of both.

South Korean identity can also be viewed in terms of these two components. The myth of Dangun epitomizes the ethnic identity shared by the Korean people, both North and South. The public is likely to believe that Koreans are descendants of Dangun and have belonged to a single race since the pre-historic period. As Shin notes, the strongest rationale for unification of the two Koreas comes from this ethnic identity, which has been a part of continuous efforts to unify and restore unity on the Korean Peninsula.4

In contrast, constructivists argue that the Korean nation is a new concept created by nationalists in the late nineteenth century. For instance, Andre Schmid asserts that Korean ethnic nationalism stems from the efforts to separate Korea from China and to fit Korea into the modern international system.5 For these scholars, although Korea has maintained exceptional territorial integrity for a long period, the country has not met the conditions for primordial ethnic nationalism. For instance, civilizational identity stemming from Chinese Confucianism overpowered society, and Korean elites conformed to Chinese civilization rather than forming a cultural and ethnic nation limited to residents of the Chosun dynasty.

If so, why is there such a strong emphasis on ethnic unity and a shared bloodline in Korea? Behind this phenomenon lies Japanese racial discrimination in the 1900s. Shin asserts that Korean nationalism became ethnic in the late 1920s to resist the brutal Japanese colonial rule. Even after Korean independence, however, ethnic nationalism did not fade. On the contrary, it became stronger. The division of Korea propelled competition between the South and the North for the prize of one legitimate ethnic Korea. Shin also accurately notes that “race, ethnicity, and nation were conflated” in Korean nationalism, evidenced in the frequent usage of the term minjok, sometimes implying “ethnicity,” and, at other times, implying “nation.”6 Unification became a raison d’être for both Koreas, and ethnic nationalism has been the driving force, which explains the South’s continued economic assistance to the North since the late 1990s, despite it still being at war against the North.7

Recently, there has been growing concern that Korean ethnic nationalism will be transformed into South Korean nationalism. Kang Won-Taek and Lee Nae-Young’s edited volume, Understanding Korean Identity: Through the Lens of Opinion Surveys, first took a serious look at such a transformation. Kang admits that Korean nationalism has been maintained by an ethnic myth for a long period; however, he predicts that ethnic-oriented Korean nationalism will soon be challenged because of changing demography and changing national identity as a consequence. He expresses concern that Korean nationalism will soon be replaced by “South Korean nationalism,” which may displace the rationale for unification with North Korea.8

Kang and Lee use the East Asia Institute’s surveys in 2005 and 2010 to examine national identity among South Koreans. Following Anthony Smith’s criteria, they use seven questions
to determine one’s degree of civic and ethnic identity. I used results from the 2013 Asan Daily Poll in which the same questions used by Kang and Lee were asked to the South Korean public. Of the seven criteria, three measure the strength of a respondent’s ethnic identity regarding North Korean defectors. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements. A Korean is someone who: (1) is born in Korea, (2) has the Korean bloodline, and (3) lives in Korea for most of one’s life. The remaining four measure the strength of one’s civic identity. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements. A Korean is someone who: (4) possesses Korean nationality, (5) is able to speak and write the Korean language, (6) abides by the Korean political and legal system, and (7) understands the Korean traditions.

Table 1 presents Asan’s 2013 results compared with Kang and Lee’s 2005 and 2010 studies. In 2013, “abiding by the Korean political and legal system” was identified as the most important measuring stick for being Korean. Surprisingly, the least important factor was “having the Korean bloodline,” which has been widely considered to be the indispensible component of ethnic nationalism (See Table 1).

Notable declines were detected in the number of those who agreed that “a person should be born in Korea” and “have the Korean bloodline” to be considered Korean. In 2005 and 2010, 81.9 percent and 87.7 percent of respondents, respectively, agreed that being born in Korea was important. However, 2013 saw a huge decline with only 69.0 percent agreeing with the statement. In contrast, the number of those who think that birth in Korea is not important more than doubled to 27.9 percent. A similar tendency can be seen with regard to the statement that Koreans should have a Korean bloodline. The numbers were nearly 80 percent in both 2005 and 2010 while dropping to 65.8 percent in 2013. As many as 30.4 percent of respondents thought that sharing the same bloodline is not important for one to be considered a Korean. The percentage of respondents who consider “living in Korea for most of one’s life” important was also relatively low (66.1 percent).

Questions that measure civic identity showed similar, if not greater, importance than before. Approximately 88 percent of respondents answered that keeping Korean nationality was important, which is only a 1 percent drop from the 2010 result. The ability to use the Korean language remained important as well, with 91.7 percent of respondents in agreement. Two elements of civic identity became more important as a measurement of Koreanness. In 2005, 77.5 percent agreed that respecting the Korean political and legal system was essential. In 2013, that number rose to 93.4 percent, the highest percentage among all the survey questions. Conversely, those who think that this is not important for measuring Koreanness dropped to 4.2 percent, compared to 20.6% percent in 2005. The survey also shows that the public views understanding Korean traditions as a significant measurement for being Korean. While 80.9 percent of respondents considered it to be so in 2005, the number rose to 91.5 percent in 2013.
The changes observed in the 2013 study are dramatic and, more importantly, it appears that they have been, by and large, driven by the young generation. As Table 2 indicates, ethnic identity is less important to the Korean youth than it is to the old generation. The phenomenon is particularly visible in questions that ask whether Koreans need to be born in Korea and have the Korean bloodline. Only 56.5 percent of those in their twenties thought that one should be born in Korea to be considered a Korean. Also, 56.9 percent of them thought that having the Korean bloodline is important for a Korean. The numbers differ for older Koreans. 88.1 percent of whom in their sixties and over thought that a Korean should be born in Korea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Not important</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Asan Daily Poll (Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 2013)
From Table 2, it is apparent that South Koreans’ national identity is undergoing a significant change. Once heavily centered on ethnic identity, it is now moving toward civic identity. This finding appears closely related to the responses to survey questions on unification. From numerous surveys, it is frequently reported that fewer South Koreans want immediate unification with North Korea. The number of young people who do not seek unification at all is increasing as well. For instance, the recent survey of the Asan Institute’s Daily Poll suggests that only 17 percent of the Korean public agree that unification should be done as soon as possible. It is only 10 percent of those who are in their twenties who think that unification needs to be done as soon as possible. On the contrary, 21.9 percent of them want the two Koreas to stay the same as separated without unification.11

In addition, the perspective on North Korea does not give sufficient reason for unification founded in ethnic nationalism. According to the numbers in Table 3, only 21.8 percent of South Koreans see North Korea as “one of us.” A plurality of South Koreans considers North Korea as a neighbor (32 percent), and 22.4 percent of them indeed consider North Korea as an enemy. The young generation tends to feel distanced from North Korea more than the elderly do. Only 14.1 percent of respondents in their twenties answer North Korea is “one of us.” On the other hand, a plurality of the young generation sees North Korea as an enemy.
Ethnic identity, which has played a role of uniting North Korea and South Korea as one Korea, is apparently weakening and fewer people perceive North Korea as “one of us.” The distance between North Korea and South Korea is extended, and it is much more serious among youth. The next question is, does it influence those who are originally from North Korea and living in South Korea as a citizen of the latter?

### Table 3. Views on North Korea by the South Korean Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>One of us</th>
<th>Neighbor</th>
<th>Stranger</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
<th>Nointerest</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20s</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>30s</td>
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<td>42.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40s</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50s</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60s or over</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asan Daily Poll (Mar. 29-Mar. 31, 2014)

**GOING ETHNIC OR CIVIC?**

The common misperception regarding North Koreans defectors is that their defections are driven solely by political reasons. However, according to Jang Joon-oh and his colleague Go Sung-Ho’s survey in 2010, about 54 percent of North Korean defectors came to the South at the risk of their own lives for economic reasons.12 Political defection accounted for only 19.2 percent (see Table 4). From this result, the defectors are not particularly different from other immigrant groups.

### Table 4. Motivations of North Korean Defectors to Escape

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family problem (domestic violence)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political reason</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followed one's family</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jang, Joon-oh and Sung-Ho Go. Survey result used in North Korean Defectors: Crime & Countermeasures, 2010
Many believe that South Korea welcomes North Korean defectors with open arms, taking satisfaction that the oppressive North Korean regime is the reason for the escape, and feeling, above all, that the defectors share the same Koreanness ethnically, which is the reason for tendering citizenship as soon as they arrive in South Korea. Nonetheless, that underlying principle that “we” share the same ethnic origin and unconditionally accept the newcomers appears to be under transformation. According to the East Asia Institute’s survey on Koreans’ identity in 2005 and 2010, South Koreans were demonstrating a changed attitude toward the acceptance of North Korean defectors into their society. As displayed in Table 5, there is rather a significant change in people’s opinion on this. In 2005, a plurality of South Koreans (46.2 percent) answered that South Korea should admit all North Korean defectors, since they are Koreans after all. In 2010, the percentage of people who think that way decreased to 38.1 percent. Instead, almost a majority of South Koreans thought that defectors should be selectively admitted to Korea, conditioned on the economic and diplomatic situation (49.9 percent), an increase of 11.1 percent compared with the result in 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. Acceptance of North Korean Defectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should not admit them for political/economic burden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional on economic/diplomatic situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should admit all of them b/c they are Koreans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EAI Survey, Sohn & Lee (2012)

The volume of previous studies on South Koreans’ attitude toward North Korean defectors is meager, and scholarship has primarily focused on the policy arena. However, more studies have shown concern with South Koreans views of North Korean defectors as the number of defectors has increased dramatically. According to the Ministry of Unification statistics, the number of defectors continued to increase until 2011, when 2,706 residents of North Korea arrived in South Korea. The number decreased to 1,516 in 2013. Altogether, 26,124 defectors had settled down in South Korea by the end of that year.

What is driving the change in opinion by South Koreans regarding North Korean defectors? The preliminary studies that examine individual attitudes toward North Korean defectors in South Korea can be classified into three dimensions.13 Earlier studies conducted by Kim, Jeong, and Yang focus on psychological aspects of South Koreans, which influence their attitude toward North Korean defectors at an individual level. For instance, Kim and Jeong test contact theory relating to opinions of North Korean defectors. Depending on the experience of contacting or being exposed to defectors, they find that people have different attitudes toward them. Without contact people tend to have sentiments of both sympathy and wariness. In addition, overall feeling toward North Korea and the North Korean people turned out to be influential in determining one’s attitude toward the defectors. Those who feel alienated from North Korea in general are estranged toward North Korean defectors as well.
Some studies also find that socio-demographic factors have influence on how one thinks about the defectors. For instance, the level of education and age are positively associated with the attitude toward North Korean defectors.\textsuperscript{14}

Another stream of research relates North Korean defectors to tolerance of immigrants. They pay attention to the fact that defectors are from a country with a completely different political and economic system, as well as cultural environment. In this regard, they are treated in a manner similar to foreign immigrants. Sohn and Lee analyze South Koreans’ attitude toward North Korean defectors from this perspective. They find how much a person is tolerant or generous on immigrant issues is a significant determinant. They use one’s opinion on multicultural Korea and on protection of immigrants’ rights to measure the person’s level of tolerance on North Korean defectors. They found a somewhat contradictory outcome: one’s opinion of multicultural Korea is adversely related to the attitude toward North Korean defectors, but protecting immigrants’ rights is positively associated with this attitude.\textsuperscript{15} The result begs for clarification, but at least gives an idea of changing attitudes toward North Korean defectors.

In a similar vein, one of the many determinants of one’s tolerance of outsiders is national economic outlook. This is due to the perception that immigrants can be a threat in the job market. The level of threat posed by immigrants can be expected to be greater and the attitude toward them aggravated when the economy is not performing well. Thus, one’s perception of the national economy is considered to be a significant factor in deciding whether or not one welcomes outsiders.\textsuperscript{16} Considering that those most vulnerable in a depressed economy are less educated and in the low-income group, the level of education and of income can be factors that measure one’s tolerance of outsiders. Kwon tests these hypotheses for North Korean defectors, finding a limited impact of subjective perceptions of the national economy on South Koreans’ attitude toward North Korean defectors. She explains that the limited impact comes from the still small fraction of North Korean defectors in the labor market of South Korea. Also, she asserts that the fact that North Korean defectors generally work as unskilled laborers means that they do not pose much threat to South Koreans.\textsuperscript{17}

Adding to earlier works, I examine the sense of national identity of South Koreans and its impact on their attitude toward North Korean defectors. There has been a strong sense of ethnic identity assumed when it comes to North Korean defectors. The foremost element that distinguishes these defectors from other immigrant groups is the fact that they are from North Korea, the country South Koreans have believed will become unified with them for more than sixty years. Sohn and Lee use this framework and demonstrate how national identity plays out in one’s attitude toward North Korean defectors. They find a mixed result: civic identity and ethnic pride are positively related to one’s view of North Korean defectors, while national pride is negatively related.\textsuperscript{18} While the study is groundbreaking, the data they used was collected in 2010, which turned out to have quite different responses on national identity from the data in 2013.

I examine this in association with the changed national identity of South Koreans, using the Daily Poll conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies between November 29 and December 1, 2013. The Asan Daily Poll used in this chapter had a sample size of 1,000.
I first measure a respondent’s attitude toward North Korean defectors and other immigrants from the United States, Japan, and China. The respondents were asked how they view each migrant group and their answers were originally coded on a four-step scale, 1=“very negative” and 4=“very positive.” I recoded the responses to normalize the scale (“very negative”=0; “very positive”=1). In order to measure favorability, we asked questions about perceptions of immigrants from various countries and North Korea defectors. The average favorability of North Korean defectors was .59, which was the highest, followed by immigrants from the United States (Table 6). This is a notable result considering the usual country favorability ratings, which, according to the Asan Institute’s Daily Poll in December 2013, showed that North Korea and Japan were the two least favored countries. The United States was most favored by Koreans. However, when it comes to immigrants, the public showed the closest connection with North Korean defectors. This implies that South Korea’s negative perception of North Korea as a country does not have bearing on their connection with North Koreans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Feelings Toward Immigrants and North Korean Defectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea Defectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Asan Daily Poll (Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 2013)*

One aspect to note is the difference in the South Korean public’s perception of immigrants from the United States, Japan, and China by age group. In particular, those who are in their twenties show higher favorability toward immigrants from Japan than immigrants from China, which is reversed for the elderly. While 54.3 percent of those in their 20s view immigrants from China negatively, 40.4 percent of them so view immigrants from Japan. On the contrary, it is 48.9 percent of those who are in their sixties whose attitudes are negative about immigrants from China. Antagonistic feeling toward Japan by this age cohort is much stronger; so that the percentage of them who see immigrants from Japan negatively is as high as 63.8 percent. Considering the argument that ethnic national identity of Koreans had originated from imperial Japan’s racial discrimination against Korean people during colonial times, these numbers corroborate what I found above on national identity. South Korean youth are apparently overcoming hostile feelings originating from the colonial period, which are believed to be based on ethnic national identity, against Japan. (See Figure 1 and Figure 2)

Next, I examined the views of North Korean defectors by age group. Previously, the data demonstrated that South Korean youth have weaker ethnic identity than the elderly. In addition, this group has a hostile attitude toward North Korea. Those findings may lead us to the conclusion that the young generation is more antagonistic toward North Korean defectors. Despite their weak ethnic bond, the outcome is the opposite. Whereas only 14.7 percent of those who are in their twenties disliked North Korean defectors, 29.2 percent of
those who are in their sixties or over did. In fact, 66 percent of South Korean youth have positive sentiment toward them. Only 52.6 percent of the elderly, who are believed to have the strongest ethnic bond with North Koreans, have any positive opinion of North Korean defectors. While there is a high proportion of “don’t know” answers, it is surprising to see that the youth are more welcoming despite their distant memory and weak ethnic identity of belonging to one, extended Korea. This is indeed an interesting finding because South Korean youth are known to be as conservative as the elderly when it comes to national security issues. In addition, they tend to be as hostile toward North Korea as the elderly. It appears that Korean youth are particularly apt to discern North Korea from North Korean people and defectors. Yet, it is not certain if identity politics plays any sort of a role (See Table 7).
At the heart of this study is analysis of the impact of different types of national identity on attitudes toward North Korean defectors, centering on the distinction between ethnic identity and civic identity. For each question, I coded incrementally from 1 to 4, noting that 1 means “do not agree at all” while 4 means “agree very much” (2=do not agree, 3=agree on the whole). For instance, we ask a question whether or not being born in Korea is important to being Korean, a respondent chooses an answer, then the average score is calculated from the quantified answer to measure the level of agreement with the statement by respondents. The higher the score, the more Koreans think the element is important. Also, for the purpose of convenience, I classified attitudes toward North Korean defectors into two categories, positive or negative. For comparison, attitudes toward immigrants from the United States are added on the side as a reference. According to conventional wisdom, it is expected that those who have strong ethnic identity have more sympathetic and positive sentiments to North Korean defectors than those who have weak ethnic identity because strong ethnic identity is supposed to connect the South and the North. The result is, surprisingly, the opposite again.

First, I examine the generational difference on identity politics by comparing the scores (see Table 8). As the results in Table 7 demonstrate, most South Koreans consider that civic identity is more important than ethnic identity regardless of age group. Nonetheless, a large difference in the perceptions of significance is present among South Korean youth. The ethnic identity score for those who are in their twenties is 2.72 which is the lowest across age groups, and the civic identity score is 3.44. The difference of these two scores for this age cohort is .72, which is the largest across all generations. Compared with this, the spread between civic and ethnic identity scores for the elderly is much smaller. The result bodes well for changing national identity among the young generation.

Those who have a sympathetic and positive attitude toward North Korean defectors are less likely to agree that having the Korean bloodline is important to being Korean (2.95 v. 3.27). This tendency is found in all ethnic components. Those who think that living in Korea and being born in Korea are important qualities for being Korean tend to have a less favorable attitude toward North Korean defectors. When it comes to civic identity components, no discernible difference is found between those who have positive and negative attitudes toward North Korean defectors. A quite similar tendency is found in attitudes toward immigrants from

### Table 7. Feelings Toward North Korean Defectors by Age Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>20s</th>
<th>30s</th>
<th>40s</th>
<th>50s</th>
<th>60s</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very negative</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very positive</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asan Daily Poll (Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 2013)
the United States. While no gap was distinguished between civic identity scores of respondents who have positive and negative attitudes toward immigrants from the United States, there exist ethnic identity score differences. Apparently, those who have a stronger degree of ethnic identity tend to have a negative attitude toward immigrants from the United States, which was exactly the same propensity as seen in attitudes toward North Korean defectors (see Table 9).

### Table 8. Ethnic v. Civic Identity by Age Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Ethnic identity (A)</th>
<th>Civic identity (B)</th>
<th>Difference (B – A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20s</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30s</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40s</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50s</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60s</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Asan Daily Poll (Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 2013)*

### Table 9. Ethnic and Civic Components: North Korean Defectors v. Immigrants from US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component Description</th>
<th>North Korean defector</th>
<th>Immigrants from the United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ETHNIC COMPONENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being born in Korea</td>
<td>Positive toward: 3.08</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative toward: 3.25</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Having the Korean bloodline</td>
<td>Positive toward: 2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative toward: 3.27</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Living in Korea for most of one’s life</td>
<td>Positive toward: 2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative toward: 3.11</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIVIC COMPONENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining Korean nationality</td>
<td>Positive toward: 3.55</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative toward: 3.57</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being able to speak and write in Korean</td>
<td>Positive toward: 3.61</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative toward: 3.65</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being able to speak and write in Korean</td>
<td>Positive toward: 3.69</td>
<td>3.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative toward: 3.59</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Korean traditions</td>
<td>Positive toward: 3.51</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative toward: 3.53</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Asan Daily Poll (Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 2013)*
I then generated indices for two identities by calculating the average values of responses to each question and conducted a t-test to compare different attitudes toward North Korean defectors. Simply put, the average scores of ethnic identity and civic identity are calculated and tested to see if there exists any significant difference between respondents who have positive and negative attitudes toward North Korean defectors. The test result confirms what I found above. The average score of ethnic identity for those who have a positive attitude is 2.98, while it is 3.22 for those who have a negative attitude. The difference was .23, a statistically significant finding. On the contrary, there was no significant difference in civic identity scores between these two groups. For those who have a positive attitude, the civic identity score was 3.59, and for those who have a negative attitude, it was 3.60 (see Table 10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Identity</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>t = 4.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic Identity</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>t = .37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asan Daily Poll (Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 2013)

In sum, we can conclude that as a person sympathizes more with North Korean defectors, he or she is less likely to appreciate ethnic identity. In other words, a lower degree of ethnic identity helps a person have a positive and sympathetic sentiment toward North Korean defectors. This is, as a matter of fact, the same relationship I find in the analysis of immigrants. Those who have a lower level of ethnic identity tend to have a more accommodating attitude toward immigrants from the United States, China, and Japan. The civic identity did not discern the attitudinal differences.22

It is expected that ethnic identity will have an adverse relationship with regard to a person's attitude toward immigrants and, more broadly, immigration issues. That is, the stronger one's degree of ethnic identity, the less favorable attitude he or she has on immigrants and immigration issues. On the contrary, those who have stronger civic identity are more likely to have a favorable attitude. The result, therefore, implies that Koreans stopped seeing North Korean defectors from the perspective of ethnic identity, but began to see them through the lens that they use to see immigrants from other countries.23

This result partially explains why we see a much more favorable attitude toward North Korean defectors by South Korean youth. They emphasize civic identity more than ethnic identity to become Korean. Once they see North Korean defectors without the ethnic lens, North Korean defectors are one of various migrant groups. On that premise, young people who have strong civic identity and a low ethnic one are likely to display a more accommodating attitude toward the defectors wherever they come from.
CONCLUSION

On January 6, 2014, President Park Geun-hye held her first press conference since her inauguration. Although it took almost a year, she was successful in generating a huge media buzz. She laid out her economic plan, explained her position on the ongoing National Intelligence Service scandal and the prosecution process, and went through her foreign policies for 2014. What caught the most attention from the media and the Internet was her statement on Korean unification. During the Q&A session, she declared that, “unification, in my opinion, is hitting the jackpot (daebak).” Since the word daebak is a term most often used by the young generation and is slang not often used by politicians—let alone the president—it instantly became the most searched word on the Internet.

On December 31, 2013, The Chosun Ilbo, the newspaper in Korea with the largest number of subscribers, began a project entitled, “Special Report: Unification is the Future.” The report provided analyses of experts from various fields regarding the economic benefits South Korea can expect from unification. For example, the report quoted the famous investor Jim Rogers, who claimed that he would invest all his fortune in Korea if the Korean Peninsula were to be unified.

Thanks to Park’s press conference and the “Unification is the Future” project, unification quickly became a national buzzword. However, efforts to raise awareness of the economic benefits of unification underscore the fact that the South Korean public has deep reservations about it, most likely due to the perception that unification will be expensive, especially after witnessing the German unification.

Park’s remarks on the economic benefits of unification can be viewed as a good political move and an appropriate answer that addresses the public’s economic concerns. However, unification can be a “jackpot” only on the condition that the public still yearns for national unification. What if South Koreans no longer share an ethnic identity with North Koreans? Also, how would we mediate the discrepancies between the two peoples of the North and the South? These questions certainly shake the ground of the unification norm assumed by government and give reason to reconsider the whole economic benefit argument.

This study demonstrates that South Koreans do not view North Korean defectors in the framework of ethnic nationalism. Rather, they have begun to view the issue similar to an immigration issue. The important question for us, then, is what can we do to prepare for unification in which North and South Koreans can coexist together? Ironically, the answer seems to depend on how tolerant and mature the South Korean public is toward different ethnic groups. Given these findings, dealing with North Koreans under the assumption that they are “one of us” appears naïve and even dangerous. While it may go against the Korean norm, moving forward with the approach that North Koreans and South Koreans are members of two different countries, rather than one ethnic race, may be more realistic and practical. On that regard, fostering civic identity can provide an answer.

* The author is thankful to Mr. John J. Lee for his assistance.
ENDNOTES


11. Asan Daily Poll, March 29 and March 31. Another interesting finding is that the South Korean public is most concerned about ideological and cultural confusion after unification (31.4%). Economic cost follows as 30% of respondents states the most concerning issue of post-unification.


19. The question was asked in a plain way such as “what do you think about immigrants from the country (the United States, China, Japan)?” Only for North Korean defectors, we did not use the term ‘immigrants’ but straightforwardly referred them to “North Korean defectors.”

20. On a 1 to 4 scale, Japan scored 2.57 and North Korea 2.37.

21. While the perceptions of immigrants vary across generational groups, ideological differences are hard to find.

22. I examined the ethnic identity score and attitudes toward North Korean defectors by age group so as to check if the age effect is overpowering. That is, the elderly who are believed to have a high ethnic identity score tend to have less positive attitudes toward North Korean defectors than the youth, which may result in a positive relationship between the high ethnic identity score and the negativity toward North Korean defectors. In fact, the ethnic identity score was higher among the groups negatively seeing North Korean defectors across generations except for those in their twenties. Ethnic identity scores of those in their 20s were almost exactly the same for both negative and positive viewers of North Korean defectors. For all other generational groups, those who view North Korean defectors negatively tend to have high ethnic identity scores.

23. The result corroborates the finding of the aforementioned Daily Poll results on South Korean views toward North Korea.
Bridging the Chinese National Identity Gap: Alternative Identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan

Syaru Shirley Lin
After more than one hundred years of colonial rule, China regained sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and is now seeking the eventual return of Taiwan, which has enjoyed de facto independence since the Kuomintang (KMT) government retreated there from the mainland in 1949. China has continued to expand its social and economic ties with Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, despite China’s deepening economic integration with Hong Kong and Taiwan and the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain to China in 1997, surveys show that there has been no increase in Chinese identity among the people in Hong Kong or Taiwan. Instead, there is a rise in local identities. Beijing is determined to bridge the identity gap in both regions in the belief that the development of a Chinese national identity is necessary to ensure political stability and territorial integrity. Its aim is to prevent Taiwan from declaring de jure independence and to secure the eventual unification of Taiwan with the rest of China, and with regard to Hong Kong, it seeks to ensure that the continued progress toward direct elections does not produce an unacceptable legislature or chief executive. Promoting Chinese national identity in both Hong Kong and Taiwan is seen as important to achieving those goals.

China has employed both soft approaches, such as introducing national education and patriotic propaganda, and hard tactics, such as visa denials to those whom it believes are promoting a local identity. Neither strategy has been effective in bridging the identity gap. This chapter seeks to understand the widening gap between a Chinese national identity and the alternative local identities that are gaining ground in both regions, and to assess the prospect that people in either region will regain or adopt a Chinese national identity.

**Deepening Economic and Social Integration**

After China began its program of economic reform and opening in the 1980s, it did so primarily through Hong Kong and Taiwan, whose businessmen benefitted greatly from being the first investors to take advantage of cheap labor and favorable policies for “Overseas Chinese.” Initially, China’s goals were primarily economic, but in the last decade, China has given even greater priority to economic and social integration with Hong Kong and later, Taiwan, this time not just to promote China’s own economic growth, but also in the hope such integration would enhance people’s sense of Chinese national identity.

This renewed emphasis on cross-border integration began in 2003, when Hong Kong experienced an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and a dramatic economic slowdown under an already unpopular chief executive, C.H. Tung. Beijing tried to revitalize Hong Kong’s economy by the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), which granted Hong Kong preferential access to the Chinese market. The industries receiving preferential terms under CEPA now constitute 58.5 percent of Hong Kong’s GDP. To date, CEPA is the most liberalized free trade agreement (FTA) signed by Beijing. When Taiwan and China signed liberalization measures in services that went beyond what CEPA granted, CEPA was immediately amended in June 2013 to keep pace. Furthermore, the Individual Visit Scheme was introduced in 2003, which greatly eased the restrictions on mainland Chinese tourists coming to Hong Kong.
As for Taiwan, Beijing introduced a series of economic measures to encourage cross-Strait integration after 2008, in an attempt to strengthen the position of the pro-unification KMT, which had just returned to power after eight years of rule by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In June 2010, Beijing and Taipei signed the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a preferential trade agreement (PTA) with an “early harvest” list that specified which goods and services would be liberalized first. Similar to CEPA, ECFA is a framework agreement that needs further negotiations to broaden the scope of liberalization. Beijing and Taipei also signed agreements allowing Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, which had not been permitted. Group tours have been allowed since 2008, and a restricted number of individual travelers were also permitted starting in 2011.

Due to these liberalization measures, Hong Kong has become an even more important gateway to China. Since China’s opening in 1979, Hong Kong has become the leading source of foreign direct investment (FDI) for China. As of 2013, China is also the leading source of FDI for Hong Kong. In 2013, China is responsible for over half of Hong Kong’s re-exports and exports. Similarly, Taiwan’s two-way trade with China has risen significantly and exceeded $124.4 billion in 2013, accounting for 21.6 percent of Taiwan’s total foreign trade. Cumulative direct investment into China reached 62.7 percent of Taiwan’s total FDI, at $133.7 billion as of year-end 2013, which is only a fraction of the real amount, given that most Taiwanese investments in China flow through Hong Kong and other offshore entities, making Taiwan one of China’s leading investors.

Aside from trade and investment, Chinese tourists play an increasingly important role in the two economies, creating growth and jobs. In 2013, 40.7 million Chinese tourists visited Hong Kong, constituting 75 percent of total foreign visitors, and 2.8 million Chinese tourists visited Taiwan, constituting 36 percent of total foreign visitors. In addition, since the handover about 150 Chinese immigrants qualify to become Hong Kong residents per day, including primarily family members of Hong Kong residents and a limited number of professionals and investors. The number of new immigrants will soon reach one million, in a city of only seven million residents. Chinese immigration to Taiwan had been restricted to spousal reunions in the past, but those restrictions have since been relaxed to include professionals, with the cumulative number of immigrants now at more than 720,000, in an island of 23 million people.

Beijing’s most significant economic measure integrating the three regions was to allow Hong Kong and Taiwan to become offshore renminbi (RMB) centers, since 2004 and 2013, respectively. Because of capital controls, RMB earnings from trade and investment could not be converted into home currencies. With this new status, Hong Kong and Taiwan businesses and individuals are able to convert RMB into their local currencies. Furthermore, with increased RMB liquidity in these two offshore markets, financial institutions will be able to gather deposits and offer RMB products. Some believe that the creation of these offshore RMB centers will produce a Greater China financial industry that will bind the three markets more closely together.
**The Growing Identity Gap**

**Beijing’s Definition of National Identity**

Beijing has always defined its core interests as the perpetuation of CCP leadership and the socialist system, the preservation of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the promotion of national unification. In the case of Hong Kong and Taiwan, strengthening a Chinese national identity, especially among the younger generation, is particularly important. President Xi Jinping concluded one of his first “China Dream” speeches at the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) by calling for Hong Kong “compatriots” to prioritize the interests of the nation, and for Taiwan “compatriots” to be united in creating a new future for the Chinese nation. He appealed for “contributions from compatriots in Hong Kong and Taiwan in realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” To Beijing, the political component of a Chinese national identity is acceptance of increasing Chinese influence in Hong Kong under the “One Country Two Systems” (OCTS) formula and future unification of Taiwan under the “one China” principle.

China had welcomed the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, as a way not only of restoring national dignity after a “century of humiliation,” but also of showing that the successful governance of Hong Kong could be the model for governing Taiwan were unification to be achieved. Deng Xiaoping’s OCTS formula was devised specifically with Taiwan in mind, but it was also applied to Hong Kong as an interim system for fifty years following the handover. The structure of the OCTS is laid out in Hong Kong’s Basic Law, adopted by the NPC in 1984, to ensure a high degree of political, economic, and legal autonomy for what was to become a special administrative region (SAR). Although Hong Kong people seemed to accept the Basic Law and OCTS, they had had no say in the development of either, and there remained much ambiguity as to how Hong Kong would be governed over the next fifty years.

As a precondition to peace talks, Beijing has always insisted on Taipei’s acceptance of the “one China” principle, which provides that there is only one China, Taiwan is part of China, and Beijing is the only legitimate government of this China. Taiwanese have voted for their legislators since 1992 and directly elected their president since 1996, and the island has its own army. An increasingly assertive and hostile China refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of the elected Taiwanese government and has never renounced force against its Taiwanese “compatriots.” Only one of the two dominant political parties in Taiwan, the KMT, has accepted the “one China” principle, and then only partially. Under the “92 Consensus,” reached with Beijing in 1992, the KMT accepts that there is only one China of which Taiwan is a part, but has never acknowledged that Beijing is the sole government to represent this one China. The DPP continues to adhere to the principle that Taiwanese, not Beijing, must decide Taiwan’s future, and opposes establishing reunification as an a priori goal.

Beijing has also emphasized that China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are all one “nation” ethnically. Since people in Hong Kong and Taiwan are predominantly Han Chinese, they acknowledge their Chinese roots, but this does not translate easily into a common national identity. While Beijing stresses common ethnicity, people in Hong Kong and Taiwan place at least equal weight on strong civic values that Beijing either rejects or does not fully implement, such as freedom of speech, the rule of law and an independent judiciary, an open market economy, a clean bureaucracy, and democratic institutions. In particular, many look with great sympathy at how minorities in autonomous regions like Tibet and Xinjiang have suffered from political
repression. With over 120 cases of self-immolation of Tibetans in the last three years and arrests of Uighurs, including professionals and intellectuals who speak up for minority rights, Beijing’s record of governance of regions that were promised autonomy for people with different values has not been comforting.15

Definition and Measurement of Identity

In both regions, identity has been primarily defined in two ways. The first is self-identification: whether one chooses to identity oneself as “Chinese,” or adopt an alternative local identity. The second is preference for the region’s political structure and status, in particular, support for OCTS in Hong Kong and for unification in Taiwan. These two dimensions of identity have been measured through public opinion polls in both regions for many years.

The Identity Gap in Hong Kong

From 1846 to 1997, both the British and Chinese governments depoliticized the city and avoided mobilizing strong national sentiment in order to minimize anti-colonial sentiments. The local sense of identity that developed was rooted more in social and economic factors than in political institutions. Residents viewed Hong Kong society as much more developed and free compared to China, and took pride in speaking Cantonese, rather than Mandarin.16

In December 2013, more than sixteen years after the handover to Beijing, a survey found that 62.4 percent still saw themselves as having primarily a Hong Kong identity, either a “Hong Konger in China” for 27.6 percent or a “Hong Konger” for 34.8 percent of the respondents. This was an increase from the 56.7 percent in 1997. Only 36.5 percent called themselves a “Chinese in Hong Kong” or a “Chinese,” a decline from 38.7 percent in 1997. More alarmingly, despite years of “patriotic education,” 87.6 percent of people under 29 years old identified themselves as having primarily a Hong Kong identity. Only
11.8 percent of the young people identified themselves as primarily Chinese, about one-third of the 31.6 percent recorded in 1997 (see Figure 1). In a separate 2013 Baptist University study, which showed the same trend but divided the respondents by profession, not one of the 93 students surveyed wanted to be known as simply “Chinese.”

The second measure of Chinese identity used here is the degree of confidence that Hong Kong people have in OCTS. In July 1997, the percentage who felt confident about their political system exceeded 63.6 percent but has since dropped to 49.2 percent. Conversely, those who lacked confidence in the system had risen from 18.1 percent to 42.3 percent (see Figure 2). The degree of confidence is primarily dependent on whether people believe Hong Kong enjoys autonomy, free of Beijing’s interference and irrespective of changes in CCP leadership. This is especially tied to perceptions of whether Beijing will allow universal suffrage as provided for in Hong Kong’s Basic Law. From 2007, the tenth anniversary of the handover, to 2013, confidence in OCTS dropped more dramatically than in previous years, declining 27 percentage points in both the POP polls and the surveys conducted by Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (HKIAPS), the two leading polling centers in Hong Kong. No matter which measure of identity is examined, whether self-identification or confidence in OCTS, the identity gap is widening, not narrowing.

**Figure 2. People's Confidence in "One Country, Two Systems" (per poll) (7/1997 - 12/2013)**

![Confident vs. Not Confident](image)

Source: HKU POP, December 2013

The Identity Gap in Taiwan

The gap between a Chinese identity and an alternative local identity is even more glaring. During the Cold War, after fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, the KMT attempted to impose a Chinese identity on Taiwanese in order to maintain its authoritarian rule and to maintain
support for its ultimate goal of national unification. After the lifting of martial law in 1987, and as Beijing secured more diplomatic relations and membership in all major international institutions, Taiwanese began an open and long debate over their national identity with increasing criticism of the KMT-imposed Chinese identity and growing support for a more Taiwanese identity.\(^{22}\) This was reflected in the attempt by the DPP government to shift the focus of school curricula to be more Taiwan-centric. At the same time, the earlier primordial definition of that identity has given way to a “new Taiwanese” identity, defined less in terms of ethnicity and more as a commitment to the interests of the people of Taiwan and the island’s new civic values and democratic institutions.

In a June 2013 poll conducted by the Election Study Center of Taiwan’s National Chengchi University (ESC), fully 93.6 percent of Taiwanese identified themselves as “Taiwanese” or “Both Taiwanese and Chinese.” The exclusively “Taiwanese” category has increased more dramatically than the dual identity, rising from 17.6 percent in 1992 to 57.5 percent in 2013. Only 3.6 percent identified themselves as “Chinese” in 2013, a decline from 25.5 percent in 1992.\(^{23}\) In two decades, a primarily Taiwanese identity has been accepted by the majority. Ironically, despite greater economic interdependence with China, the Taiwanese have continued to move away from a full or partial Chinese identity.\(^{24}\) Although the increase in a local identity is across all age groups, the increase was higher in the younger generations, just as in Hong Kong. Young people do not think of China as an enemy and are open-minded about their relationship with China, but they have a firm sense of a local identity. Their attitude is no longer “anti-Chinese” but just “non-Chinese” and Taiwanese.\(^{25}\)

In order to analyze the similarities and differences between the two regions’ rising local identities, HKIAPS and Taiwan’s Academia Sinica conducted a joint “China Impact” study in April and May of 2013. Using a common questionnaire, the team found a high correlation between age and local identity in both regions. For Taiwanese respondents under the age of 34, nearly 90 percent identified themselves as simply, “Taiwanese,” compared to 76 percent in the other three age groups.\(^{26}\) In terms of preference for unification or independence (known as future-national-status, or FNS), the June 2013 ESC polls showed that support for immediate unification had dwindled to only 2.1 percent. The majority preferred the status quo, 58.0 percent in 2013 vs. 12.9 percent in 1994. Support for autonomy, either the status quo or immediate or eventual independence had risen from 24.0 percent to 81.3 percent, while support for immediate or eventual unification had dropped to half of the level of two decades earlier. In terms of OCTS, the Taiwanese are equally skeptical. Polls in the last twenty years have repeatedly shown low acceptance rates of unification, the “one China” principle, or OCTS.\(^{27}\) Most believe that any of these outcomes would only curtail Taiwan’s autonomy, especially as they watch Hong Kong’s autonomy erode. When self-identification is juxtaposed with FNS, it is clear that national identity on Taiwan is evolving rapidly in one direction—away from being “Chinese” or part of a Chinese state (see Figure 3).\(^{28}\)

This trend is clear even when respondents are permitted to express their preference under hypothesized conditions. Academia Sinica has conducted surveys every five years to show these conditional FNS preferences. The latest poll in 2010 showed the continued decline (29.6 percent vs. 54.1 percent in 1995, 48.2 percent in 2000, and 37.5 percent in 2005) in support for unification, even if China were to become democratic.\(^{29}\)
Causes of the Identity Gap

What is it about those more intense interactions that have caused identity in the two societies to pull away from China, and their attitudes to become less positive? The increased number of tourists and immigrants explains much of the growing identity gap. With only 7.2 million people living in 1,104 square km, Hong Kong will see the number of mainland Chinese tourists rise to 70 million in three years and 100 million in 2023, officials estimate.30

Polls conducted on the Individual Visit Scheme have indicated the strong negative reaction most people in Hong Kong feel toward Chinese tourists, despite the benefits they bring to Hong Kong’s economy.31 Mainland tourists overrun downtown shopping areas and attractions previously the domain of Hong Kong locals and the much smaller number of overseas tourists.32 The working class immigrants and students coming from China have put pressure on the city’s limited resources, from housing and maternity wards to university placements. Repeated problems with tainted baby formula among mainland babies have led to thousands of Chinese coming to Hong Kong to buy imported baby formula and creating a shortage. A similar problem is the insufficient supply of maternity wards after mainland mothers started to flock to Hong Kong to give birth to obtain residency for their children, crowding out local mothers. New immigrants, many of whom are from low-income families, place more burdens on the city’s welfare and education systems. Wealthy Chinese immigrants and visitors are resented as well, since they are believed to be bidding up real estate prices and flooding Hong Kong schools with students willing and able to pay full tuition. Once derided as “clumps of earth,” given their rural backgrounds and unsophisticated ways, mainlanders

![Figure 3. Taiwanese Self-identification and Preference for Future-National-Status (1994-2013)](source: Compiled by author according to data from ESC, “Important Political Attitude Trend Distribution,” June 2013.)
are now described as “locusts,” swarming into Hong Kong to denude the city of some of its most valuable assets. The more Hong Kong people interact with the mainland Chinese in China and in Hong Kong and become aware of the endemic problems throughout China, the more committed they are to maintain autonomy.33

Similar problems from intense social interactions with mainland Chinese have arisen in Taiwan. Although Chinese tourists are reported to bring Taiwan an additional $300 million of revenue per year, the impact on Taiwan’s environment and way of life are creating problems on a daily basis. From reports of visitors exhibiting uncivilized behavior to tourist groups taking up the entire daily admission quota for the National Palace Museum, the Taiwanese have been shocked and resentful.34 These episodes are seen as typical, not exceptional.

Although Hong Kong and Taiwan have benefitted in terms of overall growth and employment as a result of CEPA, ECFA, and the liberalization of tourism, the gains are not perceived as being evenly distributed. After the conclusion of CEPA, inequality in Hong Kong widened dramatically, with the Gini coefficient increasing from 0.518 in 1996 to 0.537 in 2011, one of the highest in developed economies, worse than the United States and Singapore.35 Many members of the middle class feel that the additional tourist revenues do not benefit them, only the business elites and real estate companies amidst skyrocketing real estate prices. Young people believe that their prospects for local jobs and college placements are being reduced by integration.36 Nearly a third of the Hong Kong people feel dissatisfied with how SAR government has handled relations with the central government, up from 12.3 percent in 1997.37

Similarly, instead of creating good will among a broad spectrum of Taiwanese, ECFA and its related agreements have led to intense domestic debates about the benefits and costs of becoming more integrated with the PRC.38 Taiwanese analysts have concluded that high trade dependence on China has been associated with a rising poverty rate and inequality, and the working class increasingly believes they have been hurt by the implementation of ECFA.39 After its signing, Taiwan became even more polarized between pro-China and anti-China groups. Nor has the increase in Taiwanese identity in terms of both self-identification and FNS preference for autonomy been reversed. The Service Trade Agreement (STA) signed in June 2013 as a supplement to ECFA opens more industries to mutual investments, but is perceived to threaten Taiwan’s economic security and job prospects. There has been widespread criticism of the STA and the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union flat out opposes it.40 The KMT government’s attempt in March 2014 to move the STA to a legislative floor vote without conducting a review of each provision has resulted in the largest student-led protest in Taiwan’s history. The students occupied the legislature for three weeks and did not end the protest until the government agreed to adopt a legislative framework to guide consideration of all future cross-Strait negotiations.

Polls have corroborated that the negative consequences of economic integration have widened the national identity gap. The Hong Kong-Taiwan “China Impact” joint project highlights how identity is closely related to perceptions of economic prospects.41 Someone who believes that economic integration will benefit his family was much more likely to identify himself as “Chinese.” Conversely, the perception that economic integration with China will hurt one’s family’s economic prospects is associated with a high degree of a local
As the two societies perceive that integration with China is damaging to their economy, a distinct local identity becomes ever more consolidated. In addition, identity appears to be correlated with class. In Hong Kong, the less educated and lower income individuals are more likely to assume a Chinese identity. Many of these are recent Chinese immigrants, who retain their original Chinese identity and depend on public welfare and social services provided by a local government linked to Beijing. In contrast, the more educated individuals are more likely to assume a local identity. These middle-class professionals are unlikely to view economic integration with China to be beneficial to their families. In Taiwan, educational level is not highly correlated with identity, but income level is. High-income individuals, many of whom were mainland Chinese who came to Taiwan with the KMT and have benefitted from doing business in China, are more likely to assume a “Chinese” identity. The middle and lower classes in Taiwan are predominantly native Taiwanese whose ancestors immigrated to Taiwan hundreds of years ago and do not visit China frequently, if at all. For them, integration with China robs Taiwan of jobs and creates inequality. With increased interaction with mainland Chinese and visits to China, Taiwanese have found that they are not regarded as Chinese and have developed a stronger and distinct sense of separate identity. In addition, Taiwan’s rural and working classes are more supportive of democratic values, as they were the ones who had fought against the KMT for Taiwan’s democratization and, therefore, find it difficult to associate themselves with China’s non-democratic political system or accept unification under Beijing’s authoritarian rule.

**Beijing’s Strategy to Bridge the Gap**

In short, social and economic integration with China has made local identities more salient in both regions. These identities are perceived to be eroding the legitimacy of Beijing’s rule over Hong Kong and reducing the support for Taiwan’s unification with China. Beijing has thus been attempting through a variety of strategies to reverse the trends toward local identities so as to instill a greater sense of Chinese identity.

One strategy is the use of economic incentives to reward supporters and penalize opponents in both regions. Beijing has offered favorable business opportunities in China to pro-Beijing individuals and their families like the first chief executive of Hong Kong C.H. Tung and the former KMT chairman Lien Chan, both of whose families have extensive businesses in China. Firms that do not toe the party line are penalized, like Apple Daily, the leading newspaper in Hong Kong that is highly critical of Beijing headed by the pro-democracy Jimmy Lai, or Chi Mei Corporation, the largest ABS plastics producer owned by the former DPP-supporter Wen-long Shi.

**Soft Power Through Propaganda and Education**

After Hong Kong was reincorporated, Beijing was very mindful to utilize softer power, hoping that this would reinforce a sense of Chinese identity in Hong Kong. For example, China supported the continued representation of Hong Kong in international organizations, and promoted the appointment of individuals from Hong Kong to leading positions in international organizations, as exemplified by Margaret Chan, the director-general of the
World Health Organization (WHO). When Beijing hosted the 2008 Olympics, it permitted Hong Kong to host the equestrian events. Beijing has also exposed Hong Kong to Chinese icons in order to foster patriotism. After successful space explorations, Chinese astronauts visited Hong Kong in October 2003 and June 2012, before visiting any other Chinese cities. China’s gold medalists from the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2012 London Olympics also visited the city after the closing ceremonies.

To further consolidate Chinese identity among Hong Kong people, Beijing requested the inclusion of “national education,” “enhancing students’ understanding of our country and national identity” in school curricula. During the first years after the handover, there was little systematic attempt to introduce national education, but in 2007, when President Hu Jintao attended the tenth anniversary handover celebration in Hong Kong, he stressed that Hong Kong should provide more national education for young people. Hong Kong’s Education Bureau then proposed reforms requesting schools to strengthen national education and a special department focusing on national identity was set up in the Education Bureau. Teachers were given resources to teach students about national flag raising, the national anthem and national identity. Finally, Chief Executive Donald Tsang proposed that national education become mandatory in his 2011 policy address.

The proposal generated intense opposition, involving an unusual degree of collaboration among different societal groups. In response to concerns that such reforms amounted to government-sponsored brainwashing, the publicity director of Beijing’s liaison office defended the policy by saying national education in school was “necessary brainwashing” and internationally accepted practice. Some schools set evaluation criteria for students that included supporting the country even if the people believe that the country has done wrong. Furthermore, in multi-ethnic, multi-lingual Hong Kong, many raised doubts about the curriculum guide that also contained ethnocentric language calling for national unity based on geography, blood, and ethnic commonalities. In April 2012, the Education Bureau declared that national education must be introduced over three years for primary and secondary schools, but on July 29, more than 90,000 citizens, including educators, parents, and students, joined a successful protest to demand the order be retracted.

Since Beijing does not exercise sovereignty over Taiwan, it cannot try to reshape the educational system in the same way as it does in Hong Kong. Instead, it focuses on sending both positive and negative messages. One theme has been to insist on a renewed commitment to unification under the “one China” principle. Relatedly, Chinese leaders have been intent on promoting a Chinese national identity in Taiwan. In 2011 Hu Jintao asked the people on both sides of the Strait to “enhance the sense of a common national identity… [and] heal wounds of the past.” The Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office Wang Yi, at a cross-Strait conference in June 2012, reminded the Taiwanese audience that recent favorable policies such as allowing the import of Taiwanese rice to China depended on “people across the Strait deepening their identity as one family.”

Conversely, Beijing has sought to denigrate “local” identity as a form of false consciousness, the product of “identity politics” and foreign intervention. Beijing has criticized the DPP government for “de-Sinification” of curricula and has regularly accused pollsters in Hong Kong of working for foreigners to deny their Chinese identity. Recent attacks on the protests
against national education and the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong have continued this line of argument, accusing the leaders of working with foreign forces to divide the Chinese people and of employing identity politics for their own political gain. Similarly, Beijing denies that a Taiwanese identity is a genuine popular sentiment that has arisen spontaneously. Instead Beijing portrays it as an outcome of political contestation, engineered by pro-independence political leaders for their own political gain, and resulting from the collusion between those leaders and foreign forces conspiring to undermine Beijing.

**Hardline Strategies of Sanctions and Legislation**

Beijing cannot rely solely on soft power to prevent Chinese national identity from eroding in Hong Kong and Taiwan, but has used tougher measures as well. Even before Hong Kong’s handover, it refused to allow entry to Hong Kong to people who might be offensive to Beijing, including pro-democracy activists, Falun Gong members, and supporters of Tibetan independence. In some cases, Beijing detained Hong Kong residents when they crossed the border, most recently Yiu Mantin, the Hong Kong publisher of an upcoming book about Xi Jinping. For Taiwanese, Beijing selectively grants visas to officials and politicians based on “good behavior” and has regularly denied visas to pro-independence activists or leaders from the DPP or other pro-independence parties. For both regions, Beijing has tried to ostracize organizations and individuals such as journalists who are considered to be undermining what Beijing regards as key aspects of national identity, denying them visas and opportunities, such as prohibiting universities and state-owned companies to work with them.

Beijing has also enacted or demanded legislation aimed at what it regards as treasonable behavior or secessionist movements. In 2003, it pressured C.H. Tung to introduce a security law, as provided in Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which would criminalize activities that constituted sedition, secession, or subversion. When this legislation was introduced in 2002, it aroused a protest involving half a million people, the largest in Hong Kong’s history since 1989. Although the legislation required by Article 23 failed to pass, Beijing has continued to press for its passage, and Hong Kong’s current chief executive, C.Y. Leung, has acknowledged that the SAR government has constitutional responsibility to do so.

Whether hard or soft, Beijing’s strategies to promote national identity have tended to be counterproductive. The more it threatens those who oppose Chinese policies and rewards those who support them, the more local identity appears to be strengthened. As one writer describes it, Hong Kong people have developed less of a political boundary with China since 1997, but more of a psychological boundary. They have accepted Beijing as their sovereign, but feel strongly that their freedom, rule of law, and independent judiciary separate them.

Given that Beijing has no ability to monitor Taiwanese internally, as it does in Hong Kong, and is intent on taking over Taiwan, its strategy toward Taiwan is even more heavy-handed than toward Hong Kong. After democratization, when Taiwan began the search for its identity and opened the debate over unification, the initial strategy was simply to influence the presidential election in order to influence Taiwanese identity, especially in terms of FNS. Beijing made direct threats to pressure the Taiwanese not to vote for pro-independence candidates by lobbing missiles in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996, which appeared to backfire.
Similar to Beijing’s efforts in Hong Kong, exasperated by the re-election of DPP president Chen Shui-bian, whom it regarded as a supporter of Taiwanese identity and independence, the NPC passed an “Anti-Secession Act” in March 2005. It stipulated that should Taiwan move toward independence, Beijing would use force. The Anti-Secession Act was intended to deter any attempt to declare independence or even reduce Taiwan’s commitment to eventual unification. With an increasing number of more accurate missiles deployed by China across the Taiwan Strait, this was not an empty threat. But the law’s enactment fueled a massive public demonstration in Taipei, involving all the political parties, with approximately one million participants. Another strategy has been to isolate Taiwan internationally, successfully excluding it from almost all international organizations, or restricting Taipei’s participation so that the invitation is subject to China’s approval, including for the WHO or the International Civil Aviation Organization, and only on an ad hoc basis. By narrowing Taiwan’s feasible options, Beijing hopes to reshape Taiwan’s national identity.

The Growing Importance of a Common Identity

Hong Kong’s 2017 Chief Executive Election

Beijing believes that a more Chinese identity is necessary to gain acceptance of Chinese restrictions on Hong Kong’s political autonomy. Immediately after the resumption of sovereignty, Beijing established a liaison office in Hong Kong. Over time, Beijing has increasingly reiterated that the degree of autonomy granted by the Basic Law is limited and that in the OCTS formula, “one country” should be given priority over the “two systems.” Hong Kong people have often reacted strongly when officials in the liaison office or in Beijing appeared to be intervening in local affairs.\(^57\) In particular, Beijing would like to control the redefinition of Hong Kong’s electoral systems for the 2016 Legislative Council election and the 2017 election of the chief executive, fearing that universal suffrage would encourage the development and expression of local sentiments.\(^58\) This is despite the fact that the Standing Committee of the NPC announced in 2007 that the chief executive may be chosen by universal suffrage in 2017 and after that, it may apply to the Legislative Council.\(^59\) The selection of successive chief executives who are regarded as puppets of Beijing has culminated in widespread calls for universal suffrage for the next chief executive in 2017, with an open nominating process, as the ultimate expression of the Hong Kong people’s emerging identity. Beijing wants to ensure that no candidate for chief executive unacceptable to Beijing is nominated, let alone elected, and that pro-Beijing legislators will enjoy a majority in the legislature.

In contrast, recent polls have shown that the people of Hong Kong are not only demanding the preservation of Hong Kong’s autonomy and the protection of civil rights but are also seeking the development of more democratic institutions including universal suffrage of both the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive.\(^60\) In response, Beijing has encouraged discussions that would promote Beijing’s core national interests and enhance people’s Chinese identity. But there is little cohesion even among Beijing loyalists, as was shown in the election of C.Y. Leung as Hong Kong’s Chief Executive in 2012, whom many business
tycoons normally favorable to Beijing still do not support. The growing dissatisfaction with the pace of democratization and Beijing’s greater involvement in the city has certainly contributed to people feeling more local and less Chinese.

The five-month public consultative process on the nomination and the election process started in December 2013. Although Article 45 claims that the “ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures,” it is rather vague as to the timing and the details. The Basic Law is even more ambiguous with regard to the timing and process to implement universal suffrage for the Legislative Council, in which a system of functional constituencies leads to an overrepresentation of certain sectors. The city is polarized between pro-Beijing and pro-democracy camps hurling insults and threats at each other. With every suggestion made by pro-Beijing individuals or groups, especially regarding the chief executive nomination procedures, there appears to be more support for protests. With widespread support by students, two professors and a Baptist minister are organizing “Occupy Central,” a large-scale sit-in scheduled for July 2014 if there is no acceptable plan for the 2017 chief executive election. Beijing has denounced the leaders of the sit-in as “enemies of the state,” and warned against foreign interference. It has also incensed the public by announcing that only candidates who “love the country and love Hong Kong” can run for chief executive, and not those “who confront the central government.”

Studies have shown that before the handover and as recently as 2007, Hong Kong people did not fully embrace the liberal values underlying a democratic system. Instead, they seemed content with a relatively undemocratic governance structure as long as rule of law and a market economy remained the foundation. However, as identity has evolved, so have values and views on democracy. In December 2013, polls found that over half the people were dissatisfied with the pace of development of democracy in Hong Kong. This increasing impatience with the pace and extent of democratic reform suggests that Hong Kong people are more committed to democratic values, further separating them from their mainland Chinese compatriots, and strengthening the development of a separate Hong Kong identity.

**Taiwan’s 2016 Presidential Election**

In late 2013, the pan-democrats in Hong Kong paid a visit to the DPP in Taiwan to exchange views on democracy and advocate universal suffrage. Beijing was quite alarmed and pro-Beijing media have described this as the collusion of secessionists. While Hong Kong simply demanded universal suffrage under the framework established by the Basic Law, Taiwan is a fully functioning democracy with its own government and military. Further along than the development of a Hong Kong identity, Taiwanese have adopted a primarily local identity that has little in common with the national identity that Beijing wants, embracing civic nationalism in the sense of cherishing democracy, rule of law, and freedom of speech.

At the 18th Party Congress, the CCP leadership emphasized consolidating political, economic, cultural, and social foundations in order to create more favorable conditions for peaceful reunification. In October 2013, at the APEC summit, Xi Jinping said to the Taiwan representative, Vincent Siew, the Taiwan problem should not be handed down to future generations, the first time Chinese leaders have signaled their impatience with the lack of
progress toward unification. While President Ma has focused intensely on warming relations with China during his first term, he has repeatedly emphasized that the Taiwanese sense of national identity is growing and that he could negotiate with China only if there is consensus among the Taiwanese to do so. His 2011 suggestion of discussions of a peace agreement drew heavy public criticism, which led him to be more cautious in his second term.

Beijing’s efforts to apply soft and hard strategies have not increased the prevalence of a Chinese identity on Taiwan nor elevated the popularity of the KMT, the party more associated with a Chinese identity. With the consolidation of a Taiwanese identity, both the KMT and the DPP have moved toward the center on cross-Strait policy. To Beijing, a pro-Beijing president could be extremely important in closing the identity gap, both broadly and in terms of support for unification. Under Taiwan’s semi-presidential system, the president wields unusual power over cross-Strait relations, and the next presidential election will be in January 2016. While the DPP may have lost the 2012 presidential election because of the lack of a clear China policy, Taiwanese do not seem pleased with Ma’s pro-China attitude, which fails to reflect the growing Taiwanese national identity on the island. Since Ma assumed the presidency in 2008 and initiated liberalization measures with the Chinese economy, Ma has seen only a drastic decline in his popularity in his second term, hitting a record low 9 percent. Beijing is very concerned about the outcome of the presidential election in 2016, fearing that the consolidation of a Taiwanese national identity will lead to the return of the DPP.

ASSESSMENT AND PROSPECTS

None of Beijing’s present strategies is reversing the trend toward local identity in either Hong Kong or Taiwan. Rewarding businesses, individual leaders, or political parties who appear sympathetic to Beijing, in the hope that they will thereby adopt a Chinese identity, seems only to polarize both societies without narrowing the identity gap. At the same time, mainland tourists pouring into both Hong Kong and Taiwan have created a host of social problems. The daily problems created by tourists, students, and new immigrants in both places and the experience Hong Kong and Taiwanese people have when they go to China have actually intensified the trends toward separate local identities.

Despite the recent consolidation of a Taiwanese national identity, there remains the risk that national identity in Taiwan may become polarized once again if those who benefit economically become more “Chinese” than those who feel left out, while those who are disadvantaged by integration become more exclusively “Taiwanese.” The same dynamic might be seen in Hong Kong. As the identity gap widens, Chinese leaders are becoming increasingly frustrated that the economic benefits provided to Taiwanese have not produced a greater sense of Chinese national identity or made them more committed to unification, and have begun to suggest that their patience is limited. Some Taiwanese, on the other hand, see ECFA and financial liberalization as a self-interested tactic that China is using to promote unification, and fear that China might revoke that policy unless Taiwan adopts a more accommodative position. This mutual mistrust creates the risk of growing polarization within both Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as polarization between each of them and China.
Sanctions and legislation may deter pro-independence movements on Taiwan, but they are not preventing protests in Hong Kong or promoting a Chinese identity in either region. Propaganda promoting national identity and denigrating local identities as a form of false consciousness is equally ineffective. Deeper social and economic integration is underscoring differences rather than producing a common identity.

Given these trends, is a common Chinese identity conceivable any longer? An identity of the sort Beijing prefers seems highly unlikely, given the consolidation of local identities in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. A more plausible outcome would be the emergence of mixed identities, wherein residents increasingly see themselves as both Hong Kongers and Chinese or both Taiwanese and Chinese. Such mixed identities might emerge if the three governments adopt measures that ensure that economic integration provides more equitable benefits for all the residents of both regions, and if they seek policy solutions for the social and economic woes resulting from the deepening integration of Hong Kong and Taiwan with mainland China. Beijing could help the SAR government to control immigration and tourism, and alleviate the shortage of affordable housing and reduce the level of income inequality. In both regions, Beijing could consult with a wider range of social and political groups, not just the business sector and sympathetic political leaders.

Even if these developments occur, China may find it impossible to reduce the level of local identity among Hong Kong and Taiwanese people because neither incentives nor coercion are sufficient. This echoes the conclusion Deepa Ollapally reached in her chapter about India that identity matters, above and beyond material interests. In order to bridge the gap, China may have to propose a new identity based on common civic value rather than ethnicity, and develop a formula for governance that guarantees even greater autonomy to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Similar to Jiyoon Kim’s findings about Korean national identity, this study highlights how civic values are more important than ethnicity in creating a common Chinese identity, especially among the younger generations. Unless China embraces the values that people in Hong Kong and Taiwan hold dear, or at least respects them, neither Taiwanese nor the people of Hong Kong are likely to become more “Chinese.” Conversely, by incorporating the civic values that Hong Kong and Taiwanese people cherish, Beijing might be able to create a new and more inclusive Chinese national identity.
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Identity and Strategy in India’s Asia-Pacific Policy

Deepa M. Ollapally
The major international structural changes over the last 25 years—the end of the Cold War and rapid ascent of China—have direct impact on India’s national interests. The dominant strategic theory of realism would predict that given the emergence of China as a great power in the Asia-Pacific, and the loss of its erstwhile partner, the Soviet Union, India would seek to bolster its power through external or internal balancing. Given its asymmetrical power with China, the unresolved border dispute, and the history of the 1962 war, realist logic sees India and the United States as natural partners against a common threat from the rising power of China. But at the end of the Cold War, India also faced an economic crisis that fundamentally changed the outlook toward liberalization, which over time has pushed India closer to China, as well as to the United States. Amidst these strategic and economic shifts, the question that this chapter seeks to answer is the extent to which Indian foreign policy has been responsive to realist expectations. The chapter concludes that realist explanations fall short on a range of Indian foreign policy issues related to the United States and China, shortcomings that are best understood by an examination of India’s national identity through its changing domestic foreign policy discourse.

I begin by giving a brief overview of India’s strategic discourse, and the new identity debates that are being spawned over Indian foreign policy as a rising power. I then turn to Indian foreign policy toward the United States and China and lay out what realist expectations would be. To assess the validity of the realist approach, I consider evidence from two specific issues that favor the realist approach in predicting Indian policy: reactions to the U.S. pivot or rebalance; and reactions to a huge trade deficit with China. I view these two issues as critical to the formulation of India’s Asia-Pacific strategy. I then identify gaps in realist explanations and bring in identity factors as revealed in India’s domestic discourse that, I argue, address these gaps. In conclusion, I sketch out how domestic contestation over India’s foreign policy interests may lead to several possible scenarios for India’s strategy toward the Asia-Pacific.

**Ambivalence in Strategic Purpose**

Unlike other major powers, India does not have a well-articulated grand strategy or doctrine to guide its foreign policy. Its rise has not been accompanied by White Papers, prime ministerial doctrines, or any other clear and open statements by the government about what the objectives are for India’s global role. This is not surprising—official India rarely spells out its long-term vision with discrete steps to be taken to achieve its goals. At the same time, India’s behavior on the world stage leaves its policy preferences open and at times inconsistent and ambivalent: for example, labeling itself a developing country at WTO negotiations while demanding a seat in the exclusive U.N. Security Council as a permanent member; exhorting its pluralist democracy model but unwilling to incorporate this value into its foreign policy; and wearing the mantle of Asian leadership without offering any new “big ideas” or committing resources to that end.

The lack of purposive strategic thinking in Indian foreign policy has long been observed, and often critiqued. As India’s profile rises, the question of just what kind of power India wants to be on the regional and global scenes is increasingly being questioned at home and abroad, with pressure to define its vision more clearly and definitively. The push is to go beyond India’s current position as an “ambiguous rising power.” At the same time, Indian policymakers and commentators have written extensively about what principles should drive Indian foreign
policy and what values should be promoted. Indeed, India’s foreign policy has been described by some as a “moralistic running commentary.” The foreign policy consensus forged by the first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, laid the foundation for such an approach, though since the end of the Cold War, analysts have argued about whether his orientations were really along “idealpolitik” lines.

The debate on Nehru comes down to whether Indian foreign policy has been “realist” or “idealist.” This debate is not entirely about the past: many who argue that India’s orientation has been realist are also proposing that it should adopt a more realistic and pragmatic strategy. Indeed, their adumbration of the realist strands in India’s traditional approach, especially those in Nehru’s foreign policy, usually appears as a prelude to their advocacy of a much more power-oriented stance for contemporary India. K. Subrahmanyam, considered an early leading Indian realist strategist, has characterized Nehru as “one of the most pragmatic and realist politicians.” The essence of the revisionist argument is that Indian foreign policy has been suffused with unnecessary moralism which, according to these critics, is mistakenly traced back to Nehruvian ideals. By showing that Nehru was much more realist than he is generally given credit for, these advocates seek to establish a case for greater realism in contemporary policy. Some revisionists have even argued that Gandhi was a realist. The hallmark of Nehru’s thinking was its eclectic and expansive nature, thus leaving ample room for interpretation from different sides. With the collapse of the Nehruvian consensus, foreign policy has become much more contested.

**DIVERGENT DOMESTIC FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPTIONS**

I have distinguished four separate schools to capture the various strands of current foreign policy discourse and discussed them in detail: nationalists, great power realists, liberal globalists, and leftists. The first group can be further broken down into soft, hard, and standard nationalists.

### Table 1. Indian Foreign Policy Perspectives

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<tr>
<th>Major Schools of Thought</th>
<th>Goals &amp; Attitudes</th>
<th>Roots</th>
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<td><strong>NATIONALISTS</strong></td>
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<td>Standard Nationalists</td>
<td>Aim for developed country status</td>
<td>Nehruvianism with pragmatist elements</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1947-)</td>
<td>Pursue balanced growth</td>
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<td>Soft Nationalists</td>
<td>No to idea of Great Power</td>
<td>Soft Nehruvianism</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1947-)</td>
<td>Domestics consolidation first</td>
<td>Gandhian</td>
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<td></td>
<td>South-South solidarity</td>
<td>Indian civilization</td>
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<td>Hard Nationalists</td>
<td>Achieve global power</td>
<td>Kautilya (ancient India’s Machiavelli)</td>
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<td>(Post 1998)</td>
<td>India First</td>
<td>Selective Realist theory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tight internal security</td>
<td>Hindu nationalism</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GREAT POWER REALISTS</strong></td>
<td>Become global player</td>
<td>Kautilya</td>
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<tr>
<td>(POST 1998)</td>
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<td>Realist theory</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LIBERAL GLOBALISTS</strong></td>
<td>Aim for global</td>
<td>Economic theory</td>
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<td>(POST 1991)</td>
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<td><strong>LEFTISTS (1947-)</strong></td>
<td>Economic power</td>
<td>Marxist theory</td>
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These aggregations might not do justice to all of the opinions available and some viewpoints might not fully fit these labels, just as there might be spillovers between the views in these different strands. But they do represent a spectrum along which we can assess impact on policy formulations. The thinking of these three schools may be briefly summarized. The proponents of the realist school of thought tend to emphasize the following set of ideas. First, they stress the importance of self-strengthening and self-reliance in the international arena. According to them, the international system is anarchic; a country cannot rely on international institutions for protection. They place a great deal of importance on the role of great powers as actors in the global system and privilege hard power over ideology and economics. Nationalists emphasize self-reliance and self-strengthening too. However, they may embrace these goals not only as a means to the end of meeting foreign threats, but also as an end in itself. In the Indian context, the soft nationalists are more inward looking and prioritize domestic consolidation and economic development, whereas hard nationalists are more global and security oriented through military means. Being “nationalists,” these groups tend to be the most driven by ideological and value based arguments. The group that I term standard-nationalists, occupies a spot between the soft nationalists and great power realists—a centrist outlook probably best suited in many ways to ruling over the huge diversity that comprises India. Proponents of the liberal-globalist school of thought tend to favor international political and/or economic integration, stressing economic means and institutional goals. They tend to argue for free trade and fewer restrictions on capital movement. Globalists are relatively skeptical about military power as a tool of statecraft.11

Although it is difficult to assign relative weight to these perspectives, my interpretation is that hard nationalists and leftists are less influential than the other perspectives. However, if Indian voters reject the ruling Congress Party in favor of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a hard nationalist agenda will gain much greater traction. The BJP’s hard nationalism emphasizes Indian identity in exclusivist, Hindu religious terms. This could very well have both internal and external repercussions—on India’s pluralist democracy, as well as on relations with neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh. More broadly, the idea of Indian civilizational supremacy forms a significant part of the BJP’s narrative on India’s rise and fall, and the notion of autonomy of action will be even more important.12 I also see that a pragmatist strain, mostly made up of great power realists and liberal globalists, has gained strength over the last two decades though it is not yet dominant.13 When aligned with standard nationalists, this group occupies a strong middle ground. Equally true is that the nationalist strain in general is proving to be much more enduring than might have been envisioned.

India’s Relations with the U.S. and China: Expectations from Realism

Realism gives little weight to domestic sources of foreign policy and has long been critiqued in this regard. For realism, consideration of domestic debates would be exogenous to how a country behaves in the international system. All you need to determine the direction of a country’s foreign policy (if not specific policies) is the strategic conditions a state faces. On Indo-U.S. relations, from a conventional realist outlook, an almost foregone conclusion is that India and the United States would find common strategic cause in the current period.
The global and regional balance of power and political competition between the United States and China on the one hand, and India and China on the other, offer strong logic for such a conclusion. Since the early 2000s, there has certainly been no dearth of such thinking, especially from the American side beginning most publicly with statements from National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice but continuing uninterruptedly through to the present. There has been some reciprocal thinking along these lines from India as well. Behind such thinking is the concern about China’s military and economic rise threatening American supremacy in the Asia-Pacific; and for India, resulting in the emergence of an Asia that is China-centric and worse, China-controlled. At a bilateral level, the border dispute is more fodder for realist arguments. Given the asymmetry of power in China’s favor vis-à-vis India, the expectation is that India would inexorably draw closer to the United States on strategic matters, especially in the Asian context. Thus, the “pivot” would elicit a strong response from India. Conversely, India would be expected to take a hard-line approach in relations with China.

As a further “test” of realism in Indian foreign policy in Asia, India’s economic relations with China, specifically its rapidly growing trade deficit, is a good case for investigation. Most realists would, more or less, ignore economic variables, seeing them as secondary with no independent causal value for strategic decisions. However, proponents of realism would, no doubt, adhere to economist Albert Hirschman’s view that open trade and intensive economic interdependence can negatively affect state security if it gives rise to relatively big imbalances (such as trade deficits) which can then have undue influence on political relations. The assumption for India’s relations with China is that India would not give China any additional leverage through their economic interactions and leave itself even more vulnerable to greater Chinese political influence. An exploding trade imbalance in China’s favor since 2008 gives us the opportunity to assess India’s response in this connection. We would expect India to take forceful action, in the economic and political spheres, to counter this negative trend through economic retaliation, even “trade wars” of sorts. We would also expect political relations to perceptibly decline as a result of the deficits.

**America’s Rebalance and India’s Reactions**

When U.S. policy was rolled out in 2011-12, the emphasis was on military initiatives in the region. The Obama administration explicitly identified the broad Asia-Pacific region, from India to New Zealand and the Pacific Islands to northern Japan and the Korean Peninsula as a geostrategic priority. It gave India exceptional importance: in the 2012 defense guidelines laying out the rebalance, India was the only country singled out as a “strategic” partner by name while allied countries were simply grouped together under “existing alliances.” According to the report, “The United States is investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.” There is no doubt that the United States counted on India to be among the most receptive to this shift. Traditional alliances along with the budding partnership with India would be used to offset China’s rising military power and assertiveness. Thus, expectations were high in the Pentagon that India would be eager to engage with the United States in this initiative.
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made his first trip to India in July 2012 as part of an Asian tour to define the new strategy. During two days of high-level visits, including meeting with his counterpart A.K. Antony and Prime Minister Singh, Panetta described the role he visualized for India: “We will expand our military partnerships and our presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Defense cooperation with India is a linchpin in this strategy. India is one of the largest and most dynamic countries in the region and the world, with one of the most capable militaries...In particular, I believe our relationship can and should become more strategic, more practical and more collaborative.”

If realist sentiment was controlling, such a strong endorsement of U.S.-India defense ties at the level of the secretary of defense should have received a warm welcome. Instead, the Indian Defence Ministry’s response to Panetta’s description of India as a “linchpin” was practically a snub. Instead of welcoming his remarks as a historic gesture and unprecedented opportunity for India, the Ministry quickly released a short statement that “Antony emphasized the need to strengthen the multilateral security architecture in the Asia-Pacific and to move at a pace comfortable to all countries concerned.” In a nod to the United States, the statement also conveyed that India supports “unhindered freedom of navigation in international waters,” but it insisted that it is “desirable” that “contentious” bilateral issues be settled by the two nations “themselves.” The statement came just one day after Beijing relayed its displeasure at the U.S. announcement, terming the “prominence” given to the strengthening of “military deployment and alliances” as “untimely.” This outcome came despite the fact that Prime Minister Singh himself was seen as having moved closer and closer to U.S. positions over his tenure.

Official Indian policy sentiments seemed to remain steadfast even just one month after the start of the Sino-Japanese East China Sea confrontation. India’s ambassador to the United States delivered a lecture at Brown University on “America’s ‘Asian Pivot,’” worth quoting at length. Speaking about India’s own history with the Asia-Pacific, she said “In our view, more than geopolitical or geo-economic, this was a geo-civilizational paradigm--creative space with revolving doors where civilizations coalesced and did not clash...We see that as a rough guide to our future.” On the pivot and India’s role, she clarifies that “Many observers are tempted to view the India-U.S. engagement in this region as directed at China. I do not believe that such a construct is valid or sustainable...” On the desirability of what regional analysts call an Asian “concert” of powers, she notes, “This would require mutual accommodation between the countries concerned. This is an ‘inclusive balancing’ where the U.S. simultaneously engages all the regional powers like China, India, Japan and Russia working to see a multipolar order that reduces the risk of military confrontation.” Rao was effectively challenging the implicit, if not explicit, goal of the pivot.

Former Foreign Secretary and current National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon also weighed in on the idea of an Asian concert of powers and directly challenged the notion of the United States as a “sea-based balancer” in the Indian Ocean. He asked pointedly: "Which major power would not like to play the role of the balancer, given the chance? For a superpower that is refocusing on Asia but finding the landscape considerably changed while she was preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, this would naturally be an attractive option. But is it likely that two emerging states like India and China, with old traditions of
statecraft, would allow themselves to remain the objects of someone else’s policy, no matter how elegantly expressed? I think not. Instead, what is suggested is a real concert of Asian powers, including the USA which has a major maritime presence and interests in Asia, to deal with issues of maritime security in all of Asia’s oceans.”22 This push for a multipolar Asia fits in well with China’s vision, not the U.S. one.

Even the media which tends to have a strong nationalistic bent and is known for anti-China rhetoric did not fully warm to the idea of India playing a role in America’s pivot. The influential Hindustan Times editorial cautioned that India “is not yet big enough to be treated as a viable balancing partner by smaller countries in the region…the game is about trying to preserve sufficient autonomy of action for other Asian countries that they can resist when Beijing lapses into aggressive or bullying behavior.” Others noted that the U.S. long-term presence in Asia could not be taken for granted and that India should strengthen its own military capability to play a role in regional stability.23 

The director-general of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), the most influential government funded foreign policy think tank in India and the forum where Panetta delivered his speech, hardly found the rebalancing attractive. As he put it, “The U.S. will support India’s rise…However, Indian planners would be cautious about an open U.S. embrace as India does not want to be drawn into a U.S. containment policy, which is how China perceives U.S. rebalancing.”24 It is clear that India does not want to become involved in any conflict not of its choosing; moreover, it is loathe to appear to be linked to U.S. “containment” strategy in any way. Arun Sahgal, senior retired army officer, writing soon after Panetta’s speech, finds that many would “like India to follow an independent course in concert with its concept of strategic autonomy.” He adds, “the challenge for India is how to leverage its policy of engaging China with that of close strategic cooperation with the U.S. while maintaining its strategic autonomy.”25

Instead of viewing American overtures as a strategic opportunity, India became consumed with a debate about how the U.S. vision threatened its strategic autonomy. The reluctance and even aversion to embracing the rebalance strategy in any meaningful way, thus, needs further explanation.

## Trade Deficit with China and India’s Reactions

A second test for realism versus national identity is the response to a trade deficit with China. It is difficult not to be impressed by the exponential growth of India’s trade with China since the late 1990s. The two resumed trade in 1978 (halted after the 1962 war), signing the Most Favored Nation Agreement in 1984.26 Trade did not take off until much later, but when it did, it did so in stunning fashion. From a negligible $260 million as late as 1991, it increased to $1.1 billion by 2003 and then exploded to $51.8 in 2008, with China overtaking the United States as India’s largest trading partner in goods.27 Almost as stunning is the huge growth in India’s trade deficit with China. It was more than $27 billion in 2011 and in 2012 it continued to rise to $29 billion. The deficit is close to $30 billion for 2013, despite a sharp decline in trade. While a combination of factors such as a ban on iron ore mining in India (due to
corruption scandals) coupled with the global slowdown contributed to this outcome, the ambitious goal of reaching $100 million by 2015 is elusive. During this same time period, China’s trade with the rest of Asia as well as with its major western trading partners picked up, while trade with India remained in a slump. Trade experts project that if an FTA were executed between India and China to lift trade (something China has sought), the latter will gain significantly more. Without a major improvement in the competitiveness of Indian goods, any mutual reduction in tariffs by China and India would result in a much higher level of increase in Chinese exports to India than Indian exports to China.

Other avenues for addressing the trade imbalance also face challenges. Indian leaders have argued that the deficit is partly due to restricted market access in China. Two sectors where India is viewed as competitive globally—information technology (IT) services and pharmaceuticals—have not made much dent in the Chinese market. Both are affected by non-tariff trade barriers on China’s part such as prolonged approval times for Indian drugs, and in IT, burdensome security clearances. Stepped up Chinese FDI in India could allay the huge trade imbalance, and this seems to be the latest measure that the two countries are discussing. China has suggested the creation of a Chinese Industrial Park in India where companies could operate together. China ranks 31st in terms of FDI investments into India, which is seen as unsatisfactory given the trade volume. At the same time, Chinese entry into certain sectors in India is also viewed as sensitive in political terms—especially the telecommunications area. There is also resistance to giving Chinese firms a large physical presence in India due to longstanding political mistrust. Overall economic relations are also skewed in China’s favor. In 2012, India was China’s 15th largest trading partner with a share of 1.72 percent, 7th largest export destination, and 19th among the countries exporting, comprising 1.1 percent of total Chinese imports. In the same year, China was India’s 2nd largest trading partner with a share of 8.31 percent, 4th largest export destination, and 1st among the countries exporting to India, comprising 8.32 percent of total Indian imports.

When we turn to India’s responses to this negative state of affairs, we find a mixed picture. Most notably, government leadership consistently worked to keep the political fallout from the trade deficit contained. In 2009, under questioning from parliamentarians on relations as the swelling deficit drew high media attention, Singh tried to quell rising fears by putting it in a broader context: “I should say that China is our strategic partner. We have a multi-faceted relationship with China. There is enough space – I have said so often – for both China and India to develop and contribute to global peace, stability and prosperity. We do not see our relations with China in antagonistic terms. We have a large trading relationship, we consult each other on global issues, whether in the G-20 process on climate change or terrorism, and we share a common commitment to maintain peace and tranquility on our border.” Even with the downturn in trade during 2012 and 2013, Singh remained bullish on deepening economic ties with China.

In this effort, an energetic partner for the government is Indian industry—from business associations to important companies that were global market leaders. The dominant view seems to be that economic relations with China, including the trade deficit, need to be “managed” rather than necessitating drastic measures which could stimulate greater trade conflict. While this is especially true in the case of business sectors that stand to gain from increased economic activity with China such as information technology, pharmaceuticals,
and financial services, it is also found among a cross section of businesses as well as among sections of the strategic elite, political leadership, and even bureaucrats.35

Overall, India’s reactions to the rebalance and trade deficit are not consistent with realist expectations. India essentially spurned what realists would see as a “strategic opportunity” with the United States rebalance, and meanwhile, took a much more relaxed view of what realists (and more mercantilist economists) would see as a “threat” from the highly skewed trade deficit with China. How might we explain these results? I suggest that we need to go beyond strategic analysis to Indian national identity. By looking at the domestic identity discourse, we gain a deeper understanding of the factors that drive India to unexpected policy orientations on the United States and China, and in particular why realist propositions are weak in these cases.

**India’s Identity Discourse and Impact on U.S. and China Relations**

**Impact on Policy Towards the U.S.**

The underlying dispute between the various schools of thought relates to India’s U.S. policy. Indeed, it is difficult not to suspect that all the other differences in perspective are subsumed under this key issue: in other words, each of these perspectives appear to define their position on other issues on the basis of where they think the United States stands on each issue.36 Thus, it is not surprising that the rebalance issue did not catch on as the United States expected, but what explains India’s ambivalence, if not, antipathy? I suggest that it has little to do with structural variables and much more to do with India’s “dominant ideas,” those ingrained in public discourse and bureaucratic processes that make them survive. The most important of these or key value in Indian foreign policy is the concept of autonomy in the global arena, born out of a particular combination of colonial trauma and perceived civilizational status. This value is most strongly ingrained in nationalist schools of thought, but it finds some resonance practically across the spectrum of domestic discourse. To the extent that an appeal is made to what conforms to an established national identity, policy is not likely to be based purely on economic or strategic interests. Entrenched assumptions about national identity come with a longstanding view that it is the United States that poses a special danger of undermining that identity.37

The most serious opposition to closer U.S.-India relations comes, understandably, from the leftists, but there is also significant opposition from both soft and hard nationalists. Soft nationalists, like the left, oppose closer U.S. ties on ideological grounds.38 For hard nationalists, the United States is seen as a constraint on Indian power, which seeks to direct Indian foreign policy towards U.S. rather than Indian interests.39 Support for a closer, working U.S. relationship comes mostly from great power realists and liberal globalists. The former, pragmatic in foreign policy orientation, see closer U.S. ties as necessary for India’s rise.40 The latter, interested in economic liberalization and trade for growth and dismissive of the ideological concerns of both the left and the right, also see a U.S. partnership as necessary for economic development.41

If we look closely at the discourse surrounding the rebalance, we see a fairly consistent reference to the autonomy value, suggesting that it remains at the top in the hierarchy of
foreign policy drivers. And it seems to cut across a wide swathe of perspectives, leaving the Indian “realists” who would like New Delhi to embrace the United States and the rebalance, rather isolated.

Thus, there is little likelihood that the dispute over partnering with the United States will end any time soon. But it should be noted that whatever the differences in the public debate, Indian governments since the end of the Cold War have consistently sought closer relations with the United States. At the same time, no group apart from the great power realists seems inclined toward any serious military partnership with the United States. Thus, the notion of India being amenable to any form of military “burden sharing” implied in the U.S. strategy of rebalance, does not appear to have any prospect of realization.

**Impact on Policy Towards China**

In contrast to India’s relations with the United States, identity factors, arguably, played a role in bridging the gap between India and China. Despite the strategic competition between them, there are areas of convergence at the global and even regional levels in their “worldviews.” Most importantly, these include elements that happen to coincide with India’s core national identity—foremost among them strategic autonomy and commitment to sovereignty. These are based on long historical experiences of Western domination, giving rise to what Manjari Miller has called a “post imperial ideology” for both India and China. She declares that: “…the study of international relations is radically incomplete if it fails to systematically account for colonialism and its legacy…[and] states that have undergone the traumatic transformative historical event of extractive colonialism maintain an emphasis on victimhood and entitlement that dominates their decision calculus even today.”

Beyond the bilateral level, the two countries are key members in BRICS; they, together with Russia, interact in the Trilateral Summits; and they tend to uphold mechanisms promoting multipolarity and tend to be sovereignty hawks on the global stage.

India and China also share what might be called a “developing country” identity that draws them together, especially on global economic issues. One way in which Deng Xiaoping set China on the path of sustained economic liberalization and engagement from 1978 onwards was to tie Chinese nationalism to the pursuit of wealth and commercial achievement. India too is increasingly incorporating the objective of achieving developed country status in its global image making—the standard nationalists, great power realists, and liberal globalists all share this vision, which predisposes India to be receptive to economic interdependence beyond purely functional reasons.

Political leaders from the different parties in India have been supportive of economic initiatives toward China, even when the idea of deepening economic ties was first raised in the early 2000s. As far back as 2003 when Sino-Indian relations were being renewed after the dip following India’s nuclear test, it was not hard to find members of parliament urging more trade and economic ties with China. There was no shortage of Congress Party members praising the efforts of its rival ruling party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to step up economic engagement with China. Later under the Congress regime, it was possible to find support for economic engagement with China from not only BJP and Congress, but other regional parties as diverse as the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena to the
Communist Party of India. A more nuanced notion of China as an opportunity rather than just a threat is discernible.

The Indian business opinion towards China seems to have remained rather consistently favorable even with the emergence of the large trade deficits since 2008 and the ups and downs in political relations. Many of the business leaders I interviewed hold this view, and believe that there is a positive relationship between economic interaction and political relations. As a general point, this belief was held even by heads of businesses that stood to lose from Chinese competition. A representative view was that “If there’s a significant amount of trade interdependence, it makes them less inclined or less able to have military conflict. This is especially good for India, being the weaker country.” Not all saw this direct correlation, but nearly all believe that economic relations between India and China will not be negatively affected even if political relations go sour. Short of war, they were confident that economic ties would not be severely disrupted. Most reflect a liberal-globalist outlook. The most important factor for many business leaders is to have continuing leadership on both sides who understand that countries cannot grow without putting economics ahead of politics. As of now, the standard nationalists that run India seem to buy into this logic.

On the trade deficit, the liberal globalist counter-argument to the nationalist and realist views is that a major reason for the deficit is internal to India: the lack of a strong manufacturing base. They urge fast-track development of manufacturing and note that as China moves up the value chain, Indian businesses can enter these vacated spaces. So it is up to India to correct the course, not China or any other country. They also point out that India too is generally gaining from trade: for example, the critical telecommunication products are cheap due to Chinese cost efficiencies; likewise with Chinese power plants. As one industry expert said, “China is subsidizing the Indian consumer.” Other opinion shapers argue that while the pattern of trade may be skewed, Chinese imports—machinery, chemicals, steel, and electronic goods—play an important role in India’s own industrialization process. “Simply put, a part of India’s industrialization and infrastructure development becomes viable only if it can piggyback on the price competitiveness of Chinese industry.” Others, including key national security officials, say that the trade deficit with China could work the other way around: China becomes export dependent, so India gains leverage.

Policy commentators and politicians, however, have shown susceptibility to nationalist and realist sentiments on the trade imbalance. Parliamentary debates reveal rising concern beyond just economics. Against this development, what is notable is the steady policy orientation and commitment of the ruling Congress government to continue uninterrupted relations with China along liberal globalist lines. In this effort, an energetic partner was Indian industry—from business associations to important companies that were global market leaders. The industry associations in particular have emerged as key domestic actors since the mid-2000s in helping to shape Indian government strategies. Their view is that India needs to “manage” relations by trying to raise Chinese stakes in India, a strategy with which the ruling elite seems to agree.

Nationalist and realist opinion in India envisions the widening trade gap in China’s favor as giving the Chinese yet another pressure point over India. In their view, China’s economic advantage is providing additional leverage in the political sphere—an arena where there
are still serious unresolved issues. So far, however, the center of gravity is on the liberal-globalist side of opinion, especially given the continuing support of the standard nationalist government and the tacit support from some great power realists and soft nationalists for continuing to engage China.

CONCLUSION

Despite conditions in the U.S. rebalance and China’s trade surplus favorable for a “realist” response from India, actual policies did not match expectations. Realist expectations fell short especially on the rebalance, but they were also weak on reactions to the deficit. What I would term as India’s “under-performance” vis-à-vis the United States and “over-performance” vis-à-vis China, cannot be adequately explained by realism. Rather, as domestic discourse shows, India’s policy toward the Asia-Pacific, exemplified in the two key issues of the rebalance (military driven) and trade deficit (economic), is imbued with identity conceptions that militate against purely realist logic. What might this portend for India’s future strategy towards the Asia-Pacific region? I offer two possible scenarios apart from the status quo if India’s chief foreign policy identity variable—strategic autonomy—is the main driver.

If economic factors become more entrenched in India’s identity as seems to be occurring now, it could give rise to a much more self-conscious economic identity that parallels China’s worldview. This would allow India to build up the idea of India as a global economic power, which liberal globalists and standard nationalists desire. But it would also go some distance to meet nationalist and realist goals of “autonomy,” if economics is viewed as a strategic asset. Given the critical role of China in India’s current economic equation and what we can gather from one of the most contentious economic issues with China—the trade deficit—as I have discussed, a major priority for Indian policy would be to maintain economic stability in the Asia-Pacific. In the event that BJP gains power, however, relations with China may be in for a spell of uncertainty or worse. For example, the BJP has declared, “There will be special emphasis on massive infrastructure development, especially along the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim.”49 This border dispute remains the most sensitive aspect of India-China bilateral relations with the potential to destabilize, if not derail, ties. At the same time, the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, has been self-consciously running on an “economic development” plank to broaden his appeal, which would require continuity in economic engagement with China. We would then expect India (under Congress or BJP) to manage political conflict with China in such a way as not to jeopardize its economic ties. Any U.S. policy in the region would then be weighed by India against that standard. On the politico-military side, the idea of a “concert of powers” in Asia to maintain strategic stability might further influence Indian policy. While this would include the United States as an Asia-Pacific power, it would differ from conventional balancing to support what has been termed “inclusive balancing,” which would fit well with India’s treasured value of keeping equidistance from great powers—something that does not sit well with the core idea of realism.
ENDNOTES

1. The author gratefully acknowledges support from the Carnegie Corporation of NY and MacArthur Foundation for research related to this work.

2. The first commentator to argue forcefully that India lacked a strategic culture was the American author George Tanham, leading to a brief burst of writings by Indian analysts, many pointing to India’s discursive diplomacy versus western legalistic approaches, that outsiders did not grasp. This initiative has not produced much enduring work. George Tanham, *India Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992). A good compendium of writings on India’s strategic culture is Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Matoo, eds., *Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996). See also Deepa Ollapally, “India’s Strategic Doctrine and Practice,” in Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds., *India’s Nuclear Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).


5. The best case is made by C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Viking, 2003).


12. The BJP’s election manifesto states, “What is needed is to take lessons from history, recognize the vitality and resilience of India, the power of its world-view and utilize its strength, which drove it to glorious heights and analyse its weakness, which led to this abysmal fall.” Bharatiya Janata Party, *Election Manifesto 2014*, p. 2

13. Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, “The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy,”


23. *Hindustan Times*, November 20, 2011; and *Times of India*, November 22, 2011.
27. Embassy of India, Beijing, China. Indianembassy.org.cn.
31. Embassy of India, Beijing, China. Indianembassy.org.cn.
32. “Export Import Data Bank,” The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Government of India, http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/default.asp. In 2012, the UAE was India’s largest trading partner for unique circumstances related to India’s energy exports from Iran.
33. Lok Sabha Debates, June 9, 2009.
35. The author conducted a series of focused interviews in 2011 and 2012 across a broad spectrum of the Indian economic and strategic elite, geared specifically to accessing their views on India-China economic relations. References here to business-based opinions unless otherwise indicated are from these interviews, given under non-attribution rules. My findings are examined in more detail in “The India-China Divergence.”
40. C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*.
45. Budget (General) for the year 2003-2004 on 23rd April 2003, Parliamentary Debates.
47. For more information, see Deepa Ollapally, “The India-China Divergence.”
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